Comparisons of models of associative recall

We tested three mathematical models of associative recall that differ in the assumed structure of the memory trace (direct or indirect connections between parts) and the interdependence of the connections (independent or correlated). The three models compared are the “horizontal” model with direct, independent connections, the “schema” model with indirect, independent connections, and the “fragment” model with indirect, correlated connections. In Experiment 1, subjects studied quartets of minimally related words and then recalled, using one or two words of each quartet as cues. The horizontal and schema models predicted the data very well, but the fragment model did poorly. In Experiment 2, related word quintets were learned, and recall cues contained one, two, or three words of a quintet. Only the schema model adequately fit these data. Experiment 3 directly tested the fragment model, using sequential tests of unrelated word quartets. Even an augmented fragment model with extra recall failure parameters was decisively rejected by these data. Both the horizontal and schema models gave satisfactory qualitative accounts, although poor quantitative fits. A means of deriving the models through a spreading activation semantic network of preexperimental knowledge is suggested, and related models are discussed.     

The use of schemata in the acquisition and transfer of knowledge

A learning model based on “memory schemata” is presented. The model assumes that knowledge substructures in memory are shared by multiple representations of information from diverse contexts. These substructures, or schemata, are collections of concepts and associations that occur together repeatedly and act as unitary, higher-order concepts. When knowledge is represented in terms of a schema, associations from the schema to additional concepts specify the detailed information for that context. This organization of knowledge entails both costs and benefits for the acquisition and retention of new information that utilizes a schema. The use of a familiar encoding structure facilitates memory access at storage and retrieval time. Multiple uses of the shared structure produce interference among concepts from the various contexts. The predictions of the model were tested in two transfer experiments in prose learning. Experiment l demonstrated the simultaneous effects of both facilitation and interference in the learning of diverse information conforming to a single schema. Recall of information from the schema was a non-monotonic function of schema strength. In Experiment 2 facilitation was preserved while interference was eliminated by increasing the discriminability among competing contexts. Results from both experiments confirmed the predictions of the model.     

Bartlett's schema theory: The unreplicated “portrait d'homme” series from 1932

In 1932, Frederic Bartlett laid the foundation for the later schema theory. His key assumption of previous knowledge affecting the processing of new stimuli was illustrated in the famous “portrait d'homme” series. Sequenced reproductions of ambiguous stimuli showed progressive object-likeness. As Bartlett pointed out, activation of specific schemata, for instance “the face schema”, biases memory retrieval towards such schemata. In five experiments (Experiment 1, n?=?53; Experiment 2, n?=?177; Experiment 3, n?=?36; Experiment 4, n?=?6; Experiment 5, n?=?2), we tested several factors potentially influencing retrieval biases—for example, by varying the general procedure of reproduction (repeated vs. serial) and by omitting versus providing visual or semantic cues for activating face schemata. Participants inspected face-like stimuli with the caption “portrait of the human” and reproduced them repeatedly under specific conditions. None of the experiments revealed a systematic tendency towards Bartlett's described case, even when the participants were explicitly instructed to draw “a face” like the previously inspected one. In one of the “serial reproduction” experiments, we even obtained contrary effects with decreasing face-likeness over the reproduction generations. A close analysis of the original findings raises questions about the replicability of Bartlett's findings, qualifying the “portrait d'homme” series more or less as an illustrative example of the main idea of reconstructive memory.     

Post-iconic visual storage: chunking in the reproduction of briefly displayed visual patterns

