Epistemological Development and Judgments and Reasoning About Teaching Methods

Children's, adolescents’, and adults’ (N = 96 7–8, 10–11, and 13–14-year-olds and university students) epistemological development and its relation to judgments and reasoning about teaching methods was examined. The domain (scientific or moral), nature of the topic (controversial or noncontroversial), and teaching method (direct instruction by lectures versus class discussions) were systematically varied. Epistemological development was assessed in the aesthetics, values, and physical truth domains. All participants took the domain, nature of the topic, and teaching method into consideration in ways that showed age-related variations. Epistemological development in the value domain alone was predictive of preferences for class discussions and a critical perspective on teacher-centered direct instruction, even when age was controlled in the analysis.     

Human-centeredness is not a universal feature of young children's reasoning: Culture and experience matter when reasoning about biological entities

We consider young children's construals of biological phenomena and the forces that shape them, using Carey's (1985) category-based induction task that demonstrated anthropocentric reasoning in young urban children. Follow-up studies (including our own) have questioned the generality of her results, but they have employed quite different procedures and either have not included urban children or, when urban samples were included, have failed to reproduce her original findings. In the present study of 4–10-year-olds from three cultural communities, our procedures followed Carey's more closely and replicated her findings with young urban children. However, they yielded quite different results for young rural European American and young rural Native American children. These results underscore the importance of a complex interaction of culture and experience – including both day-to-day interactions with the natural world and sensitivity to the belief systems of the communities – in children's reasoning about the natural world.     

Knowing How to Project Objects: Probing the Generality of Children's Action Knowledge

Previous work on the development of intuitive knowledge about trajectories has shown a dissociation between young children's aimed throwing actions, in which they are highly sensitive to the physical laws of motion, and their explicit judgments, in which they exhibit misconceptions. This research investigated the generality of children's action knowledge by having the participants project a ball with a sling. Instead of adjusting sling stretch, and hence sling force, correctly as a function of both the release height and the target distance, 5- and 6-year-olds (Experiment 1, N = 32) and, without flight feedback, even most 7- to 10-year-olds (Experiment 2, N = 96) considered distance only and ignored the height dimension. Similarly, children's judgments of the required sling stretch tended to follow a distance-only rule, especially with children younger than 9 years of age. These results show that young children's action knowledge exhibited in throwing does not generalize to arbitrary means of force production. They further suggest that there is no developmental trend toward such generalization in the age range examined.     

How do use and comprehension of mental-state language relate to theory of mind in middle childhood?

This study investigates the relationship between mental-state language and theory of mind in primary school children. The participants were 110 primary school students (mean age = 9 years and 7 months; SD = 12.7 months). They were evenly divided by gender and belonged to two age groups (8- and 10-year-olds). Linguistic, metacognitive and cognitive measures were used to assess the following competencies: verbal ability, use of mental-state terms, understanding of metacognitive language, understanding of second-order false beliefs, and emotion comprehension. Correlations between children’ use of mental-state language and their performance on theory-of-mind tasks were moderate, whereas correlations between children's comprehension of such language and ToM abilities were high. In addition, regression analyses showed that comprehension of metacognitive language was the variable which best explained children's performance on both false belief tasks and an emotion comprehension test when verbal ability and age were controlled for.     

Preschoolers’ understanding of multiple orientations to reality: The adjectives task

Preschoolers’ understanding that an object can be accurately described using two different non-synonymous words was investigated using a task in which children (N = 36) had to judge which of two animals had provided correct adjectival labels for a series of pictures. For some pictures, only one animal provided a correct adjective, for some both animals were correct, and for some neither was correct. For all types of judgement, 4-year-olds outperformed 3-year-olds. Children in both age groups performed worst on trials where both animals were correct. Children's performance on the adjectives task related to concurrent understanding of the appearance–reality distinction, but not to false-belief task performance. Implications for children's mentalizing development are discussed.     

Japanese and British Children's Understanding of the Social Function of Pretend Crying

The purpose of this study was to investigate cross-cultural differences in children's understanding of pretend crying. Five- and 6-year-olds from Japan and the United Kingdom (N = 71) heard two hypothetical stories in which the protagonist of each story pretended to cry in front of another person. Children were asked about the appearance–reality distinction of pretend crying, the other character's thoughts and behavior, and the children's own moral judgment of pretend crying. Cultural differences were found in their understanding of the social function of pretend crying. Japanese children judged that pretend crying elicited another's concern and prosocial behavior more than British children. There were no significant differences in appearance–reality distinction or moral judgments between Japanese and British children. All participants successfully discriminated between pretend crying and real crying, and most participants judged pretend crying as “not good” behavior. These results suggested that Japanese children might be more expected to be sensitive to others’ feelings, and that such cultural differences in communication and socialization lead to different patterns in expectations of the social consequences of pretend crying.     

