Scrutinizing the Emotional Nature of Intuitive Coherence Judgments

Dual‐system models propose that cognitive processing can occur either intuitively or deliberately. Unlike deliberate decision strategies, intuitive ones are assumed to have an emotional component attached to the decision process. We tested if intuitive decisions are indeed accompanied by an emotional response while deliberate decisions are not. Specifically, we conducted a psychophysiological study in which participants were instructed to decide either intuitively or deliberately if three simultaneously presented words were semantically coherent or incoherent (triad task). The degree of emotionality of these two decision strategies (intuitive vs. deliberate) was compared using changes in electrodermal activity (EDA) and the reaction time (RT) effect of an affective priming paradigm as primary measurements. Based on a valence‐arousal model, our results revealed that intuitive and deliberate judgments do not differ as to their emotional valence but that they do differ in emotional arousal. Most notably, sympathetic activation during intuitive judgments was significantly lower compared to sympathetic activation during deliberate judgments. Our results reflect that a relaxed state of mind—manifested in low sympathetic activity—could underlie the holistic processing that is assumed to facilitate the proliferation of semantic associations during coherence judgments. This suggests that coherence judgments made under an (instructed) intuitive decision mode have a specific psychophysiological signature and that arousal is the differentiating component between intuitive and deliberate decision strategies. © 2016 The Authors Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

Causal Networks or Causal Islands? The Representation of Mechanisms and the Transitivity of Causal Judgment

Knowledge of mechanisms is critical for causal reasoning. We contrasted two possible organizations of causal knowledge—an interconnected causal network, where events are causally connected without any boundaries delineating discrete mechanisms; or a set of disparate mechanisms—causal islands—such that events in different mechanisms are not thought to be related even when they belong to the same causal chain. To distinguish these possibilities, we tested whether people make transitive judgments about causal chains by inferring, given A causes B and B causes C, that A causes C. Specifically, causal chains schematized as one chunk or mechanism in semantic memory (e.g., exercising, becoming thirsty, drinking water) led to transitive causal judgments. On the other hand, chains schematized as multiple chunks (e.g., having sex, becoming pregnant, becoming nauseous) led to intransitive judgments despite strong intermediate links ((Experiments 1–3). Normative accounts of causal intransitivity could not explain these intransitive judgments (Experiments 4 and 5).     

Feeling of knowing for names in response to faces

Participants were asked to recall the names when shown photographs of faces in both a semantic task (Experiment 1) and an episodic task (Experiments 2 and 3). When recall failed, feeling of knowing (FOK) ratings were solicited. In addition, participants reported on the strategies that they used to make their ratings, whether they could recall other pieces of information (the target-accessibility strategy, e.g., Koriat, A. (1993). How do we know that? The accessibility model of the feeling of knowing. Psychological Review, 100, 609–639) or whether the faces simply looked familiar (the cue-familiarity strategy, e.g., Schwartz, B. L., & Metcalfe, J. (1992). Cue familiarity but not target accessibility enhances feeling of knowing ratings. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 18, 1074–1083). In all experiments, FOK ratings were fairly accurate in that participants were successful in predicting their performance on a subsequent recognition test. More importantly, participants reported using the cue-familiarity strategy more often, although they gave higher FOK ratings when they reported using the target-accessibility strategy. The FOK ratings that were given using the two strategies were equally accurate.     

Counter‐intuitive moral judgement following traumatic brain injury

Several neurological patient populations, including traumatic brain injury (TBI), appear to produce an abnormally ‘utilitarian’ pattern of judgements to moral dilemmas; they tend to make judgements that maximize the welfare of the majority, rather than deontological judgements based on the following of moral rules (e.g., do not harm others). However, this patient research has always used extreme dilemmas with highly valued moral rules (e.g., do not kill). Data from healthy participants, however, suggest that when a wider range of dilemmas are employed, involving less valued moral rules (e.g., do not lie), moral judgements demonstrate sensitivity to the psychological intuitiveness of the judgements, rather than their deontological or utilitarian content (Kahane et al., Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7, 2011, 393). We sought the moral judgements of 30 TBI participants and 30 controls on moral dilemmas where content (utilitarian/deontological) and intuition (intuitive/counter‐intuitive) were measured concurrently. Overall TBI participants made utilitarian judgements in equal proportions to controls; disproportionately favouring utilitarian judgements only when they were counter‐intuitive, and deontological judgements only when they were counter‐intuitive. These results speak against the view that TBI causes a specific utilitarian bias, suggesting instead that moral intuition is broadly disrupted following TBI.     

