READING SKILL AND SUPPRESSION REVISITED

Abstract— In a previous issue of Psychological Science, we (Gernsbacher, 1993) reported that less skilled readers are less able than more skilled readers to quickly suppress irrelevant information (e.g., the contextually inappropriate meaning of a homonym, such as the playing-card meaning of spade, in the sentence He dug with the spade, or the inappropriate form of a homophone, such as patience, in the sentence He had lots of patients). In the current research, we investigated a ramification of that finding. If less skilled readers are less able to suppress a contextually inappropriate meaning of a homonym, perhaps less skilled readers might be better than more skilled readers at comprehending puns. However, intuition and previous research suggest the contrary, as do the results of the research presented here. On a task that required accepting, rather than rejecting, a meaning of a homonym that was not implied by the sentence context, more skilled readers responded more rapidly than less skilled readers. In contrast, on a task that required accepting a meaning of a homonym that was implied by the sentence context, more and less skilled readers performed equally well. We conclude that more skilled readers are more able to rapidly accept inappropriate meanings of homonyms because they are more skilled at suppression (which in this case involves suppressing the appropriate meanings).     

Preschool children's use of cues to generic meaning

Sentences that refer to categories - generic sentences (e.g., "Dogs are friendly") - are frequent in speech addressed to young children and constitute an important means of knowledge transmission. However, detecting generic meaning may be challenging for young children, since it requires attention to a multitude of morphosyntactic, semantic, and pragmatic cues. The first three experiments tested whether 3- and 4-year-olds use (a) the immediate linguistic context, (b) their previous knowledge, and (c) the social context to determine whether an utterance with ambiguous scope (e.g., "They are afraid of mice", spoken while pointing to 2 birds) is generic. Four-year-olds were able to take advantage of all the cues provided, but 3-year-olds were sensitive only to the first two. In Experiment 4, we tested the relative strength of linguistic-context cues and previous-knowledge cues by putting them in conflict; in this task, 4-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, preferred to base their interpretations on the explicit noun phrase cues from the linguistic context. These studies indicate that, from early on, children can use contextual and semantic information to construe sentences as generic, thus taking advantage of the category knowledge conveyed in these sentences.     

From synonyms to homonyms: exploring the role of metarepresentation in language understanding

Doherty and Perner (Metalinguistic awareness and theory of mind: just two words for the same thing? Cognitive Development, 13 (1998), 279–305) report that children’s understanding of synonyms and false belief is dependent on an understanding of the representational mind. Experiment 1 extends this finding by examining children’s understanding of homonyms. Children aged 3 and 4 years were asked to judge whether a puppet correctly selected the second member of a homonym pair. Performance on this task was strongly associated with performance on the false belief task even after chronological and verbal mental age had been accounted for. Experiment 2 incorporated two new tasks: a synonyms task and an adjectives task. Understanding of synonyms and homonyms significantly predicted performance on the false belief task. However, once chronological age was accounted for, only performance on the homonyms task did so. The difficulty experienced on the homonyms task was not due to a reluctance to acknowledge that the puppet can point to a different picture when the the same word label is used twice. Children had no difficulty on the adjectives task when the puppet had to point to a different picture described using the same adjective. The suggestion that the understanding of synonyms, homonyms and false belief are related by a common insight into the representational mind is therefore not supported.     

Cognitive "babyness": Developmental differences in the power of young children's supernatural thinking to influence positive and negative affect

Perceptions of maturational status may play an important role in facilitating caretaking and resources toward children expressing them. Previous work has revealed evidence that cues of cognitive immaturity foster positive perceptions in adults toward young children at a time during their lives when they are most dependent on adult care. In the current series of studies, the authors investigated when during development these biases emerge. They tested American and Spanish adolescents ranging from 10 to 17 years of age. Each participant rated a series of vignettes presenting different expressions of immature and mature thinking attributed to young children. Results revealed that older adolescents performed similarly to adults tested in previous studies (D. F. Bjorklund, C. Hernández Blasi, & V. A. Periss, 2010), rating positively expressions of supernatural thinking (e.g., animism) compared with other forms of immature cognition labeled as natural (e.g., overestimation). Both male and female participants 14 years and older favored children expressing the immature supernatural cognition on traits reflecting positive affect (e.g., endearing, likeable), while associating greater negative affect (e.g., sneaky, impatient with) with children expressing immature natural cognition. However, younger adolescents consistently rated all forms of immature thinking less positively than mature thinking, suggesting that a positive bias for some forms of immature thinking develops during adolescence. Based on an evolutionary developmental framework, the authors suggest that supernatural thinking may have a unique role in humans, fostering positive perceptions of young children in older adolescents (and adults) as they prepare themselves for the possible role of parenthood. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Order Matters! Influences of Linear Order on Linguistic Category Learning

