Here and now: My perspective1

In this paper the author describes her particular perspective in doing analytic work. She stresses working in the here and now. For example, making interpretations that grow out of what the patient says or does in the sessions, keeping the patient’s history in mind, but not letting it lead interpretations. The analysis tries to understand why something is being said now, in this way, and what impact it may have or be designed to have in the analytic relationship. The term ‘here’ refers to what is going on between patient and analyst in the room while not leaving out the patient’s immediate reality in the outside world, his everyday life. The word ‘now’ implies awareness of time that is not just of the past and future but of the patient’s situation at the moment in analysis, which is constantly shifting.The author believes that by working primarily in the present the patient will feel more anchored, both patient and analyst can observe what is going on, for example how anxiety arises or decreases, how defences are mobilised or lessen. Both analyst and patient experience movement and change rather than relying on more theoretical explanations.     

TRANSFERENCE‐FOCUSED PSYCHOTHERAPY AND MENTALIZATION‐BASED TREATMENT: BROTHER AND SISTER?

Transference‐focused psychotherapy and mentalization‐based treatment are new psychoanalytic treatment forms for borderline patients. How do these forms of treatment differ and how are they alike? What interventions do they yield in clinical practice? In the past few years two methods of psychoanalytic treatment for borderline patients have been developed: transference‐focused therapy and mentalization‐based treatment. This paper explores the similarities and differences between them, with a special focus on how the different theories lead to different interventions in clinical practice. TFP takes the central problem to be the disorder in object relations, while MBT focuses on the self as agent. Further differences concern notions of the role of aggression, the presence of mental representations and the position of the therapist. Interventions formulated by therapists of both frames of reference in response to some therapy fragments differed substantially. Both theories share a desire to develop a psychoanalytical technique suitable for borderline patients, and both stress the central importance of the handling of the transference and of working in the here‐and‐now, as well as the necessity for effect research.     

The use of the past and the present in the clinical setting Pasts and presents

The author provides a brief summary of Latin American literature concerning temporality. She shows that a common theme throughout all these papers is that the analytical relationship is considered to be bipersonal and symmetrical, thus demonstrating a concern for establishing the basis by which social subjectivity can be reconsidered. This literature displaces the idea of linear time from its central position and introduces other measures of time. The analytical relationship takes place not only in the past but also in a newly created present. This is the ongoing present, of what is happening now, instantaneous and without a prior history attached to it. This leads the author to suggest that there is a present to one's history and a history to one's present. She then analyses the consequences of this proposition by examining some clinical material where she attempts to pinpoint those instances in which the analyst may have reacted defensively, tending to position himself in the analysand's past instead of being able to take action in the present. Clinical material from the IJP is used.     

Applied Ethics and Free Will: Some Untoward Results of Independence

ABSTRACT Is free will a necessity or a luxury for an understanding of applied ethics? This paper offers an argument for why it is the former. First some reasons are offered why applied ethics, under the influence of Rawls's metaethics, has eschewed the topic of free will. It is shown why this is a mistake — namely, how applied ethics will falter without such a theory. The paper then argues for a conception of free will and indicates what ethical and public policy implications may flow from this theory.     

Aristotelian necessities

In his Parts of Animals, Aristotle distinguishes three modes of the necessary.However, it is not clear just what these three modes are.Nor is it clear how this passage fits with other texts where Aristotle distinguishes modalities in different ways.Here I present and explain Aristotle’s three modes of necessity, and claim that they are the only three recognized by Aristotle.I then explain how this passage agrees with other passages where Aristotle mentions formal and structural features of the modalities.I end by showing how having three modes of necessity does not make ‘necessary’ ambiguous.Rather, I claim, Aristotle has a single, central notion of necessity and hence a unified theory of modality     

EUTHYPHRO AND THE GOODNESS OF GOD INCARNATE

A familiar problem is here viewed from an unfamiliar angle. The familiar problem is the Euthyphro dilemma: if God wills something because it is good, then goodness is independent of God, so God becomes, morally speaking, de trop. On the other hand, if something is good because God wills it, then, given the absence of constraint on what God may will, moral truths are – counterintuitively – contingent. An examination of the kinds of necessity and possibility at work in this conundrum leads us to the most promising solution: there is a metaphysical connection between God and goodness. What he wills is an expression of his nature. But (and this is the unfamiliar angle), that solution now poses an acute problem for an understanding of the Incarnation. For if God is constitutive of goodness, and Christ is God incarnate, then Christ is constitutive of goodness. But Christ, as a human, is subject to external moral evaluation and obligation, which entails that he is not constitutive of goodness. This metaethical difficulty is not easily met by the usual strategies by which Christ is understood to have two natures. Reflection on our moral relations to our past selves, however, suggests a way forward.     

