Is What You See What You Really Get? Comparison of Scoring Techniques in the Assessment of Real-World Divergent Thinking

In recent years, the social sciences have seen a resurgence in the study of divergent thinking (DT) measures. However, many of these recent advances have focused on abstract, decontextualized DT tasks (e.g., list as many things as you can think of that have wheels). This study provides a new perspective by exploring the reliability and validity evidence for several methods for scoring real-world DT tasks (i.e., tasks situated within a real-world problem or situation). The results suggest a combination of objective and subjective scoring methods may be optimal for originality scoring for contextualized DT tasks, which stands in contrast to recent research suggesting the objective, percentage scoring technique may be optimal for scoring originality on abstract tasks.     

What Is The Most Creative Thing You Have Ever Seen? “Useful” is the New “Valuable” and Dynamic Systems are the Key!

Creativity has been described by many as something which we all can recognize, yet few can completely and sufficiently define. In a discussion of Glăveanu’s (2011) Creating Creativity, further topics and questions, such as pragmatism and neopragmatism as well as the nature of creativity studies are explored. Using the medium of Glăveanu’s research on creativity and Romanian Easter Egg decorating, this article expands the discussion of pragmatism, neopragmatism and the future of research surrounding creativity. This future can be addressed by exploring the nature of the interconnectedness of creativity and cognition via dynamic systems approaches. To enhance this viewpoint, a brief discussion of dynamic systems theory is brought in to supplement the enhanced discussion of pragmatism and the nature of the usefulness of creativity.     

What is a Thing?

“Thing” in the titular question of this paper should be construed as having the utmost generality. In the relevant sense, a thing just is an entity, an existent, a being. The present task is to say what a thing of any category is. This task is the primary one of any comprehensive and systematic metaphysics. Indeed, an answer provides the means for resolving perennial disputes concerning the integrity of the structure in reality—whether some of the relations among things are necessary merely given those relata themselves—and the intricacy of this structure—whether some things are more or less fundamental than others. After considering some reasons for thinking the generality of the titular question makes it unanswerable, the paper propounds the methodology, original inquiry, required to answer it. The key to this methodology is adopting a singular perspective; confronting the world as merely the impetus to inquiry, one can attain an account of what a thing must be. Radical ontology is a systematic metaphysics—broadly Aristotelian, essentialist, and nonhierarchical—that develops the consequences of this account. With it, it is possible to move past stalemate in metaphysics by revealing the grounds of a principled choice between seemingly incommensurable worldviews.     

“You Just Know It’s the Only Thing You Can Think”: A Conversation with Chodorow

ABSTRACT

Nancy Julia Chodorow (1944–) is a pioneer feminist theorist who brought together academic fields of sociology, anthropology, and psychoanalysis in her work related to feminist theories and psychoanalysis. Her first book, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (1978 Chodorow, N. J. (1978; second ed. 1999). The reproduction of mothering: Psychoanalysis and the sociology of gender. Berkeley: University of California Press. [Google Scholar]), gave primacy to a more generalized account of the developmental and familial origins of prevalent psychological differences between femininity and masculinity from a psychoanalytic sociological viewpoint. Her later books, Femininities, Masculinities, Sexualities: Freud and Beyond (1994 Chodorow, N. J. (1994). Femininities, masculinities, sexualities: Freud and beyond. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky. [Google Scholar]), The Power of Feelings: Personal Meaning in Psychoanalysis, Gender, and Culture (1999 Chodorow, N. J. (1999). The power of feelings: Personal meaning in psychoanalysis, gender, and culture. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. [Google Scholar]), and Individualizing Gender and Sexuality: Theory and Practice (2012 Chodorow, N. J. (2012). Individualizing gender and sexuality: Theory and practice. New York and London: Routledge.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), bring in a rich interplay among socio-structural influences (i.e., culture) as well as intra- and inter-psychic dynamic processes, emphasizing more the importance of individuality and subjectivity. Based on an interview I had with Chodorow on the development of her thought, this paper gives Chodorow’s account of her personal history and academic background, current manifestations in feminist social science research and feminist psychoanalysis based on her contribution and legacy, and reflective narratives on the unfolding of feminist and psychoanalytic theories from the 1970s onward. Chodorow’s note to the next generation of feminist psychotherapists is also included.     

What Is This Thing Called Mental Toughness? An Investigation of Elite Sport Performers

The literature on mental toughness is characterized by a general lack of conceptual clarity and consensus as to its definition, as well as a general failure to operationalize the construct in a consistent manner. This study addressed two fundamental issues surrounding mental toughness: how can it be defined? and what are the essential attributes required to be a mentally tough performer? Ten international performers participated in either a focus group or one-toone interviews, from which a definition of mental toughness and the attributes of the ideal mentally tough performer emerged. The resulting definition emphasized both general and specific dimensions, while the 12 attributes covered self-belief, desire/motivation, dealing with pressure and anxiety, focus (performance-related), focus (lifestyle-related), and pain/hardship factors.     

An Evaluation of Construct Validity: What Is This Thing Called Emotional Intelligence?

This article presents a meta-analytic review of the Emotional Intellpigence (EI) construct. The first portion of the study examines the relation between EI measures based on two differing models of the construct (i.e., mixed and ability). This study then examines the relation of each of the models separately with cognitive ability and the Big Five personality factors. Results indicate that measures based on the mixed model of EI overlap extensively (i.e., correlate .71 among themselves; k = 12, N = 3,259), whereas mixed measures and ability measures are relatively distinct (.14; k = 13, N = 2,442). Mixed model measures of EI exhibited greater overlap with personality- than ability-based EI measures. Conversely, ability-based EI measures demonstrated a higher correlation with cognitive ability than mixed measures (.34 vs. .13). Implications and suggestions for the measurement of EI are provided.     