Processing of Numerical and Proportional Quantifiers

Quantifier expressions like “many” and “at least” are part of a rich repository of words in language representing magnitude information. The role of numerical processing in comprehending quantifiers was studied in a semantic truth value judgment task, asking adults to quickly verify sentences about visual displays using numerical (at least seven, at least thirteen, at most seven, at most thirteen) or proportional (many, few) quantifiers. The visual displays were composed of systematically varied proportions of yellow and blue circles. The results demonstrated that numerical estimation and numerical reference information are fundamental in encoding the meaning of quantifiers in terms of response times and acceptability judgments. However, a difference emerges in the comparison strategies when a fixed external reference numerosity (seven or thirteen) is used for numerical quantifiers, whereas an internal numerical criterion is invoked for proportional quantifiers. Moreover, for both quantifier types, quantifier semantics and its polarity (positive vs. negative) biased the response direction (accept/reject). Overall, our results indicate that quantifier comprehension involves core numerical and lexical semantic properties, demonstrating integrated processing of language and numbers.     

Beyond self-report in the study of hedonic and eudaimonic well-being: Correlations with acquaintance reports, clinician judgments and directly observed social behavior

Surprisingly little is known about how well-being is related to social reputation, clinician judgments, and directly observed social behaviors. This study presents data that bear directly on these issues, along with comparing the personality and behavioral correlates of subjective happiness, a measurement based on a hedonic conceptualization of well-being, with psychological well-being, a eudaimonic conceptualization. The findings demonstrate remarkable consistency in the pattern of correlates of the two measures across acquaintance ratings, clinician judgments, and directly observed social behaviors. By either conceptualization, people high in well-being enjoy positive social reputations (e.g., cheerful, sociable, satisfied with life), are rated as well-adjusted by clinicians (e.g., consistent, resilient), and can be observed to exhibit adaptive social behaviors (e.g., social skill, expressiveness).     

Finding similarity in a model of relational reasoning

Similarity plays a central role in the study of perception and cognition. Previous attempts to model similarity have captured effects of either featural or structural similarity, but typically not both. We simulated both by fitting similarity data with the LISA model of relational reasoning [Hummel, J. E., & Holyoak, K. J. (1997). Distributed representations of structure: A theory of analogical access and mapping. Psychological Review, 104, 427–466, Hummel, J. E., & Holyoak, K. J. (2003a). A symbolic-connectionist theory of relational inference and generalization. Psychological Review, 110, 220–264]. The same mechanisms LISA uses to simulate analogy also provide a natural account of feature-based similarity effects (e.g., violations of symmetry), structural effects (e.g., the advantage of alignable over non-alignable differences), and the combined effects of featural and structured information (i.e., MIPs and MOPs; “Matches In/Out of Place”) on similarity judgments. Our approach differs from most models of similarity in that LISA was not originally designed to simulate similarity judgments, but rather analogical reasoning. LISA’s incidental ability to simulate diverse similarity effects speaks to the plausibility of the model’s account of human knowledge representation.     

