Emotional distress regulation takes precedence over impulse control: if you feel bad, do it!

Why do people's impulse controls break down during emotional distress? Some theories propose that distress impairs one's motivation or one's ability to exert self-control, and some postulate self-destructive intentions arising from the moods. Contrary to those theories, Three experiments found that believing that one's bad mood was frozen (unchangeable) eliminated the tendency to eat fattening snacks (Experiment 1), seek immediate gratification (Experiment 2), and engage in frivolous procrastination (Experiment 3). The implication is that when people are upset, they indulge immediate impulses to make themselves feel better, which amounts to giving short-term affect regulation priority over other self-regulatory goals.     

Now you see it; now you don't: inhibiting recall and recognition of scenes

Postevent misleading information can distort people's memories by altering and adding scenes. But can you also inhibit the retrieval of information from memory? In two studies we show that postevent information can make memory for a scene less accessible. In both studies participants first saw an event (e.g. a restaurant scene displayed in slides, or a drunk‐driving incident shown via a video clip). Later they were shown the same event without a critical scene and were told either to use this to generate a story (Experiment 1) or to imagine the event (Experiment 2). Finally they were tested. Relative to controls, this postevent omission led to fewer people reporting the critical scene in free recall and in recognition. Thus, we demonstrated that it may be possible to inhibit memories. This finding has important implications for eyewitness testimony and the recovered memory debate. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Not being what you claim to be: impostors as sources of group threat

We examine the notion of impostors within groups, defined in this paper as people who make public claims to an identity while disguising their failure to fulfil key criteria for group membership. In Experiment 1, vegetarians showed heightened levels of negative affect toward vegetarians who ate meat occasionally compared to an authentic vegetarian. In contrast, non‐vegetarians saw the impostor to be marginally more likeable than the authentic vegetarian. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants evaluated only a vegetarian who ate meat. Evaluations of the target were influenced by group attachment, such that participants who identified strongly as vegetarians downgraded the target more strongly and experienced more negative affect than did moderate identifiers and non‐vegetarians. Participants were also sensitive to the size of the gulf between the target's claims for identity and their behaviour. Thus, targets who made public claims to being a vegetarian but ate meat were evaluated more negatively than were people who kept their claims for identity private (Experiment 2). Similarly, targets who tried to keep their deviant behaviour secret were evaluated more negatively than were people who openly admitted their deviant behaviour (Experiment 3). The reasons why impostors might threaten the integrity of group identities are discussed. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Searching for certainty in an uncertain world: the difficulty of giving up the experiential for the rational mode of thinking

Our research explores predictions that people make in a simple environment consisting of sequences of a binary signal followed by two possible outcomes. In order to optimize their prediction success, respondents should use a very simple decision rule, called maximization, whereby they consistently predict according to the signal. In line with past research, our findings show that even respondents who realized after the experiment that maximization is optimal failed to use it during the experiment itself. We discuss conditions that weaken or reinforce behaving according to the optimal rule in a repeated choice situation. Experiment 1 shows that individuals who are forced to plan their strategy and justify their actions are more likely to discover and use the optimal rule than those not forced to do so. Thinking about the appropriateness of one's performance can be done in two different orientations: focusing on the past (justifying past actions) or on the future (planning future action). Experiment 2 shows that planning induces rule‐base thinking, while justifying fails to do so. These findings are discussed within a theoretical framework which suggest an interplay between the experiential and the rational modes of processing. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Time-limited effects of emotional arousal on item and source memory

Two experiments investigated the time-limited effects of emotional arousal on consolidation of item and source memory. In Experiment 1, participants memorized words (items) and the corresponding speakers (sources) and then took an immediate free recall test. Then they watched a neutral, positive, or negative video 5, 35, or 50?min after learning, and 24 hours later they took surprise memory tests. Experiment 2 was similar to Experiment 1 except that (a) a reality monitoring task was used; (b) elicitation delays of 5, 30, and 45?min were used; and (c) delayed memory tests were given 60?min after learning. Both experiments showed that, regardless of elicitation delay, emotional arousal did not enhance item recall memory. Second, both experiments showed that negative arousal enhanced delayed item recognition memory only at the medium elicitation delay, but not in the shorter or longer delays. Positive arousal enhanced performance only in Experiment 1. Third, regardless of elicitation delay, emotional arousal had little effect on source memory. These findings have implications for theories of emotion and memory, suggesting that emotion effects are contingent upon the nature of the memory task and elicitation delay.     