Two experiments are reported which investigate the organization of visuospatial information in post-iconic storage. In both experiments, stimuli consisting of 10 disks randomly placed in a four-by-five array were tachistoscopically presented to subjects whose task was to recreate the pattern. In Experiment 2, reproduction was constrained (on a row-by-row basis) while in Experiment 1 it was unconstrained. The results of Experiment 1 showed that subjects recalled in terms of “chunks” of spatially adjacent disks, with most “chunks” consisting of about three of four disks. Within each sequence of 10 responses the probability of correctly recalling a chunk decreased with its serial position but was relatively independent of chunk size per se (for chunks containing seven or less disks). In addition, clear topographical variations in accuracy were found, which tended to covary strongly with order of recall. In Experiment 2, the order of reproduction was prespecified (either top row down to bottom row, or bottom row up to top row) in order to induce chunking by rows. The direction of reproduction was either pre- or post-cued. The results of this study showed that subjects encode the stimulus, wherever possible, in a form which is compatible with the constraints imposed on recall order. The results for the postcued conditions provide strong support for the argument that topographical variations in accuracy are a function of variations in accuracy of encoding, and not simply a function of order of report. The results are discussed in terms of an attentional model. It is proposed that a general “anticipatory schema” (cf. Neisser, Cognition and Reality 1976) presets the distribution of attention in the visual field, preselects a set of coding heuristics, and subsequently interacts with the present stimulus pattern. Spatial discontinuities in the distribution of attention resulting from this interaction are regarded as “defining” chunks of stimulus elements.     

The role of context on boundary extension

Boundary extension (BE) is a memory error in which observers remember more of a scene than they actually viewed. This error reflects one’s prediction that a scene naturally continues and is driven by scene schema and contextual knowledge. In two separate experiments we investigated the necessity of context and scene schema in BE. In Experiment 1, observers viewed scenes that either contained semantically consistent or inconsistent objects as well as objects on white backgrounds. In both types of scenes and in the no-background condition there was a BE effect; critically, semantic inconsistency in scenes reduced the magnitude of BE. In Experiment 2 when we used abstract shapes instead of meaningful objects, there was no BE effect. We suggest that although scene schema is necessary to elicit BE, contextual consistency is not required.     

Remembering and knowing: Two means of access to the personal past

The nature of recollective experience was examined in a recognition memory task. Subjects gave “remember” judgments to recognized items that were accompanied by conscious recollection and “know” judgments to items that were recognized on some other basis. Although a levels-of-processing effect (Experiment 1) and a picture-superiority effect (Experiment 2) were obtained for overall recognition, these effects occurred only for “remember” judgments, and were reversed for “know” judgments. In Experiment 3, targets and lures were either preceded by a masked repetition of their own presentation (thought to increase perceptual fluency) or of an unrelated word. The effect of perceptual fluency was obtained for overall recogrntion and “know” judgments but not for “remember” judgments. The data obtained for confidencejudgments using the same design (Experiment4) indicated that “remember”/”know” judgments are not made solely on the basis of confidence. These data support the two-factor theories of recognition memory by dissociating two forms of recognition, and shed light on the nature of conscious recollection.     

Helping Children Enter Into Another's Experiences: The Look and Feel of It

The role of focusing 4-year-olds' attention on “feeling” or “looking” was examined in three experiments by testing predictions about children's memory for their interactions with an adult partner as they engaged in a collaborative task. Children made collages with an adult partner, and they were later asked to remember who placed the pieces on the collage. Children were more likely to claim they placed pieces actually placed by their partner (Experiments 1, 2, and 3), unless directed to think about how their partner looked when placing the partner's pieces (Experiments 1 and 3). False claims were observed after children were directed to think about how it would “feel” to perform the actions, whether motoric instructions were focused on the self (Experiment 2, N = 48) or partner (Experiment 1, N = 40, and Experiment 3, N = 24). Furthermore, false claims (referred to as I did it errors) were positively associated with accurate collage memory (Experiment 3). These findings suggest that adopting a perspective during encoding that involves “feeling” movements—whether focused on the self or partner—plays an important role in children's memory for collaboration (in this context, memory for contributions made by children or their adult partners to the completion of a collage). A focus on “feeling” may be a way to “enter into” the experiences of another, promoting anticipation and recoding, which may lead to better learning in both collaborative and non-collaborative contexts.     

