The wealth paradox: Prosperity and opposition to immigration

The idea that economic downturns and economic deprivation provoke tensions and intergroup hostility is remarkably pervasive. These accounts often work from the premise that economic crises and poverty provide “fertile soil” for populist parties and leaders with an anti-immigrant agenda. This may explain why we intuitively expect that “hard times” produce “harsh attitudes” towards minorities. However, there is also robust empirical evidence showing that intergroup hostility (and anti-immigration sentiments more specifically) can (i) surge in times of economic prosperity, and (ii) be widespread among relatively affluent groups. In this article, I will review evidence showing that intergroup hostility (such as anti-immigrant sentiments) can be equally prevalent in times of relative gratification as well as in times of relative deprivation (accounting for the “Wealth Paradox”). In the second part of this contribution, I will explore these processes through the lens of classic social identity theorising focusing on the way that status anxiety, status threat, and fear of falling among members of wealthier groups are shaped by the permeability of group boundaries and the security of wealth positions. I argue that social identity theorising, typically applied to explain the behaviour of low status groups, can provide a parsimonious and integrative account for why and when high status (i.e., as a result of affluence and prosperity) may be associated with hostility towards minorities rather than with greater tolerance.     

Deciding to believe: The ethics and rationality of religious belief

This is the text of an Inaugural Lecture, given at the University of Auckland, 25th July, 1994. I am grateful to Stephen Davies, Fred Kroon and Alastair Anderson for helpful discussion on earlier drafts.     

Unintentional influences and opposition: A reply to graf

Abstract

People's behaviour is often influenced by processes of which they are not aware or that they do not intend. However, behaviour is also, at least partially, under intentional control. Most task performance is co-determined by these two classes of processes. Placing intentional control in opposition to unintentional influences is useful for understanding the nature of the two forms of processing. However, opposition alone cannot provide a pure measure of automatic influences because, as in most tasks, intentional processes also affect the overall level of performance. The goal of the process dissociation procedure is to disentangle the effects of these two forms of processing on behaviour. It approaches this goal by taking advantage of a unique property of intentionally controlled processes their ability to either oppose or act in concert with automatic processes. The goal of separating the two forms of processing is imperative for both theoretical and applied purposes.     

The rationality of reasonableness

Rationality and reasonableness are often sharply distinguished from one another and are even held to be in conflict. On this construal, rationality consists in means-end calculation of the most efficient means to one's ends (which are usually taken to be self-interested), while reasonableness consists in equitableness whereby one respects the rights of other persons as well as oneself. To deal with this conflict, it is noted that both rationality and reasonableness are based on reason, which is analyzed as the power of attaining truth, and especially necessary truth. It is then shown that, by the rationality involved in reason, the moral principle of reasonableness, the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC), has a stringently rational justification in that to deny or violate it is to incur self-contradiction. Objections are considered bearing on relevance and motivation. It is concluded that, where reasonableness and egoistic rationality conflict, the former is rationally superior.     

The rationality of metaphysics

In this paper, it is argued that metaphysics, conceived as an inquiry into the ultimate nature of mind-independent reality, is a rationally indispensable intellectual discipline, with the a priori science of formal ontology at its heart. It is maintained that formal ontology, properly understood, is not a mere exercise in conceptual analysis, because its primary objective is a normative one, being nothing less than the attempt to grasp adequately the essences of things, both actual and possible, with a view to understanding as far as we can the fundamental structure of reality as a whole. Accordingly, it is urged, the deliverances of formal ontology have a modal and epistemic status akin to those of other a priori sciences, such as mathematics and logic, rather than constituting rivals to the claims of the empirical sciences, such as physics.     

The rationality of informal argumentation: a Bayesian approach to reasoning fallacies

Classical informal reasoning "fallacies," for example, begging the question or arguing from ignorance, while ubiquitous in everyday argumentation, have been subject to little systematic investigation in cognitive psychology. In this article it is argued that these "fallacies" provide a rich taxonomy of argument forms that can be differentially strong, dependent on their content. A Bayesian theory of content-dependent argument strength is presented. Possible psychological mechanisms are identified. Experiments are presented investigating whether people's judgments of the strength of 3 fallacies--the argumentum ad ignorantiam, the circular argument or petitio principii, and the slippery slope argument--are affected by the factors a Bayesian account predicts. This research suggests that Bayesian accounts of reasoning can be extended to the more general human activity of argumentation.     

Useful lies: The twisted rationality of denial

He who increases knowledge increases sorrow.

Ecclesiastes 1:18

The truth will set you free.

John 8:32

Denial, or the habit of treating a real problem as if it were a nonissue, has both rational and irrational features. The interplay between these is best captured by a utilitarian-rationalist framework stretched to its limits. When in denial, people follow what they feel to be in their best interest by minimizing the psychosocial cost of acknowledging their problems. At its core, denial is thus based on a self-interested rationale of pain avoidance and harm minimization. Depending on the characteristics of the issue at hand, some of the effects are deeply ironic. I demonstrate this by starting from the simplest and most beneficial form of denial, before moving on to cases that are more complex and harmful. I also show how people can be liberated from denial when the practice has become counterproductive. Most of the mystery surrounding denial disappears when we accept that it is premised on a twisted kind of rationality.     

The nature and rationality of conversion

We can differ in our beliefs, values, interests, goals, preferences, and moral psychologies. How we see things can be different. But in none of these respects is our thinking fixed. Beliefs, values, preferences, moral psychology, and so on can change. And sometimes, the change can be significant enough to warrant talk of a conversion. The aim of this paper is then to investigate the nature and rationality of conversion. What is it to undergo a conversion? What practical or epistemic justification can be given of conversion?     

The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire for Children and Adolescents (ERQ-CA): a psychometric evaluation

Despite the recognized importance of emotion regulation (ER) for healthy psychological development, ER research has focused predominantly on the developmental periods of infancy, early childhood, and adulthood, while the middle childhood to adolescence years have been relatively neglected. An obstacle to ER research during these periods is the paucity of valid age-appropriate measures. This study reports on the psychometric evaluation of the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire for Children and Adolescents (ERQ-CA), a revision of the adult measure. The ERQ-CA was evaluated with a sample of 827 participants aged between 10 and 18 years. Results indicate sound internal consistency as well as stability over a 12-month period. Sound construct and convergent validity are also demonstrated. It is concluded that the ERQ-CA is a valid age-appropriate measure for investigating the use of 2 specific strategies of ER during the childhood and adolescence developmental periods.     

Institutional rationality: The complex norms of science

The claim is made that the norms for justified belief in science require a complex structure of practices and institutional arrangements, that these arrangements have a history which, at crucial junctures, are subject to severe stress, that such severe stress puts at issue the whole epistemic structure of science, and that at present science faces one of these periods, and its future is in doubt.     

Child and Adolescent Emotion Regulation: The Role of Parental Emotion Regulation and Expression

This paper reviews current literature relating to parent and child emotional functioning, specifically their emotion regulatory skills and emotional expression. Included are considerations regarding theoretical, methodological, and sampling strengths and weaknesses of existing literature. On the basis of the review, several directions for future research are proposed. First, it is argued that consistency in the measurement of emotion regulation is necessary, including assessment of more refined theoretical conceptualizations of regulatory types, skills, or strategies. Second, it is argued that emotion regulation developmental research examining the post-early childhood period is necessary in order to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of youths’ emotion regulation. Finally, it is argued that greater examination of paternal influences on child emotional functioning, in addition to maternal influences, is required. Consideration of these issues in future emotion regulation research will ideally contribute to a greater understanding of the mechanisms involved in child and adolescent development of optimal regulatory capacities.