Anti-luck epistemology

In this paper, I do three things. First, I offer an overview of an anti-luck epistemology, as set out in my book, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005). Second, I attempt to meet some of the main criticisms that one might level against the key theses that I propose in this work. And finally, third, I sketch some of the ways in which the strategy of anti-luck epistemology can be developed in new directions.     

Non‐Scientific Criteria for Belief Sustain Counter‐Scientific Beliefs

Why is evolutionary theory controversial among members of the American public? We propose a novel explanation: allegiance to different criteria for belief. In one interview study, two online surveys, and one nationally representative phone poll, we found that evolutionists and creationists take different justifications for belief as legitimate. Those who accept evolution emphasize empirical evidence and scientific consensus. Creationists emphasize not only the Bible and religious authority, but also knowledge of the heart. These criteria for belief remain predictive of views about evolution even when taking into account other related factors like religion, political affiliation, and education. Each view is supported by its own internally specified criteria for what constitutes a justified belief. Changing minds may thus require changing epistemic norms.     

Social epistemology as a rhetoric of inquiry

Fuller's program of social epistemology engages a rhetoric of inquiry that can be usefully compared and contrasted with other discursive theories of knowledge, such as that of Richard Rorty. Resisting the model of conversation, Fuller strikes an activist posture and lays the groundwork for normative knowledge policy, in which persuasion and credibility play key roles. The image of investigation is one that overtly rejects the storehouse conception of knowledge and invokes the metaphors of distributive economics. Productive questions arise as to how notions of creation and distribution might guide this rhetoric.     

Argumentation,epistemology and the sociology of language

Both the sociology of knowledge and the philosophy of science are centrally concerned with the succession of scientific beliefs. In case studies of scientific debates, however, the emphasis tends to be placed on the outcome of disputes. This paper proposes that attention should instead be focused on the process of debate: that is, on scientific argumentation. It is shown how such a focus circumvents many traditional epistemological problems concerning the truth-status of scientific knowledge. By reference to the consensus conception of truth, it is claimed that scientific arguments can be studied naturalistically whilst still honouring the orientation towards truth exhibited by scientists. Finally, the paper offers a brief résumé of recent studies indicating how this naturalistic study of scientific argumentation can be developed through the sociology of language.     

第三种生命形式的诞生与科学哲学

美国科学家卡尔·戊斯发现了生命的第三种形式－古生菌域,并将生物分成三大分支,即真核生物域、细菌域和古生菌域。这一理论被称为戊斯革命。但是,他的理论历经艰辛才得到同行的认可,从科学哲学研究的方法论和认识论讨论这一重大发现带给我们有关思维方式和科学评价体系的思考。     

Two Notions of Scientific Justification

Scientific claims can be assessed epistemically in either of two ways: according to scientific standards, or by means of philosophical arguments such as the no-miracle argument in favor of scientific realism. This paper investigates the basis of this duality of epistemic assessments. It is claimed that the duality rests on two different notions of epistemic justification that are well-known from the debate on internalism and externalism in general epistemology: a deontological and an alethic notion. By discussing the conditions for the scientific acceptability of empirical results, it is argued that intrascientific justification employs the deontological notion. Philosophical disputes such as those on scientific realism can by contrast be shown to rest on the alethic notion. The implications of these findings both for the nature of the respective epistemic projects and for their interrelation are explored.     

Social epistemology and reflexivity: Two versions of how to be really useful

This essay argues that the really useful character of reflexivity is that it enables a radical critique of representation and its conventional material and rhetorical practices. It is uniquely able to produce paradox and thus disrupt discourses by undermining authorial privilege. Because Fuller's social epistemology is insensitive to its own reflexive implications, and limits itself to normative questions about knowledge policy, it is too limited — and limiting — to provide a context that can nurture reflexivity.     

The role of experience in children's developing folk epistemology: review and analysis from the theory–theory perspective

The role of experience in children's developing folk epistemology, specifically in their acquisition of an understanding of belief, is explored from the theory–theory perspective (i.e., the perspective claiming that children's conceptual development can be viewed as analogous to scientific theory development) through a selective review and analysis of extant empirical literature. Three types of investigations are identified: examinations of observed relationships between social experiences and belief understanding, attempts to facilitate the reasoning of children on the verge of belief understanding through experiences intended to compel children to face reasoning inconsistencies; and training studies demonstrating that children can be trained to understand belief over time through specific feedback experiences. A comparison of these studies reveals that experience is defined differently across them, resulting in varying and sometimes ambiguous implications for a theory–theory perspective on development. Implications for future research are discussed.     