Waiting for feedback helps if you want to know the answer: the role of curiosity in the delay-of-feedback benefit

When participants answer a test question and then receive feedback of the correct answer, studies have shown that the feedback is more effective when it is delayed by several seconds rather than provided immediately (e.g., Brackbill & Kappy, Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 55, 14–18, 1962; Schroth, Contemporary Educational Psychology, 17, 78–82, 1992). Despite several demonstrations of this delay-of-feedback benefit, a theoretical explanation for this finding has not yet been developed. The present study tested the hypothesis that brief delays of feedback are beneficial because they encourage anticipation of the upcoming feedback. In Experiment 1, participants answered obscure trivia questions, and before receiving the answer, they rated their curiosity to know the answer. The answer was then provided either immediately or after a 4-s delay. A later final test over the same questions revealed a significant delay-of-feedback benefit, but only for items that had been rated high in curiosity. Experiment 2 replicated this same effect and showed that the delay-of-feedback benefit only occurs when feedback is provided after a variable, unpredictable time duration (either 2, 4, or 8 s) rather than after a constant duration (always 4 s). These findings demonstrate that the delay-of-feedback effect appears to be greatest under conditions in which participants are curious to know the answer and when the answer is provided after an unpredictable time interval.     

Looking young for your age: Perceptions of anti‐aging actions

Despite the potential benefits of looking young, we predicted that older adults who attempt to look younger than they are would threaten the distinctiveness of young adults' social identity and, for this reason, such “passers” would be evaluated negatively. In three experiments we found that both male and female young adults negatively evaluated older adults who attempt to look younger compared to older adults who do not attempt to do so. Both male and female targets who attempt to look younger were evaluated negatively (Experiment 2), and these negative evaluations were a function of experienced threat to young adults' social identities (Experiment 3). Older adults may attempt to look young to avoid age‐based prejudice or conform to existing standards, but doing so can result in negative evaluations by younger people. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

预测特征竞争范式下的特征推理方式

当面临归类不确定的情景时,人们的特征推理是基于类别进行,还是基于特征联结进行,一直是类别研究中的重要内容。本研究采用预测特征竞争范式对这一问题进行了探究。共两个实验：实验1采用预测特征竞争范式探讨推理前预先归类时,人们的推理方式是基于类别还是基于特征联结。实验2采用预测特征竞争范式探讨推理前不预先归类时,人们的推理是基于类别还是基于特征联结。实验结果表明,推理前预先归类时,被试倾向于基于类别进行推理。推理前不预先归类时,被试倾向于根据特征联结进行推理。     

Are you sure you forgot? Feeling of knowing in directed forgetting.

One significant issue in metamemory is how variables increasing memorability affect metamemory. Previous research has produced inconsistent results. The effect of directed forgetting on the magnitude and accuracy of feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments was investigated. Participants were presented with word pairs, some to be remembered and some to be forgotten, and then were asked to recall all target words regardless of initial instructions. For unrecalled items, they were asked to give FOK judgments about performance in a future memory task: a cued stem-completion task (Experiment 1) or a recognition test (Experiment 2). This encoding manipulation increased both the memory performance and the magnitude of FOK judgments. However, no such effect on the accuracy of FOK judgments was observed.     

Processing a display even after you make a response to it. How perceptual errors can be corrected

We know that when people make responses which they did not intend they can discover this by monitoring kinaesthetic and visual feedback. It is less clear whether they can also correct perceptual errors which occur when they mistake one signal for another. It was argued that, if they can sometimes do this, extra errors which occur when discriminations become more difficult may be detected and corrected. Experiment I compared the ability of young fit subjects to detect errors made during easy and during difficult discriminations between tone signals. There was no evidence that any additional errors made to difficult discriminations were detected. Fast errors were detected, slower errors were not. The results were consistent with the idea that subjects can detect fast motor errors by monitoring feedback, but that they cannot detect perceptual mistakes.

In Experiment II subjects made easy and difficult line length discriminations. Displays lasted for 100 ms, 200 ms or 500 ms and were followed by random masks. In this case, fast errors were again corrected more frequently than slow errors but eight aspects of the data suggest that subjects could, and did, correct perceptual as well as motor mistakes and that they managed to do this by continuing to process a display after the moment at which they may have initiated an impulsive response to it. The data are interpreted in terms of a “Committee Decision” model for extended perceptual processing previously applied to other, similar data by Rabbitt and Rodgers (1977) and Rabbitt, Cumming and Vyas (1978).     

