Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support

We show that the contemporary debate surrounding the question “What is the norm of assertion?” presupposes what we call the quantitative view, i.e. the view that this question is best answered by determining how much epistemic support is required to warrant assertion. We consider what Jennifer Lackey (2010) has called cases of isolated second-hand knowledge and show—beyond what Lackey has suggested herself—that these cases are best understood as ones where a certain type of understanding, rather than knowledge, constitutes the required epistemic credential to warrant assertion. If we are right that understanding (and not just knowledge) is the epistemic norm for a restricted class of assertions, then this straightforwardly undercuts not only the widely supposed quantitative view, but also a more general presupposition concerning the universalisability of some norm governing assertion—the presumption (almost entirely unchallenged since Williamson’s 1996 paper) that any epistemic norm that governs some assertions should govern assertions—as a class of speech act—uniformly.     

Information dynamics and uniform substitution

The picture of information acquisition as the elimination of possibilities has proven fruitful in many domains, serving as a foundation for formal models in philosophy, linguistics, computer science, and economics. While the picture appears simple, its formalization in dynamic epistemic logic reveals subtleties: given a valid principle of information dynamics in the language of dynamic epistemic logic, substituting complex epistemic sentences for its atomic sentences may result in an invalid principle. In this article, we explore such failures of uniform substitution. First, we give epistemic examples inspired by Moore, Fitch, and Williamson. Second, we answer affirmatively a question posed by van Benthem: can we effectively decide when every substitution instance of a given dynamic epistemic principle is valid? In technical terms, we prove the decidability of this schematic validity problem for public announcement logic (PAL and PAL-RC) over models for finitely many fully introspective agents, as well as models for infinitely many arbitrary agents. The proof of this result illuminates the reasons for the failure of uniform substitution.     

Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account

According to the usual way of understanding how true knowledge attribution works, it is not right to attribute knowledge of p to S unless p is true and S is justified in believing p. This assumption seems to hold even if we shun away from the idea that we can give an analysis of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. I want to raise some suspicions on the correctness of this traditional picture. I suggest that justification is not always perceived as a necessary condition for true knowledge attribution, according to our pre-theoretical usage of standard epistemic terms. This is not to say that justification is never seen as an important requirement; sometimes it certainly is. Still, the full-fledged, traditional position on epistemic justification needs to be seriously qualified. Ultimately, I will contend that this result lends support to a rival epistemological standpoint — what we might dub a Moderate Peircean stance on epistemic matters.     

$${\in_K}$$: a Non-Fregean Logic of Explicit Knowledge

We present a new logic-based approach to the reasoning about knowledge which is independent of possible worlds semantics. \({\in_K}\) (Epsilon-K) is a non-Fregean logic whose models consist of propositional universes with subsets for true, false and known propositions. Knowledge is, in general, not closed under rules of inference; the only valid epistemic principles are the knowledge axiom K _i φ → φ and some minimal conditions concerning common knowledge in a group. Knowledge is explicit and all forms of the logical omniscience problem are avoided. Various stronger epistemic properties such as positive and/or negative introspection, the K-axiom, closure under logical connectives, etc. can be restored by imposing additional semantic constraints. This yields corresponding sublogics for which we present sound and complete axiomatizations. As a useful tool for general model constructions we study abstract versions of some 3-valued logics in which we interpret truth as knowledge. We establish a connection between \({\in_K}\) and the well-known syntactic approach to explicit knowledge proving a result concerning equi-expressiveness. Furthermore, we discuss some self-referential epistemic statements, such as the knower paradox, as relaxations of variants of the liar paradox and show how these epistemic “paradoxes” can be solved in \({\in_K}\). Every specific \({\in_K}\)-logic is defined as a certain extension of some underlying classical abstract logic.     

A Theory of Interpretation for Comparative and Chinese Philosophy

Why should interpretation of conceptual schemes and practices (forms of life) across traditions work at all? In this paper we present the following necessary conditions of possibility for interpretation in comparative and Chinese philosophy: the interpreter must presuppose that there are mutually recognizable human practices; the interpreter must presuppose that “the other” is, on the whole, sincere, consistent, and right; the interpreter must be committed to certain epistemic virtues. Some of these necessary conditions are consistent with the fact that interpretation is not thwarted by the “danger” of relativism or of incommensurability. Some other conditions are suggestive of reorientations of methodologies of comparative and Chinese philosophy.     