Supporting the formal verification of mathematical texts

The formal verification of mathematical texts is one of the most interesting applications for computer systems. In fact, we argue that the expert language of mathematics is the natural choice for achieving efficient mathematician–machine interaction. Our empirical approach, the analysis of carefully authored textbook proofs, forces us to focus on the language and the reasoning pattern that mathematician use when presenting proofs to colleagues and students. Enabling a machine to understand and follow such language and argumentation is seen to be the key to usable and acceptable math assistant systems. In this paper, we first perform an analysis of three textbook proofs by hand; we then describe a computational framework that aims at mechanising such an analysis. The resulting proof-of-concept implementation is capable of processing simple textbook proofs and constitutes promising steps towards a natural mathematician–machine interface for proof development and verification.     

Abductive inference in defeasible reasoning: a model for research programmes

Abduction is regarded as the inference process that goes from observations to explanations within a more general context or theoretical framework. There are good characterizations of abduction of surprising observations in monotonic theories. Also, in normal logic programs there are a tight relation among SLDNF and the abduction of negative literals. However, a problem that faces abduction is the explanation of anomalous observations, i.e., observations that are contradictory with respect to the current theory. For this reason, in this work we will consider the problem of embedding abduction of surprising and anomalous observations in defeasible (nonmonotonic) theories. We discuss some issues arising the pragmatic acceptance of abductive inferences in defeasible theories, and how to accommodate anomalous observations and characterize all the possible outcomes that a defeasible theory may face when confronted with new evidence. We explore the use of partial structures approach as a semantic foundation for our system. Finally, we discuss an application of our system as a formal device for representing the methodology of scientific research programmes. In this representation, a programme is regarded as a defeasible theory that draws predictions. When confronted with surprising or anomalous observations, the programme protects itself by means of heuristic procedures, which are represented in our system as abductive inference procedures.     

Within-subject consistency and between-subject variability in Bayesian reasoning strategies

It is well known that people tend to perform poorly when asked to determine a posterior probability on the basis of a base rate, true positive rate, and false positive rate. The present experiments assessed the extent to which individual participants nevertheless adopt consistent strategies in these Bayesian reasoning problems, and investigated the nature of these strategies. In two experiments, one laboratory-based and one internet-based, each participant completed 36 problems with factorially manipulated probabilities. Many participants applied consistent strategies involving use of only one of the three probabilities provided in the problem, or additive combination of two of the probabilities. There was, however, substantial variability across participants in which probabilities were taken into account. In the laboratory experiment, participants’ eye movements were tracked as they read the problems. There was evidence of a relationship between information use and attention to a source of information. Participants’ self-assessments of their performance, however, revealed little confidence that the strategies they applied were actually correct. These results suggest that the hypothesis of base rate neglect actually underestimates people’s difficulty with Bayesian reasoning, but also suggest that participants are aware of their ignorance.     

Theory of mind and epistemological development: the relation between children's second-order false-belief understanding and their ability to reason about evidence

The study investigates the hypothesis that children's ability to attribute second-order beliefs facilitates their understanding of evidence, as seen in the ability to distinguish between causes and reasons. Seventy-four children 5–7 yr old were given belief and evidence tests. The belief tests assessed their ability to represent and reason from second-order false-beliefs, and the evidence tests assessed their ability to distinguish between the cause of a situation and a person's reason for believing it. The relation between performance on the two tests was determined, taking into account general language and non-verbal reasoning abilities. Results show that performance on the belief test and on the evidence part of the evidence test improved significantly over the age range, and that a significant proportion of variance in the evidence test scores is accounted for by second-order false-belief understanding, over and above that accounted for by general language and non-verbal abilities. The argument is made that second-order false-belief understanding is fundamental to children's epistemological development, underlying not just their understanding of evidence, but also their understanding of inference and truth.     

Information becomes evidence when an explanation can incorporate it into a causal framework

Recognizing information as evidence is central to the development of scientific reasoning. When does information about an event come to be treated as evidence relevant to explaining the event? We asked whether this was increasingly likely to happen when an explanation becomes available that can incorporate both the event and the information into a single causal framework. In three studies, we presented participants with events for which there were two possible and plausible explanations (a baseline and one of two alternative explanations), as well as with two pieces of background information. While all explanations could account for the event, only one alternative explanation (the “target” explanation) could incorporate both the event and the background information into a single causal framework. The results indicated that information is more likely to be seen as evidentially relevant to an event when there is an explanation available that can accommodate both the event and the information into a single casual framework than when such an explanation is lacking. Furthermore, the presence of this information renders the target alternative increasingly plausible. That is, it is the interdependence of explanation or theory and evidence that allows us to realize that some information is likely to be evidential. However, for this to happen, the relation between explanation and information must be made salient, either by explicitly asking about it (as we did in Study 1) or by fleshing out the target explanation (as we did in Study 3).     

