Recruiting source effects: A test of two alternative explanations

This field study examined two alternative explanations for recruitment source effects which have been consistently reported in previous studies. For this sample of 98 social service workers, the ‘ realism’ explanation for source differences received more empirical support than the ‘ individual difference ’ explanation. Employee referrals were found to have more realistic expectations than individuals who responded to newspaper ads or directly applied to the organization. In addition, recruitment source was found to be related to employee performance and involuntary turnover. The authors suggest an, as yet, unexamined individual difference variable (motivation) as a possible explanation for the unexpected performance findings.     

Sex-role change, anomie and female suicide: a test of alternative Durkheimian explanations.

Durkheim's influential book, Suicide, provides general (economic) anomie, conjugal anomie, and sex-role convergence explanations of changes in suicide rates under conditions of social change. We used trend analyses of American suicide rates and female/male suicide ratios from 1950 to 1984 and the regression of the ratios on female educational attainment, white female labor force participation, white fertility rates, and divorce rates to examine these explanations. The general anomie explanation of female suicide trends is supported for the middle-aged (30 to 54 years) but not for the young (10 to 30 years) or the elderly (55 to 74 years). The conjugal anomie proposition is at best supported for age groups between 15 and 44 when general anomie is not pronounced. The role convergence explanation is rejected for all 13 5-year-age-groups. General anomie may not be a viable explanation of suicide trends for groups actively supporting relevant social changes or not yet tradition-bound or for groups whose retirement status reduces the importance of some social changes.     

The different effects of family on objective career success across gender: A test of alternative explanations

Gender gaps in achieved rank and salary, common indicators of objective success, often are attributed to the different family roles and responsibilities of men and women. This study tested three explanations for the different effects of family on careers: that is, choice, performance, and signaling explanations. In a sample of American doctoral graduates, the impact of family on career outcomes was felt at entry, early, and middle career stages and support was provided for arguments of all explanations. At the time of graduation, two family variables, the presence of a young child, and not having a non-employed spouse, were associated with women favoring work-family balance in jobs that in turn predicted geographic restrictions on employment. For men, family structure was not associated with job preferences. At later career stages, women did not experience the performance benefits from having a non-employed spouse that men did. In addition, women were at a career disadvantage because they were far less likely to have non-employed spouses who were associated with achieving high ranks by middle career for both genders.     

The threat of nuclear war: Some responses

The possibility of nuclear holocaust threatens the very existence of the world community. Biologists, earth scientists, educators, lawyers, philosophers, physicists, physicians, and social scientists have addressed the problem from their special perspectives, and have had substantial impact on the public. Behavior analysts, however, have not as a whole contributed a great deal to the goal of preventing nuclear catastrophe. We argue that the threat of nuclear war is primarily a behavioral problem, and present an analysis of that problem. In addition, we address the difficulty of implementing behavioral interventions that would contribute to the survival of the World.     

The relation between adaptive behavior and intelligence: Testing alternative explanations

Adaptive behavior has become an increasingly important component of the assessment of children referred for learning and behavioral problems in educational settings. Yet the construct of adaptive behavior remains ill defined, and fundamental questions about the nature of adaptive behavior remain unanswered. As a result, measures of adaptive behavior are often problematic. Among the most important of these fundamental questions is the nature of the underlying relation between adaptive behavior and intelligence. The present study used confirmatory factor analysis and 556 school-age children from the overlap of the standardization sample of the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale and the Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children to test three models of the relation between adaptive behavior and intelligence: as identical underlying constructs, as completely unrelated constructs, or as separate but related constructs. The model specifying adaptive behavior and intelligence as separate but related constructs proved significantly better than either competing model. Similar results were obtained for preschool children and low-ability school-age children, further suggesting that adaptive behavior and intelligence should be considered as separate but related constructs. Two plausible models to further explain the nature of this relation are presented.     

