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In this paper we claim that Rawls’s theory is compatible with the absence of rectification of extremely important historical injustices within a given society. We hold that adding a new principle to justice-as-fairness may amend this problem. There are four possible objections to our claim: First, that historical rectification is not required by justice. Second, that, even when historical rectification is a matter of justice, it is not a matter of distributive justice, so that Rawls’s theory is justified in leaving it unaddressed. Third, that dealing with historical injustice is outside of the scope of ideal theory, so that even when historical rectification is required by justice, Rawls’s theory starts with the assumption that no such historical injustice has occurred. Fourth, that while historical injustice is within the scope of Rawls’s theory, there is no need for further principles of justice to deal with it, so that the correct regulation of the principles of justice-as-fairness would ensure the rectification of all relevant historical injustices of a particular society. While we offer several arguments against the first and second objections, we address the last two at length and show that both fail. 相似文献
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Katie Stockdale 《希帕蒂亚:女权主义哲学杂志》2017,32(2):363-379
In this article, I defend a conception of bitterness as a moral emotion and offer an evaluative framework for assessing when instances of bitterness are morally justified. I argue that bitterness is a form of unresolved anger involving a loss of hope that an injustice or other moral wrong will be sufficiently acknowledged and addressed. Orienting the discussion around instances of bitterness in response to social and political injustices, I argue that bitterness is sometimes morally justified even if it is ultimately undesirable to bear. I then suggest that focusing only on the harms and risks of bitterness can distract from its positive role as a moral reminder about a past or persistent injustice, indicating that there is still moral and often political work left to do. Finally, I address the concern that bearing bitterness may lead to despair and inaction. I respond by arguing that moral agents can and do persist in their moral and political struggles with bitterness, and without hope that their efforts will be successful. 相似文献
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ABSTRACT Biomedical experimentation on animals is justified, researchers say, because of its enormous benefits to human beings. Sure, animals suffer and die, but that is morally insignificant since the benefits of research incalculably outweigh the evils. Although this utilitarian claim appears straightforward and relatively uncontroversial, it is neither straightforward nor uncontroversial. This defence of animal experimentation is likely to succeed only by rejecting three widely held moral presumptions. We identify these assumptions and explain their relevance to the justification of animal experimentation. We argue that, even if non-human animals have considerably less moral worth than humans, experimentation is justified only if the benefits are overwhelming. By building on and expanding on arguments offered in earlier papers, we show that researchers cannot substantiate their claims on behalf of animal research. We conclude that there is currently no acceptable utilitarian defence of animal experimentation. Moreover, it is unlikely that there could be one. Since most apologists of animal experimentation rely on utilitarian justifications of their practice, it appears that biomedical experimentation on animals is not morally justified . 相似文献
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The Effects of Moral and Pragmatic Arguments Against Torture on Demands for Judicial Reform
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Torture can be opposed on the basis of pragmatic (e.g., torture does not work) or moral arguments (e.g., torture violates human rights). Three studies investigated how these arguments affect U.S. citizens' attitudes toward U.S.‐committed torture. In Study 1, participants expressed stronger demands for redressing the injustice of torture when presented with moral rather than pragmatic or no arguments against torture. Study 2 replicated this finding with an extended justice measure and also showed the moderating role of ingroup glorification and attachment. Moral arguments increased justice demands among those who typically react most defensively to ingroup‐committed wrongdoings: the highly attached and glorifying. Study 3 showed that the effect of moral arguments against torture on justice demands and support for torture among high glorifiers is mediated by moral outrage and empathy but not guilt. 相似文献
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Shlomo Dov Rosen 《The Journal of religious ethics》2018,46(1):124-155
Distributive justice assumes a morally critical judgment of nature, which typically contradicts providential conceptions. Hence, simple conceptions of divine Providence cannot support distributive justice. This essay analyzes and develops a complex strand of theorizing about Providence within Jewish philosophy that is compatible with distributive justice. According to this conception, the actions of divine Providence express different and mutually exclusive considerations of justice. Therefore, the moral value of outcomes is intransitive between the situations of different people. And while each providential action is justified from an ethical perspective, the total outcome is distinct from God's ultimate desire. Human ethics responds to this disparity by redistribution. This conception of Providence also contributes to the additional issue of intergenerational justice through the concomitant idea of life missions. The classical rendering of missions creates problems, however, for distributive justice. I conclude by formulating a conception of life missions that is compatible with both distributive and intergenerational justice. 相似文献