Apparent depth of pictures reflected by a mirror: The plastic effect

We investigated the plastic effect in picture perception, in which the apparent depth of a picture is increased when it is reflected by a mirror. The plastic effect was well known in the mid-18th century, but very few studies have elucidated its nature. In Experiment 1, we examined how often the plastic effect occurs in different ocular conditions. A group of 22 observers compared directly observed pictures and their mirror-reflected images in each of free-binocular, free-monocular, and restrictive-monocular conditions. When the observers were forced to choose the picture that appeared greater in depth, 73?% of them chose the reflected pictures, regardless of oculomotor condition. In Experiment 2, we examined how often the plastic effect is detected as a function of observation time. When 22 observers compared a directly watched movie and its mirror-reflected movie for 5?min, the number of observers who judged the reflected movie to be greater in depth was about 55?% at the onset of the trial but was 86?% at the end. In Experiment 3, we examined transfer of the plastic effect. Ten observers judged the change in apparent depth of directly observed pictures after prolonged exposure to the same reflected or actual pictures. Transfer was confirmed and was greater for pictures that represented greater depth (r = .88). We suggested that the plastic effect is mainly induced by the double apparent locations of a reflected picture. From the long incubation time and the transfer to real pictures, we also suggested that it involves perceptual learning regarding visual skill.     

Commitment and self-control in a prisoner's dilemma game

Humans often make seemingly irrational choices in situations of conflict between a particular smaller-sooner reinforcer and a more abstract, temporally extended, but larger reinforcer. In two experiments, the extent to which the availability of commitment responses-self-imposed restrictions on future choices-might improve self-control in such situations was investigated. Participants played a prisoner's dilemma game against a computer that played a tit-for-tat strategy-cooperating after a participant cooperated, defecting after a participant defected. Defecting produced a small-immediate reinforcer (consisting of points convertible to gift cards) whereas cooperating increased the amount of subsequent reinforcers, yielding a greater overall reinforcer rate. Participants were normally free to cooperate or defect on each trial. Additionally, they could choose to make a commitment response that forced their choice for the ensuing five trials. For some participants, the commitment response forced cooperation; for others, it forced defection. Most participants, with either commitment response available, chose to commit repeatedly despite a minor point loss for doing so. After extended exposure to these contingencies, the commit-to-cooperate group cooperated significantly more than a control group (with no commitment available). The commit-to-defect group cooperated significantly less than the control group. When both commitment alternatives were simultaneously available-one for cooperation and one for defection-cooperation commitment was strongly preferred. In Experiment 2, the commitment alternative was removed at the end of the session; gains in cooperation, relative to the control group, were not sustained in the absence of the self-imposed behavioral scaffold.     

Spatial and temporal separation fails to counteract the effects of low prevalence in visual search

Recent research has shown that, in visual search, participants can miss 30–40% of targets when they only appear rarely (i.e., on 1–2% of trials). Low target prevalence alters the behaviour of the searcher. It can lead participants to quit their search prematurely (Wolfe, Horowitz, & Kenner, 2005), to shift their decision criteria (Wolfe et al., 2007), and/or to make motor or response errors (Fleck & Mitroff, 2007). In this paper we examine whether the low prevalence (LP) effect can be ameliorated if we split the search set in two, spreading the task out over space and/or time. Observers searched for the letter “T” among “L”s. In Experiment 1, the left or right half of the display was presented to the participants before the second half. In Experiment 2, items were spatially intermixed but half of the items were presented first, followed by the second half. Experiment 3 followed the methods of Experiment 2 but allowed observers to correct perceived errors. All three experiments produced robust LP effects with higher errors at 2% prevalence than at 50% prevalence. Dividing up the display had no beneficial effect on errors. The opportunity to correct errors reduced but did not eliminate the LP effect. Low prevalence continues to elevate errors even when observers are forced to slow down and permitted to correct errors.     

Panoramic search: the interaction of memory and vision in search through a familiar scene

How do observers search through familiar scenes? A novel panoramic search method is used to study the interaction of memory and vision in natural search behavior. In panoramic search, observers see part of an unchanging scene larger than their current field of view. A target object can be visible, present in the display but hidden from view, or absent. Visual search efficiency does not change after hundreds of trials through an unchanging scene (Experiment 1). Memory search, in contrast, begins inefficiently but becomes efficient with practice. Given a choice between vision and memory, observers choose vision (Experiments 2 and 3). However, if forced to use their memory on some trials, they learn to use memory on all trials, even when reliable visual information remains available (Experiment 4). The results suggest that observers make a pragmatic choice between vision and memory, with a strong bias toward visual search even for memorized stimuli.     

