Race, brain size, and intelligence: another reply to Cernovsky

Five sets of observations require explanation. Firstly, within both black and white populations there is a small positive correlation between IQ and brain size whether or not there is control for body size. Secondly, racial differences in average brain size occur such that Mongoloids greater than Caucasoids greater than Negroids especially with control for body size. Thirdly, mammals with larger brains relative to their bodies perform better on learning tasks than mammals with smaller brains relative to their bodies. Fourthly, average racial differences on measures of cognitive performance parallel the differences in average brain size. Fifthly, average racial differences on numerous other traits parallel the differences in intelligence and brain size. It is incumbent on scientists to explain these facts.     

Differential K theory and race differences in E and N

Differential K Theory was recently proposed relating personality to reproductive strategy (Rushton, 1985). The more K the person is (the symbol derives from population biology), the more he or she will delay reproductive effort, produce fewer children and more intensely care for them. Concomitant characteristics include intelligence, altruism, law-abidingness and behavioural restraint. Race differences are hypothesized such that, in terms of K, Mongoloids > Caucasoids > Negroids. Barratt and Eysenck (1984) recently published standardized Extraversion (E), Neuroticism (N), Psychoticism (P) and Social Desirability (L) scores for males and females from 25 different countries, but did not analyse the data in such a way that racial differences were found. In the current study Barratt and Eysenck's data are aggregated across sex and over countries to examine whether theoretical predictions regarding race differences in behavioural restraint do in fact occur. Behavioural restraint was indexed by low E and high N scores. The means for 8 Mongoloid samples (N = 4044) were contrasted with those of 38 Caucasoid (N = 19, 807) and 4 Negroid ones (N = 1906), and the resultant comparisons confirmed expectations. Mongoloids are lower on E and higher on N than Caucasoids, who in turn are lower in E and higher on N than Negroids.     

Race differences in behaviour: A review and evolutionary analysis

Racial differences exist on numerous heritable behaviour traits such that Caucasoids fall between Mongoloids and Negroids. Across samples, ages, and time periods, this pattern is observed on estimates made of brain size and intelligence (cranial capacity=1448, 1408, 1334 cm^3., brain weight=1351, 1336, 1286 g; IQ scores=107, 100, 85); maturation rate (age to walk alone, age of puberty, age of death); personality and temperament (activity level, anxiety, sociability); sexual restraint (gamete production, intercourse frequency, size of genitalia); and social organization (marital stability, mental health, law abidingness). These observations may be explained in part in terms of gene-culture coevolutionarily based r/K reproductive strategies.     

Rushton’s r–K life history theory of race differences in penis length and circumference examined in 113 populations

 and r–K life history theory that Mongoloids are the most K evolved, Caucasoids somewhat less K evolved, and Negroids the least K evolved is examined and extended in an analysis of data for erect penis length and circumference in two new data sets. These new data extend Rushton’s theory by presenting disaggregated data for penis size for European and North African/South Asian Caucasoids; for East Asian and Southeast Asian Mongoloids; for Inuit and Amerindians and Mestizos, and for thirteen mixed race samples. The results generally confirm and extend Rushton’s r–K life history theory.     

Differential K theory: The sociobiology of individual and group differences

Differential K Theory is proposed to help systematize individual and group differences in life histories, social behaviour and physiological functioning. K refers to one end of a continuum of reproductive strategies organisms can adopt, characterized by the production of very few offspring with a large investment of energy in each. At the opposite extreme is the r-strategy in which organisms produce a large number of offspring but invest little energy in any one. Between-species comparisons demonstrate that these reproductive strategies correlate with a variety of life history traits including: litter size, birth-spacing, parental care, infant mortality, developmental precocity, life span, intelligence, social organization and altruism. As a species, humans are at the K end of the continuum. Some people, however, are postulated to be more K than others. The more K a person is, the more likely he or she is to come from a smaller sized family, with a greater spacing of births, a lower incidence of DZ twinning, and more intensive parental care. Moreover, he or she will tend to be intelligent, altruistic, law-abiding, behaviourally restrained, maturationally delayed, lower in sex drive and longer lived. Thus diverse organismic characteristics, not otherwise relatable, are presumed to covary along the K dimension. Group differences are also hypothesized, such that, in terms of K: higher socio-economic > lower socio-economic; and Mongoloids > Caucasoids > Negroids.     

