Irrational desires

Conclusion I believe that the attempts discussed above fail to show that logically satisfiable basic desires can be rationally impotent. Obviously, this does not entail that they cannot be. Nevertheless, I think it is reasonable to accept a Neo-Humean view. Such acceptence need not be based on burden of proof arguments, about which there is well-grounded skepticism. I prefer instead to base it on a burden of introduction argument; because of the initial plausibility of the Neo-Humean view, critics carry the burden of introducing theories that entail that basic desires can be non-instrumentally irrational (in the relevant sense). Once such theories are introduced, the philosophical court can rule without imposing a burden of proof. I have tried to establish that three recently introduced theories in fact give us no grounds for rejecting Neo-Humeanism.     

Explanatory Exclusion and Causal Exclusion

Given Kim’s principle of explanatory exclusion (EE), it follows that in addition to the problem of mental causation, dualism faces a problem of mental explanation. However, the plausibility of EE rests upon the acceptance of a further principle concerning the individuation of explanation (EI). The two methods of defending EI—either by combining an internal account of the individuation of explanation with a semantical account of properties or by accepting an external account of the individuation of explanation—are both metaphysically implausible. This is not, however, to reject the problem of mental explanation, for EE can be replaced with a far weaker principle, which does not require the acceptance of EI, but which generates a similar problem for dualism.

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On Irrational Guilt

A person raised in a religious family may have been taught that going to the theater is not allowed, and even if he has rejected this taboo years ago, he still feels guilty when attending theater. These kinds of cases may not be rare, but they are strange. Indeed, one may wonder how they are even possible. This is why an explanation is needed, and in my paper I aim to give such an explanation. In particular, I will first provide a brief review of the explanations of irrational guilt that are compatible with the cognitive theories of emotions, that is, theories that presuppose that there is a causal or a constitutional connection between emotions and cognitive factors, such as judgments, beliefs or thoughts. Following many other reviewers, I found most of the explanations of irrational guilt unsatisfactory, although my reasons for critical conclusions will partly differ from the usual ones. After the review, I will defend a solution according to which it is possible to believe that an act does not have any moral costs and at the same time to have an impression that is has, which explains the guilty feelings.     

Irrational beliefs and personality

This study investigated the relationship between irrational beliefs and the nonpathological personality characteristics origence and intellectence described by Welsh (1972, 1975b). The Adjective Check List (ACL) and the Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT) were administered to 319 college students. Data were analyzed for the entire sample and for males and females separately. In each case, two combinations of scores yielding significant canonical correlation coefficients were produced. The results offer a refinement to Ellis' personality model and suggest that irrational beliefs are insufficient as indications of psychopathology.     

Irrational Beliefs and Socio-Political Extremism

This paper discusses the role of irrational beliefs and socio-political extremism. A central feature of extremist ideology involves utopian beliefs regarding the perfectability of individuals or society. The relationship between these ideas and the absolute beliefs described in Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy is considered.     

Irrational beliefs and bulimia symptoms

The psychological correlates of bulimia include affective disorder and emotional liability. In addition, emotional liability appears to precipitate binge-purge episodes. It has been proposed that emotional liability is a function of irrational beliefs regarding personal performance, interpersonal relationships and self-control. Irrational beliefs and bulimia symptoms were assessed with psychometrically valid self-report measures. Correlational analyses showed that the irrational beliefs of Anxious Overconcern, Problem Avoidance, Helplessness and Blame Proneness are separately correlated with bulimia symptoms. The implications for the psychological assessment and treatment of bulimia symptoms are discussed.Jeffrey M. Lohr, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of Psychology at the University of Arkansas. His research interests are in the assessment of irrational beliefs and their association with dysphoric motivational states.Donna L. Parkinson, M.A., is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Psychology at the University of Arkansas. Her research interests are in the assessment of eating disorders.     

Irrational beliefs and conflict-handling orientations

Before a series of conflict-resolution and communication-skills workshops, measures were obtained on the dependent variables of conflict-handling orientations and on the independent variables of irrational beliefs. The population was rather general, i.e. nonstudent, nonclinical and non-volunteer, who were the managers and the engineers of three enterprises. Correlation analysis showed that irrational beliefs underlying anger, anxiety, frustration, guilt and other negative emotions were correlated with different conflict-handling orientations. On the basis of the obtained results a series of workshops was conducted in the format of Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET).Mikhael I. Timofeev, Ph.D., is a senior lecturer at the Inter-Branch Institute of Advanced Training, St. Petersburg Technical University, Politechnicheskaya, 29, St. Petersburg, 195251, Russia.     

Irrational beliefs and psychological needs

Studied the relationship between irrational beliefs and 15 psychological needs described by Murray. The Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT) and the Adjective Check List (ACL) were administered to 46 high school students and 50 adults. Results of stepwise multiple regression analyses indicated that five IBT scales and IBT Full-Scale were significantly associated with psychological needs. It was concluded that pathological behavior could not be readily predicted on the basis of irrational beliefs. It was further concluded that Ellis' model of personality obtained additional validating evidence.     