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Mark Piper 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2007,62(2):65-79
Skeptical theism seeks to defend theism against the problem of evil by invoking putatively reasonable skepticism concerning
human epistemic limitations in order to establish that we have no epistemological basis from which to judge that apparently
gratuitous evils are not in fact justified by morally sufficient reasons beyond our ken. This paper contributes to the set
of distinctively practical criticisms of skeptical theism by arguing that religious believers who accept skeptical theism
and take its practical implications seriously will be forced into a position of paralysis or aporia when faced with a wide set of morally significant situations. It is argued that this consequence speaks strongly against
the acceptance of skeptical theism insofar as such moral aporia is inconsistent with religious moral teaching and practice. In addition, a variety of arguments designed to show that accepting
skeptical theism does not lead to this consequence are considered, and shown to be deficient. 相似文献
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《Canadian journal of philosophy》2012,42(3-4):443-462
G.A. Cohen and David Estlund claim that, because of their fact-dependent nature, constructivist theories of justice do not qualify as moral theories about fundamental values such as justice. In this paper, I defend fact-dependent, constructivist theories of justice against this fact-independency critique. I argue that constructivists can invoke facts among the grounds for accepting fundamental principles of justice while maintaining that the foundation of morality has to be non-empirical. My claim is that constructivists ultimately account for the normativity of fact-dependent principles by referring to a fact-independent, moral conception of the person, which is not a principle of justice.1 相似文献
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KIMBERLEY BROWNLEE 《Journal of applied philosophy》2010,27(2):123-139
In recent years, political philosophers have hotly debated whether ordinary citizens have a general pro tanto moral obligation to follow the law. Contemporary philosophers have had less to say about the same question when applied to public officials. In this paper, I consider the latter question in the morally complex context of criminal justice. I argue that criminal justice officials have no general pro tanto moral obligation to adhere to the legal dictates and lawful rules of their offices. My claim diverges not only from the commonsense view about such officials, but also from the positions standardly taken in legal theory and political science debates, which presume there is some general obligation that must arise from legal norms and be reconciled with political realities. I defend my claim by highlighting the conceptual gap between the rigid, generalised, codified rules that define a criminal justice office and the special moral responsibilities of the various moral roles that may underpin that office (such as guard, guardian, healer, educator, mediator, counsellor, advocate, and carer). After addressing four objections to my view, I consider specific contexts in which criminal justice officials are obligated not to adhere to the demands of their offices. Amongst other things, the arguments advanced in this paper raise questions about both the distribution of formal discretion in the criminal justice system and the normative validity of some of the offices that presently exist in criminal justice systems. 相似文献
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Evan Riley 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2017,20(3):597-616
Is implementing the beneficent nudge program morally permissible in worlds like ours? I argue that there is reason for serious doubt. I acknowledge that beneficent nudging is highly various, that nudges are in some circumstances morally permissible and even called for, and that nudges may exhibit respect for genuine autonomy. Nonetheless, given the risk of epistemic injustice that nudges typically pose, neither the moral permissibility of beneficent nudging in the abstract, nor its case-by-case vindication, appears sufficient to justify implementing a nudge program in worlds like ours. Drawing on Miranda Fricker’s account of epistemic injustice, I argue that the cogent defense of any nudge program, relative to worlds like ours, stands in need of serious attention to its potential for fostering or sustaining epistemic injustice. A more specific point hinges on recognizing a form of epistemic injustice not enough attended to in the literature to date, which I call reflective incapacitational injustice. This includes relative disadvantages in the attaining of (or opportunity to exercise) the capacity to engage in critical reason, such as the capacity to go in for potentially critical reasoned deliberation and discursive exchange concerning ends. Since Cass Sunstein’s First Law of behaviorally informed regulation would be taken, in worlds like ours, to justify indeterminately many nudges leading to such epistemic injustice we have general grounds for doubting the moral permissibility of this nudge program. We should hence oppose the implementation of any such program until it is shown not to violate the demands of epistemic justice. 相似文献