Hypothesis Testing of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Q</Emphasis>-matrix

The recent surge of interests in cognitive assessment has led to the development of cognitive diagnosis models. Central to many such models is a specification of the Q-matrix, which relates items to latent attributes that have natural interpretations. In practice, the Q-matrix is usually constructed subjectively by the test designers. This could lead to misspecification, which could result in lack of fit of the underlying statistical model. To test possible misspecification of the Q-matrix, traditional goodness of fit tests, such as the Chi-square test and the likelihood ratio test, may not be applied straightforwardly due to the large number of possible response patterns. To address this problem, this paper proposes a new statistical method to test the goodness fit of the Q-matrix, by constructing test statistics that measure the consistency between a provisional Q-matrix and the observed data for a general family of cognitive diagnosis models. Limiting distributions of the test statistics are derived under the null hypothesis that can be used for obtaining the test p-values. Simulation studies as well as a real data example are presented to demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed method.     

Reasoning defeasibly about probabilities

In concrete applications of probability, statistical investigation gives us knowledge of some probabilities, but we generally want to know many others that are not directly revealed by our data. For instance, we may know prob(P/Q) (the probability of P given Q) and prob(P/R), but what we really want is prob(P/Q&;R), and we may not have the data required to assess that directly. The probability calculus is of no help here. Given prob(P/Q) and prob(P/R), it is consistent with the probability calculus for prob(P/Q&;R) to have any value between 0 and 1. Is there any way to make a reasonable estimate of the value of prob(P/Q&;R)? A related problem occurs when probability practitioners adopt undefended assumptions of statistical independence simply on the basis of not seeing any connection between two propositions. This is common practice, but its justification has eluded probability theorists, and researchers are typically apologetic about making such assumptions. Is there any way to defend the practice? This paper shows that on a certain conception of probability—nomic probability—there are principles of “probable probabilities” that license inferences of the above sort. These are principles telling us that although certain inferences from probabilities to probabilities are not deductively valid, nevertheless the second-order probability of their yielding correct results is 1. This makes it defeasibly reasonable to make the inferences. Thus I argue that it is defeasibly reasonable to assume statistical independence when we have no information to the contrary. And I show that there is a function Y(r, s, a) such that if prob(P/Q) = r, prob(P/R) = s, and prob(P/U) = a (where U is our background knowledge) then it is defeasibly reasonable to expect that prob(P/Q&;R) = Y(r, s, a). Numerous other defeasible inferences are licensed by similar principles of probable probabilities. This has the potential to greatly enhance the usefulness of probabilities in practical application.     

Deontological evidentialism and <Emphasis Type="Italic">ought</Emphasis> implies <Emphasis Type="Italic">can</Emphasis>

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that S ought to form or maintain S’s beliefs in accordance with S’s evidence. A promising argument for this view turns on the premise that consideration c is a normative reason for S to form or maintain a belief that p only if c is evidence that p is true. In this paper, I discuss the surprising relation between a recently influential argument for this key premise and the principle that ought implies can. I argue that anyone who antecedently accepts or rejects this principle already has a reason to resist either this argument’s premises or its role in support of deontological evidentialism.     

One Thought Too Few: Where <Emphasis Type="Italic">De Dicto</Emphasis> Moral Motivation is Necessary

De dicto moral motivation is typically characterized by the agent’s conceiving of her goal in thin normative terms such as to do what is right. I argue that lacking an effective de dicto moral motivation (at least in a certain broad sense of this term) would put the agent in a bad position for responding in the morally-best manner (relative to her epistemic state) in a certain type of situations. Two central features of the relevant type of situations are (1) the appropriateness of the agent’s uncertainty concerning her underived moral values, and (2) the practical, moral importance of resolving this uncertainty. I argue that in some situations that are marked by these two features the most virtuous response is deciding to conduct a deep moral inquiry for a de dicto moral purpose. In such situations lacking an effective de dicto moral motivation would amount to a moral shortcoming. I show the implications for Michael Smith’s (1994) argument against Motivational Judgment Externalism and for Brian Weatherson’s (2014) argument against avoiding moral recklessness: both arguments rely on a depreciating view of de dicto moral motivation, and both fail; or so I argue.     