Mental rotation under head tilt: Factors influencing the location of the subjective reference frame

We report five experiments on the effect of head tilt on the mental rotation of patterns to the “upright.” In Experiment 1, subjects rotated alphanumeric characters, displayed within a circular surround. Experiment 2 was similar except that the character was an unfamiliar letter-like symbol. In Experiment 3, subjects again rotated alphanumeric characters, but they were displayed within a rectangular frame tilted 60° to the right. Experiment 4 was similar, except that the subjects were instructed to rotate the characters to the “upright” defined by the tilted frame. In all four experiments, the subjects performed the task with their heads either upright or tilted 60°. In Experiment 5, subjects had their heads and bodies tilted 90°, and rotated alphanumeric characters displayed within a circular surround. In all except Experiment 4, analysis of response latencies revealed that the subjective vertical lay closer to the gravitational than to the retinal vertical, although it was somewhat displaced in the direction of the head tilt—more so in Experiments 2 and 3 than in Experiment 1, and more so still in Experiment 5. In Experiment 4, instructions to adopt the axes of the frame land thus of the retina) succeeded in bringing the subjective vertical closer to the retinal than to the gravitational vertical, although the subjective vertical was still some 20° on average from the gravitational vertical. The results show that the subjective reference frame is distinct from both gravitational and the retinal frames, and that the gravitational frame exerts the stronger influence. They also argue against the primacy of a “retinal factor” in the perception of orientation.     

Memory psychophysics for visual area and length

Independent groups of observers made magnitude estimates of geographical area or interstate distance. In Experiment 1, observers estimated the areas of nations or of states of the United States from memory. In Experiment 2, estimates of state area were made either with a map present or from memory after the map had been studied. Similarly, in Experiment 3, observers made perceptual or memorial estimates of interstate distances. Perceptual estimates of distance and geographical area were related to actual stimulus magnitude by power functions whose exponents were similar to those found with conventional procedures. Memory estimates were also related to actual area and distance by power functions. Comparison of memory and perceptual exponents showed that for both area and distance, the memory exponent was equal to the square of the perceptual exponent. The results of Experiment 3 were predicted by a “re-perceptual” model of memory for continuous dimensions, which was developed to describe the results of Experiment 2.     

The effect of knowledge and context in the elicitation of inferences in class-inclusion reasoning

Abstract

Two experiments were carried out with adult subjects to investigate the conditions of production of inferences in a problem-solving task involving reasoning about class inclusion. We tested the hypothesis that the production of appropriate inferences is facilitated whenever pieces of information are stored in memory that can be matched at least in part with the conclusion resulting from the inference. In Experiment 1, problems involving the same inferential pattern but belonging to three different domains were compared. The inclusion relations were of the type “is a kind of” (semantic domain), “more than” (being 8 years old is being more than 7 years old: logico-mathematical domain) or “what I have received on a given day is a part of what I have in the evening” (possession domain). In the semantic domain, the critical inference may be facilitated by the semantic network of concepts stored in memory. In the logico-mathematical domain, there is no information that corresponds to the critical inference, so that inferences have to be elaborated merely by use of general knowledge about the meaning of the relation. The possession domain is an intermediate case, since the inference corresponds to knowledge about relations in the possession domain. The results clearly support a memory-cueing hypothesis: There is a marked order of difficulty ranging from the logico-mathematical domain (most difficult) to the semantic domain (least difficult). In Experiment 2, equivalent problems using the same conceptual information were compared: The critical inference involved scanning a series of numbers either in direct order (more than 7 is 8, 9, 10) or in reverse order (8, 9, 10 is more than 7). The number of correct solutions was higher and the response latency much shorter for those problems in which the critical inference was of the type “more than 7 is 8, 9 or 10″.     

Name that percussive tune: Associative memory and amplitude envelope†

A series of experiments demonstrated novel effects of amplitude envelope on associative memory, with tones exhibiting naturally decaying amplitude envelopes (e.g., those made by two wine glasses clinking) better associated with target objects than amplitude-invariant tones. In Experiment 1 participants learned associations between household objects and 4-note tone sequences constructed of spectrally matched pure tones with either “flat” or “percussive” amplitude envelopes. Those hearing percussive tones correctly recalled significantly more sequence–object associations. Experiment 2 demonstrated that participants hearing percussive tones learned the associations more quickly. Experiment 3 used “reverse percussive” tones (percussive tones played backwards) to test whether differences in overall energy might account for this effect, finding they did not lead to the same level of performance as percussive tones. Experiment 4 varied the envelope at encoding and retrieval to determine which stage of the task was most affected by the envelope manipulation. Participants hearing percussive tones at both encoding and retrieval performed significantly better than the other three groups (i.e., flat at encoding/percussive at retrieval, etc.). We conclude that amplitude envelope plays an important role in learning and memory, a finding with relevance to psychological research on audition and associative memory, as well as practical relevance for improving human–computer interface design.     