The teleological origins of mentalistic action explanations: A developmental hypothesis

In this paper we shall argue that mentalistic action explanations, which form an essential component of a mature theory of mind, are conceptually and developmentally derived from an earlier and purely teleological interpretational system present in infancy. First we summarize our evidence demonstrating teleological action explanations in one-year-olds. Then we shall briefly contrast the structure of teleological vs. causal mentalistic action explanations and outline four logical possibilities concerning the nature of the developmental relationship between them. We shall argue for the view that causal mentalistic action explanations are constructed as useful theoretical extensions of the earlier, purely teleological, nonmentalistic interpretational stance.     

A test of current explanations of the effect of item familiarity on memory

The effects of item familiarity in memory have been variously ascribed to differences in storage or retrieval efficiency, response availability, and response bias. The experiments reported here attempted to discriminate between these explanations, using a model of the response process based on signal-detection theory. Memory for English surnames varying in frequency of occurrence was tested under free recall and recognition conditions. In both conditions, common names appeared more often among the incorrect responses, reflecting a response bias in their favour; but storage and/or retrieval of these names, as measured by the parameter d', was less efficient than for uncommon ones. The finding of similar results in recognition and recall shows that the effect remains even when differences in response availability are removed by the use of a probe.     

Interpersonal comparison versus persuasive argumentation: A more direct test of alternative explanations for group-induced shifts in individual choice

One class of theories explains group induced shifts in individual choice in terms of interpersonal comparison process. By comparing himself with others a member finds out that his position is uncomfortably discrepant, e.g., he is overly “cautious” or overly “risky”. Knowledge of this discrepancy presumably is necessary and sufficient to induce him to change his initial choice. Another class of theories holds that merely knowing one is different from others is unimportant. Shifts in choice occur because during discussion a member is exposed to persuasive arguments which prior to discussion were not available to him. Thus, if in a factorial design one independently varied (a) the number of others' choices available for comparison and (b) the number of arguments others presented in support of these choices, interpersonal comparison theories would predict the magnitude of the shift to be a function of (a) and not of (b), while theories of persuasive argumentation would predict the opposite. When such an experiment was performed the only reliable main effects were based on the number of arguments, (b), as predicted by persuasive arguments. In no instance did effects involving (a) approach significance.     

The evolution of explanations of a perceptual phenomenon: a case history using the Ternus effect

The Ternus effect involves a multi-element stimulus that can lead to either of two different percepts of apparent movement depending upon a variety of stimulus conditions. Since Ternus's 1926 discussion of this phenomenon, many researchers have attempted to explain it. We examine the history of explanations of the Ternus effect and show that they have evolved to contemporary theoretical positions that are very similar to Ternus's own ideas. Additionally, we describe a new experiment showing that theoretical positions that emphasize element grouping and element identity within groups can predict the effects of certain stimulus manipulations on the Ternus effect.     

Exploring the role of personal normative beliefs in the theory of reasoned action: The problem of discriminating between alternative path models

In the 1967 version of Fishbein's model of the attitude-behaviour relationship a distinction was drawn between personal and social normative beliefs. Personal normative beliefs were later removed from the model on the grounds that they act as an alternative measure of behavioural intention. It is argued that the existing literature does not support this hypothesis and data is presented which indicates that personal normative beliefs are not an alternative measure of behavioural intention. It is argued that personal normative beliefs can be reconceptualized as measuring a person's ideal behavioural intention; a variable which mediates the relationship between attitudes, subjective norms and intentions, Evidence is presented which supports this hypothesis, but it is further demonstrated that an alternative model can be fitted to the present data. It is argued that it is impossible to discriminate between these alternative models on the basis of path analytic techniques, and the implications that this finding has for attitude research are discussed.     

