From “Block-Things” to “Time-Things”: Merleau-Ponty’s temporal ontology in part two of the phenomenology of perception

Continental Philosophy Review - Scholars such as Renaud Barbara and Bernhard Waldenfels and Regula Giuliani have emphasized time’s central role in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, and...     

From species ethics to social concerns: Habermas’s critique of “liberal eugenics” evaluated

Three arguments of Habermas against “liberal eugenics”—the arguments from consent, responsibility, and instrumentalization—are critically evaluated and explicated in the light of his discourse ethics and social theory. It is argued that these arguments move partly at a too deep level and are in part too individualistic and psychological to sufficiently counter the liberal position that he sets out to criticize. This is also due to limitations that prevent discourse ethics from connecting effectively to the moral and political domains, e.g., through a discussion of justice. In spite of these weaknesses, Habermas’s thesis is of major relevance and brings up neglected issues in the discussion about eugenic reproductive practices. This relevance has not been duly recognized in bioethics, largely because of the depth of his speculations of philosophical anthropology. It is argued that Habermas’s notion of the colonization of the lifeworld could provide the analytical tool needed to build that bridge to the moral and political domain.     

From life state to ecological consciousness: on Wang Yangming’s “natural principles of order within the realm of liang zhi”

Wang Yangming argues that the life state of a virtuous person is “forming one body with Heaven, Earth and the myriad things.” For instance, in watching a child fall into a well, he cannot help feeling alarmed and commiserate; In observing the pitiful cries and frightened appearance of animals, he cannot help feeling “unable to bear” their suffering; In seeing plants destroyed or tiles shattered, he cannot help but feel pity and regret and so forth. At the same time, he also stresses that there is a natural order of values with the help of which a human being deals with the myriad things, namely the natural principles of order within the realm of liang zhi. From a practical perspective, Yangming integrated these two aspects into a spontaneously psychological self-consciousness and an intuition of judgment and choice. Under its direction and instruction, human beings cannot only generally care for the myriad things, but also make reasonable use of them. Therefore, the significant reference to “the natural principles of order within the realm of liang zhi” involves the harmony between nature and human beings from life state to ecological consciousness. __________ Translated from Tranjin Shehui Kexue 天津社会科学 (Tianjin Social Sciences), 2004 (6) by Wu Min, Proofread by Xu Xiangdong & Wu Fei     

Iconic wonder: Pavel Florensky’s phenomenology of the face

The key focus of this essay is the experience of encountering divine wonder in things. The examination of the divine encounter is staged against the phenomenological backdrop. Specifically, the concept of the divine wonder is taken in its original, Husserlian, definition as Verwunderung and is traced via Levinas and his concept of face (le visage) to the early 20th century Russian philosopher, Pavel Florensky (1882–1943), whose 1922 essay “Iconostasis” approaches divine representation (лuк) in icon painting explicitly and consistently as a phenomenon of wonder. More broadly, by connecting Florensky and his work to the phenomenological project at large, this essay aspires to show that the early 20th century Russian contributions to phenomenological thought go beyond adaptations and simulations of the traditional phenomenological prolegomena toward highly original philosophical encounters.

The metaphysics of human freedom: from Kant’s transcendental idealism to Schelling’s Freiheitsschrift

Schelling’s 1809 Freiheitsschrift (Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom), perhaps his most widely read work, presents considerable difficulties of understanding. In this paper, I offer an interpretation of the work in relation to Kant. My focus is on the relation in each case of their theory of human freedom to their general metaphysics, a relation which both regard as essential. The argument of the paper is in sum that Schelling may be viewed as addressing and resolving a problem which faces Kant’s theory of freedom and transcendental idealism, deriving from the challenge posed by Spinozism. One major innovation in Schelling’s theory of human freedom is his claim that it presupposes the reality of evil. I argue that Schelling’s thesis concerning evil also provides a key to the new and highly original metaphysics of the Freiheitsschrift. The relation of Schelling’s theory of freedom to his general metaphysics is therefore complex, for it goes in two directions: the metaphysics are not simply presupposed by the theory of freedom but are also in part derived from it. These new metaphysics also, I argue, allow Schelling to resolve a problem which his own earlier Spinozistic system had left unresolved.     

