Rethinking the focusing effect in decision-making

According to Legrenzi et al. [Cognition 49 (1993) 37], in making a choice people consider only the alternatives explicitly represented in their mental model of the decision situation. Their idea has found empirical support in the "focusing effect": Individuals focus on the alternatives explicitly stated in the problem context, and do not take into account other possibilities. In their original study, Legrenzi and colleagues considered only one factor to account for the explicit representation of an alternative--i.e., its explicit verbal formulation in the decision problem. Recent theories of relevance and information gain can help articulate their original idea, suggesting that individuals explicitly represent relevant alternatives, whether or not they are explicitly formulated in the decision problem. In three experiments we first replicated Legrenzi et al.'s original experiment, and then showed that the explicit verbal mention of an alternative is neither sufficient nor necessary to focus on it. The results suggest that individuals are able to consider relevant alternatives, even when they are not made explicit in the verbal formulation of a decision problem.     

Dissecting the symbolic distance effect: Comparison and priming effects in numerical and nonnumerical orders

When participants are asked to compare two stimuli, responses are slower for stimuli close to each other on the relevant dimension than for stimuli further apart. Previously, it has been proposed that this comparison distance effect originates from overlap in the representation of the stimuli. This idea is generally accepted in numerical cognition, where it is assumed that representational overlap of numbers on a mental number line accounts for the effect (e.g., Cohen Kadosh et al., 2005). In contrast, others have emphasized the role of response-related processes to explain the comparison distance effect (e.g., Banks, 1977). In the present study, numbers and letters are used to show that the comparison distance effect can be dissociated from a more direct behavioral signature of representational overlap, the priming distance effect. The implication is that a comparison distance effect does not imply representational overlap. An interpretation is given in terms of a recently proposed model of quantity comparison (Verguts, Fias, & Stevens, 2005).     

Choice-Process Satisfaction: The Influence of Attribute Alignability and Option Limitation

This research investigates how choice-process satisfaction is influenced by limitation of choice option and by the types of features used to represent the options. Studies of choice satisfaction have focused on how satisfied the decision maker feels about the choice that has been made and have overlooked the importance of the process through which the decision maker makes a choice, i.e., choice-process satisfaction. We show that the comparability of choice options through alignable features increases choice-process satisfaction, whereas option limitation (i.e., making one option unavailable from a set of equally attractive options) decreases choice-process satisfaction. Further, this decrease in satisfaction, relative to all options being available, occurs for people who are given a set of options in which the difference features are alignable (i.e., differences of a corresponding dimension) but not for people who are given a set of options in which the difference features are nonalignable (i.e., differences of unique dimensions). We propose that alignable differences are easier to compare and have more weight in people's attribute processing, and thus give rise to a perception of a greater amount of information about the option set that is relevant for choice. Making an option unavailable in this case would have a bigger impact than in a situation in which all options have nonalignable differences. Nonalignable differences are difficult to process and are less likely to make people aware that there is very much information about the options for decision making. This explanation and the interaction effect between option limitation and feature alignability are tested in four experiments.     

质量还是价格?折衷产品缺货情境下的消费者选择

基于情境效应和决策冲突理论, 通过三个实验探讨折衷产品选项的不可得如何影响消费者对余下可得产品的偏好。研究结果表明, 折衷商品不可得对余下商品的吸引力呈现非对称性的影响。以质量和价格产品属性的购买情境为例, 中等价格中等质量商品的不可得将显著提升低价格商品的吸引力(实验1), 其原因在于折衷方案不可得显著提高了消费者的决策冲突, 高水平的决策冲突导致决策者偏好具有确定性优势的选项, 规避优势存在模糊性的选项。随着质量属性模糊性的降低(提供专家评价, 实验2; 消费者专业知识较强, 实验3)或提高(质量存在波动范围, 实验2), 折衷商品不可得效应相应减弱或加强。     

Roots, stems, and the universality of lexical representations: evidence from Hebrew