Is What You Feel What They See? Prominent and Subtle Identity Signaling in Intergroup Interactions

Individuals often signal group affiliations to others, and the display of such identity signals is frequently rather subtle. While prior work has focused on understanding an individual's choices of subtle versus prominent signals, in this work, we look at the downstream consequences of such choices. Specifically, we explore how the prominence of identity signals may affect one's behavior in intergroup interactions. Drawing from literature on processing fluency, we propose that the use of difficult to process (subtle) identity signals in intergroup interactions leads signalers to experience identity threat, lowering confidence in their identity and leading them to engage in behaviors to recover from this experience. Across three different identity domains (college affiliation, political affiliation, and brand loyalty), we show that when individuals use difficult to process identity signals, they derogate out‐group members in communication and behave less cooperatively in intergroup interactions. We find that these effects depend upon the observability of the signals by out‐group members and only occur for individuals who are highly identified with the in‐group. We also find that the effects are attenuated when behavior towards members of the out‐group is made public. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The American Dream Revisited: Is It What You Want or Why You Want It That Matters?

Previous research found that aspirations to financial success related inversely to self-actualization and that aspirations to community involvement related positively to self-actualization. We argue that diverse reasons can underlie both of these aspirations, leading to more complex predictions. In a sample of 246 participants, we assessed both self-determining and controlling reasons for each class of aspiration, along with endorsements of the aspirations themselves. Initial regression analyses replicated the earlier findings. Subsequent analyses found that endorsement of self-determining reasons for either class of aspiration related positively to self-actualization and that endorsement of controlling reasons for either class of aspiration related inversely to self-actualization. In the analysis involving community involvement, the aspiration itself no longer retained predictive power after the other variables were taken into account. In the analysis involving financial success, however, the aspiration retained an independent predictive role.     

What is the Right Thing to Say? Agreement among Perceivers on the Supportiveness of Statements

Most social support theory implies that there are objectively supportive people and statements. Yet there is little agreement among perceivers that some people are more supportive than others. Nonetheless, there might be better agreement regarding supportive statements. In three studies, children, college students, and members of a clinical training program rated the supportiveness of specific statements presented by text or video. Agreement among perceivers accounted for only 11% of the variance (range = 8%–12%). Perceivers disagreed because of their traitlike perceptual biases, as well as perceivers’ idiosyncratic tastes. Implications for social support theory were discussed.     

What Is the Model in Model-Based Planning?

Flexibility is one of the hallmarks of human problem-solving. In everyday life, people adapt to changes in common tasks with little to no additional training. Much of the existing work on flexibility in human problem-solving has focused on how people adapt to tasks in new domains by drawing on solutions from previously learned domains. In real-world tasks, however, humans must generalize across a wide range of within-domain variation. In this work we argue that representational abstraction plays an important role in such within-domain generalization. We then explore the nature of this representational abstraction in realistically complex tasks like video games by demonstrating how the same model-based planning framework produces distinct generalization behaviors under different classes of task representation. Finally, we compare the behavior of agents with these task representations to humans in a series of novel grid-based video game tasks. Our results provide evidence for the claim that within-domain flexibility in humans derives from task representations composed of propositional rules written in terms of objects and relational categories.     

‘You Are What You Read:’ Is selective exposure a way people tell us who they are?

Selective exposure is the tendency to gather viewpoint-congenial versus viewpoint-uncongenial information. Extant models of selective exposure suggest this tendency occurs because people anticipate reading congenial (vs. uncongenial) information will cause more favourable intrapersonal consequences. However, these models ignore the notion that people's information choices are, in part, symbolic gestures designed to convey identity-relevant beliefs to an audience through information display. Drawing from perspectives that emphasize human consumption as symbolic and a way to signal one's identity, we suggest that selective exposure pertains not only to information processing but also to conveying identity through information display. Experiment 1 showed that people characterize information display as a way to communicate their views to an audience. Experiments 2–4 showed that people are averse to displaying uncongenial versus congenial information (without processing the information), anticipate feeling more uncomfortable and more inauthentic merely displaying (without processing) uncongenial versus congenial information, and that people's intentions to engage in selective exposure in daily life are a function of their belief that selective-exposure displays convey their identity. None of these studies or findings can be generated from extant selective-exposure theories. Thus, selective-exposure theories are likely incomplete because they ignore people's beliefs and goals regarding information display.     

What Is Left of the Active Externalism Debate?

Since the publication of Clark and Chalmers' Extended Mind paper, the central claims of that paper, viz. the thesis that cognitive processes and cognitive or mental states extend beyond the brain and body, have been vigorously debated within philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science. Both defenders and detractors of these claims have since marshalled an impressive battery of arguments for and against “active externalism.” However, despite the amount of philosophical energy expended, this debate remains far from settled. We argue that this debate can be understood as answering two metaphysical questions. Yet prominent voices within the debate have assumed that there is a tight relationship between these two questions such that one question can be answered via the other. We defend an alternative ‘wide’ view, whereby mentality is understood as constituted by wide social and cultural factors. Our wide view entails that the two metaphysical questions are separate and should be kept distinct. This suggests that active externalism as understood by prominent voices within that debate requires dissolution, rather than solution. However, if the debate were instead understood as only focusing on the second of the two questions, then there could be a possible future for this debate.