From cognition’s location to the epistemology of its nature

One of the liveliest debates about cognition concerns whether our cognition sometimes extends beyond our brains and bodies. One party says Yes, another No. This paper shows that debate between these parties has been epistemologically confused and requires reorienting. Both parties frequently appeal to empirical considerations and to extra-empirical theoretical virtues to support claims about where cognition is. These things should constrain their claims, but cannot do all the work hoped. This is because of the overlooked fact, uncovered in this paper, that we could never distinguish the rival views empirically or by typical theoretical virtues. I show this by drawing on recent work on testing, predictive accuracy, and theoretical virtues. The recommendation to emerge is that we step back from debate about where cognition is, to the epistemology of what cognition is.     

Critique of metaphysics, capital logic and totality, and social critique theory: the three critical dimensions of Marx’s philosophy

Karl Marx’s philosophy includes three dimensions of critique. The first is the critique of metaphysics, which is also the major premise on the basis of which Marx turns his philosophical viewpoint to the analysis of social life and its cultural logic. The second is the capital logic and totality, the core of Marx’s philosophy, according to which Marx exposes the totality and contradictions inherent in the capital logic. The third is the theory of social critique that is the realistic end of his philosophy. __________ Translated from Xueshu Yanjiu 学术研究 (Academic Studies), 2005 (5) by Yang Haifeng & Xing Lijun     

Bergson’s philosophical method: At the edge of phenomenology and mathematics

Continental Philosophy Review - This article highlights the mathematical structure of Henri Bergson’s method. While Bergson has been historically interpreted as an anti-scientific and...     

Martin Ritter: Into the world: the movement of Patočka’s phenomenology

Continental Philosophy Review - The studies of the Czech phenomenologist Jan Patočka (1907–1977) has been flourishing recently. Martin Ritter’s book Into the...     

From the Thou to the We: Rediscovering Martin Buber’s Account of Communal Experiences

Human Studies - While Martin Buber is best known for his conception of the so-called I-Thou relation, many of his philosophical writings are concerned with the wider realities of communal being...     

Józef Tischner’s interpretation and praxis of phenomenology in the context of Polish society under communist regime

Studies in East European Thought - Józef Tischner’s role in co-shaping the social consciousness of Polish society was significant. His axiology based on phenomenological method concerned...     

From philosophy to criticism of myth: Cassirer’s concept of myth

This article discusses the question whether or not Cassirer’s philosophical critique of technological use of myth in The Myth of the State implies a revision of his earlier conception and theory of myth as provided by The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. In the first part, Cassirer’s early theory of myth is compared with other approaches of his time. It is claimed that Cassirer’s early approach to myth has to be understood in terms of a transcendental philosophical approach. In consequence, myth is conceived as a form of cultural consciousness which is constituted by specific symbolic processes. In the second part, the theoretical assumptions underlying Cassirer’s criticism of myth are discussed and compared with his earlier theory. It is argued that there is a strong conceptual and theoretical continuity between Cassirer’s early views on myth as a symbolic form and his later critique of technological use of myth.     

“Being tied to experience”: towards a subjective account of the phenomenology of the event

Continental Philosophy Review - In this text, Heidegger's notion of the event is understood as a rupture on an ontological level. From this follows the aporia of whether the event concerns the...     

Wisdom at the end of life: Hospice patients’ reflections on the meaning of life and death

The processes of aging and confronting mortality are often accompanied by unique psychological challenges. From the perspective of positive psychology, such challenges can yield opportunities for growth, including increased wisdom. This qualitative study explored 15 terminally ill hospice patients’ perspectives on wisdom, the dying process, and the meaning of life using consensual qualitative research methods. Most participants cited humility as a key component of wisdom, emphasizing that “Wisdom is when we realize ‘I don’t really know much’.” Other components of wisdom included self-knowledge, rationality, experiential learning, listening to and learning from others, and sharing knowledge with others. Participants also suggested that the process of facing illness and death presents opportunities for positive growth, including changing priorities and learning to appreciate life more fully in the present moment. In considering the sources of meaning in their lives, participants emphasized relational connections, personal growth, spirituality, vocational fulfilment, and living a full life. Participants also shared their reflections on important past experiences and regrets. Lastly, participants offered advice to others based on their experiences facing illness and mortality. Implications for psychological care of the dying and future research are discussed.