动允直接知觉的共鸣原理

传统认知理论认为我们只能间接知觉动允,而生态认知心理学则认为对动允的知觉是个体与环境信息直接共鸣的过程。生态认知心理学首先判定动允并不是存在于我们头脑中的认识,而是实际存在于个体-环境系统中的事实,对动允的直接知觉就是对动允的检测而非推测,是对动允信息的拾取而非对记忆内容的提取。这种直接知觉表现为身体的相关动作机制（动作神经元、肌肉组织等）与环境中动允信息的共鸣。进化与学习在共鸣的形成与发展中具有重要作用。     

Bidirectional semantic interference between action and speech

Research on embodied cognition assumes that language processing involves modal simulations that recruit the same neural systems that are usually used for action execution. If this is true, one should find evidence for bidirectional crosstalk between action and language. Using a direct matching paradigm, this study tested if action-languages interactions are bidirectional (Experiments 1 and 2), and whether the effect of crosstalk between action perception and language production is due to facilitation or interference (Experiment 3). Replicating previous findings, we found evidence for crosstalk when manual actions had to be performed simultaneously to action-word perception (Experiment 1) and also when language had to be produced during simultaneous perception of hand actions (Experiment 2). These findings suggest a clear bidirectional relationship between action and language. The latter crosstalk effect was due to interference between action and language (Experiment 3). By extending previous research of embodied cognition, the present findings provide novel evidence suggesting that bidirectional functional relations between action and language are based on similar conceptual-semantic representations.     

Conscious Vision for Action Versus Unconscious Vision for Action?

David Milner and Melvyn Goodale’s dissociation hypothesis is commonly taken to state that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in striate (V1) cortex: a dorsal, action‐related “unconscious” stream and a ventral, perception‐related “conscious” stream. As Milner and Goodale acknowledge, findings from blindsight studies suggest a more sophisticated picture that replaces the distinction between unconscious vision for action and conscious vision for perception with a tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. The combination excluded by the tripartite division is the possibility of conscious vision for action. But are there good grounds for concluding that there is no conscious vision for action? There is now overwhelming evidence that illusions and perceived size can have a significant effect on action ( Bruno & Franz, 2009 ; Dassonville & Bala, 2004 ; Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008 ; McIntosh & Lashley, 2008 ). There is also suggestive evidence that any sophisticated visual behavior requires collaboration between the two visual streams at every stage of the process ( Schenk & McIntosh, 2010 ). I nonetheless want to make a case for the tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. My aim here is not to refute the evidence showing that conscious vision can affect action but rather to argue (a) that we cannot gain cognitive access to action‐guiding dorsal stream representations, and (b) that these representations do not correlate with phenomenal consciousness. This vindicates the semi‐conservative view that the dissociation hypothesis is best understood as a tripartite division.     

The role of motor simulation in action perception: a neuropsychological case study

Research on embodied cognition stresses that bodily and motor processes constrain how we perceive others. Regarding action perception the most prominent hypothesis is that observed actions are matched to the observer’s own motor representations. Previous findings demonstrate that the motor laws that constrain one’s performance also constrain one’s perception of others’ actions. The present neuropsychological case study asked whether neurological impairments affect a person’s performance and action perception in the same way. The results showed that patient DS, who suffers from a frontal brain lesion, not only ignored target size when performing movements but also when asked to judge whether others can perform the same movements. In other words DS showed the same violation of Fitts’s law when performing and observing actions. These results further support the assumption of close perception action links and the assumption that these links recruit predictive mechanisms residing in the motor system.     

Stratification in perception and action

Summary This paper discusses the concept of stratification, in the sense of levels of analysis and levels of control, in relation to human perception and performance. It is contended that functional analysis is the proper level of analysis for the domain of perception and action. This is illustrated by means of models of cognitive energetics and motor control. The functional level of analysis can be situated in between the level of symbolic representations and the level of neurophysiological mechanisms. It is also argued that the concept of levels of control provides a way of integrating or relating ecological and information-processing approaches to psychology, in the sense that ecological psychology is concerned with lower and more peripheral levels of control (coordinative structures). Finally, some remarks are made on the relation between cognition and perception and action, drawing on Piaget, and it is proposed that the concept of schema is more appropriate for the domain of perception and action than is the notion of symbolic representations.     