Backwards causation and the permanence of the past

Can a present or future event bring about a past event? An answer to this question is demanded by many other interesting questions. Can anybody, even a god, do anything about what has already occurred? Should we plan for the past, as well as for the future? Can anybody precognise the future in a way quite different from normal prediction? Do the causal laws and the past jointly preclude free action? Does current physical theory entail a consistent version of backwards causation? Recent articles on the problem of backwards causation have drawn attention to the importance of the principle of the fixity of the past: that the past is now fixed. It can be shown that the standard argument against backwards causation (the bilking experiment) simply builds in the assumption of past fixity. A fixed past deprives future events of past efficacy. This has naturally led to the speculation that by abandoning past fixity real power over the past may be possible. In this paper I show that in order to have an interesting thesis of backwards causation it is not enough simply to drop past fixity. More must go. In particular, to ensure what could be called future-to-past efficacy we must abandon two entrenched principles of permanence: the principle of permanent fixity, and the principle of permanent truth. The only alternative for backwards causal theorists is to embrace real contradictions in nature.     

Evolution, selection and cognition: from "learning" to parameter setting in biology and in the study of language

Most biologists and some cognitive scientists have independently reached the conclusion that there is no such thing as learning in the traditional "instructive" sense. This is, admittedly, a somewhat extreme thesis, but I defend it here in the light of data and theories jointly extracted from biology, especially from evolutionary theory and immunology, and from modern generative grammar. I also point out that the general demise of learning is uncontroversial in the biological sciences, while a similar consensus has not yet been reached in psychology and in linguistics at large. Since many arguments presently offered in defense of learning and in defense of "general intelligence" are often based on a distorted picture of human biological evolution, I devote some sections of this paper to a critique of "adaptationism," providing also a sketch of a better evolutionary theory (one based on "exaptation"). Moreover, since certain standard arguments presented today as "knock-down" in psychology, in linguistics and in artificial intelligence are a perfect replica of those once voiced by biologists in favor of instruction and against selection, I capitalize on these errors of the past to draw some lessons for the present and for the future.     

Retiring the central executive

Reasoning, problem solving, comprehension, learning and retrieval, inhibition, switching, updating, or multitasking are often referred to as higher cognition, thought to require control processes or the use of a central executive. However, the concept of an executive controller begs the question of what is controlling the controller and so on, leading to an infinite hierarchy of executives or “homunculi”. In what is now a QJEP citation classic, Baddeley [Baddeley, A. D. (1996). Exploring the central executive. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 49A, 5–28] referred to the concept of a central executive in cognition as a “conceptual ragbag” that acted as a placeholder umbrella term for aspects of cognition that are complex, were poorly understood at the time, and most likely involve several different cognitive functions working in concert. He suggested that with systematic empirical research, advances in understanding might progress sufficiently to allow the executive concept to be “sacked”. This article offers an overview of the 1996 article and of some subsequent systematic research and argues that after two decades of research, there is sufficient advance in understanding to suggest that executive control might arise from the interaction among multiple different functions in cognition that use different, but overlapping, brain networks. The article concludes that the central executive concept might now be offered a dignified retirement.     

Desert for Wrongdoing

Much government and personal conduct is premised on the idea that a person made thereby to suffer deserves that suffering thanks to prior wrongdoing by him. Further, it often appears that one kind of suffering is more deserved than another and, in light of that, conduct inflicting the first is superior, or closer to being justified than conduct inflicting the second. Yet desert is mysterious. It is far from obvious what, exactly, it is. This paper offers and argues for a theory of comparative desert. It offers an account of the conditions under which one harm is more deserved for past wrongdoing than another. The theory offered here can be stated, roughly, like so: One harm is more deserved for a wrongful act than another if, in light of it more than the other, the act is supported by reasons for the agent in a way similar to the way it ought to have been supported by reasons for him. The central task of the paper is to explain, elaborate and offer an argument for this theory. The paper also shows that, under the theory, differences in culpability—as between, for instance, intentionally rather than knowingly bringing about a harm—make a difference to desert. And the paper shows that under the proposed theory it is easier for the state to justify inflicting a punishment that is more deserved than it is to justify inflicting a punishment that is less deserved.     

