Caffeine cravings impair memory and metacognition

Cravings for food and other substances can impair cognition. We extended previous research by testing the effects of caffeine cravings on cued-recall and recognition memory tasks, and on the accuracy of judgements of learning (JOLs; predicted future recall) and feeling-of-knowing (FOK; predicted future recognition for items that cannot be recalled). Participants (N?=?55) studied word pairs (POND-BOOK) and completed a cued-recall test and a recognition test. Participants made JOLs prior to the cued-recall test and FOK judgements prior to the recognition test. Participants were randomly allocated to a craving or control condition; we manipulated caffeine cravings via a combination of abstinence, cue exposure, and imagery. Cravings impaired memory performance on the cued-recall and recognition tasks. Cravings also impaired resolution (the ability to distinguish items that would be remembered from those that would not) for FOK judgements but not JOLs, and reduced calibration (correspondence between predicted and actual accuracy) for JOLs but not FOK judgements. Additional analysis of the cued-recall data suggested that cravings also reduced participants’ ability to monitor the likely accuracy of answers during the cued-recall test. These findings add to prior research demonstrating that memory strength manipulations have systematically different effects on different types of metacognitive judgements.     

Measuring Feeling of Knowing: Comment on Schraw (1995)

Schraw compares two coefficients for the 2×2 contingency tables resulting from many feeling of knowing (FOK) studies: Hamann's coefficient and Goodman and Kruskal's γ. He favours Hamann's coefficient and gives examples where Hamann's coefficient produces what might be considered the more intuitive result. Further scrutiny reveals that these examples are not as convincing as Schraw makes them out to be. Because Hamann's coefficient depends on the row and column marginals, it does not map onto FOK ability as well as Goodman and Kruskal's γ, which is a direct measure of the diagnostic worth of FOK ratings.     

Feeling of knowing for names in response to faces

Participants were asked to recall the names when shown photographs of faces in both a semantic task (Experiment 1) and an episodic task (Experiments 2 and 3). When recall failed, feeling of knowing (FOK) ratings were solicited. In addition, participants reported on the strategies that they used to make their ratings, whether they could recall other pieces of information (the target-accessibility strategy, e.g., Koriat, A. (1993). How do we know that? The accessibility model of the feeling of knowing. Psychological Review, 100, 609–639) or whether the faces simply looked familiar (the cue-familiarity strategy, e.g., Schwartz, B. L., & Metcalfe, J. (1992). Cue familiarity but not target accessibility enhances feeling of knowing ratings. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 18, 1074–1083). In all experiments, FOK ratings were fairly accurate in that participants were successful in predicting their performance on a subsequent recognition test. More importantly, participants reported using the cue-familiarity strategy more often, although they gave higher FOK ratings when they reported using the target-accessibility strategy. The FOK ratings that were given using the two strategies were equally accurate.     

Selective deficits in episodic feeling of knowing in ageing: A novel use of the general knowledge task

Failure to recall an item from memory can be accompanied by the subjective experience that the item is known but currently unavailable for report. The feeling of knowing (FOK) task allows measurement of the predictive accuracy of this reflective judgement. Young and older adults were asked to provide answers to general knowledge questions both prior to and after learning, thus measuring both semantic and episodic memory for the items. FOK judgements were made at each stage for all unrecalled responses, providing a measure of predictive accuracy for semantic and episodic knowledge. Results demonstrated a selective effect of age on episodic FOK resolution, with older adults found to have impaired episodic FOK accuracy while semantic FOK accuracy remained intact. Although recall and recognition measures of episodic memory are equivalent between the two age groups, older adults may have been unable to access contextual details on which to base their FOK judgements. The results suggest that older adults are not able to accurately predict future recognition of unrecalled episodic information, and consequently may have difficulties in monitoring recently encoded memories.     

Measures of feeling-of-knowing accuracy: A new look at an old problem

Two ordinal measures of feeling-of-knowing performance appropriate for n × n data arrays are reviewed. Goodman and Kruskal's gamma provides a measure of association between recognition performance and feeling-of-knowing judgements. The Hamann coefficient provides a measure of agreement accuracy. The relative strengths and weaknesses of each measure are compared at length. A proof is provided, which reveals a lack of one-to-one relation between the two and suggests that they may be independent under most circumstances. It is concluded that both measures should be reported together as complementary indices as each captures a different facet of feeling-of-knowing performance. Alternative measures for gamma and the Hamann coefficient are considered and a number of recommendations are made for future research.     