Love and Power,and the Development of the Brain,Mind, and Agency

In drawing on my own research and collaborative work with Karl Pribram, I show that love (affective attachment) and power (social control) play a central role in psychosocial evolution. When these relations are coupled in a self-regulating system of cooperative interactions, brain growth is stimulated, mind and agency develop, and stable forms of collective social organization are generated. Focusing on the endogenous dynamics of social collectives, the article is organized in four parts. (A "social collective" is defined as a durable arrangement of relations among two or more individuals that is distinguished by shared membership and collaboration in relation to a common function or goal.) Part I summarizes evidence from developmental neuropsychology and social science to show that stable psychosocial organization, across the human life span, is associated with social interaction organized along two dimensions. One dimension involves love, positive affective attachment, and the second involves power, social regulation of the aroused affective energy. Part II draws on Piaget's theory of cooperation and Bradley and Pribrams' theory of communication to describe how mind and agency are generated, and how stable organization is produced, respectively, from the relations involved in the arousal and regulation of affective energy. Combining elements of the two theories, Part III presents a sketch of a holographic model of collective organization in which goal-directed behavior is generated by a feed-forward process involving imaging and information processing of interaction along the two dimensions. Part IV shows how the model accounts for the emergence of human agency within the context of a more general evolutionary theory, such as Laszlo's. The article concludes with a discussion of my approach for building a "fully human theory of evolution."     

New essays on old philosophers

In an article in Mind (Vol. 73, No. 291, July 1964) I tried to show that there is a fundamental difference between primary and secondary qualities. The present analysis of perceived size of an object and its relation to the size of the ‘objective’ and the ‘real’ object reveals that my thesis 1 regarding visual primary qualities, viz. size and shape, while true so far as shape is concerned, has to be modified in regard to size. After having criticized the usual view of size constancy, I show by means of a diagram how we may determine the location in physical space of a percept of an object. This diagram reveals at the same time how perceived size decreases gradually with increasing distance of the object from the percipient, but at a much smaller rate than the retinal image of the object. By means of the diagram I show furthermore how the perceived size may in theory vary from person to person. In conclusion a modification of my thesis 1 is suggested.     

Belief and Self‐consciousness

Abstract

This paper is about what is distinctive about first‐person beliefs. I discuss several sets of puzzling cases of first‐person belief. The first focus on the relation between belief and action, while the second focus on the relation of belief to subjectivity. I argue that in the absence of an explanation of the dispositional difference, individuating such beliefs more finely than truth conditions merely marks the difference. I argue that the puzzles reveal a difference in the ways that I am disposed to revise my beliefs about myself. This point develops the insight that Anscombe and others had that those of an agent’s beliefs about himself that manifest that special self‐consciousness are not based on observation, testimony or inference. The puzzles show that this kind of self‐consciousness involves, not a special kind of belief or even a special kind of self‐reference, but a special kind of belief revision policy.     

Deception of parents during adolescence

Two hundred eighty-one undergraduates at a large university in the southeastern United States anonymously completed a 26-item questionnaire about the degree to which they deceived their parents during high school. Only five percent of the respondents reported that they had never lied to their parents about "where I was." "Who I was with," "my alcohol use," and "my sexual behavior" were additional topics about which they lied the most. It was also found that (1) females lied more than males about sexual behavior, (2) the opposite-sex parent was deceived more often, and (3) intact homes were associated with more lying. Respondents also reported more lies when they lived with their parents than when they left for college. The implications of the findings are discussed.     

A REPLY TO ANNE KULL,EDUARDO CRUZ,AND MICHAEL DeLASHMUTT

In my reply to the essays by Anne Kull, Eduardo Cruz, and Michael DeLashmutt, I turn first to Cruz's charge that my use of “the sacred” is at odds with a growing religious studies mainstream that understands religion in secular terms. I suggest that this latter approach has its own problems, deriving partly from its neglect of the political, constructed nature of the category of “religion.” Second, in relation to Cruz's suggestion that my lack of attention to explanation compromises my claim to be social scientific, I defend a broader understanding of the human sciences and explore the relationships between understanding, critique, and history, and between sociology and theology. Third, reflecting on DeLashmutt's suggestion that I neglect the way that technical invention provides a glimpse of divine creativity, and the myth making that goes on around technology in vehicles such as science fiction, I argue that such issues have to be approached in a radically historical way. I conclude by identifying three challenges: to explore more deeply how technological objects form part of human being‐in‐the‐world, to show how my approach might offer practical resources for assessing technological and environmental developments, and to expand my analysis to include non‐Western religious traditions.     