Weaving the fabric of social interaction: Articulating developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience in the domain of motor cognition

In this article, we bring together recent findings from developmental science and cognitive neuroscience to argue that perception-action coupling constitutes the fundamental mechanism of motor cognition. A variety of empirical evidence suggests that observed and executed actions are coded in a common cognitive and neural framework, enabling individuals to construct shared representations of self and other actions. We review work to suggest that such shared representations support action anticipation, organization, and imitation. These processes, along with additional computational mechanisms for determining a sense of agency and behavioral regulation, form the fabric of social interaction. In addition, humans possess the capacity to move beyond these basic aspects of action analysis to interpret behavior at a deeper level, an ability that may be outside the scope of the mirror system. Understanding the nature of shared representations from the vantage point of developmental and cognitive science and neuroscience has the potential to inform a range of motor and social processes. This perspective also elucidates intriguing new directions and research questions and generates specific hypotheses regarding the impact of early disorders (e.g., developmental movement disorders) on subsequent action processing.     

The perception/cognition distincton: Challenging the representational account

A central goal for cognitive science and philosophy of mind is to distinguish between perception and cognition. The representational approach has emerged as a prominent candidate to draw such a distinction. The idea is that perception and cognition differ in the content and the format in which the information is represented —just as perceptual representations are nonconceptual in content and iconic in format, cognitive representations are conceptual in content and discursive in format. This paper argues against this view. I argue that both perception and cognition can use conceptual and nonconceptual contents and be vehiculated in iconic and discursive formats. If correct, the representational strategy to distinguish perception from cognition fails.     

Representation and learning in motor action – Bridges between experimental research and cognitive robotics

To gain a better understanding of the functionality of representation and categorization in action and interaction, it is fundamental that researchers understand how movements are represented in long-term memory. It is our position that human motor control requires that our actions be planned and represented in terms of intended perceptual effects and future task demands, and that the individual has a well-structured mental representation of the task so that the movement can be carried out successfully. Basic Action Concepts (BACs) are identified as major building blocks of cognitive representation in long-term memory, which are cognitive tools used to master the functional demands of movement tasks. In this paper, we consider relevant issues in research methodology and present an experimental method that can be used to assess action-relevant representational structures. This method permits us to observe the strong relationship between cognitive representation and performance in manual action. For example, the specific differences in the mental representations of participants are strongly related to skill level, as well as biomechanical and task constraints. We then discuss results from our learning experiments, where we have examined the development and changes in cognitive representation over time. From these experiments we have found that cognitive reference structures include task-specific spatial information, which provides the basis for action control in skilled voluntary movement. We have implemented these results on various robotic platforms. We argue that the insights gained from various experimental approaches in the field of cognitive psychology and motor control enable researchers to explore the possibilities and limitations of artificial control architectures in robot systems. Finally, we argue that this is not a unidirectional process. Researchers from the field of cognitive psychology and motor control can profit from the advances in technological systems, which enhance the understanding of human motor control in skilled voluntary action.     

The handedness of imagined bodies in action and the role of perspective taking

Past research at the nexus of motor control and perception investigated the role of perspective taking in many behavioral and neuroimaging studies. Some investigators addressed the issue of one's own vs. others' action imagination, but the possible effects of a front or a back view in imagining others' actions have so far been neglected. We report two 'single trial' experiments in which a total of 640 participants were asked to imagine a person performing a manual action - either in a front or in a back view - and then to indicate the hand used by the imagined person during movement execution. In such a task, we assume the existence of two distinct biases: a perceptual-mnemonic bias due to subjects' visual experience of others' actions, encouraging them to imagine right-handed movements, and a motor bias due to subjects' experience of self-made actions, encouraging them to imagine movements performed with the same hand as their dominant hand. We hypothesized that a greater involvement of motor representations in the back view compared to the front view could result in an increased correspondence between one's own manual preference and the hand used by the imagined agent in the former condition. The results of both experiments were consistent with this hypothesis, suggesting that while imagining others' actions we employ motor simulations in different degrees according to the perspective adopted.     