Is the structure of lexical representations universal, or do languages vary in the fundamental ways in which they represent lexical information? Here, we consider a touchstone case: whether Semitic languages require a special morpheme, the consonantal root. In so doing, we explore a well-known constraint on the location of identical consonants that has often been used as motivation for root representations in Semitic languages: Identical consonants frequently occur at the end of putative roots (e.g., skk), but rarely occur in their beginning (e.g., ssk). Although this restriction has traditionally been stated over roots, an alternative account could be stated over stems, a representational entity that is found more widely across the world's languages. To test this possibility, we investigate the acceptability of a single set of roots, manifesting identity initially, finally or not at all (e.g., ssk versus skk versus rmk) across two nominal paradigms: CéCeC (a paradigm in which identical consonants are rare) and CiCúC (a paradigm in which identical consonants are frequent). If Semitic lexical representations consist of roots only, then similar restrictions on consonant co-occurrence should be observed in the two paradigms. Conversely, if speakers store stems, then the restriction on consonant co-occurrence might be modulated by the properties of the nominal paradigm (be it by means of statistical properties or their grammatical sources). Findings from rating and lexical decision experiments with both visual and auditory stimuli support the stem hypothesis: compared to controls (e.g., rmk), forms with identical consonants (e.g., ssk, skk) are less acceptable in the CéCeC than in the CiCúC paradigm. Although our results do not falsify root-based accounts, they strongly raise the possibility that stems could account for the observed restriction on consonantal identity. As such, our results raise fresh challenge to the notion that different languages require distinct sets of representational resources.     

Guilt and focusing in decision-making

In this paper we examined the impact of a specific emotion, guilt, on focusing in decision-making. Through the focusing mechanism, when making decisions, individuals tend to restrict their thoughts to what is explicitly represented in the decisional task, disregarding alternatives. In this paper, three experiments are performed to investigate whether an emotional state of guilt can critically guide individuals' focusing, and even prevailing over the focusing mechanism. Guilty emotional state was induced by asking participants to write about a guilty related life event. The emotional state was thus neither generated by nor related to the tasks used in the experiments. Results of the first two studies show that guilt affects focusing in decision-making in the case of only one explicitly specified option (a positive or a negative one). Guilty participants, when presented with a stated option that has predominantly positive characteristics, prefer other, unspecified options over the positive one. Guilty participants faced with a stated option that has predominantly negative features tend to prefer it to other, unspecified, options, instead. Finally, experiment 3 shows that guilty participants presented with two different options (a negative vs. a positive one) having different degrees of explicitness (i.e. they are not equally represented in the decision frame), focus on the negative option, even though the latter was not explicitly represented but only hinted at the end of the text. Overall, these results suggest that guilt emotion state can play a crucial role in either strengthening or reducing the focusing mechanism. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Representational unification in cognitive science: Is embodied cognition a unifying perspective?

In this paper, we defend a novel, multidimensional account of representational unification, which we distinguish from integration. The dimensions of unity are simplicity, generality and scope, non-monstrosity, and systematization. In our account, unification is a graded property. The account is used to investigate the issue of how research traditions contribute to representational unification, focusing on embodied cognition in cognitive science. Embodied cognition contributes to unification even if it fails to offer a grand unification of cognitive science. The study of this failure shows that unification, contrary to what defenders of mechanistic explanation claim, is an important mechanistic virtue of research traditions.

     

Ecological and evolutionary validity: comments on Johnson-Laird,Legrenzi, Girotto,Legrenzi, and Caverni's (1999) mental-model theory of extensional reasoning

The mental-model account of naive probabilistic reasoning by P. N. Johnson-Laird, P. Legrenzi, V. Girotto, M. S. Legrenzi, and J.-P. Caverni (1999) provides an opportunity to clarify several similarities and differences between it and ecological rationality (frequentist) accounts. First, ambiguities in the meaning of Bayesian reasoning can lead to disagreements and inappropriate arguments. Second, 2 conflated effects of using natural frequencies are noticed but not actually tested separately because of an artificial dissociation of frequency representations and natural sampling. Third, similarities are noted between the subset principle and the principle of natural sampling. Finally, some potentially misleading portrayals of the role of evolutionary factors in psychology are corrected. Mental-model theory, rather than better explaining probabilistic reasoning, may be able to use frequency representations as a key element in clarifying its own ambiguous constructs.     