Linguistic category learning has been shown to be highly sensitive to linear order, and depending on the task, differentially sensitive to the information provided by preceding category markers (premarkers, e.g., gendered articles) or succeeding category markers (postmarkers, e.g., gendered suffixes). Given that numerous systems for marking grammatical categories exist in natural languages, it follows that a better understanding of these findings can shed light on the factors underlying this diversity. In two discriminative learning simulations and an artificial language learning experiment, we identify two factors that modulate linear order effects in linguistic category learning: category structure and the level of abstraction in a category hierarchy. Regarding category structure, we find that postmarking brings an advantage for learning category diagnostic stimulus dimensions, an effect not present when categories are non-confusable. Regarding levels of abstraction, we find that premarking of super-ordinate categories (e.g., noun class) facilitates learning of subordinate categories (e.g., nouns). We present detailed simulations using a plausible candidate mechanism for the observed effects, along with a comprehensive analysis of linear order effects within an expectation-based account of learning. Our findings indicate that linguistic category learning is differentially guided by pre- and postmarking, and that the influence of each is modulated by the specific characteristics of a given category system.     

Visible homonyms are ambiguous, subliminal homonyms are not: a close look at priming

Homonyms, i.e. ambiguous words like ‘score’, have different meanings in different contexts. Previous research indicates that all potential meanings of a homonym are first accessed in parallel before one of the meanings is selected in a competitive race. If these processes are automatic, these processes of selection should even be observed when homonyms are shown subliminally. This study measured the time course of subliminal and supraliminal priming by homonyms with a frequent (dominant) and a rare (subordinate) meaning in a neutral context, using a lexical decision task. In the subliminal condition, priming across prime-target asynchronies ranging from 100 ms to 1.5 s indicated that the dominant meaning of homonyms was facilitated and the subordinate meaning was inhibited. This indicates that selection of meaning was much faster with subliminal presentation than with supraliminal presentation. Awareness of a prime might decelerate an otherwise rapid selection process.     

Categorization by schema relations and perceptual similarity in 5-year-olds and adults: A study in vision and in audition

This research explores the way in which young children (5 years of age) and adults use perceptual and conceptual cues for categorizing objects processed by vision or by audition. Three experiments were carried out using forced-choice categorization tasks that allowed responses based on taxonomic relations (e.g., vehicles) or on schema category relations (e.g., vehicles that can be seen on the road). In Experiment 1 (visual modality), prominent responses based on conceptually close objects (e.g., objects included in a schema category) were observed. These responses were also favored when within-category objects were perceptually similar. In Experiment 2 (auditory modality), schema category responses depended on age and were influenced by both within- and between-category perceptual similarity relations. Experiment 3 examined whether these results could be explained in terms of sensory modality specializations or rather in terms of information processing constraints (sequential vs. simultaneous processing).     

Context and Perceptual Salience Influence the Formation of Novel Stereotypes via Cumulative Cultural Evolution

We use a transmission chain method to establish how context and category salience influence the formation of novel stereotypes through cumulative cultural evolution. We created novel alien targets by combining features from three category dimensions—color, movement, and shape—thereby creating social targets that were individually unique but that also shared category membership with other aliens (e.g., two aliens might be the same color and shape but move differently). At the start of the transmission chains each alien was randomly assigned attributes that described it (e.g., arrogant, caring, confident). Participants were given training on the alien‐attribute assignments and were then tested on their memory for these. The alien‐attribute assignments participants produced during test were used as the training materials for the next participant in the transmission chain. As information was repeatedly transmitted an increasingly simplified, learnable stereotype‐like structure emerged for targets who shared the same color, such that by the end of the chains targets who shared the same color were more likely to share the same attributes (a reanalysis of data from Martin et al., 2014 which we term Experiment 1). The apparent bias toward the formation of novel stereotypes around the color category dimension was also found for objects (Experiment 2). However, when the category dimension of color was made less salient, it no longer dominated the formation of novel stereotypes (Experiment 3). The current findings suggest that context and category salience influence category dimension salience, which in turn influences the cumulative cultural evolution of information.     

Where do "constraints" come from? A comparison between inferences in biology and in word learning

In this paper, as a commentary on the papers in this special issue, the nature of constraints is discussed in terms of the comparison between inferences in biology and in word learning. Young children's inferences in biology could be constrained by three sources of information: factual knowledge, expectations based on a theory, and ontological knowledge. For example, young children's inference about the length of noses could be constrained by the facts the children know about the animals, the similarity between the animals and humans, and the ontological distinction between living things and nonliving things. In the same way, young children might figure out word meanings by linguistic and pragmatic knowledge, expectations of word meanings (e.g., the whole-object assumption), and ontological knowledge. Interactions among these sources of knowledge are documented by the papers in this special issue and related studies. It is argued that learning biases such as the whole-object assumption could not be induced only by linguistic and pragmatic cues in a social context, but should be regarded as a product of the interaction between a social context and children's theories.     

