Sensitive questions in surveys

Psychologists have worried about the distortions introduced into standardized personality measures by social desirability bias. Survey researchers have had similar concerns about the accuracy of survey reports about such topics as illicit drug use, abortion, and sexual behavior. The article reviews the research done by survey methodologists on reporting errors in surveys on sensitive topics, noting parallels and differences from the psychological literature on social desirability. The findings from the survey studies suggest that misreporting about sensitive topics is quite common and that it is largely situational. The extent of misreporting depends on whether the respondent has anything embarrassing to report and on design features of the survey. The survey evidence also indicates that misreporting on sensitive topics is a more or less motivated process in which respondents edit the information they report to avoid embarrassing themselves in the presence of an interviewer or to avoid repercussions from third parties.     

Many questions Begs the Question (but questions do not Beg the Question)

The fallacy of many questions or the complex question, popularized by the sophism ‘Have you stopped beating your spouse?’ (when a yes-or-no answer is required), is similar to the fallacy of begging the question orpetitio principii. Douglas N. Walton inBegging the Question has recently argued that the two forms are alike in trying unfairly to elicit an admission from a dialectical opponent without meeting burden of proof, but distinct because of the circularity of question-begging argument and noncircularity of many questions. I offer a reconstruction of the many questions fallacy according to which it is just as circular as begging the question, concluding that many questions begs the question. The same analysis contradicts Walton's claim that questions can beg the question, drawing a distinction between questions as the instruments of question-begging, and as vehicles for categorical noninterrogative presuppositions that beg the question.     

On the reducibility of questions

The concepta question is reducible to a non-empty set of questions is defined and examined. The basic results are: (1) each question which is sound relative to some of its presuppositions is reducible to some set of binary (i.e. having exactly two direct answers) questions; (b) each question which has a finite number of direct answers is reducible to some finite set of binary questions; (c) if entailment is compact, then each normal question (i.e. sound relative to its presuppositions) is reducible to some finite set of binary questions.     

Inviting questions

Consumers are frequently invited to ask questions in everyday life. The current research provides an initial examination of how inviting consumers to ask questions influences their attitudes and intentions. Two experiments show that inviting questions can have a positive or negative effect depending on whether consumers actually ask them. Experiment 1 shows that merely inviting questions has a positive effect, but that this effect reverses when consumers actually ask questions. Following a similar logic, Experiment 2 shows that inviting questions has a positive effect under low involvement conditions, but a negative effect under high involvement conditions where the likelihood of generating questions is higher.     

Existence questions

I argue that thinking of existence questions as deep questions to be resolved by a distinctively philosophical discipline of ontology is misguided. I begin by examining how to understand the truth-conditions of existence claims, by way of understanding the rules of use for ‘exists’ and for general noun terms. This yields a straightforward method for resolving existence questions by a combination of conceptual analysis and empirical enquiry. It also provides a blueprint for arguing against most common proposals for uniform substantive ‘criteria of existence’, whether they involve mind-independence, possession of causal powers, observability, etc., and thus for showing that many arguments for denying entities (numbers, ordinary objects, fictional characters, propositions…) on grounds of their failure to meet one or more of these proposed existence criteria are mistaken.

Ethical questions in the age of the new eugenics

As a result of the publicly funded Human Genome Project (HGP), and an increasing number of private enterprises, a new form of eugenic theory and practice has emerged, differing from previous manifestations. Genetic testing has become a consumer service that may now be purchased at greatly reduced cost. While the old eugenics was pseudoscientific, the new eugenics is firmly based on DNA research. While the old eugenics focused on societal measures against the individual, the new eugenics emphasizes the family as a control agent. Eugenics is now voluntary, with the promise of abortion for those afraid of producing genetically damaged children. The ethical concepts of beneficence, avoidance of maleficence, autonomy, and equity are discussed in terms of aspects of the HGP. One major issue is the need for an ethical system available to health consumers that will empower them and assist in their biogenic decisions. “The concentration on the genes implicated in cancer is only a special case of a general genomania (emphasis added) that surfaces in ... the weekly announcements in The New York Times of the location of yet another gene for another disease. The revealing rhetoric of this publicity is always the same; only the blanks need to be filled in: ‘It was announced today by scientists at [Harvard, Vanderbilt, Stanford] Medical School that a gene responsible for [some, many, a common form of] [schizophrenia, Alzheimer’s, arteriosclerosis, prostate cancer] has been located and its DNA sequence determined. This exciting research, say scientists, is the first step in what may eventually turn out to be a possible cure for this disease.’” Lewontin ¹ Portions of this paper were presented at the Eighth National Conference on Applied Ethics, Long Beach, CA, February 27, 28 and March 1, 1997.     