A Definition Framework for the Terms <Emphasis Type="Italic">Nanomaterial</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Nanoparticle</Emphasis>

Scientific writings and policy documents define the terms nanomaterial and nanoparticle in various ways. This variation is considered problematic because the absence of a shared definition is understood as potentially hindering nanomaterial knowledge production and regulation. Another view is that the existence of a shared definition may itself cause problems, as rigid definitions arguably exclude important aspects of the studied phenomena. The aim of this paper is to inform this state of disagreement by providing analytical concepts for a systematic understanding of how, and even whether, nanomaterial and nanoparticle could and should be defined. To do this, we review definitions of nanomaterial and nanoparticle presented in research articles and policy documents. Definitions were identified by first conducting a Scopus search and then tracing cited definitions back to their sources. In total, 36 definitions were identified. Theories of definition from philosophy and linguistics provide analytical guidance for structuring and categorizing the identified definitions, and the main analytical dimensions of the definitions are then identified and discussed. Finally, we propose a framework for understanding the process of defining nanomaterial and nanoparticle. This framework considers both the generality needed for a shared understanding (by suggesting proto-definitions of nanomaterial and nanoparticle) and the level of precision required for different purposes (by allowing for various explications of the proto-definitions).     

The metaphysics of goodness in the ethics of Aristotle

Kraut (Against absolute goodness. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) and other neo-Aristotelians have argued that there is no such thing as absolute goodness. They admit only good in a kind, e.g. a good sculptor, and good for something, e.g. good for fish. What is the view of Aristotle? Mostly limiting myself to the Nicomachean Ethics (NE), I argue that Aristotle is committed to things being absolutely good and also to a metaphysics of absolute goodness where there is a maximally best good that is the cause of the goodness of all other things in virtue of being their end. I begin (in Sect. 2) by suggesting that the notion of good as an end, which is present in the first lines of the NE, is not obviously accounted for by good in a kind or good for something. I then give evidence that good in a kind (in Sect. 3) and good for something (in Sect. 4) can explain neither certain distinctions drawn between virtues nor the determinacy ascribed to what is good “in itself.” I argue (in Sect. 5) contra Gotthelf (2012) that because several important arguments in the Nicomachean Ethics rely on comparative judgments of absolute value—e.g. “Man is the best of all animals”—Aristotle is committed to the existence of both absolute goodness and an absolutely best being. I focus (in Sect. 6) on one passage, Aristotle’s division of goods in NE I 12, which presupposes this metaphysical picture.     

Group Agents and Their Responsibility

Group agents are able to act but are not literally agents. Some group agents, e.g., we-mode groups and corporations, can, however, be regarded as functional group agents that do not have “intrinsic” mental states and phenomenal features comparable to what their individual members on biological and psychological grounds have. But they can have “extrinsic” mental states, states collectively attributed to them—primarily by their members. In this paper, we discuss the responsibility of such group agents. We defend the view that if the group members have accepted the group agent’s (attributed) attitudes and are committed to them, we can favorably compare the situation with the case of individual human agents and a group agent can be regarded as morally responsible for its intentional activities.     

Patriotic Conscientious Objection to Military Service

The purpose of this paper is to show that conscientious objection (henceforth CO) to military service is essentially not a dilemma of freedom of conscience versus the duty to obey the law, but above all a dilemma between two conflicting patriotic moral obligations. Furthermore, the paper demonstrates that CO is justifiable on the basis of what is known as moderate patriotism, that is, out of a patriotism which is committed simultaneously to universal and particular values. The paper begins with a critical discussion of theoretical weaknesses in liberal thought of CO. Then, the concept of moderate patriotism is presented, followed by a discussion of the notion of patriotic CO (PCO). The next stage presents a step Towards A Theory of PCO to Military Service and shows how it differs from other liberal theories of disobedience. The conclusion is that if CO on patriotic grounds is morally justifiable, it follows that this is an act committed within the framework of legitimate political discourse. Therefore, PCO is politically legitimate even if it is not always legal. In other words, the discussion of PCO offers a theoretical distinction between political legitimacy and legality.     

The <Emphasis Type="Italic">Facet Satisfaction Scale</Emphasis>: an Effective Affective Measure of Job Satisfaction Facets

Purpose

Job satisfaction facets are theoretically and practically important variables. Most existing facet satisfaction scales, however, have two noteworthy limitations—they often do not clearly assess affective content, and they use non-parallel items. In the current paper, we examined the measurement qualities of the Facet Satisfaction Scale (FSS; [Beehr et al. (Journal of Applied Social Psychology 36:1523–1547, 2006)], a measure that may address the limitations of existing facet satisfaction measures.