Using sentences to convey spatial information

Individuals listened to pairwise relationships (e.g., AB, BC, CD) and learned the underlying spatial ordering (e.g., ABCD). Previous work shows that the order in which information is presented strongly affects the success of learning and that these presentation order effects are different when the information occurs in sentences (e.g., “The B is to the left of the C”) instead of pairs (e.g., “B-C”). By using a number of different presentation orders and both kinds of input, the present work reveals that these sentence-pair differences can be attributed to the presence of a stated relationship (e.g., the adjective “left”) in the sentence and the corresponding facilitation of basic processes by linguistic structures. The role of language in the learning of spatial relationships is discussed.     

The Influence of Language Form and Conventional Wording on Judgments of Illness

Prior research indicates that category labels influence category judgments, but little is known regarding the effects for familiar categories with significant social consequences. The present studies address this issue by examining the effect of linguistic form on judgments of illnesses. Both mental and physical illnesses were presented in each of three linguistic forms: noun, adjective, and possessive phrase. In Study 1, participants were asked to judge the permanence of a set of novel illnesses that differed in wording (e.g., “He is a baxtermic”; “He is baxtermic”; “He has baxtermia”). In Studies 2 and 3, participants were asked to judge which forms of wording were most familiar for actual mental illnesses (e.g., schizophrenia) and physical illnesses (e.g., diabetes). In Study 4, participants were asked to judge the permanence of a set of familiar illnesses that differed in wording. The results indicated that for novel illnesses, nouns (“is a”) imply greatest permanence and possessive nouns (“has”) imply least permanence. However, for familiar illnesses, permanence judgments are also influenced by how frequently each form appears in ordinary language use. Mental illnesses are more often expressed with relatively permanent forms (“is” and “is a”) , whereas physical illnesses are more often expressed with relatively transient forms (“has”). The results demonstrate the importance of both linguistic form and conventional wording patterns on how categories are interpreted.     

Beginning readers activate semantics from sub-word orthography

Two experiments assessed whether 7-year-old children activate semantic information from sub-word orthography. Children made category decisions to visually-presented words, some of which contained an embedded word (e.g., hip in ship). In Experiment 1 children were slower and less accurate to classify words if they contained an embedded word related in meaning to the category (e.g., slower to reject ship as a ‘body part’ than an ‘animal’), especially when the embedded word was higher in frequency than the carrier word. This demonstrates that young children activate semantic information from sub-word orthographic representations, and that they do so from the relatively early stages of learning to read. Experiment 2 replicated this effect. Furthermore, we observed semantic interference regardless of whether the embedded word shared its pronunciation with the carrier (e.g., the hip in ship) or not (e.g., the crow in crown), and regardless of its position within the carrier, suggesting that interference was not dependent on phonological mediation. These findings show that by 7-years-of age, children have begun to establish an orthographic system that is capable of activating sub-word orthographic patterns, strong enough to connect with meaning, when reading words silently.     

When what you say about others says something about you: Language abstraction and inferences about describers’ attitudes and goals

According to the linguistic category model ( [Semin and Fiedler, 1988] and [Semin and Fiedler, 1991]), a person’s behavior can be described at varying levels of abstraction from concrete (e.g., “Lisa slaps Ann”) to abstract (e.g., “Lisa is aggressive”). Research has shown that language abstraction conveys information about the person whose behavior is described (Wigboldus, Semin, & Spears, 2000). However to date, little research has examined the information that language abstraction may convey about describers themselves. In this paper, we report three experiments demonstrating that describers who use relatively abstract language to describe others’ behaviors are perceived to have biased attitudes and motives compared with those describers who use more concrete language.     

Psychometric Evaluation of 5- and 7-Year-Old Children's Self-Reports of Conduct Problems

Past research suggests that young children are incapable of reporting information about their own behavior problems. To test this, we examined the validity and the usefulness of children's self-reports in the E-Risk Study, a nationally representative birth cohort of 2,232 children. We used the Berkeley Puppet Interview to obtain children's self-reports of conduct problems when they were 5-years old and the Dominic-R when they were 7-years old. We also collected information about the children and their families by interviewing mothers, sending questionnaires to teachers, and rating examiners' observations during home visits. Results indicate that when children's self-reports are gathered with structured and developmentally appropriate instruments, they are shown to be valid measures: conduct problems reported by the children themselves were associated with known correlates including individual characteristics (e.g., IQ), related behaviors (e.g., hyperactivity), and family variables (e.g., economic disadvantages). Observed correlations closely matched effect sizes reported in the literature using adults' reports of children's behavioral problems. In addition, children's self-reports can be useful: both measures distinguished children meeting DSM-IV criteria for research diagnoses of conduct disorder. Children's reports also contributed unique information not provided by adults. For research and clinical purposes, young children's self-reports can be viewed as a valuable complement to adults' ratings and observational measures of children's behavior problems.     