Seeing through eyes,mirrors, shadows and pictures

I argue that we can see in a great many cases that run counter to common sense. We can literally see through mirrors, in just the same way that we (literally) see through our eyes. We can, likewise, literally see through photographs, shadows, and (some) paintings. Rather than starting with an analysis of seeing, I present a series of evolving thought experiments, arguing that in each case there is no relevant difference between it and the previous case regarding whether we see. In a sense, my arguments can be thought of as akin to the Extended Mind Hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers 1998). But instead of arguing that our minds can extend into the world, I argue that our sensory organs can extend into the world. Among the things that emerge from this discussion are (1) that—contrary to Currie (1995) and Carroll (1996)—seeing an object O doesn’t require being able to locate O with respect to yourself, (2) that—contrary to Sorensen (2008)—we can see objects by seeing their shadows, and (3) that—contrary to Walton (1984)—it doesn’t matter whether the causal relation between O and yourself is mediated by beliefs.     

Memory and identity

Among the many topics covered in Sven Bernecker’s impressive study of memory is the relation between memory and personal identity. Bernecker uses his grammatical taxonomy of memory and causal account to defend the claim that memory does not logically presuppose personal identity and hence that circularity objections to memory-based accounts of personal identity are misplaced. In my comment I investigate these claims, suggesting that the relation between personal identity and memory is more complicated than Bernecker’s analysis suggests. In particular, I argue (1) that while he shows that some memories do not presuppose personal identity he fails to show that those that are appealed to in memory-based accounts of personal identity do not, and (2) that the features of his view that allow him to define memory without reference to personal identity also obscure important features of memory that must be part of a complete account.     

JUSTICE AS INHERENT RIGHTS: A RESPONSE TO MY COMMENTATORS

The critical comments by my fellow symposiasts on my book, Justice: Rights and Wrongs , have provided me with the opportunity to clarify parts of my argument and to correct some misunderstandings; they have also helped me see more clearly than I did before the import of some parts of my argument. In his comments, Paul Weithman points out features of the right order conception of justice that I had not noticed. They have also prodded me to clarify in what way rights are trumps; and both his comments and Bernstein's have prodded me to clarify certain aspects of the theistic account of human rights that I offered. Attridge's comments lead me to see that I was perhaps over-zealous in emphasizing the objective aspects of the semantic range of dikaiosunê as used in the New Testament and downplaying the subjective aspects. And O'Donovan's comments have provided me with the opportunity to make clear that my account of rights is not an immunities account that presupposes nominalism, and to emphasize the ways in which it is not an asocial individualistic account.     

Continuing the Dialogue between Psychoanalysis and Somatic Experiencing: Reply to Bass,Leddick, Levine,Blakeslee, Sylvae,and Lombardi

I had expected that bringing together psychoanalysis and Somatic Experiencing (SE) might be controversial. That expectation was certainly not disappointed. Although Bass resonated with much of my thinking, he also challenged the whole idea of integrating these two forms of treatment. Leddick provided extensive critique, though more about how I drew upon SE, not so much the fact that I did. While Lombardi appreciated aspects of my work with the patient, he utterly rejected the whole notion of drawing upon SE, viewing it as mechanistic, simplistic, narrowly behavioral, and merely about modulation. To address these critiques, I revisit here the clinical process with Sue, highlighting how SE is about so much more than just modulation. SE can deepen our forms of analytic holding and can help patients (re)connect with their bodies in ways that are emotionally alive, intimate, and healing. In revisiting the clinical process, I draw upon Levine, Blakeslee, and Sylvae’s in-depth discussion of SE: its goals, principles, and techniques. Though I agree with Bass’s and Lombardi’s concerns about “integration” of psychoanalysis and SE, I do not propose integration of the two, but rather interweaving of one into the other. In essence, I seek here to continue to illustrate how SE can interweave into our work, enriching our psychoanalytic ways of looking, listening, and responding.     

The intelligence of the Mongoloids: A psychometric, evolutionary and neurological theory

This paper presents a theory of the intelligence of the Mongoloids consisting of three linked sub-theories. The first concerns the psychometric features of Mongoloid intelligence and proposes that Mongoloids are characterised by high general intelligence (Spearman's g), high visuospatial abilities and low verbal abilities. Mongoloid abilities also display slow maturation in infancy and early childhood. It is proposed that this pattern of abilities cannot be explained in environmental terms and should be regarded as substantially genetically programmed. The second sub-theory presents an evolutionary explanation for this pattern of abilities in Mongoloids, whereby it is proposed that the extreme cold of the ice ages acted as a selection pressure for increases in Spearman's g and the visuospatial abilities. The low verbal abilities and slow maturation rates are interpreted as by-products of these adaptations. The third sub-theory presents a neurological model for the Mongoloid brain in which it is proposed that cortex devoted to the visuospatial abilities was expanded at the expense of the cortex devoted to the verbal abilities. The implication that there exists a negative correlation between the visuospatial abilities and the verbal abilities is considered in the concluding part of the paper and shown to be correct.     