The dream between “here‐and‐now” and “there‐and‐then”

The analysand recounts his/her dream now, and here, in the setting. Though a dream may be recounted repeatedly, the human situation in which the recounting takes place is unrepeatable. Each moment of the analytic relationship is unique, and the recounting is essentially relational. Even if the dreamer were to read from a written text, his/her voice and non‐verbal aspects would render the communication unique. Not only the recounting but also the content recounted may present relational aspects, manifest or latent, but of a relational nature different from that of the session “here‐ and‐now”. The dream dreamt belongs to the “there‐and‐then”, and its analysis, like every analysis, implies an objectification. The analyst reacts to the recounted dream, trying to objectify it in its “there‐and‐then” and also inviting the dreamer to a common task. Working on the manifest content, free associations and interpretations of symbols, they voyage through the time and space of the analysand's life. The recounted dream involves the “here‐and‐now” of the session and asks to be meaningful as a cue in the analytic dialogue (what is the meaning of recounting this dream at this moment). At the same time it refers back to the dream dreamt, to a “there‐and‐then” which, if it is not to remain “an unopened letter”, must be received as an enigmatic challenge and a window on the unconscious, open and ready to close. Thinking of an opening of the dreamer's unconscious the analyst may find himself/herself faced with an opening of his/her own unconscious.     

Positive organizational behavior and safety in the offshore oil industry: Exploring the determinants of positive safety climate

Much research has now documented the substantial influence of safety climate on a range of important outcomes in safety critical organizations, but there has been scant attention to the question of what factors might be responsible for positive or negative safety climate. The present paper draws from positive organizational behavior theory to test workplace and individual factors that may affect safety climate. Specifically, we explore the potential influence of authentic leadership style and psychological capital on safety climate and risk outcomes. Across two samples of offshore oil-workers and seafarers working on oil platform supply ships, structural equation modeling yielded results that support a model in which authentic leadership exerts a direct effect on safety climate, as well as an indirect effect via psychological capital. This study shows the importance of leadership qualities as well as psychological factors in shaping a positive work safety climate and lowering the risk of accidents.     

Evolutionary policy contexts and policies in preparation for the twenty‐first century

The importance of preparing now for the next century is emphasized. The author's field and Kondratiev theories as a basis for long‐range policymaking over periods of dynamic, recon‐figurational change are briefly reviewed, and a number of assumptions relevant to this kind of policymaking are provided.. Equilibrium and nonequilibrium structures and thinking are contrasted. Limitations to control associated with limits to knowledge and knowability are discussed. The possibility is considered that continuation of present policies and practices may accelerate movement along a trajectory to nowhere. Problem solutions are considered within the context of what is meant by a civilized society, and some 15 characteristics of a civilized society are proposed. The theoretical basis for preparation for the Twenty‐First Century is advanced. Deficiencies in the present dominant politicoeconomic theories of Western Capitalistic Democracy and Marxism are discussed, and the need for a new set of “founding fathers” is proposed. The importance of developing and implementing a replacement theory of similar magnitude to present theories is emphasized, and the nature of this theory is briefly sketched. Some recommendations for guided paradigm change are offered.     

Transference: current concepts and controversies

In this paper I have presented a brief outline of some of the more important issues regarding transference. To summarize I shall restate ten transference issues heretofore discussed: What should be included in the definition of transference? Should it be defined narrowly or broadly? In what ways can transference be usefully viewed in relation to reality? What merit is there in distinguishing the working alliance from transference? Should self and object transference be differentiated? Should transference neuroses be discriminated from transference reactions on the one hand and from transference psychoses on the other? In addition to sexual and aggressive transferences, should sexualized and aggressivitized transferences, respectively, be distinguished? How may transference be conceived of as a vehicle of cure and yet also as a resistance to cure? What is to be said for the relative merit of the "here and now" versus the "there and then?" What is the role of transference in relation to insight on the one hand and to the therapeutic object on the other? What are some of the basic issues in countertransference?     

Identity,past and present,in an historical child-care setting

This article puts into context the service offered today to adults (former pupils) who grew up in the care of the Foundling Hospital. Key issues referred to are attachment, loss, identity and the urge to reconnect with one's personal history. Reflections on these issues are based on the experience of Coram Family social workers, who have for the past thirty years provided a birth-record service to the former pupils of the Foundling Hospital and their descendants. It is a moving experience to hear from this group of individuals something of what it has meant to have grown up in such particular circumstances. Although there are many echoes with adoption and fostering today, other significant issues are raised which do not apply in the work of family placement as it is now practised. Some historical background is given below in order to set the scene for this unique piece of child-care history, also to allow examination of the challenges faced by some 20,000 children over 200 years, in recognition of which the service to those former pupils and their families is still offered.     