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Walter Sinnott-Armstrong 《Argumentation》2000,14(2):159-174
Many philosophers claim that no formally valid argument can have purely non-normative premises and a normative or moral conclusion that occurs essentially. Mark Nelson recently proposed a new counterexample to this Humean doctrine:All of Dahlia's beliefs are true.Dahlia believes that Bertie morally ought to marry Madeleine. Bertie morally ought to marry Madeleine.I argue that Nelson's universal premise has no normative content, that Nelson's argument is valid formally, and that Nelson's moral conclusion occurs essentially and not vacuously. Nonetheless, I show that Nelson's argument faces a more fundamental problem if it is used in moral epistemology. An argument that appeals to a moral authority, such as Dahlia, might justify some moral belief out of a contrast class that does not include extreme views like moral nihilism; but it begs the question against moral nihilism, since one cannot be adequately justified in believing the conjunction of its premises without depending on assumptions that moral nihilists would deny. Thus, arguments like Nelson's can accomplish something important in moral epistemology, but their use is strictly limited. 相似文献
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Christian Coons 《Philosophical Studies》2011,155(1):83-98
I first argue that there are many true claims of the form: Φ-ing would be morally required, if anything is. I then explain
why the following conditional-type is true: If φ-ing would be morally required, if anything is, then anything is actually
morally required. These results allow us to construct valid proofs for the existence of some substantive moral facts—proofs
that some particular acts really are morally required. Most importantly, none of my argumentation presupposes any substantive
moral claim; I use only plausible claims that most moral skeptics and error theorists can and do accept. The final section
diagnoses why my arguments work. Here, I offer an explanation for the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral that may
help those worried that the strategy is a sophisticated trick. I conclude by considering two objections. In replying to these
objections, I explain why the strategy may allow us to demonstrate more than “obvious” moral truths, and why it may also address
a stronger version of error theory, according to which, moral truths are not possible. 相似文献
13.
Seth R. M. Lazar 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(4):355-368
In this paper, I ask how – and whether – the rectification of injury at which corrective justice aims is possible, and by
whom it must be performed. I split the injury up into components of harm and wrong, and consider their rectification separately.
First, I show that pecuniary compensation for the harm is practically plausible, because money acts as a mediator between
the damaged interest and other interests. I then argue that this is also a morally plausible approach, because it does not
claim too much for compensation: neither can all harms be compensated, nor can it be said when compensation is paid that the
status quo ante has been restored. I argue that there is no conceptual reason for any particular agent paying this compensation.
I then turn to the wrong, and reject three proposed methods of rectification. The first aims to rectify the wrong by rectifying
the harm; the second deploys punitive damages; the third, punishment. After undermining each proposal, I argue that the wrong
can only be rectified by a full apology, which I disaggregate into the admission of causal and moral responsibility, repudiation
of the act, reform, and, in some cases, disgorgement and reparations, which I define as a good faith effort to share the burden
of the victim’s harm. I argue, further, that only the injurer herself can make a full apology, and it is not something that
can be coerced by other members of society. As such, whether rectification of the wrong can be a matter of corrective justice
is left an open question.
相似文献
Seth R. M. LazarEmail: |
14.
Mark Coeckelbergh 《Res Publica》2009,15(1):67-84
Various arguments have been provided for drawing non-humans such as animals and artificial agents into the sphere of moral
consideration. In this paper, I argue for a shift from an ontological to a social-philosophical approach: instead of asking
what an entity is, we should try to conceptually grasp the quasi-social dimension of relations between non-humans and humans.
This allows me to reconsider the problem of justice, in particular distributive justice. Engaging with the work of Rawls, I show that an expansion of the contractarian framework to non-humans causes an important
problem for liberalism, but can be justified by a contractarian argument. Responding to Bell’s and Nussbaum’s comments on
Rawls, I argue that we can justify drawing non-humans into the sphere of distributive justice by relying on the notion of
a co-operative scheme. I discuss what co-operation between humans and non-humans can mean and the extent to which it depends
on properties. I conclude that we need to imagine principles of ecological and technological distributive justice. 相似文献
15.