因果与权重：决策的眼动模型

结合眼动注视的漂移扩散模型可很好描述个体的决策行为,但尚存在两个问题未得到解决：注视与决策的因果关系以及决策过程中累积证据的权重问题。本研究采用基于注视的操纵范式考察了基于价值的决策中注视与决策的关系,发现操纵被试对选项的注视时间可影响其选择,注视操纵主要影响决策后期时程,且模型参数估计结果更支持近因模型。研究结果支持了漂移扩散模型的近因假设,为今后的模型发展指明了新方向。     

Differential effects of aging on processes involved in mental imagery generation]

The purpose of this study was to measure the degree to which the deterioration of mental image generation processes observed in elderly subjects by Dror and Kosslyn (1994) depends on the nature of the processing (referential vs. representational) involved in performing the task at hand. In keeping with the results of research showing that processing resources diminish as normal aging occurs (Craik & Bird, 1982; Rabinowitz, Craik & Ackerman, 1982), we suggest that generation ability based on referential processing is affected to a greater extent in older adults than is the generation ability involving representational processing. Fifteen young adults and 15 elderly persons performed a generation task modeled on that used by Dror and Kosslyn (1994). Observations were based on two contrasting conditions. In the first instance, subjects were required to generate an image representation of numbers when instructed to do so by a graphic stimulus, e.g., "31" (representational generation). In the second case, generation was produced on the basis of a verbal stimulus, e.g., "thirteen" (referential generation). Results (response time and number of accurate answers) show that, compared to young adults, elderly adults have a diminished ability to generate images based on words rather than numbers and do so at a slower pace. Our results suggest, therefore, that the performance of the first type of generation is cognitively more demanding for elderly subjects than that which is founded on figurative stimuli. The deterioration of mental image generation processes observed in elderly subjects by Dror and Kosslyn (1994) is therefore dependent on the nature of processing (referential vs. In conclusion we suggest two complementary assumptions to explain the observed dissociation. The differential effect of age may be the result of a deficienness cy linked to the nature of processing (control vs. automatic). Our second assumption is that, more specifically, referential generation involves more processing resources than does representational generation because it requires an additional transcoding operation. In this instance, the differential effect of aging that we observed would be closely linked to the number of cognitive operations involved in mental image generation.     

Which is the compromise option? Information format and task format as determinants

When consumers must make a decision but are uncertain of their preferences, they often select a compromise choice. Early studies emphasized the relational properties of choice alternatives and indicated that the middle option, whose attribute values fall between the values of other alternatives, is always the compromise option. More recent studies have suggested that when consumers rate two attributes with the same metrics, the attribute–balance choice whose two attributes have equal ratings, might represent the compromise choice. We propose that the different characteristics of the middle and attribute–balance options—which may be compatible with certain determinants such as information and task formats—might be more salient and affect the relative attractiveness of each option. The results of three experiments confirmed this prediction: the middle option was more attractive in list‐by‐attributes and rejecting conditions, whereas the attribute–balance option was more attractive in list‐by‐alternatives and choosing conditions. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does category labeling lead to forgetting?