The representation of category typicality in the frontal cortex and its cross-linguistic variations

When asked to judge the membership of typical (e.g., car) vs. atypical (e.g., train) pictures of a category (e.g., vehicle), native English (N = 18) and native Chinese speakers (N = 18) showed distinctive patterns of brain activity despite showing similar behavioral responses. Moreover, these differences were mainly due to the amount and pervasiveness of category information linguistically embedded in the everyday names of the items in the respective languages, with important differences across languages in how pervasive category labels are embedded in item-level terms. Nonetheless, the left inferior frontal gyrus and the bilateral medial frontal gyrus are the most consistent neural correlates of category typicality that persist across languages and linguistic cues. These data together suggest that both cross- and within-language differences in the explicitness of category information have strong effects on the nature of categorization processes performed by the brain.     

The importance of differentiation in young children’s acquisition of expertise

In a short-term longitudinal study, stories told about novel creatures conveyed information varying in its capability for differentiating. Depending on the context, a bodily feature could be functionally undifferentiated (FUF), meaning that its subtypes (e.g., eyes of two forms) shared a generic function (“seeing”), or functionally differentiated (FDF), meaning that each subtype’s function was unique to it (e.g., only a “hooded eye” could “see in a sandstorm”). 5- to 6-year-olds who heard 8 stories, but not those who heard only 4, cited FDFs more than FUFs in a pair-justification test of judged similarity; and their delayed recall of specific story events was greater when FDFs rather than FUFs were involved. In the absence of direct instruction, young children show sensitivity to the degree of differentiation afforded by feature-function relations.     

Evidentiality in language and cognition

What is the relation between language and thought? Specifically, how do linguistic and conceptual representations make contact during language learning? This paper addresses these questions by investigating the acquisition of evidentiality (the linguistic encoding of information source) and its relation to children's evidential reasoning. Previous studies have hypothesized that the acquisition of evidentiality is complicated by the subtleness and abstractness of the underlying concepts; other studies have suggested that learning a language which systematically (e.g. grammatically) marks evidential categories might serve as a pacesetter for early reasoning about sources of information. We conducted experimental studies with children learning Korean (a language with evidential morphology) and English (a language without grammaticalized evidentiality) in order to test these hypotheses. Our experiments compared 3- and 4-year-old Korean children's knowledge of the semantics and discourse functions of evidential morphemes to their (non-linguistic) ability to recognize and report different types of evidential sources. They also compared Korean children's source monitoring abilities to the source monitoring abilities of English-speaking children of the same age. We found that Korean-speaking children have considerable success in producing evidential morphology but their comprehension of such morphology is very fragile. Nevertheless, young Korean speakers are able to reason successfully about sources of information in non-linguistic tasks; furthermore, their performance in these tasks is similar to that of English-speaking peers. These results support the conclusion that the acquisition of evidential expressions poses considerable problems for learners; however, these problems are not (necessarily) conceptual in nature. Our data also suggest that, contrary to relativistic expectations, children's ability to reason about sources of information proceeds along similar lines in diverse language-learning populations and is not tied to the acquisition of the linguistic markers of evidentiality in the exposure language. We discuss implications of our findings for the relationship between linguistic and conceptual representations during development.     

Reading homographs: orthographic, phonologic, and semantic dynamics

Reading processes were compared across 3 word types: homographs (separate pronunciations and meanings, such as lead), homonyms (singular pronunciations but separate meanings, such as spring), and control words (e.g., clock). In Experiment 1, naming reaction times were significantly slower to homographs than to all other words. Experiments 2 and 3 used an association judgment task, with referent words related to the dominant or subordinate meanings of homonyms and homographs. In Experiment 2, homonyms and homographs were presented 1st, followed by disambiguating associates. In Experiment 3, presentation order was reversed. For homographs, performance costs always occurred for subordinate meanings. For homonyms, these costs vanished when context was provided by the preceding associates. The data underscore the priority of phonologic information in word meaning access and suggest that low- and high-level constraints combine to shape word perception.     

Discourse bootstrapping: preschoolers use linguistic discourse to learn new words

When children acquire language, they often learn words in the absence of direct instruction (e.g. ‘This is a ball!’) or even social cues to reference (e.g. eye gaze, pointing). However, there are few accounts of how children do this, especially in cases where the referent of a new word is ambiguous. Across two experiments, we test whether preschoolers (2‐ to 4‐year‐olds; n = 239) can learn new words by inferring the referent of a new word from the surrounding linguistic discourse. Across two experiments, we show that children as young as 2 can learn a new word from the linguistic discourse in which it appears. This suggests that children use the linguistic discourse in which a word appears to learn new words.