Effects of aging and divided attention on episodic feeling-of-knowing accuracy

This research investigated the effect of aging on episodic feeling-of-knowing (FOK) using a divided attention (DA) paradigm in order to examine whether DA in younger adults mimics the effects of aging when decreasing either memory encoding or monitoring processes. To that end, four groups of participants were tested on the FOK task: young adults (control group), young adults under DA at encoding, young adults under DA when making FOK judgments, and older adults. Our results showed that DA at encoding in young adults mimicked the effect of aging on memory performance, and also on FOK magnitude and accuracy, supporting the memory-constraint hypothesis ( Hertzog et al., 2010). However, our results do not completely contradict the monitoring-deficit hypothesis, as DA during FOK judgments also affected FOK accuracy, but to a lesser extent than the aging effect or DA during encoding. We suggest that the age-related FOK deficit may be due to a lower level of deep encoding, leading to difficulty retrieving target-related contextual details enabling accurate prediction of subsequent recognition.     

Do age-related differences in episodic feeling of knowing accuracy depend on the timing of the judgement?

The current study investigated whether there were age-related differences in episodic feeling-of-knowing (FOK) accuracy and whether accuracy was influenced by when the FOK judgements were made. Younger and older participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions that manipulated the timing of the FOK in relation to cued recall and associative recognition. Age-related differences in FOK accuracy were not reliable either when the FOK was immediate or when it was delayed. Moreover, FOK accuracy was above chance for both age groups. Remember/Know (RK) judgements correlated reliably with FOKs for unrecalled words for both age groups and did not vary by FOK timing. The invariance in FOK accuracy occurred despite robust age differences in associative cued recall and associative recognition, as well as age differences in recollection as measured by RK judgements. The findings are inconsistent with the argument that there is a general age deficit in episodic FOK accuracy. Possible reasons for discrepant findings in the literature are discussed.     

‘Feeling of knowing’ and cued recall

This study investigates further the relationship between an individual's ‘Feeling of Knowing’ (FOK) that a memory response is stored, and evidence of later retention. Following the presentation of a test list, in which Ss were required to recall capitals of countries, unretrieved items were immediately subject to a further retrieval attempt. Items still unretrieved were then subject to first letter cueing. Finally, items still unretrieved were subject to first and second letter cueing. Results indicate that degree of expressed FOK is significantly related to later retrieval following both first, and first and second letter cueing. This finding thus extends the earlier findings of Hart (1965) and Freedman and Landauer (1966) concerning the relationship between FOK and later measured retention, as in both these studies retention was measured by a recognition procedure. Where Ss reported ‘not knowing’ a capital on the test list, there was nevertheless a substantial probability of recall following cueing (0.33). Finally, it was shown that wrong responses given during the test list presentation were highly indicative of a correct response following cueing.     

An analysis of the determinants of the feeling of knowing

Research has demonstrated that feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments are affected by the amount of accessible information related to an inaccessible target. Further, studies have demonstrated that, in some situations, FOK judgment magnitude is not only related to the amount (quantity) of accessed features, but also the correctness of those features (Thomas, Bulevich, & Dubois, 2011). The present study examined the conditions under which the correctness of features would influence FOK judgment magnitude. We hypothesized that accuracy of retrieved features would influence FOK judgments, but only in situations where semantically meaningful information was accessible. In three experiments, we manipulated accessibility of semantic information. In all experiments, the quantity, or amount of retrieved partial information had a greater impact on FOK judgments than the accuracy of that information. However, in situations where semantic information was accessible, accuracy of retrieved semantic features also influenced FOK judgment magnitude, and later recognition.     

知道感（FOK）和不知道感（FOnK）的双向实验分离

为了实现FOK（feeling-of-knowing）和FonK（feeling-of-not-knowing）的双向分离,实验一采用高频词或者低频词为线索项目,检验FOK和FOnK的预测准确性。结果发现,在低频线索条件下FOK的预测准确性表现出高于FOnK的预测准确性的趋势,而在高频线索条件下则正好相反,但上述两组差异并未在统计学上达到显著的程度。实验二采用词－非词对和相关词对两种实验条件,在证明相关词对条件可以促进FOK并降低FOnK的同时,观察到词－非词条件可以促进FOnK并降低FOK,从而在较为严格的意义上证明了FOK和FOnK是两个不同的维度的量。上述结果为知道感的“双过程假设”提供了进一步的实验证据     