Andrew Hurrell 《Metaphilosophy》2001,32(1&2):34-57
This article considers the links between international institutions and global economic justice: how international institutions might be morally important; how they have changed; and at what those changes imply for justice. The institutional structure of international society has evolved in ways that help to undercut the arguments of those who take a restrictionist position towards global economic justice. There is now a denser and more integrated network of shared institutions and practices within which social expectations of global justice and injustice have become more securely established. But, at the same time, our major international social institutions continue to constitute a deformed political order. This combination of density and deformity shapes how we should think about international justice in general and has important implications for the scope, character, and modalities of global economic justice. Having laid out a view of normative development and where it leads, the article then examines why international distributive justice remains so marginal to current practice. 相似文献
16.
François Boucher 《Metaphilosophy》2023,54(5):626-640
Many of the most influential theorists of linguistic justice make arguments on the basis of comparisons between language and religion. They claim either that (1) language, by contrast with religion, cannot be separated from the state or that (2) unequal official linguistic recognition, just like unequal official religious recognition, is morally problematic. This article argues that careful attention to debates about liberalism and the place of religion in public life invites us to question the two above-mentioned liberal assumptions about religion underlying many arguments concerning linguistic justice based on (dis)analogies between language and religion. The hope is that such critical scrutiny is likely to shed some light on normative questions of linguistic justice, more precisely on questions about the legitimacy of granting more recognition to certain languages, usually those of national native groups (as opposed to groups resulting from more or less recent immigration). 相似文献
17.
Joshua Shepherd 《European Journal of Philosophy》2017,25(2):398-415
In this paper, I examine the claim that self‐consciousness is highly morally significant, such that the fact that an entity is self‐conscious generates strong moral reasons against harming or killing that entity. This claim is apparently very intuitive, but I argue it is false. I consider two ways to defend this claim: one indirect, the other direct. The best‐known arguments relevant to self‐consciousness's significance take the indirect route. I examine them and argue that (a) in various ways they depend on unwarranted assumptions about self‐consciousness's functional significance, and (b) once these assumptions are undermined, motivation for these arguments dissipates. I then consider the direct route to self‐consciousness's significance, which depends on claims that self‐consciousness has intrinsic value or final value. I argue what intrinsic or final value self‐consciousness possesses is not enough to generate strong moral reasons against harming or killing. 相似文献
18.
Jill Graper Hernandez 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2010,13(4):403-419
Samuel Kerstein argues that an asymmetry between moral worth and maxims prevents Kant from accepting a category of acts that
are impermissible, but have moral worth. Kerstein contends that an act performed from the motive of duty should be considered
as a candidate for moral worth, even if the action’s maxim turns out to be impermissible, since moral worth depends on the
correct moral motivation of an act, rather than on the moral rightness of an act. I argue that Kant cannot consistently maintain
that there are morally forbidden, though good, acts since one of the conditions of acting from the moral law should be that
one has a true belief about what the moral law requires. My project, then, rejects the possibility of morally impermissible,
worthy acts for Kant, and qualifies the conditions for moral worth Kerstein gives with an epistemological constraint on moral
worth. 相似文献
19.
Anca Gheaus 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2017,47(6):739-759
Three claims about love and justice cannot be simultaneously true and therefore entail a paradox: (1) Love is a matter of justice. (2) There cannot be a duty to love. (3) All matters of justice are matters of duty. The first claim is more controversial. To defend it, I show why the extent to which we enjoy the good of love is relevant to distributive justice. To defend (2) I explain the empirical, conceptual and axiological arguments in its favour. Although (3) is the most generally endorsed claim of the three, I conclude we should reject it in order to avoid the paradox. 相似文献
20.
Stefan Gosepath 《Metaphilosophy》2001,32(1&2):135-159
In this paper, I examine the question of the scope of justice, in a not unusual distributive, egalitarian, and universalistic framework. Part I outlines some central features of the egalitarian theory of justice I am proposing. According to such a conception, justice is – at least prima facie – immediately universal, and therefore global. It does not morally recognize any judicial boundaries or limits. Part II examines whether, even from a universalistic perspective, there are moral or pragmatic grounds for rejecting or limiting the global scope of justice. In particular, I scrutinize five universalistic objections: (1) the principle of "moral division of labor"; (2) the connection between cooperation and distributive justice; (3) the primacy of democracy; (4) the dangers of a world state; and (5) political-pragmatic reasons. I intend to show that these objections cannot undermine the strong normative claims of global justice. At the most, political-pragmatic reasons speak in favor of initially striving for somewhat less, in order to receive more general backing. 相似文献