Paranoid atmospheres: Psychiatric knowledge and delusional realities

In this paper I investigate the topic of paranoid atmospheres. This subject is especially of interest with respect to persons who are deluded, and also, I will demonstrate, sheds light upon the psychiatrist's "gaze" and knowledge of delusions. In my argument I will follow a path initially outlined by Karl Jaspers (1883-1969): modern psychiatric diagnosis of delusions is a diagnosis of form and not content. Jaspers' emphasis on the form of delusions enables psychiatrists to be self-critical about their professional knowledge and, consequently, prevent the development of dogmatic attitudes. In accord with Jaspers, my argument will focus on the basic structure of delusions and highlight the difference between delusional realities and non-delusional realities, a difference that follows from the possibility of self-criticism of one's own conscious and explicit convictions. I will demonstrate the importance of self-criticism with regard to paranoid atmospheres and also to psychiatric knowledge. In this manner, an understanding of delusions as lived experience will be developed, which argues that an escalation of the influence of delusional convictions, resulting in a profoundly paranoid atmosphere, is most problematic for the deluded person. To acknowledge this insight mirrors the need for a self-critique of psychiatric discourse, encourages an empathic and respectful relationship between professionals and deluded patients, and enables deluded persons to restrict their paranoid atmosphere. It is the main conclusion of my paper that a deluded person cannot do (with respect to his delusional convictions) what a psychiatrist must do (with respect to his psychiatric knowledge and his own existential convictions) in order to prevent a profoundly paranoid atmosphere in their relationship: be self-critical.     

Reply to: Roberts

In his critique of my views on supererogation, Rodney Roberts (Philosophia, 2014) claims that I treat care ethics as having a more general moral validity than other care ethicists do. He also claims that the kind of sentimentalism I espouse doesn’t sufficiently emphasize sentiment and then goes on to question what I say about supererogation. But in fact other care ethicists also think care ethics can cover the whole of morality, and my sentimentalism emphasizes sentiment just as much and as little as that paradigm sentimentalist Francis Hutcheson does. Further, the critique Roberts makes of my view on supererogation doesn’t allow for the full range of possible cases of supererogation.     

THEOLOGICAL APPROPRIATION OF SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDINGS: RESPONSE TO HEFNER, WICKEN, EAVES, AND TIPLER

Abstract. Philip Hefner's focus on contingency and field as the guiding concepts in my thinking and his characterization of my theological enterprise as a Lakatosian research program are appropriate and helpful.
I welcome Jeffrey Wicken's holistic approach to the emergence of life. Theology can appropriate the language of self-organizing systems exploiting the thermodynamic flow of energy degradation for interpreting organic life as a creation of the Spirit of God.
However, I cannot sympathize with Lindon Eaves's equation of "hard science" with a reductionism which raises the double helix to the status of icon; the "meaning" of DNA derives from its place in the total phenomenon of life—not the reverse.
Frank Tipler's cosmology raises the prospect of a rapprochement between physics and theology in the area of eschatology. A Christian cosmology, however, would require at least three modifications: contingency in the history of creation; the uniqueness of Jesus' resurrection; and the relation of these to the problem of evil.     

Being Aggrieved,Faith Crises,and Racism

In this article, I depict the notion of being aggrieved and its relation to crises in or struggles of , faith, using racism to illustrate my claims. I begin the discussion by explaining what I mean by being aggrieved and its relation to faith vis-à-vis racism, relying on theological, philosophical, and psychological frameworks. In the second section of the paper, the faith journey of Malcolm X serves to illustrate this hermeneutical perspective. More specifically, I argue that his faith journey, marred by experiences of racism, led him to a faith wherein his experiences of being aggrieved no longer meant that his being was being aggrieved.     

Reply to my Critics

In response to critical discussion of my book, A Tear Is an Intellectual Thing: The Meanings of Emotion, I clarify and develop various aspects of my analysis of jealousy in particular and affectivity in general. In relation to jealousy, I explore the nature of pathology, the role of fantasy and of the rival, and the place of examples and of evolutionary theory. In relation to affectivity, I emphasize the difference between distinguishing emotions from other psychological states and distinguishing among, within and between, particular emotions (where affectivity may not be central). In addition, I emphasize the dangers of a version of G.E. Moore's error in demanding a nonreductive analysis of good in parallel demands for a nonreductive analysis of affectivity.