Interference between cues requires a causal scenario: Favorable evidence for causal reasoning models in learning processes

In an interference-between-cues design (IbC), the expression of a learned Cue A–Outcome 1 association has been shown to be impaired if another cue, B, is separately paired with the same outcome in a second learning phase. The present study examined whether IbC could be caused by associative mechanisms independent of causal reasoning processes. This was achieved by testing participants in two different learning situations. In the Causal Scenario condition, participants learned in a diagnostic situation in which a common cause (Outcome 1) caused two disjoint effects, namely Cues A and B. In the Non-Causal Scenario condition, the same IbC design and stimulus conditions were used. However, instructions provided no causal frame to make sense of how cues and outcomes were related. IbC was only found in the Causal Scenario condition. This result is consistent with Causal Reasoning Models of causal learning and raises important difficulties for associative explanations of IbC.     

Acquisition of a conditioned taste aversion becomes context dependent when it is learned after extinction

A conditioned taste aversion experiment tested context-switch effects on retrieval of conditioned stimulus (CS)–unconditioned stimulus (US) acquisition performance in rats. A context switch impaired performance when the target flavour was trained in a context where a different flavour underwent extinction. Conditioned taste aversion in the absence of previous extinction of the alternate flavour was not context dependent. It is suggested that the ambiguity in the meaning of the extinguished cue leads animals to pay attention to the context, so that the information learned in that context becomes context dependent.     

Mental representation of a line when patients with left unilateral spatial neglect bisect it: A study with an endpoint reproduction task

Patients with left unilateral spatial neglect (USN) typically place the subjective midpoint to the right of the objective centre. Based on the previous findings (e.g., Ishiai et al. 1989, Brain, 112, 1485), we hypothesized that the patients with left USN may see the representational image of a line that extends equally towards either side of the subjective midpoint depending not upon the information about the leftward extent. The present study tested whether patients with left USN would place the subjective midpoint at the centre of their mental representation of the line. The participants were 10 patients with left USN and 10 neurologically healthy controls. We devised a new ‘endpoint reproduction task’ using a computer display with a touch panel to seek the representational image when patients with left USN bisect lines and asked the participants to reproduce the location of the right or left endpoint after bisecting lines. The results showed that the representational image of the bisected line depends primarily on the location of the objective right endpoint, not on the location of the objective left endpoint in space. The analyses of the estimated right and left representational extents confirmed our hypotheses that patients with left USN would bisect a line seeing the representational line image that centred across their subjective midpoint. We believe that the findings of the present study with the use of the endpoint reproduction task will contribute to a better understanding of the visuospatial process underlying line bisection of patients with left USN.