Semantic Information and the Correctness Theory of Truth

Semantic information is usually supposed to satisfy the veridicality thesis: p qualifies as semantic information only if p is true. However, what it means for semantic information to be true is often left implicit, with correspondentist interpretations representing the most popular, default option. The article develops an alternative approach, namely a correctness theory of truth (CTT) for semantic information. This is meant as a contribution not only to the philosophy of information but also to the philosophical debate on the nature of truth. After the introduction, in Sect. 2, semantic information is shown to be translatable into propositional semantic information (i). In Sect. 3, i is polarised into a query (Q) and a result (R), qualified by a specific context, a level of abstraction and a purpose. This polarization is normalised in Sect. 4, where [Q + R] is transformed into a Boolean question and its relative yes/no answer [Q + A]. This completes the reduction of the truth of i to the correctness of A. In Sects. 5 and 6, it is argued that (1) A is the correct answer to Q if and only if (2) A correctly saturates Q by verifying and validating it (in the computer science’s sense of “verification” and “validation”); that (2) is the case if and only if (3) [Q + A] generates an adequate model (m) of the relevant system (s) identified by Q; that (3) is the case if and only if (4) m is a proxy of s (in the computer science’s sense of “proxy”) and (5) proximal access to m commutes with the distal access to s (in the category theory’s sense of “commutation”); and that (5) is the case if and only if (6) reading/writing (accessing, in the computer science’s technical sense of the term) m enables one to read/write (access) s. Sect. 7 provides some further clarifications about CTT, in the light of semantic paradoxes. Section 8 draws a general conclusion about the nature of CTT as a theory for systems designers not just systems users. In the course of the article all technical expressions from computer science are explained.     

Efficiently measuring recognition performance with sparse data

We examine methods for measuring performance in signal-detection-like tasks when each participant provides only a few observations. Monte Carlo simulations demonstrate that standard statistical techniques applied to ad’ analysis can lead to large numbers of Type I errors (incorrectly rejecting a hypothesis of no difference). Various statistical methods were compared in terms of their Type I and Type II error (incorrectly accepting a hypothesis of no difference) rates. Our conclusions are the same whether these two types of errors are weighted equally or Type I errors are weighted more heavily. The most promising method is to combine an aggregated’ measure with a percentile bootstrap confidence interval, a computerintensive nonparametric method of statistical inference. Researchers who prefer statistical techniques more commonly used in psychology, such as a repeated measurest test, should useγ (Goodman & Kruskal, 1954), since it performs slightly better than or nearly as well asd’. In general, when repeated measurest tests are used,γ is more conservative thand’: It makes more Type II errors, but its Type I error rate tends to be much closer to that of the traditional .05 α level. It is somewhat surprising thatγ performs as well as it does, given that the simulations that generated the hypothetical data conformed completely to thed’ model. Analyses in which H—FA was used had the highest Type I error rates. Detailed simulation results can be downloaded fromwww.psychonomic.org/archive/Schooler-BRM-2004.zip.     

The <Emphasis Type="Italic">γ</Emphasis>-admissibility of Relevant Modal Logics II — The Method using Metavaluations

The γ-admissibility is one of the most important problems in the realm of relevant logics. To prove the γ-admissibility, either the method of normal models or the method using metavaluations may be employed. The γ-admissibility of a wide class of relevant modal logics has been discussed in Part I based on a former method, but the γ-admissibility based on metavaluations has not hitherto been fully considered. Sahlqvist axioms are well known as a means of expressing generalized forms of formulas with modal operators. This paper shows that γ is admissible for relevant modal logics with restricted Sahlqvist axioms in terms of the method using metavaluations.     

The <Emphasis Type="Italic">γ</Emphasis>-admissibility of Relevant Modal Logics I — The Method of Normal Models

The admissibility of Ackermann’s rule γ is one of the most important problems in relevant logic. While the γ-admissibility of normal modal logics based on the relevant logic R has been previously discussed, the case for weaker relevant modal logics has not yet been considered. The method of normal models has often been used to prove the γ-admissibility. This paper discusses which relevant modal logics admit γ from the viewpoint of the method of normal models.     

A graphic measure for game-theoretic robustness

Robustness has long been recognized as an important parameter for evaluating game-theoretic results, but talk of ‘robustness’ generally remains vague. What we offer here is a graphic measure for a particular kind of robustness (‘matrix robustness’), using a three-dimensional display of the universe of 2 ×  2 game theory. In such a measure specific games appear as specific volumes (Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt, etc.), allowing a graphic image of the extent of particular game-theoretic effects in terms of those games. The measure also allows for an easy comparison between different effects in terms of matrix robustness. Here we use the measure to compare the robustness of Tit for Tat’s well-known success in spatialized games (Axelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books; Grim, P. et al. (1998). The philosophical computer: Exploratory essays in philosophical computer modeling. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press) with the robustness of a recent game-theoretic model of the contact hypothesis regarding prejudice reduction (Grim et al. 2005. Public Affairs Quarterly, 19, 95–125).     