Power of the desired self: Influence of induced perceptions of the self on reasoning

This research shows that the motivation to posses a desired characteristic (or to avoid an undesired one) results in self-perceptions that guide people’s use of base rate in the Lawyer–Engineer problem (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). In four studies, participants induced to believe (or recall, Exp. 2) that a rational cognitive style is success-conducive (or an intuitive cognitive style failure-conducive) subsequently viewed themselves as more rational and relied more on base rate in their probability estimates than those induced to believe that a rational cognitive style is failure-conducive (or an intuitive cognitive style success-conducive). These findings show that the desired self had an influence on reasoning in the self-unrelated lawyer–engineer task, since the use of base rates was mediated by changes in participants’ perceptions of their own rationality. These findings therefore show that the desired self, through the working self-concept that it entails, constitutes another factor influencing people’s use of distinct modes of reasoning.     

Complexity effects on the children's gambling task

The children's gambling task (CGT [Kerr, A., & Zelazo, P. D. (2004). Development of “Hot” executive function: The children's gambling task. Brain and Cognition, 55, 148–157]) involves integrating information about losses and gains to maximize winnings when selecting cards from two decks. Both cognitive complexity and control (CCC) theory and relational complexity (RC) theory attribute younger children's difficulty to task complexity. In CCC theory, identification of the advantageous deck requires formulation of a higher-order rule so that gains and losses can be considered in contradistinction. According to RC theory, it entails processing the ternary relation linking three variables (deck, magnitude of gain, magnitude of loss). We designed two less complex binary-relational versions in which either loss or gain varied across decks, with the other held constant. The three closely matched versions were administered to 3–5-year-olds. Consistent with complexity explanations, children in all age groups selected cards from the advantageous deck in the binary-relational versions, but only 5-year-olds did so on the ternary-relational CGT.     

I see what you’re saying: Voice signals influence children’s judgments of direct and averted gaze

Adults use gaze and voice signals as cues to the mental and emotional states of others. We examined the influence of voice cues on children’s judgments of gaze. In Experiment 1, 6-year-olds, 8-year-olds, and adults viewed photographs of faces fixating the center of the camera lens and a series of positions to the left and right and judged whether gaze was direct or averted. On each trial, participants heard the participant-directed voice cue (e.g., “I see you”), an object-directed voice cue (e.g., “I see that”), or no voice. In 6-year-olds, the range of directions of gaze leading to the perception of eye contact (the cone of gaze) was narrower for trials with object-directed voice cues than for trials with participant-directed voice cues or no voice. This effect was absent in 8-year-olds and adults, both of whom had a narrower cone of gaze than 6-year-olds. In Experiment 2, we investigated whether voice cues would influence adults’ judgments of gaze when the task was made more difficult by limiting the duration of exposure to the face. Adults’ cone of gaze was wider than in Experiment 1, and the effect of voice cues was similar to that observed in 6-year-olds in Experiment 1. Together, the results indicate that object-directed voice cues can decrease the width of the cone of gaze, allowing more adult-like judgments of gaze in young children, and that voice cues may be especially effective when the cone of gaze is wider because of immaturity (Experiment 1) or limited exposure (Experiment 2).     

The Development of Proportional Reasoning: Effect of Continuous Versus Discrete Quantities

This study examines the development of children's ability to reason about proportions that involve either discrete entities or continuous amounts. Six-, 8- and 10-year olds were presented with a proportional reasoning task in the context of a game involving probability. Although all age groups failed when proportions involved discrete quantities, even the youngest age group showed some success when proportions involved continuous quantities. These findings indicate that quantity type strongly affects children's ability to make judgments of proportion. Children's greater success in judging proportions involving continuous quantities appears to be related to their use of different strategies in the presence of countable versus noncountable entities. In two discrete conditions, children—particularly 8- and 10-year-olds—adopted an erroneous counting strategy, considering the number of target elements but not the relation between target and nontarget elements, either in terms of number or amount. In contrast, in the continuous condition, when it was not possible to count, children may have relied on an early developing ability to code the relative amounts of target and nontarget regions.     