Design/Methodology/Approach

We conducted four studies to examine the measurement qualities of the FSS: (a) Study 1 examined the FSS’s factor structure, (b) Study 2 examined its test-retest reliability and construct validity, (c) Study 3 further examined its construct validity, and (d) Study 4 examined the extent to which the FSS assesses the affective and cognitive components of job satisfaction.

Findings

We found that the FSS produced the hypothesized five-factor structure and that the FSS subscales each yielded high levels of internal consistency and test-retest reliability. We also found evidence of the construct validity of the FSS subscales, and we found that the FSS subscales are generally effective measures of the affective component of their respective job satisfaction facets.

Implications

As a result of the current findings, we recommend the FSS when researchers wish to measure the affective component of job satisfaction facets.

Originality/Value

Little previous research has examined the FSS’s measurement qualities. The current studies address this gap by providing evidence for the reliability and validity of the FSS. This is of value because the FSS addresses some limitations inherent to other facet satisfaction measures.

     

The Fallaciousness of Threats: Character and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Ad Baculum</Emphasis>

Robert Kimball, in “What’s Wrong with Argumentum Ad Baculum?” (Argumentation, 2006) argues that dialogue-based models of rational argumentation do not satisfactorily account for what is objectionable about more malicious uses of threats encountered in some ad baculum arguments. We review the dialogue-based approach to argumentum ad baculum, and show how it can offer more than Kimball thinks for analyzing such threat arguments and ad baculum fallacies.     

Epistemic modals and informational consequence

Recently, Yalcin (Epistemic modals. Mind, 116, 983–1026, 2007) put forward a novel account of epistemic modals. It is based on the observation that sentences of the form ‘\({\phi}\) &; Might \({\neg\phi}\) ’ do not embed under ‘suppose’ and ‘if’. Yalcin concludes that such sentences must be contradictory and develops a notion of informational consequence which validates this idea. I will show that informational consequence is inadequate as an account of the logic of epistemic modals: it cannot deal with reasoning from uncertain premises. Finally, I offer an alternative way of explaining the relevant linguistic data.     

Executive Functioning Correlates of <Emphasis Type="Italic">DSM-5</Emphasis> Maladaptive Personality Traits: Initial Evidence from an Italian Sample of Consecutively Admitted Adult Outpatients

In order to evaluate the associations between computer-administered tasks of executive functioning (EF), and maladaptive personality domains and traits listed in DSM-5 Alternative Model of Personality Disorders, 53 consecutively admitted psychotherapy outpatients (female participants: n?=?27, 50.9%; male participants: n?=?26, 49.1%; participants’ mean age?=?37.28 years, SD?=?11.50 years) were administered the Psychology Experiment Building Language (PEBL) EF tasks and the Personality Inventory for DSM-5 (PID-5). According to rank-order correlation analyses, a number of non-negligible and specific associations were observed between selected PID-5 scales and indices of participants’ performance on EF tasks. MM robust regression models showed that participants’ performance on computer-administered EF tasks explained a non-negligible amount of variance in selected PID-5 scale scores (median R² value?=?.17). As a whole, our trait-level analyses of PID-5 dimensions suggest the clinical usefulness of integrating self-reports and EF laboratory tasks in routine clinical assessment.     

Substance concepts and personal identity

According to one argument for Animalism about personal identity, animal, but not person, is a Wigginsian substance concept—a concept that tells us what we are essentially. Person supposedly fails to be a substance concept because it is a functional concept that answers the question “what do we do?” without telling us what we are. Since person is not a substance concept, it cannot provide the criteria for our coming into or going out of existence; animal, on the other hand, can provide such criteria. This argument has been defended by Eric Olson, among others. I argue that this line of reasoning fails to show Animalism to be superior to the Psychological Approach, for the following two reasons: (1) human animal, animal, and organism are all functional concepts, and (2) the distinction between what something is and what it does is illegitimate on the reading that the argument needs.     

Understanding Islamic aid flows to enhance global humanitarian assistance

In 2008 the then Organisation of the Islamic Conference established its own Islamic Cooperation Humanitarian Affairs Department (ICHAD) as an alternative to the OECD DAC. Subsequently, aid from ICHAD predominantly goes to Muslims. This is most likely because zakat is one of the five pillars of Islam and regarded as ibadah (worship), from which non-Muslims are excluded. As such, this paper will examine the theology and ethics of giving in Islam (zakat and sadaqa) and explore these aid flows and, and whether there is room for a more inclusive interpretation that can lead to greater integration and co-operation.