What effect does labeling an object as a member of a familiar category have on memory for that object? Recent studies suggest that recognition memory can be negatively impacted by categorizing objects during encoding. This paper examines the “representational shift hypothesis” which argues that categorizing an object impairs recognition memory by altering the trace of the encoded memory to be more similar to the category prototype. Previous evidence for this idea comes from experiments in which a basic-level category labeling task was compared to a non-category labeling incidental encoding task, usually a preference judgment (e.g., “Do you like this item?”). In two experiments, we examine alternative tasks that attempt to control for processing demands and the degree to which category information is explicitly recruited at the time of study. Contrary to the predictions of the representational shift hypothesis, we find no evidence that memory is selectively impaired by category labeling. Overall, the pattern of results across both studies appears consistent with well-established variables known to influence memory such as encoding specificity and distinctiveness effects.     

Consistency,mechanicalness, and the logic of the mind

G. Priest's anti-consistency argument (Priest 1979, 1984, 1987) and J. R. Lucas's anti-mechanist argument (Lucas 1961, 1968, 1970, 1984) both appeal to Gödel incompleteness. By way of refuting them, this paper defends the thesis of quartet compatibility, viz., that the logic of the mind can simultaneously be Gödel incomplete, consistent, mechanical, and recursion complete (capable of all means of recursion). A representational approach is pursued, which owes its origin to works by, among others, J. Myhill (1964), P. Benacerraf (1967), J. Webb (1980, 1983) and M. Arbib (1987). It is shown that the fallacy shared by the two arguments under discussion lies in misidentifying two systems, the one for which the Gödel sentence is constructable and to be proved, and the other in which the Gödel sentence in question is indeed provable. It follows that the logic of the mind can surpass its own Gödelian limitation not by being inconsistent or non-mechanistic, but by being capable of representing stronger systems in itself; and so can a proper machine. The concepts of representational provability, representational maximality, formal system capacity, etc., are discussed.     

On the representational systems underlying prospection: Evidence from the event-cueing paradigm

The ability to think about the future-prospection-is central to many aspects of human cognition and behavior, from planning and decision making, to self-control and the construction of a sense of identity. Yet, the exact nature of the representational systems underlying prospection is not fully understood. Recent findings point to the critical role of episodic memory in imagining specific future events, but it is unlikely that prospection depends solely on this system. Using an event-cueing paradigm in two studies, we here show that specific events that people imagine might happen in their personal future are commonly embedded in broader event sequences-termed event clusters-that link a set of envisioned events according to causal and thematic relations. These findings provide novel evidence that prospection relies on multiple representational systems, with general autobiographical knowledge structures providing a frame that organizes imagined events in overarching event sequences. The results further suggest that knowledge about personal goals plays an important role in structuring these event sequences, especially for the distant future.     

The majority rule in individual decision making

This research investigates an understudied decision heuristic, the majority rule. By using the rule, decision makers choose the option superior on most of the available cues. Cues are broadly defined, including advisors and attributes. We propose that decision makers are more likely to use the majority rule when encouraged to employ intra-cue comparison as opposed to intra-option integration, and that their choices are influenced by factors that influence which option appears majority superior. We corroborate the two propositions in four studies. In Studies 1 and 2, we explore two factors that moderate use of the majority rule through facilitating intra-cue comparison or intra-option integration—response mode and information display format. In Studies 3 and 4, we explore two factors that influence choice through influencing which option appears majority-superior—cue-unpacking and cue-regrouping.     

Information presentation format moderates the unconscious-thought effect: The role of recollection

The unconscious-thought effect occurs when distraction improves complex decision-making. In two experiments using the unconscious-thought paradigm, we investigated the effect of presentation format of decision information (i) on memory for decision-relevant information and (ii) on the quality of decisions made after distraction, conscious deliberation or immediately. We used the process-dissociation procedure to measure recollection and familiarity. The two studies showed that presenting information blocked per criterion led participants to recollect more decision-relevant details compared to a presentation by option. Moreover, a Bayesian meta-analysis of the two studies provided strong evidence that conscious deliberation resulted in better decisions when the information was presented blocked per criterion and substantial evidence that distraction improved decision quality when the information was presented blocked per option. Finally, Study 2 revealed that the recollection of decision-relevant details mediated the effect of presentation format on decision quality in the deliberation condition. This suggests that recollection contributes to conscious deliberation efficacy.     