Spilling the beans on understanding and memory for idioms in conversation

Three experiments examine people's understanding and memory for idioms. Experiment 1 indicates that in a conversational context, subjects take less time to comprehend conventional uses of idiomatic expression than unconventional, literal uses. Paraphrase judgment errors show that there is a strong bias to interpret idiomatic expressions conventionally when there is no preceding context; however, subjects interpret literal uses of these expressions correctly when there is appropriate context. Experiment 2 showed that in a free recall task, literal uses of idioms are remembered better than conventional uses of these utterances. Experiment 3 indicated that in conversation, literal and idiomatic recall prompts facilitate memory for literal uses of idioms equally well. The results from these experiments suggest that memory for conventional utterances is not as good as for unconventional uses of the same utterances and that subjects understanding unconventional uses of idioms tend to analyze the idiomatic meaning of these expressions before deriving the literal, unconventional interpretation. It is argued that the traditional distinction between literal and metaphoric language is better characterized as a continuum between conventional and unconventional utterances.     

Fragment and schema models for recall

Two general conceptualizations of recall may be distinguished. One holds that recall is sub-served by memory traces in which representations of different aspects of external events are linked directly to each other. The other holds that these representations are connected via a mediating concept. Formalizations of these views are provided by two theories examined by Ross and Bower (1981a): the “fragment” and “schema” models, respectively. Ross and Bower found that patterns of cued recall of clusters of words with a common theme were predicted well by the schema model, but not by the fragment model. Two experiments reported here show that the reverse is true if the clusters of words are selected randomly. Ross and Bower also considered separately a third theory, the “horizontal” model. However, the horizontal model is shown here to be a constrained form of the fragment model. Another constrained form of the fragment model, termed the “link” model, is introduced and is shown to provide an account of encoding as well as of retrieval that, although it is outstandingly parsimonious, is also approximately accurate. Finally, it is shown that the memory structures characterized by the fragment model may be interpreted as either graphs or digraphs: that is, networks with either bidirectional or unidirectional connections between nodes.     

Working memory for relations among objects

Across many areas of study in cognition, the capacity of working memory (WM) is widely agreed to be roughly three to five items: three to five objects (i.e., bound collections of object features) in the literature on visual WM or three to five role bindings (i.e., objects in specific relational roles) in the literature on memory and reasoning. Three experiments investigated the capacity of observers’ WM for the spatial relations among objects in a visual display, and the results suggest that the “items” in WM are neither simply objects nor simply role bindings. The results of Experiment 1 are most consistent with a model that treats an “item” in visual WM as an object, along with the roles of all its relations to one other object. Experiment 2 compared observers’ WM for object size with their memory for relative size and provided evidence that observers compute and store objects’ relations per se (rather than just absolute size) in WM. Experiment 3 tested and confirmed several more nuanced predictions of the model supported by Experiment 1. Together, these findings suggest that objects are stored in visual WM in pairs (along with all the relations between the objects in a pair) and that, from the perspective of WM, a given object in one pair is not the same “item” as that same object in a different pair.     

The memory representation of motor skills: a test of schema theory

Currently, a popular model for the central representation of motor skills is embodied in Schmidt's schema theory of discrete motor skill learning (Schmidt, 1975). Two experiments are reported here that contrast predictions from a schema abstraction model that is the basis for schema theory with those from an exemplar-based model of motor skill memory representation. In both experiments, subjects performed 300 trials per day of three variations of a three-segment timing task over 4 days of acquisition. The subjects then either immediately transferred to four novel variations of the same task (Experiment 1) that varied in degree of similarity to the exemplars experienced during acquisition; or performed two novel and two previously produced exemplars, following 24-h and 1-week retention intervals (Experiment 2). The results indicated that novel task transfer was not affected by the degree of similarity between the acquisition and transfer exemplars, and that there was no advantage for a previously produced exemplar over a novel exemplar after either a 24-hr or 1 week retention interval. Also, in both experiments, a consistent pattern of bias in responding was noted for novel task transfer and retention. These results are indicative of a schema abstraction model of memory representation for motor skills.     