"What if…": The Use of Conceptual Simulations in Scientific Reasoning

The term conceptual simulation refers to a type of everyday reasoning strategy commonly called "what if" reasoning. It has been suggested in a number of contexts that this type of reasoning plays an important role in scientific discovery; however, little direct evidence exists to support this claim. This article proposes that conceptual simulation is likely to be used in situations of informational uncertainty, and may be used to help scientists resolve that uncertainty. We conducted two studies to investigate the relationship between conceptual simulation and informational uncertainty. Study 1 was an in vivo study of expert scientists; the results suggest that scientists do use conceptual simulation in situations of informational uncertainty, and that they use conceptual simulation to make inferences from their data using the analogical reasoning process of alignment by similarity detection. Study 2 experimentally manipulated experts' level of uncertainty and provides further support for the hypothesis that conceptual simulation is more likely to be used in situations of informational uncertainty. Finally, we discuss the relationship between conceptual simulation and other types of reasoning using qualitative mental models.     

Are self-explanations always beneficial?

We present evidence suggesting that the effect of self-explanations on learning is not always beneficial and, in fact, in some contexts has a detrimental effect. Over eight sessions, fourth-graders engaged in investigation of a database with the goal of identifying causal effects. In a separate task, children in one condition also generated self-explanations regarding the mechanisms underlying the causal effects they believed to be present. In a comparison condition, they did not. On a transfer task, children in the no-explanations condition showed superior causal inference performance. The findings are discussed as reflecting the development of “data-reading” skill with which an emphasis on explanations may interfere.     

Building to discover: a common coding model

I present a case study of scientific discovery, where building two functional and behavioral approximations of neurons, one physical and the other computational, led to conceptual and implementation breakthroughs in a neural engineering laboratory. Such building of external systems that mimic target phenomena, and the use of these external systems to generate novel concepts and control structures, is a standard strategy in the new engineering sciences. I develop a model of the cognitive mechanism that connects such built external systems with internal models, and I examine how new discoveries, and consensus on discoveries, could arise from this external-internal coupling and the building process. The model is based on the emerging framework of common coding, which proposes a shared representation in the brain between the execution, perception, and imagination of movement.     

Disentangling the course of epistemic development: parsing knowledge by epistemic content

Over the past three decades, research into the developmental course by means of which persons come to an increasingly mature conception of the knowing process has yielded an highly defracted picture. Despite some concert of opinion about the general bill of particulars, what remains deeply problematic is the increasingly radical disagreement that has arisen regarding the ages at which major milestones in the course of epistemic development are said to be reached. As a way of making some sense of these competing claims, it is argued that the emerging insight that knowledge is ineluctably shaped by those doing the knowing (i.e., that there is an unavoidable “world-to-mind direction of fit” (J.R. Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983) between things in the world and the manner of their understanding) does not arrive in a single piece. Instead, as the data presented here help to illustrate, an appreciation of the constructed character of knowledge more commonly arrives piecemeal and at different ontogenetic moments, the times of which are governed by the place that different objects of knowledge occupy along an envisioned continuum of diverse epistemic contents. On this account, not all “facts of the matter” are ordinarily seen to occupy the same epistemic footing. Rather, some so-called facts are commonly understood to be of an “institutional” sort, where “representational” diversity is early expected and widely tolerated. By contrast, other objects of knowledge are imagined to be more like “brute” facts that, on some less mature readings, fully escape the clutches of subjective opinion. Viewed against the backcloth of this proposed continuum, a developmental sequence hypothesized according to which growing persons first come to view “institutional” facts as humanly constructed before subsequently coming to a similar view about presumptively “brute” facts. To test this hypothesis, 242 young persons were administered a paper and pencil measure of epistemic reasoning (the EDQ). Results strongly support the hypothesis that respondents understood the interpretive nature of beliefs about “institutional” facts at an earlier age than so-called “brute” facts.     

On the de-naturalization of epistemology

Starting from an overview of approaches to naturalized epistemology, the paper shows, firstly, that Quine's programme yields a sceptical paradox. This means that Quine's attempt to defeat scepticism itself yields a rather strong argument for scepticism and thus against his own programme of naturalized epistemology. Secondly, it is shown that this paradox can be solved by an approach called reflexive-heuristic naturalism. Finally, the paper also raises some fundamental problems which the solution proposed has to leave open. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The development of possibility judgment within and across domains

The ability to differentiate possible events from impossible ones is an invaluable skill when reasoning about claims that transcend the perceptual evidence at hand, yet preschool-aged children do not readily make this differentiation when reasoning about physically extraordinary events [Shtulman, A., &; Carey, S. (2007). Improbable or impossible? How children reason about the possibility of extraordinary claims. Child Development, 78, 1015–1032]. The present study sought to determine whether this failure stems from deficits in domain-specific knowledge or deficits in the domain-general procedure by which possibility judgments are made. Participants (48 children aged 4-9 years olds and 16 adults) were asked to judge the possibility of three types of extraordinary events – physical, psychological, and biological – and to justify their judgments of impossibility. Developmental changes in the ability to differentiate improbable events from impossible events were qualitatively similar across domains. Moreover, participants’ propensity to judge improbable events possible was significantly correlated with the quality of their justifications, both within and across domains. These findings suggest that modal development involves a domain-general change in how modal claims are evaluated.