时间相关决策中的非理性现象

时间相关决策中存在着时间成本模糊、时间感知不稳定和远近选择决策权重不稳定等非理性现象。心理账户因素、决策认知因素、决策情境因素和个体因素影响时间相关决策中非理性现象的产生。通过加强时间价值感知训练、理性分析和想象后悔、团队决策、制订合理时间计划和理解社会文化等方法, 可减少时间相关决策中的非理性现象。研究者在未来可关注主观心理时间和高科技对时间相关决策的影响、个体时间相关决策社会化的过程、改变学科视角和实验范式进行研究等。     

Personality Traits Predict Irrational Beliefs

Irrational beliefs are the focus of many psychological theories, since research has shown that holding irrational beliefs often leads to unhealthy emotions, dysfunctional behaviors, and psychological disturbances. The aim of such therapies as rational emotive behavioral therapy and cognitive behavioral therapy is to dispute irrational beliefs to promote more rational ways of thinking; however they do not take into account individual personality differences. The aim of this study was to determine whether personality traits predict rational and irrational beliefs in a mixed student and clinical sample. It was hypothesized that the domains of the five factor model of personality would predict rational beliefs as well as a range of irrational beliefs. Our findings supported the hypothesis, showing distinct associations between personality traits and each specific irrational belief. Neuroticism predicted rational beliefs as well as six out of the seven types of irrational beliefs measured. Additionally, extraversion predicted rationality and self-downing, openness predicted need for comfort and total irrationality, and conscientiousness predicted need for achievement and demand for fairness. Agreeableness did not predict any type of rational or irrational beliefs. Knowledge of these distinct relationships may increase a clinician’s ability to conceptualize a therapy case and determine the best approach to treatment.     

Irrational action and irrational belief

Many philosophers agree with Socrates that it is not possible to perform an akratic action consciously and freely. They take this view because they assimilate the internal irrationality of such a performance to the internal irrationality of drawing a theoretical conclusion which contadicts one's premisses. This article develops some arguments against that assimilation. The extreme cost of theoretical self-contradiction is forming the belief both that something is so and that it is not so. This is impossible for anyone who understands what he is doing, and the impossibility can be explained: nothing could conceivably make such a conjunction of beliefs true. But the conjunction of a value-judgement judgment and an action that gets against it is different. Although it too is internally irrational, there is no property like truth which the value-judgement and his action ought both to possess, but cannot both possess. This article proposes a different model for akratic action, which might serve as a basis for disagreement with Socrates' view of it.     

Irrational beliefs and psychosomatic disorders

Irrational beliefs were related to psychosomatic disorders in an adult sample of 57 male and 68 female psychotherapy clients and 62 male and 38 female adult nonclients. The client and nonclient samples differed markedly in a number of ways, but nevertheless, in both samples those with relatively high frequencies of psychosomatic disorders scored as more irrational on 7 of the 10 scales of the Jones Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT) compared to those with relatively low frequencies of psychosomatic disorders. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses found Anxious Overconcern (AO) to account for 31.7% of the variance in the psychosomatic illness scores for the nonclient sample and 10.8% of the variance for the client sample. Subgroups within each sample formed on the basis of their AO scores (a B-level variable in RET theory) were subsequently found to be significantly different on the C-level variables of anxiety and psychosomatic disorders. It is argued that causal connections are implied and that the results are better understood in a monistic mind-body-unit conceptualization of the human organism.Paul J. Woods, Ph. D., co-editor of this journal, is a Fellow and an RET training supervisor of the Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy, a professor of psychology at Hollins College, and is engaged in private practice in Roanoke, Virginia. Larry C. Lyons is a graduate student in the Masters' program in psychology at Hollins College.     

Marital Adjustment and Irrational Beliefs

The present study was designed to determine which aspects of Ellis' irrational beliefs as well as emotional traits (anxiety, curiosity, anger) differentiate couples attending marriage counseling from couples couple not attending marriage counseling as well as levels of marital satisfaction in couples as measured by the Locke-Wallace Marital Adjustment Test. Participants were 61 married couples, 18 of whom were attending marriage counseling and 43 who were not attending marriage counseling. Each partner completed a number of self-report questionnaires containing items measuring irrational /rational beliefs, anger, anxiety and curiosity, and communication skills. Correlational and multiple regression analyses indicate support for Albert Ellis' proposition concerning the importance of individual partner's emotional traits and accompanying irrational beliefs in marital adjustment and dissatisfaction. Self-downing and need for comfort were the dimensions of irrational thinking most strongly related to marital dysfunction. Anger, anxiety but neither curiosity nor communication skills distinguished individuals experiencing or not experiencing marital problems. Implications for relationship counseling are briefly discussed.     

文物艺术品拍卖中竞拍人的非理性行为分析

非理性行为是文物艺术品拍卖中普遍存在的现象。本文从羊群效应和认知偏差两个视角,分析了文物艺术品拍卖中非理性行为的表现及产生的原因,对文物艺术品拍卖中非理性行为的激发机制进行了研究。     

Suicide is Neither Rational nor Irrational

Richard Brandt, following Hume, famously argued that suicide could be rational. In this he was going against a common ‘absolutist’ view that suicide is irrational almost by definition. Arguments to the effect that suicide is morally permissible or prohibited tend to follow from one’s position on this first issue of rationality. I want to argue that the concept of rationality is not appropriately ascribed – or withheld – to the victim or the act or the desire to commit the act. To support this, I explore how the concept is ascribed and withheld in ordinary situations, and show that it is essentially future-oriented. Since the suicide victim has no future, it makes no sense to call his act rational or irrational. The more appropriate reaction to a declared desire for suicide, or to the news of a successful suicide, is horror and pity, and these are absent from Brandt’s account, as is a humble acknowledgement of the profound mystery at the heart of any suicide.