Can People Identify “Deceptive” or “Misleading” Items that Tend to Produce Mostly Wrong Answers?

In many domains, two‐alternative forced‐choice questions produce more correct responses than wrong responses across participants. However, some items, dubbed “deceptive” or “misleading”, produce mostly wrong answers. These items yield poor calibration and poor resolution because the dominant, erroneous response tends to be endorsed with great confidence, even greater than that of the correct response. In addition, for deceptive items, group discussion amplifies rather than mitigates error while enhancing confidence in the erroneous response. Can participants identify deceptive items when they are warned about their existence? It is argued that people's ability to discriminate between deceptive and non‐deceptive items is poor when the erroneous responses are based on the same process assumed to underlie correct responses. Indeed, participants failed to discriminate between deceptive and non‐deceptive perceptual items when they were warned that some of the items (Experiment 1) or exactly half of the items (Experiment 2) were deceptive. A similar failure was observed for general‐knowledge questions (Experiment 3) except when participants were informed about the correct answer (Experiment 4). Possibly, for these tasks, people cannot escape the dangers lurking in deceptive items. In contrast, the results suggest that participants can identify deceptive problems for which the wrong answer stems from reliance on a fast, intuitive process that differs from the analytic mode that is likely to yield correct answers (Experiment 5). The practical and theoretical implications of the results were discussed. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Spatial reasoning with external visualizations: what matters is what you see, not whether you interact

Three experiments examined the effects of interactive visualizations and spatial abilities on a task requiring participants to infer and draw cross sections of a three-dimensional (3D) object. The experiments manipulated whether participants could interactively control a virtual 3D visualization of the object while performing the task, and compared participants who were allowed interactive control of the visualization to those who were not allowed control. In Experiment 1, interactivity produced better performance than passive viewing, but the advantage of interactivity disappeared in Experiment 2 when visual input for the two conditions in a yoked design was equalized. In Experiments 2 and 3, differences in how interactive participants manipulated the visualization were large and related to performance. In Experiment 3, non-interactive participants who watched optimal movements of the display performed as well as interactive participants who manipulated the visualization effectively and better than interactive participants who manipulated the visualization ineffectively. Spatial ability made an independent contribution to performance on the spatial reasoning task, but did not predict patterns of interactive behavior. These experiments indicate that providing participants with active control of a computer visualization does not necessarily enhance task performance, whereas seeing the most task-relevant information does, and this is true regardless of whether the task-relevant information is obtained actively or passively.     

Early understanding of age- and environment-related noxiousness in biological kinds: Evidence for a naive theory

Four experiments evaluated whether children have a naive theory in which biological kinds, specifically foods, are distinguished by potential for decomposition. In the first two experiments, 4- through 6-year-olds judged that natural changes such as aging make biological natural kinds (BNK; e.g., apple) noxious, but do not have a comparable effect on nonbiological natural kinds (e.g., rock) or artifacts. In Experiment 3, few children were able to articulate specific biological mechanisms responsible for perceptible signs of noxiousness. But most children in Experiment 4 exhibited the more general understanding that the processes by which BNK become noxious are irreversible. In sum, young children seem to have a domain-specific theory of biological kinds, although they are unaware of the exact mechanisms operative in the domain. Children may thus develop a theory that picks out a domain of objects before the causal principles organizing this domain are fully understood.     

Repetition, not number of sources, increases both susceptibility to misinformation and confidence in the accuracy of eyewitnesses

Are claims more credible when made by multiple sources, or is it the repetition of claims that matters? Some research suggests that claims have more credibility when independent sources make them. Yet, other research suggests that simply repeating information makes it more accessible and encourages reliance on automatic processes—factors known to change people's judgments. In Experiment 1, people took part in a “misinformation” study: people first watched a video of a crime and later read eyewitness reports attributed to one or three different eyewitnesses who made misleading claims in either one report or repeated the same misleading claims across all three reports. In Experiment 2, people who had not seen any videos read those same reports and indicated how confident they were that each claim happened in the original event. People were more misled by—and more confident about—claims that were repeated, regardless of how many eyewitnesses made them. We hypothesize that people interpreted the familiarity of repeated claims as markers of accuracy. These findings fit with research showing that repeating information makes it seem more true, and highlight the power of a single repeated voice.