Coding strategies in number space: Memory requirements influence spatial–numerical associations

The tendency to respond faster with the left hand to relatively small numbers and faster with the right hand to relatively large numbers (spatial numerical association of response codes, SNARC effect) has been interpreted as an automatic association of spatial and numerical information. We investigated in two experiments the impact of task-irrelevant memory representations on this effect. Participants memorized three Arabic digits describing a left-to-right ascending number sequence (e.g., 3–4–5), a descending sequence (e.g., 5–4–3), or a disordered sequence (e.g., 5–3–4) and indicated afterwards the parity status of a centrally presented digit (i.e., 1, 2, 8, or 9) with a left/right keypress response. As indicated by the reaction times, the SNARC effect in the parity task was mediated by the coding requirements of the memory tasks. That is, a SNARC effect was only present after memorizing ascending or disordered number sequences but disappeared after processing descending sequences. Interestingly, the effects of the second task were only present if all sequences within one experimental block had the same type of order. Taken together, our findings are inconsistent with the idea that spatial–numerical associations are the result of an automatic and obligatory cognitive process but do suggest that coding strategies might be responsible for the cognitive link between numbers and space.     

There aren't plenty more fish in the sea: A causal network approach

The current research investigated how lay representations of the causes of an environmental problem may underlie individuals' reasoning about the issue. Naïve participants completed an experiment that involved two main tasks. The causal diagram task required participants to depict the causal relations between a set of factors related to overfishing and to estimate the strength of these relations. The counterfactual task required participants to judge the effect of counterfactual suppositions based on the diagrammed factors. We explored two major questions: (1) what is the relation between individual causal models and counterfactual judgments? Consistent with previous findings (e.g., Green et al., 1998, Br. J. Soc. Psychology, 37, 415), these judgments were best explained by a combination of the strength of both direct and indirect causal paths. (2) To what extent do people use two‐way causal thinking when reasoning about an environmental problem? In contrast to previous research (e.g., White, 2008, Appl. Cogn. Psychology, 22, 559), analyses based on individual causal networks revealed the presence of numerous feedback loops. The studies support the value of analysing individual causal models in contrast to consensual representations. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed in relation to causal reasoning as well as environmental psychology.     

Three Arguments Against the Expertise Defense

Experimental philosophers have challenged friends of the expertise defense to show that (a) the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are different from the intuitive judgments of nonphilosophers, and (b) the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are better than the intuitive judgments of nonphilosophers, in ways that are relevant to the truth or falsity of such judgments. Friends of the expertise defense have responded by arguing that the burden of proof lies with experimental philosophers. This article sketches three arguments which show that both (a) and (b) are probably false. If its arguments are cogent, then shifting the burden of proof is a futile move, since philosophical training makes no difference so far as making intuitive judgments in response to hypothetical cases is concerned.     

Estimating the frequency of nonevents: The role of recollection failure in false recognition

Participants studied lists of multiply presented converging associates (e.g.,bed, dream, pillow, etc.) and were timed as they estimated how often they saw list items, related foils (e.g.,blanket), and non-presented critical items (SLEEP). Average number of repetitions (few [3] vs. many [6]) and repetition variability (fixed vs. variable) were manipulated between subjects. Participants responded more slowly to critical items (3.18 sec) than to list items (2.45 sec) or foils (2.22 sec). In addition, critical-item judgments of frequency (JOFs) were about as large as list-item JOFs, and false recognition (i.e., nonzero JOFs) of critical items was most likely in the few-fixed condition (96%) and least likely in the many-fixed condition (74%). These findings suggest that people can userecollection failure—the absence of an anticipated recollective experience, coupled with strong familiarity—to distinguish critical items from list items and that recollection failure is weighted most heavily when people expect familiar probes to access episodic information.     

Middle School Learners' Use of Latin Roots to Infer the Meaning of Unfamiliar Words

This study investigated how middle school students leverage information about bound Latin roots (e.g., voc in advocate and vociferous) to infer meanings of unfamiliar words, and how instruction may facilitate morphological analysis using roots. A dynamic assessment of morphological analysis was administered to 29 sixth graders (n = 17 intervention students) and 30 seventh graders (n = 18 intervention students). Qualitative analyses of analytic strategies revealed patterns of morphological problem solving that included direct (i.e., direct application of roots to analyze unfamiliar words) and indirect routes (i.e., use of known words that carry the roots to analyze unfamiliar words). Intervention students applied a direct route at higher rates than control students. Correlational analyses revealed a small but significant treatment effect on establishing meaning memory representations for roots and a significant, positive treatment effect for use of roots to infer unfamiliar word meanings. Overall results show promise for use of bound Latin roots for morphological problem solving.     