Character Disposition and Behavior Type: Influences of Valence on Preschool Children's Social Judgments

The authors studied the influences of valence information on preschool children's (n = 47) moral (good or bad), liking (liked or disliked by a friend), and consequence-of-behavior (reward or punishment) judgments. The authors presented 8 scenarios describing the behavior valence, positive valence (help, share), negative valence (verbal insult, physical aggression), and disposition valence (nice or mean) of characters in social interaction with a friend. Overall, character disposition and behavior valence significantly influenced children's judgments. Moral, liking, and consequence-of-behavior judgments varied significantly by character disposition for both positive behavior scenarios. In contrast, there were fewer significant findings as a function of character disposition for negative behavior scenarios, suggesting that the negative behavior cue somewhat diminished the effect of character disposition on children's judgments. The authors discuss preschool students’ coordination of information about valence of behavior and character disposition and the students’ reluctance to judge that misbehavior warrants punitive consequence.     

Exploring children’s face-space: A multidimensional scaling analysis of the mental representation of facial identity

We explored differences in the mental representation of facial identity between 8-year-olds and adults. The 8-year-olds and adults made similarity judgments of a homogeneous set of faces (individual hair cues removed) using an “odd-man-out” paradigm. Multidimensional scaling (MDS) analyses were performed to represent perceived similarity of faces in a multidimensional space. Five dimensions accounted optimally for the judgments of both children and adults, with similar local clustering of faces. However, the fit of the MDS solutions was better for adults, in part because children’s responses were more variable. More children relied predominantly on a single dimension, namely eye color, whereas adults appeared to use multiple dimensions for each judgment. The pattern of findings suggests that children’s mental representation of faces has a structure similar to that of adults but that children’s judgments are influenced less consistently by that overall structure.     

Deontic and epistemic reasoning in children revisited: Comment on Dack and Astington

Dack and Astington (Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 110 2011 94–114) attempted to replicate the deontic reasoning advantage among preschoolers reported by Cummins (Memory & Cognition 24 1996 823–829) and by Harris and Nuñez (Child Development. 67 1996 572–1591). Dack and Astington argued that the apparent deontic advantage reported by these studies was in fact an artifact due to a methodological confound, namely, inclusion of an authority in the deontic condition only. Removing this confound attenuated the effect in young children but had no effect on the reasoning of 7-year-olds and adults. Thus, removing reference to authority “explains away” young children’s apparent precocity at this type of reasoning. But this explanation rests on (a) a misunderstanding of norms as targets of deontic reasoning and (b) conclusions based on a sample size that was too small to detect the effect in young children.     

Reasoning about make-believe and hypothetical suppositions: Towards a theory of belief-contravening reasoning

The present study explores how suppositions which conflict with accepted beliefs are represented and reasoned about. Two studies test the predictions regarding the nature and developmental changes in children's ability to represent and reason about hypothetical or make-believe suppositions which violate their everyday knowledge and beliefs. In Study 1, 46 4th- and 5th-graders were introduced to a hand puppet, Freddy, who made claims inconsistent with generally accepted beliefs (e.g., “all dogs meow”) because he was pretending (Make-Believe Condition) or believed them (Hypothetical Condition). Participants were asked to think like Freddy and judge whether a conclusion (“There's a dog; does it meow?”) follows logically from the claim. In Study 2, 40 kindergarten (6-year-olds), 3rd–4th grade (10-year-olds), and college students were asked to represent belief contravening make-believe (pretend in a make-believe world that dogs meow) and hypothetical (imagine what the real world would be like if dogs meow) premises, evaluate conclusions of the premises (Rover is a dog, does Rover meow?) and make judgments about the attributes (growl, wag tail, purr, and eat mice) of the entity (a meowing dog) they created. The prediction that it would be easier to represent and reason from belief-contravening suppositions in the Make-Believe than Hypothetical conditions was confirmed in each study, although the two forms of reasoning were directly correlated (Study 2). The results were discussed in terms of the similarities (compartmentalization and integration) and differences (reconciliation) of processes involved in fancifully (make-believe) or seriously (hypothetical) representing and reasoning about belief-contravening suppositions.     

The influence of complexity and reasoning direction on children's causal reasoning

Causal reasoning is the core and basis of cognition about the objective world. This experiment studied the development of causal reasoning in 86 3.5–4.5-year-olds using a ramp apparatus with two input holes and two output holes [Frye, D., Zelazo, P. D., & Palfai, T. (1995). Theory of mind and rule-based reasoning. Cognitive Development 10, 483–527]. Results revealed that: (1) children performed better on cause–effect inferences than on effect–cause inferences; (2) there was an effect of rule complexity such that uni-dimensional causal inferences were easier than bi-dimensional inferences which, in turn, were easier than tri-dimensional causal inferences; and (3) children's causal reasoning develops rapidly between the ages of age of 3.5 and 4 years.     

Looking good versus doing good: which factors take precedence when children learn about new tools?