The disjunction effect reexamined: Relevant methodological issues and the fallacy of unspecified percentage comparisons

Leonard J. Savage’s sure-thing principle (1954) is a key assumption of the consequentialist conception of decision making under uncertainty, which more-or-less assumes that decision makers are rational and thorough. The sure-thing principle states that if some option x is preferred given some other event A occurs, and if option x is preferred given this event A does not occur, then x should be preferred even when the outcome of A is unknown. Tversky and Shafir [Tversky, A., &; Shafir, E. (1992). The disjunction effect in choice under uncertainty. Psychological Science, 3(5) 305–309] claim that this basic principle is frequently violated in two-step gambles. They call such violations disjunction effects. Kuhberber, Komunska, and Perner [Kuhberber, A., Komunska, D., &; Perner, J. (2001). The disjunction effect: does it exist for two step gambles? Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 85(2) 250–264] attempted to replicate Tversky and Shafir’s findings and claim their results show that people do not violate the sure-thing principle in repeated gambles. This article evaluates Kuhberger, Komunska, and Perner’s claims, suggesting they did not appropriately analyze their results, and further provides evidence that people do regularly violate the sure-thing principle in two-step gambles, providing further evidence for the reality of disjunction effects.     

Decision making in the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART): Anterior cingulate cortex signals loss aversion but not the infrequency of risky choices

The inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula (IFG/AI) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) are key regions involved in risk appraisal during decision making, but accounts of how these regions contribute to decision making under risk remain contested. To help clarify the roles of these and other related regions, we used a modified version of the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Lejuez et al., Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 8, 75-84, 2002) to distinguish between decision-making and feedback-related processes when participants decided to pursue a gain as the probability of loss increased parametrically. Specifically, we set out to test whether the ACC and IFG/AI regions correspond to loss aversion at the time of decision making in a way that is not confounded with either reward-seeking or infrequency effects. When participants chose to discontinue inflating the balloon (win option), we observed greater ACC and mainly bilateral IFG/AI activity at the time of decision as the probability of explosion increased, consistent with increased loss aversion but inconsistent with an infrequency effect. In contrast, we found robust vmPFC activity when participants chose to continue inflating the balloon (risky option), consistent with reward seeking. However, in the cingulate and in mainly bilateral IFG regions, blood-oxygenation-level-dependent activation decreased when participants chose to inflate the balloon as the probability of explosion increased, findings that are consistent with a reduced loss aversion signal. Our results highlight the existence of distinct reward-seeking and loss-averse signals during decision making, as well as the importance of distinguishing between decision and feedback signals.     

Spontaneous versus Controlled Influences of Stimulus-Based Affect on Choice Behavior

This article identifies two routes through which affect and cognitions arising from a stimulus can influence choices: a “lower order” route, where choices are influenced through automatic affective processes, and a “higher order” route, where choices are influenced through more controlled affective or consequence-related cognitive processes. Across three experiments the extent of deliberation, mental preoccupation, and the nature of exposure to the stimuli were manipulated to identify conditions under which lower order affect, higher order affect, or higher order cognitions impact choices. Respondents chose between two alternatives: one that was associated with more intense positive affect but less favorable cognitions (e.g., chocolate cake), and one that was associated with less intense positive affect but more favorable cognitions (e.g., fruit salad). Findings suggest that when the individual makes the decision quickly and is mentally preoccupied while making the decision, choices are driven by lower order affect. When the individual deliberates on the decision without being mentally preoccupied and the affect-laden option is in full view while the decision is being deliberated upon, choices are driven by higher order affect. In both cases, the affect-laden option (e.g. chocolate cake) is selected. In all other situations, choices are driven by higher order consequence-related cognitions and the alternative that is superior on the cognitive dimension (e.g. fruit salad) is selected. It is suggested that the effects of affective reactions on choice occur through the activation of appetitive (i.e., gratification-seeking) goals.