The many minds account of vagueness

This paper presents an new epistemicist account of vagueness, one that avoids standard arbitrariness worries by exploiting a plenitudinous metaphysic.

The secluded minds of violent patients

In this paper, I will present two violent patients suffering from severe Personality Disorders, illustrating the changes that can arise during the course of several years' psychoanalytic treatment in high security hospital. Progress was monitored using the Operationalised Psychodynamic Diagnostics (OPD) system. The clinical presentations will indicate how secluded these patients' minds are to themselves and to those involved in their care. The psychoanalytic treatment, as one part of the overall treatment, is described to show how the secluded parts of the patients'' minds can be approached, including references to the regular regressions that arise, provoked by ‘getting better’.     

The two minds of Roger Scruton

In two recent pieces Roger Scruton recommends that we should instil in children feelings of revulsion towards homosexuality; whereas the corollaries of his earlier book Sexual Desire contradict this. These inconsistencies are exposed and discussed and the preferability of his earlier stance defended.     

Musical minds

Music might be described as just a special form of noise, but evidence is accumulating to show that listening to it can lead to pronounced physiological and emotional responses. In a recent article, Trainor et al. have shown that specific aspects of musical structure are processed automatically in the human brain, raising the question of whether our response to music has specifically evolved or merely occurs as a side-effect of neural architecture.     

Other minds embodied

I distinguish three kinds of other minds problems—conceptual, epistemological and empirical. I argue that while Merleau-Ponty believes embodiment helps with tackling the conceptual and epistemological problems, he suggests that it is of no clear use in solving (an important variant of) the empirical problem. I sketch some considerations that could lend support to Merleau-Ponty’s claims about the conceptual and epistemological problems, without claiming that these are conclusive. I then proceed to argue that Merleau-Ponty’s take on the empirical problem is essentially correct.     

Two minds rationality

I argue that views of human rationality are strongly affected by the adoption of a two minds theory in which humans have an old mind which evolved early and shares many features of animal cognition, as well as new mind which evolved later and is distinctively developed in humans. Both minds have a form of instrumental rationality—striving for the attainment of goals—but by very different mechanisms. The old mind relies on a combination of evolution and experiential learning, and is therefore driven entirely by repeating behaviours which succeeded in the past. The new mind, however, permits the solution of novel problems by reasoning about the future, enabling consequential decision making. I suggest that the concept of epistemic rationality—striving for true knowledge—can only usefully be applied to the new mind with its access to explicit knowledge and beliefs. I also suggest that we commonly interpret behaviour as irrational when the old mind conflicts with the new and frustrates the goals of the conscious person.     

Chronometric explorations of disordered minds

Patients with borderline personality disorder have unstable emotions, difficulty maintaining relationships and a high probability of self-inflicted damage. A recent experiment of Posner et al. that measured reaction-time differences derived from a simple task, revealed that alerting and orienting is normal in these patients. By contrast, and perhaps at the root of this personality disorder, the module responsible for cognitive conflict resolution is defective.