Living toward the end

Human beings look to the end as terminus, a passing away when the individual's life story will be complete. Against a cultural tendency to deny death, Christians—claiming a Creator God who does not die—can accept their finitude in principle and aspire to a “high definition” ending. That hope is threatened by the devastating reality of dementia. But Kierkegaard reminds us that the “positive third” of selfhood is not to be identified with mentality and Whitehead stresses that the reception of the inrushing world does not depend on conscious mentality. Against the prevalent culture of individualism, a person of faith can recognize the constitutive role of community past and present. She can find in her terminus a telos, a passing on of life to the others as she steps aside. Is there more? The Newer Testament proclaims a new creation in which life's ending is transformed by the sense of end as beginning, end as advent. This omega as alpha entails both continuity and discontinuity. As to discontinuity, the Christian envisions a life “beyond Eden,” where the perilous gift of freedom is transformed in an integrating knowledge of self, world, and God—fulfilling the calling given to all as created in God's image. This sense of end does not function as an “escape to a transcendent elsewhere,” but motivates and empowers the believer to care for the suffering victims of this volatile and violent age.     

Living Beyond the Other

This article attempts to bring philosophy to clinical psychological practice by applying philosophical concepts to autobiographical experience. Through reflective engagement with personal narratives, the author tells three personal stories to illustrate ways in which the concept of Dasein in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas’s development of an ethical responsibility to the Other, in tandem with thanatology, helped the author come to terms with existential dilemmas evoked by the deaths of others.     

Is Living Longer Living Better?

abstract Some day, perhaps soon, we may have genetic enhancements enabling us to conquer aging. Should we do so, if we can? I believe the topic is both interesting and important, and that it behoves us to think about it. Doing so may yield important insights about what we do care about, what we should care about, and how we should seek to live our lives, both individually and collectively. My central question is this: Is living longer, living better? My paper does not offer a sustained argument for a single, considered, thesis. Rather, it offers a number of snippets of often‐unconnected thoughts relevant to the issues my question raises. The paper contains seven sections. Part one is introductory. Part two comments on some current longevity research. Part three indicates the attitudes towards death and science with which I approach these questions. Parts four and five, respectively, discuss some worries about immortality raised by Leon Kass and Bernard Williams. Part six points to some practical, social, and moral concerns that might arise if society's members lived super long lives. Part seven concludes by suggesting that we should favour living well over living longer, and ongoing reproduction over immortality; correspondingly, I suggest that we should think long and hard before proceeding with certain lines of longevity research.     

Explaining errors in children's questions

The ability to explain the occurrence of errors in children's speech is an essential component of successful theories of language acquisition. The present study tested some generativist and constructivist predictions about error on the questions produced by ten English-learning children between 2 and 5 years of age. The analyses demonstrated that, as predicted by some generativist theories [e.g. Santelmann, L., Berk, S., Austin, J., Somashekar, S. & Lust. B. (2002). Continuity and development in the acquisition of inversion in yes/no questions: dissociating movement and inflection, Journal of Child Language, 29, 813-842], questions with auxiliary DO attracted higher error rates than those with modal auxiliaries. However, in wh-questions, questions with modals and DO attracted equally high error rates, and these findings could not be explained in terms of problems forming questions with why or negated auxiliaries. It was concluded that the data might be better explained in terms of a constructivist account that suggests that entrenched item-based constructions may be protected from error in children's speech, and that errors occur when children resort to other operations to produce questions [e.g. Dabrowska, E. (2000). From formula to schema: the acquisition of English questions. Cognitive Liguistics, 11, 83-102; Rowland, C. F. & Pine, J. M. (2000). Subject-auxiliary inversion errors and wh-question acquisition: What children do know? Journal of Child Language, 27, 157-181; Tomasello, M. (2003). Constructing a language: A usage-based theory of language acquisition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press]. However, further work on constructivist theory development is required to allow researchers to make predictions about the nature of these operations.     

论生活世界的交往特性

生活世界是人通过实践活动与创造活动所生成的主体间世界。它作为一种文化传统与背景资源为交往行为提供了价值与意义的根据来源,因此,文化价值性是其首要的特征。生活世界因交互主体的建构呈现出交互主体性,而交互主体性又是在私人交往与公共交往的互动中确立的。私人交往与公共交往并不是完全隔绝的,二者是一种共生共荣的关系。