Voluntary manual exploration and vision in rod bisection

Two experiments were carried out to investigate contributions of voluntary manual exploration and vision to rod-bisection performance when the rod was placed in different spatial positions. Analysis showed both voluntary manual exploration and vision contributed to the accuracy of rod-bisection performance in healthy adults (Exp. 1: 12 men, 13 women; Exp. 2: 10 men, 11 women). Advantages of voluntary manual exploration were related to rod position and initial search direction. Results are discussed with regard to ecological approach to action and perception, two cortical systems (ventral and dorsal streams) for perception and control of actions, and the hemispheric activation hypothesis.     

Using Dynamic Field Theory to extend the embodiment stance toward higher cognition

The embodiment stance emphasizes that cognitive processes unfold continuously in time, are constantly linked to the sensory and motor surfaces, and adapt through learning and development. Dynamic Field Theory (DFT) is a neurally based set of concepts that has turned out to be useful for understanding how cognition emerges in an embodied and situated system. We explore how the embodiment stance may be extended beyond those forms of cognition that are closest to sensorimotor processes. The core elements of DFT are dynamic neural fields (DNFs), patterns of activation defined over different kinds of spaces. These may include retinal space and visual feature spaces, spaces spanned by movement parameters such as movement direction and amplitude, or abstract spaces like the ordinal axis along which sequences unfold. Instances of representation that stand for perceptual objects, motor plans, or action intentions are peaks of activation in the DNFs. We show how such peaks may arise from input and are stabilized by intra-field interaction. Given a neural mechanism for instantiation, the neuronal couplings between DNFs implement cognitive operations. We illustrate how these mechanisms can be used to enable architectures of dynamic neural fields to perform cognitive functions such as acquiring and updating scene representations, using grounded spatial language, and generating sequences of actions. Implementing these DFT models in autonomous robots demonstrates how these cognitive functions can be enacted in embodied, situated systems.     

具身概念表征的研究及理论述评

具身认知强调认知在本质上是具身的, 身体在认知的实现中发挥着关键作用。传统的符号加工理论认为, 概念表征独立于主体的知觉运动系统并以抽象符号的形式储存于语言记忆中。概念表征的具身理论则认为, 概念表征与知觉运动系统具有共同的神经基础, 概念在本质上是主体经验客体时知觉与运动体验的神经记录, 而概念加工的基本形式则是身体经验的模拟与还原。关于该理论的实证研究主要集中于概念加工引发的知觉动作变化、身体动作对概念加工的影响、抽象概念加工的具身特征等领域。今后的研究应关注符号加工理论与具身理论的整合等。     

Dorsal and ventral streams: a framework for understanding aspects of the functional anatomy of language

Despite intensive work on language-brain relations, and a fairly impressive accumulation of knowledge over the last several decades, there has been little progress in developing large-scale models of the functional anatomy of language that integrate neuropsychological, neuroimaging, and psycholinguistic data. Drawing on relatively recent developments in the cortical organization of vision, and on data from a variety of sources, we propose a new framework for understanding aspects of the functional anatomy of language which moves towards remedying this situation. The framework posits that early cortical stages of speech perception involve auditory fields in the superior temporal gyrus bilaterally (although asymmetrically). This cortical processing system then diverges into two broad processing streams, a ventral stream, which is involved in mapping sound onto meaning, and a dorsal stream, which is involved in mapping sound onto articulatory-based representations. The ventral stream projects ventro-laterally toward inferior posterior temporal cortex (posterior middle temporal gyrus) which serves as an interface between sound-based representations of speech in the superior temporal gyrus (again bilaterally) and widely distributed conceptual representations. The dorsal stream projects dorso-posteriorly involving a region in the posterior Sylvian fissure at the parietal-temporal boundary (area Spt), and ultimately projecting to frontal regions. This network provides a mechanism for the development and maintenance of "parity" between auditory and motor representations of speech. Although the proposed dorsal stream represents a very tight connection between processes involved in speech perception and speech production, it does not appear to be a critical component of the speech perception process under normal (ecologically natural) listening conditions, that is, when speech input is mapped onto a conceptual representation. We also propose some degree of bi-directionality in both the dorsal and ventral pathways. We discuss some recent empirical tests of this framework that utilize a range of methods. We also show how damage to different components of this framework can account for the major symptom clusters of the fluent aphasias, and discuss some recent evidence concerning how sentence-level processing might be integrated into the framework.     