We present two experiments exploring whether individuals would be persuaded to imitate the intentional action of an adult model whose actions suggest that the correct way to complete a task is with an inefficient tool. In Experiment 1, children ages 5–10 years and a group of adults watched an adult model reject an efficient tool in favor of one that was inefficient, but claim it was “made for” the task. Results indicated low rates of imitation of the model’s intentional choice until 9 and 10 years of age. In Experiment 2, children ages 3–11 years again watched a model reject a functional tool in favor of a nonfunctional one. This time, the demonstration took place on video. For half of the participants, the model from the video was present to offer a choice between the two tools (high-pressure condition), and for the other half, she was absent (low-pressure condition). Children also completed a social desirability questionnaire to explore relationships between imitation choices and personality. Results indicated that rates of imitation were associated with higher scores on the social desirability scale among children ages 3–7 years. Among 8- to 11-year-olds – and especially among 9- and 10-year-olds – the decision to copy the model’s intentional choice was more likely when the model was present than when she was absent. The findings reveal the contributions of age, personality, and social pressure to differences in imitation.     

Children's Moral Emotions,Narratives, and Aggression: Relations With Maternal Discipline and Support

ABSTRACT. Children who attribute more positive emotions to hypothetical moral victimizers are typically more aggressive and have more behavior problems. Little is known, however, about when individual differences in these moral emotion attributions first emerge or about maternal correlates of these differences. In this study, 63 4–6-year-olds judged how they would feel after victimizing peers for gain and enacted event conclusions using narrative methods adapted from the MacArthur Story Stem Battery. In addition, children's mothers completed assessments of their disciplinary styles and social support, and children's aggressive tendencies were assessed based on ratings from mothers and a second familiar adult. Results revealed that most preschoolers expected to feel happy after their victimizing acts, but variations in happy victimization were unrelated to children's aggression. Several of children's narrative themes, including making amends (e.g., apologizing, reparations), aggressive acts, and mentions of death/killing, however, were related to children's aggression. Moreover, two maternal disciplinary dimensions, higher warmth and reasoning, as well as greater social support were also related to lower child aggression. Children's emotion attributions and moral narratives, however, were unrelated to maternal disciplinary practices or social support.     

Children's interpretive understanding,moral judgments,and emotion attributions: Relations to social behaviour

The study investigated interpretive understanding, moral judgments, and emotion attributions in relation to social behaviour in a sample of 59 5‐year‐old, 123 7‐year‐old, and 130 9‐year‐old children. Interpretive understanding was assessed by two tasks measuring children's understanding of ambiguous situations. Moral judgments and emotion attributions were measured using two moral rule transgressions. Social behaviour was assessed using teachers' ratings of aggressive and prosocial behaviour. Aggressive behaviour was positively related to interpretive understanding and negatively related to moral reasoning. Prosocial behaviour was positively associated with attribution of fear. Moral judgments and emotion attributions were related, depending on age. Interpretive understanding was unrelated to moral judgments and emotion attributions. The findings are discussed in regard to the role of interpretive understanding and moral and affective knowledge in understanding children's social behaviour.     

American and Chinese parental involvement in young children's mathematics learning

This study compared the involvement of American and Chinese mothers in their 5- and 7-year-old children's number learning in their everyday experience and during mother–child interaction on mathematics tasks pertaining to proportional reasoning. Results indicated that Chinese mothers of both the 5- and 7-year-old children were more likely to teach mathematics calculation in their everyday involvement with children's number learning than their American counterparts. No differences were found in maternal instruction between American and Chinese mothers during the mother–child interaction on mathematics tasks. However, maternal instruction was related to Chinese children's learning of proportional reasoning but negligibly related to American children's learning of proportional reasoning.     

Executive functioning and prospective memory in young children

The current study examined the role of executive functioning (EF) in children's prospective memory (PM) by assessing the effect of delay and number of intentions to-be-remembered on PM, as well as relations between PM and EF. Ninety-six 4-, 5-, and 6-year-olds completed a PM task and two executive function tasks. The PM task required children to interrupt an ongoing card game to perform one action (single intention) or two actions (dual intention) with target cards after a short delay (1 min) or a long delay (5 min). There was no main effect of number of intentions or delay on the PM task. However, performance improved with age, and age and delay interacted such that 4-year-olds’ performance remained the same after a long delay whereas 5-year-olds’ performance improved after a long delay. We suggest that the age by delay interaction is a product of age differences in cognitive monitoring. Working memory but not inhibitory control predicted PM with age controlled. We argue that an executive function framework permits an integrative understanding of many processes involved in young children's prospective memory.