The revelation effect for autobiographical memory: A mixture-model analysis

Participants provided information about their childhood by rating their confidence about whether they had experienced various events (e.g., “broke a window playing ball”). On some trials, participants unscrambled a key word from the event phrase (e.g., wdinwo—window) or an unrelated word (e.g., gnutge—nugget) before seeing the event and giving their confidence ratings. The act of unscrambling led participants to increase their confidence that the event occurred in their childhood, but only when the confidence rating immediately followed the act of unscrambling. This increase in confidence mirrors the “revelation effect” observed in word recognition experiments. In the present article, we analyzed our data using a new signal detection mixture distribution model that does not require the researcher to know the veracity of memory judgments a priori. Our analysis reveals that unscrambling a key word or an unrelated word affects response bias and discriminability in autobiographical memory tests in ways that are very similar to those that have been previously found for word recognition tasks.     

Accuracy of Social Perception: An Integration and Review of Meta‐Analyses

This review examines the overall accuracy of social perception across several research topics and identifies factors that influence the accuracy of social perception. Findings from 14 meta‐analyses examining topics such as social/personality judgments, health judgments, legal judgments, and academic/vocational judgments were obtained. Social perception accuracy was generally moderate, yielding an average effect size (r) of .32. However, individual meta‐analytic effects varied widely, with some topics yielding small effects (e.g., lie detection, eyewitness identification) and other topics yielding large effects (e.g., educational judgments, health judgments). Several moderators of social perception accuracy were identified, including the nature of the information source, familiarity of the target, type of personality trait, and severity of the outcome being judged. These findings provide a comprehensive summary and novel integration of disparate findings on the accuracy of social perception. Concluding remarks highlight avenues for future research and call for cross‐disciplinary collaborations that would enhance our understanding of social perception.     

Euclid: Strategic alternative assessment matrix

The vast amount of information that must be considered to solve inherently ill‐structured and complex strategic problems creates a need for tools to help decision makers (DMs) recognize the complexity of this process and develop a rational model for strategy evaluation. Over the last several decades, a philosophy and a body of intuitive and analytical methods have been developed to assist DMs in the evaluation of strategic alternatives. However, the intuitive methods lack a structured framework for the systematic evaluation of strategic alternatives while the analytical methods are not intended to capture intuitive preferences. Euclid is a simple and yet sophisticated multiobjective value analysis model that attempts to uncover some of the complexities inherent in the evaluation of strategic alternatives. The proposed model uses a series of intuitive and analytical methods including environmental scanning, the analytic hierarchy process (AHP), subjective probabilities, and the theory of displaced ideal, to plot strategic alternatives on a matrix based on their Euclidean distance from the ideal alternative. Euclid is further compared to the quantitative strategic planning matrix (QSPM) in a real world application. The information provided by the users shows that Euclid can significantly enhance decision quality and the DM's confidence. Euclid is not intended to replace the DMs, rather, it provides a systematic approach to support, supplement, and ensure the internal consistency of their judgments through a series of logically sound techniques. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Underlying mechanisms of initial feelings of knowing in children

Past research has pointed to two contrasting mechanisms behind feeling‐of‐knowing judgments (FOKs). The trace‐based account proposes a direct internal monitor that detects the presence or non‐presence of a target item. The inferential account dictates that judgments are actually based on cues external to the memory trace, such as familiarity; FOKs could therefore be based on sometimes misleading information. Thus, while a direct mechanism will lead to good learning strategies (i.e. successful searches), an inferential process could potentially lead to less optimal strategies (i.e. search for unknown target information). The question posed in this research was: What processes underlie the judgments children make prior to fully retrieving a target item? We used a simplified version of Reder and Ritter's (1992 ) game show paradigm to investigate the accuracy (and mechanism) of children's initial FOKs. The experiment found that initial FOKs were largely driven by familiarity of the cues. These data have important implications for strategies children utilize in educational settings.     