'Thank Goodness That's Over': The Evolutionary Story

If, as the new tenseless theory of time maintains, there are no tensed facts, then why do our emotional lives seem to suggest that there are? This question originates with Prior’s ‘Thank Goodness That’s Over’ problem, and still presents a significant challenge to the new B–theory of time. We argue that this challenge has more dimensions to it than has been appreciated by those involved in the debate so far. We present an analysis of the challenge, showing the different questions that a B–theorist must answer in order to meet it. The debate has focused on the question of what is the object of my relief when an unpleasant experience is past. We outline the prevailing response to this question. The additional, and neglected, questions are, firstly –‘Why does the same event elicit different emotional responses from us depending on whether it is in the past, present, or future?’ And secondly –‘Why do we care more about proximate future pain than about distant future pain?’ We give B–theory answers to these questions, which appeal to evolutionary considerations.     

Consciousness and inference to the best explanation: Compiling empirical evidence supporting the access-phenomenal distinction and the overflow hypothesis

A tacit assumption in the field of consciousness studies is that the more empirical evidence a theory can explain, the better it fares when weighed against competitors. If one wants to take seriously the potential for empirical evidence to move forward debates in consciousness studies, there is a need to gather, organize, validate, and compare evidence. We present an inference to the best explanation (IBE) process on the basis of empirical support that is applicable in debates between competing theories of consciousness. Our proposed IBE process consists in four steps: Assimilate, Compile, Validate, and Compare. Until now, the vast majority of the work in the field has consisted in gathering empirical evidence for theories i.e., the assimilation step. To illustrate the feasibility of our proposed IBE process, and what it may look like when applied in practice, we deliver a complete collection (the compilation step) of empirical support for the distinction between A-Consciousness and P-Consciousness and the overflow hypothesis. Finally, we offer an example of the validation step, by scrutinizing the interpretation of aphantasics’ performance on retro-cue paradigms offered in the literature in support of the overflow hypothesis. The compilation we deliver here is the first effort in the IBE process, the end result of which — hopefully — will be the ability of the research community to carry out side-by-side comparisons of theories and the empirical phenomena they claim to explain, i.e., the comparison step.     

The source of belief bias effects in syllogistic reasoning.

In studies of the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning, an interaction between logical validity and the believability of the conclusion has been found; in essence, logic has a larger effect on unbelievable than on believable conclusions. Two main explanations have been proposed for this finding. The selective scrutiny account claims that people focus on the conclusion and only engage in logical processing if this is found to be unbelievable; while the misinterpreted necessity account claims that subjects misunderstand what is meant by logical necessity and respond on the basis of believability when indeterminate syllogisms are presented. Experiments 1 and 2 compared the predictions of these two theories by examining whether the interaction would disappear if only determinate syllogisms were used. It did, thus providing strong support for the misinterpreted necessity explanation. However, the results are also consistent with a version of the mental models theory, and so Experiment 3 was carried out to compare these two explanations. The mental models theory received strong support, as it did also in the follow-up Experiments 4 and 5. It is concluded that people try to construct a mental model of the premises but, if there is a believable conclusion consistent with the first model they produce, then they fail to construct alternative models.     

Why Are You Betraying Your Class?

Abstract: Social justice concerns us on two counts: One, what is social justice? Two, given that we know the answer to one, then the question is: how can social justice be implemented? Answering the first question requires hitting the right balance between two values: liberty and equality. My concern here, however, is with the second question, the question of implementation rather than with what social justice consists of. I assume that the right balance between liberty and equality is somehow a given. To implement the structural changes that a just society requires calls for a historical agent that can bring about such changes. The working class was a good candidate to be such a historical agent. The working class was suitable for this historical task because it was the class that had the most to gain from a just society and it was a very large class of people. The working class was singled out for this task not for being a particularly virtuous class but by being the class that had the most to gain from a change in the status quo. But the working class is rapidly disappearing; in the developed countries, it has shrunk considerably. Thus, the implementation of social justice is now left without an effective historical agent to carry it through.     

The central role of the parietal lobes in consciousness.

There are now various approaches to understand where and how in the brain consciousness arises from neural activity, none of which is universally accepted. Difficulties among these approaches are reviewed, and a missing ingredient is proposed here to help adjudicate between them, that of "perspectivalness." In addition to a suitable temporal duration and information content of the relevant bound brain activity, this extra component is posited as being a further important ingredient for the creation of consciousness from neural activity. It guides the development of what is termed the "Central Representation," which is supposed to be present in all mammals and extended in humans to support self-consciousness as well as phenomenal consciousness. Experimental evidence and a theoretical framework for the existence of the central representation are presented, which relates the extra component to specific buffer working memory sites in the inferior parietal lobes, acting as attentional coordinators on the spatial maps making up the central representation. The article closes with a discussion of various open questions.