Constructing a covariance matrix that yields a specified minimizer and a specified minimum discrepancy function value

A method is presented for constructing a covariance matrix Σ*₀ that is the sum of a matrix Σ(γ₀) that satisfies a specified model and a perturbation matrix,E, such that Σ*₀=Σ(γ0) +E. The perturbation matrix is chosen in such a manner that a class of discrepancy functionsF(Σ*₀, Σ(γ₀)), which includes normal theory maximum likelihood as a special case, has the prespecified parameter value γ₀ as minimizer and a prespecified minimum δ A matrix constructed in this way seems particularly valuable for Monte Carlo experiments as the covariance matrix for a population in which the model does not hold exactly. This may be a more realistic conceptualization in many instances. An example is presented in which this procedure is employed to generate a covariance matrix among nonnormal, ordered categorical variables which is then used to study the performance of a factor analysis estimator. We are grateful to Alexander Shapiro for suggesting the proof of the solution in section 2.     

Cohen’s Linearly Weighted Kappa is a Weighted Average of 2×2 Kappas

An agreement table with n∈ℕ_≥3 ordered categories can be collapsed into n−1 distinct 2×2 tables by combining adjacent categories. Vanbelle and Albert (Stat. Methodol. 6:157–163, 2009c) showed that the components of Cohen’s weighted kappa with linear weights can be obtained from these n−1 collapsed 2×2 tables. In this paper we consider several consequences of this result. One is that the weighted kappa with linear weights can be interpreted as a weighted arithmetic mean of the kappas corresponding to the 2×2 tables, where the weights are the denominators of the 2×2 kappas. In addition, it is shown that similar results and interpretations hold for linearly weighted kappas for multiple raters.     

Are you sure you forgot? Feeling of knowing in directed forgetting.

One significant issue in metamemory is how variables increasing memorability affect metamemory. Previous research has produced inconsistent results. The effect of directed forgetting on the magnitude and accuracy of feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments was investigated. Participants were presented with word pairs, some to be remembered and some to be forgotten, and then were asked to recall all target words regardless of initial instructions. For unrecalled items, they were asked to give FOK judgments about performance in a future memory task: a cued stem-completion task (Experiment 1) or a recognition test (Experiment 2). This encoding manipulation increased both the memory performance and the magnitude of FOK judgments. However, no such effect on the accuracy of FOK judgments was observed.     

The Effects of the Cognitive Interview on Recall,Identification, Confidence and the Confidence/Accuracy Relationship

The effects of two interview techniques, the Cognitive Interview (CI) and the Structured Interview (SI), were examined in relation to recall, recognition, confidence and the confidence/accuracy relationship. Volunteer subjects witnessed a live staged event, and at set time delays (48 and 96 hours) were interviewed by means of either the CI or SI and made lineup identifications from both blank and filled lineup presentations. The CI significantly improved total recall (p<0.001) and correct recall (p<0.001) relative to the SI. There were no differences in either accuracy or error rates for the two conditions. The CI produced significantly higher ‘pre-post interview’ confidence ratings than the SI (p<0.05). Within-, between- and event-confidence ratings were not predictive of recall or recognition accuracy. Failure to find a significant consistent confidence/accuracy relationship was suggested to have occurred because of the operation of an accuracy assessment heuristic. The CI did not reliably improve identification from a filled lineup presentation relative to the SI, but did produce better performance on a blank lineup presentation (p<0.001). Confidence and the confidence/accuracy relationship involving identifications were not found to differ as a function of interview condition. Throughout the study multiple regression analyses failed to reveal consistent predictors of recall or recognition accuracy, confidence or the confidence/accuracy relationship of these two domains. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Phonetic symbolism and feeling of knowing

American subjects matched English antonym pairs with antonym pairs from Thai, Kannada, and Yoruba. For each match they also,indicated their degree of feeling of knowing (FOK). Although translation accuracy was in general better than chance, suggesting universal phonetic symbolism, it was found to vary considerably with the subject’s FOK ratings: Translations evoking stronger FOK were more likely to be correct than translations evoking weaker FOK, and matches which proved correct were assigned higher FOK ratings than matches which proved incorrect. Several implications of the finding that subjects can monitor their success in guessing the meaning of words from foreign languages are outlined.