Joint action: bodies and minds moving together

The ability to coordinate our actions with those of others is crucial for our success as individuals and as a species. Progress in understanding the cognitive and neural processes involved in joint action has been slow and sparse, because cognitive neuroscientists have predominantly studied individual minds and brains in isolation. However, in recent years, major advances have been made by investigating perception and action in social context. In this article we outline how studies on joint attention, action observation, task sharing, action coordination and agency contribute to the understanding of the cognitive and neural processes supporting joint action. Several mechanisms are proposed that allow individuals to share representations, to predict actions, and to integrate predicted effects of own and others' actions.     

Distal engagement: Intentions in perception

Non-representational approaches to cognition have struggled to provide accounts of long-term planning that forgo the use of representations. An explanation comes easier for cognitivist accounts, which hold that we concoct and use contentful mental representations as guides to coordinate a series of actions towards an end state. One non-representational approach, ecological-enactivism, has recently seen several proposals that account for “high-level” or “representation-hungry” capacities, including long-term planning and action coordination. In this paper, we demonstrate the explanatory gap in these accounts that stems from avoiding the incorporation of long-term intentions, as they play an important role both in action coordination and perception on the ecological account. Using recent enactive accounts of language, we argue for a non-representational conception of intentions, their formation, and their role in coordinating pre-reflective action. We provide an account for the coordination of our present actions towards a distant goal, a skill we call distal engagement. Rather than positing intentions as an actual cognitive entity in need of explanation, we argue that we take them up in this way as a practice due to linguistically scaffolded attitudes towards language use.     

Integrating faces, houses, motion, and action: spontaneous binding across ventral and dorsal processing streams

Perceiving an event requires the integration of its features across numerous brain maps and modules. Visual object perception is thought to be mediated by a ventral processing stream running from occipital to inferotemporal cortex, whereas most spatial processing and action control is attributed to the dorsal stream connecting occipital, parietal, and frontal cortex. Here we show that integration operates not only on ventral features and objects, such as faces and houses, but also across ventral and dorsal pathways, binding faces and houses to motion and manual action. Furthermore, these bindings seem to persist over time, as they influenced performance on future task-relevant visual stimuli. This is reflected by longer reaction times for repeating one, but alternating other features in a sequence, compared to complete repetition or alternation of features. Our findings are inconsistent with the notion that the dorsal stream is operating exclusively online and has no access to memory.     

Perceptual resonance: action-induced modulation of perception

A direct relationship between perception and action implies bi-directionality, and predicts not only effects of perception on action but also effects of action on perception. Modern theories of social cognition have intensively examined the relation from perception to action and propose that mirroring the observed actions of others underlies action understanding. Here, we suggest that this view is incomplete, as it neglects the perspective of the actor. We will review empirical evidence showing the effects of self-generated action on perceptual judgments. We propose that producing action might prime perception in a way that observers are selectively sensitive to related or similar actions of conspecifics. Therefore, perceptual resonance, not motor resonance, might be decisive for grounding sympathy and empathy and, thus, successful social interactions.     

Graspability and object processing in infants

This review pursues the idea that a dual visual system approach is fruitful for interpreting work on infant cognition. We provide examples from the visual perception and cognition literature demonstrating that the potential graspability of stimuli typically used in infant studies influence how these stimuli are processed by the infant brain. Specifically, we argue that small, local, familiar and moving stimuli are more likely to be processed by the dorsal (how or action) stream of visual processing. In contrast, larger, stationary objects are likely to be processed by the ventral (what or perception) stream. This analysis clarifies apparently conflicting results in the literature.     

生成认知：理论基础与实践走向

生成认知是具身认知思潮中的一个新取向。它主张认知是通过身体活动“生成的” (enacted)。认知的起点不是一个怎样精确表征世界的信息加工问题, 而是行动者在情境中怎样利用知觉来指导自己的行动。认知不是通过精确的心理表征“恢复”世界, 而是通过知觉引导的行动“生成”或“造就”一个自己的世界。认知是具身的行动, 认知结构形成于经常和反复出现的感觉运动模式, 与身体构造和身体活动具有深刻连续性。梅洛·庞蒂的身体现象学对生成认知具有深刻影响。同时, 詹姆斯、杜威等人的实用主义哲学对于实践行动的强调也深刻影响了生成认知。这种认知观强调了“行动”对心智的意义, 引发许多争议, 也促进了心理学研究范式的转变。