The expertise reversal effect: cognitive load and motivational explanations

The expertise reversal effect occurs when a learner's expertise moderates design principles such as the redundancy principle (i.e., redundant information should be excluded rather than included) derived from the cognitive load theory. Although this effect is supported by numerous experiments, indicating an overall large effect size, a variety of explanations have been proposed. The present experiment tested a cognitive load and a motivational explanation with 104 students, who reported a lack of experience in the presented instructional contents. They spent about 30 min with the instructional material to learn fundamental concepts about the gradient descent (a mathematical optimization algorithm), and with a retention and transfer test used as dependent measures. Each learner was randomly assigned to one cell of a 2 (either novices or experts introduced to through the instructional design presented previously) × 2 (either with or without additional text explaining the animations) between-subjects factorial design. The expertise reversal effect concerning the redundancy principle was replicated. Novices receiving additional text scored higher on retention and transfer than did novices without additional text, while this result was reversed for experts. Results suggest that this effect can be explained by the learner's cognitive load differences rather than overall motivation differences. Furthermore, a partial overlap was found between the motivational subdimension, "probability of success," and a cognitive load measure. On the practical side, instructional designers should consider the learner's level of expertise and their cognitive load when applying design principles. Further implications for adaptive learning environments are discussed.     

The effect of restraint beliefs on alcohol-seeking behavior

Individuals who believe that they have high levels of restraint over motivated behaviors such as cigarette smoking are, paradoxically, more likely to engage in those behaviors when tempted (Nordgren, Van Harreveld, & Van Der Pligt, 2009). Our aim was to experimentally manipulate heavy drinkers' beliefs about their drinking restraint to examine the effect on drinking behavior. Sixty heavy drinkers completed an implicit association test and a stop-signal task before receiving bogus feedback on their task performance that indicated that they had either high or low levels of drinking restraint. Participants then completed a bogus taste test in which they were able to consume beer and a soft drink. Results indicated that the group falsely led to believe that they had a high level of drinking restraint subsequently consumed more beer than the group led to believe that they had a low level of drinking restraint. This study demonstrates that beliefs about drinking restraint can influence drinking behavior, in that individuals who overestimate their control over drinking are at greater risk of drinking to excess when exposed to tempting situations.     

The role of action-initiation in young children's causal explanations of action

Four studies examined preschoolers' use of the cue of action initiation to infer another's desired goal. In two studies, children watched as one protagonist self-initiated movement to a target while a second person was propelled there by an external force. Older 3-year-olds (M = 3;10) and 5-year-olds consistently judged only the self-initiated actor's movement as desire based. In the second study, however, younger 3-year-olds (M = 3;3 also participated, and they were equally likely to say that either movement was goal directed, even when the passive mover appeared to resist movement toward the goal. A third study, featuring only one protagonist, yielded no improvement among younger 3-year-olds. A fourth study emphasizing the single protagonist's persistence in approaching a target via repeated self-initiated movements revealed some improvement among younger 3-year-olds; older 3-year-olds were near ceiling performance. Altogether, these results suggest that differences in action initiation play an increasingly important role in 3-year-olds' mentalistic explanations of action. This development may be related to other critical changes occurring in 3-year-olds' developing theory of mind.     

Peak shift revisited: a test of alternative interpretations

In Experiment 1, 2 groups of human subjects were trained to respond to 1 of 2 light intensity stimuli, S2 or S4, and then were tested for generalization with a randomized series of increasing values from S1 to S11. Both groups, including the group trained to respond to dimmer value, showed peak shifts to a brighter more centrally located test stimulus. In Experiment 2, which used line angle stimuli, both the size of the difference between S+ and S- and the range of test stimuli that extended beyond S+ were varied. The larger the S(+)-S- separation and the larger the range, the greater was the peak shift obtained. In Experiment 3, training involved an S- (line angle) surrounded by 2 S+ values with testing symmetrical about the training values and covering either a narrow or a wide range. The wide range produced greater peak shifts in both directions from S-. All 3 experiments support an adaptation-level interpretation of intradimensional discrimination learning and generalization test performance in human subjects. Related work with animals suggests the presence of similar processes.     

The Fisher-Pitman permutation test: an attractive alternative to the F test

The Fisher-Pitman permutation test is shown to possess significant advantages over conventional alternatives when analyzing differences among independent samples with unequal variances.