How does encoding context affect memory in younger and older adults?

How does encoding context affect memory? Participants studied visually presented words viewed concurrently with a rich (intact face) or weak (scrambled face) image as context and subsequently made “Remember”, “Know”, or “New” judgements to words presented alone. In Experiment 1a, younger, but not older, adults showed higher recollection accuracy to words from rich- than from weak-context encoding trials. The age-related deficit in recollection occurred, in Experiment 1b, even when encoding and retrieval time was doubled in older adults, suggesting that insufficient processing time cannot account for this age-related deficit. In Experiment 1c, dividing attention in young, during encoding, reduced overall memory, though the recollection boost from rich encoding contexts remained, suggesting that reduced attention resources cannot explain this age-related deficit. Experiment 2 showed that an own-age bias, to face images as context, could not explain the age-related differences either. Results suggest that age deficits in recollection stem from a lack of spontaneous binding, or elaboration, of context to target information during encoding.     

Antimnemonic effects of schemas in young and older adults

Schema-consistent material that is aligned with an individual’s knowledge and experience is typically more memorable than abstract material. This effect is often more extreme in older adults and schema use can alleviate age deficits in memory. In three experiments, young and older adults completed memory tasks where the availability of schematic information was manipulated. Specifying nonobvious relations between to-be-remembered word pairs paradoxically hindered memory (Experiment 1). Highlighting relations within mixed lists of related and unrelated word pairs had no effect on memory for those pairs (Experiment 2). This occurred even though related word pairs were recalled better than unrelated word pairs, particularly for older adults. Revealing a schematic context in a memory task with abstract image segments also hindered memory performance, particularly for older adults (Experiment 3). The data show that processing schematic information can come with costs that offset mnemonic benefits associated with schema-consistent stimuli.     

Most People Think They Are More Pro-Environmental than Others: A Demonstration of the Better-than-Average Effect in Perceived Pro-Environmental Behavioral Engagement

Abstract

People tend to perceive themselves as better than average in various contexts. In this article I test if the better-than-average effect (BTAE) also holds for pro-environmental behavioral engagement. Experiment 1 supported that the majority of participants report to be more pro-environmental than others, using a large representative sample. Experiment 2 validated these findings in 3 additional cultures (United States, United Kingdom, and India) and showed that BTAE held for both abstract (other Americans) and concrete (my friends) comparisons. Experiment 3 found that participants overestimated both how “much” and how “often” they engage in pro-environmental actions. Finally, Experiment 4 found weak support for the hypothesis that inducing BTAE are inhibiting future pro-environmental behaviors.     

Role of gravitational cues in the haptic perception of orientation

The haptic perception of vertical, horizontal, +45°-oblique, and +135°-oblique orientations was studied in adults. The purpose was to establish whether the gravitational cues provided by the scanning arm—hand system were involved in the haptic oblique effect (lower performances in oblique orientations than in vertical—horizontal ones) and more generally in the haptic coding of orientation. The magnitude of these cues was manipulated by changing gravity constraints, and their variability was manipulated by changing the planes in which the task was performed (horizontal, frontal, and sagittal). In Experiment 1, only the horizontal plane was tested, either with the forearm resting on the disk supporting the rod (“supported forearm” condition) or with the forearm unsupported in the air. In the latter case, antigravitational forces were elicited during scanning. The oblique effect was present in the “unsupported” condition and was absent in the “supported” condition. In Experiment 2, the three planes were tested, either in a “natural” or in a “lightened forearm” condition in which the gravitational cues were reduced by lightening the subject’s forearm. The magnitude of the oblique effect was lower in the “lightened” condition than in the “natural” one, and there was no plane effect. In Experiment 3, the subject’s forearm was loaded with either a 500- or a 1,000-g bracelet, or it was not loaded. The oblique effect was the same in the three conditions, and the plane effect (lower performances in the horizontal plane than in the frontal and sagittal ones) was present only when the forearm was loaded. Taken together, these results suggested that gravitational cues may play a role in haptic coding of orientation, although the effects of decreasing or increasing these cues are not symmetrical.