Intuition, reason, and metacognition

Dual Process Theories (DPT) of reasoning posit that judgments are mediated by both fast, automatic processes and more deliberate, analytic ones. A critical, but unanswered question concerns the issue of monitoring and control: When do reasoners rely on the first, intuitive output and when do they engage more effortful thinking? We hypothesised that initial, intuitive answers are accompanied by a metacognitive experience, called the Feeling of Rightness (FOR), which can signal when additional analysis is needed. In separate experiments, reasoners completed one of four tasks: conditional reasoning (N = 60), a three-term variant of conditional reasoning (N = 48), problems used to measure base rate neglect (N = 128), or a syllogistic reasoning task (N = 64). For each task, participants were instructed to provide an initial, intuitive response to the problem along with an assessment of the rightness of that answer (FOR). They were then allowed as much time as needed to reconsider their initial answer and provide a final answer. In each experiment, we observed a robust relationship between the FOR and two measures of analytic thinking: low FOR was associated with longer rethinking times and an increased probability of answer change. In turn, FOR judgments were consistently predicted by the fluency with which the initial answer was produced, providing a link to the wider literature on metamemory. These data support a model in which a metacognitive judgment about a first, initial model determines the extent of analytic engagement.     

Prospective memory training in older adults and its relevance for successful aging

In research on cognitive plasticity, two training approaches have been established: (1) training of strategies to improve performance in a given task (e.g., encoding strategies to improve episodic memory performance) and (2) training of basic cognitive processes (e.g., working memory, inhibition) that underlie a range of more complex cognitive tasks (e.g., planning) to improve both the training target and the complex transfer tasks. Strategy training aims to compensate or circumvent limitations in underlying processes, while process training attempts to augment or to restore these processes. Although research on both approaches has produced some promising findings, results are still heterogeneous and the impact of most training regimes for everyday life is unknown. We, therefore, discuss recent proposals of training regimes aiming to improve prospective memory (i.e., forming and realizing delayed intentions) as this type of complex cognition is highly relevant for independent living. Furthermore, prospective memory is associated with working memory and executive functions and age-related decline is widely reported. We review initial evidence suggesting that both training regimes (i.e., strategy and/or process training) can successfully be applied to improve prospective memory. Conceptual and methodological implications of the findings for research on age-related prospective memory and for training research in general are discussed.     

Emotion regulation and risk taking: Predicting risky choice in deliberative decision making

Only very recently has research demonstrated that experimentally induced emotion regulation strategies (cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression) affect risky choice (e.g., Heilman et al., 2010). However, it is unknown whether this effect also operates via habitual use of emotion regulation strategies in risky choice involving deliberative decision making. We investigated the role of habitual use of emotion regulation strategies in risky choice using the “cold” deliberative version of the Columbia Card Task (CCT; Figner et al., 2009). Fifty-three participants completed the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003) and—one month later—the CCT and the PANAS. Greater habitual cognitive reappraisal use was related to increased risk taking, accompanied by decreased sensitivity to changes in probability and loss amount. Greater habitual expressive suppression use was related to decreased risk taking. The results show that habitual use of reappraisal and suppression strategies predict risk taking when decisions involve predominantly cognitive-deliberative processes.     

Accuracy and awareness in the perception and categorization of male sexual orientation

For clear and unambiguous social categories, person perception occurs quite accurately from minimal cues. This article addresses the perception of an ambiguous social category (male sexual orientation) from minimal cues. Across 5 studies, the authors examined individuals' actual and self-assessed accuracy when judging male sexual orientation from faces and facial features. Although participants were able to make accurate judgments from multiple facial features (i.e., hair, the eyes, and the mouth area), their perceived accuracy was calibrated with their actual accuracy only when making judgments based on hairstyle, a controllable feature. These findings provide evidence that suggests different processes for extracting social category information during perception: explicit judgments based on obvious cues (hairstyle) and intuitive judgments based on nonobvious cues (information from the eyes and mouth area). Differences in the accuracy of judgments based on targets' controllability and perceivers' awareness of cues provides insight into the processes underlying intuitive predictions and intuitive judgments.