Implicit emotion regulation under demanding conditions: The moderating role of action versus state orientation

Action orientation is a volitional mode that promotes flexible self-regulation of emotional and motivational states; state orientation represents the conceptually opposite volitional mode that promotes fixation on (particularly negative) emotional and motivational states (Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994a). The present research investigated the link between action versus state orientation and implicit emotion regulation under demanding conditions. After inducing a demanding context, action-oriented participants displayed reduced affective priming effects of negative primes relative to state-oriented individuals (Studies 1–3). Action versus state orientation did not moderate affective priming effects of positive prime words (Studies 1–3). Effects of action versus state orientation emerged only for a limited number of trials (Study 2) and were reversed under low-demanding conditions (Study 3). These findings support the notion that implicit emotion regulation is closely linked to volitional action control.     

Implicit emotion regulation under demanding conditions: the moderating role of action versus state orientation

Action orientation is a volitional mode that promotes flexible self-regulation of emotional and motivational states; state orientation represents the conceptually opposite volitional mode that promotes fixation on (particularly negative) emotional and motivational states (Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994a). The present research investigated the link between action versus state orientation and implicit emotion regulation under demanding conditions. After inducing a demanding context, action-oriented participants displayed reduced affective priming effects of negative primes relative to state-oriented individuals (Studies 1-3). Action versus state orientation did not moderate affective priming effects of positive prime words (Studies 1-3). Effects of action versus state orientation emerged only for a limited number of trials (Study 2) and were reversed under low-demanding conditions (Study 3). These findings support the notion that implicit emotion regulation is closely linked to volitional action control.     

On the regulation of cognitive control: action orientation moderates the impact of high demands in Stroop interference tasks

Previous research has established that people vary in action orientation, a tendency toward decisiveness and initiative, versus state orientation, a tendency toward indecisiveness and hesitation (J. Kuhl & J. Beckmann, 1994b). In the present 3 studies, the authors examined whether action orientation versus state orientation regulates cognitive control under demanding conditions. Under high demands, action-oriented participants displayed better cognitive control than did state-oriented participants in a Stroop color naming task (Studies 1-3). No similar effects were found under low demands (Studies 2-3). Functional differences between action- and state-oriented participants emerged especially when the task included a high proportion of congruent Stroop trials (Study 3). These findings suggest that action-oriented individuals are better protected against goal neglect than are state-oriented individuals.     

Intuition,affect, and personality: unconscious coherence judgments and self-regulation of negative affect

According to personality systems interaction theory, a negative mood was expected to reduce access to extended semantic networks and to reduce performance on intuitive judgments of coherence for participants who have an impaired ability to down-regulate negative affect (i.e., state-oriented participants). Consistent with expectations, state-oriented participants reporting higher levels of perseverating negative mood had a reduced discrimination between coherent and incoherent standard word triples (Study 1) and individually derived word triples describing persons (Study 2). Participants who are able to down-regulate negative affect (i.e., action-oriented participants) did not show this tendency. In addition, Study 2 revealed a dissociation between state orientation and Neuroticism that is discussed in terms of a functional difference between the two constructs.     

On the waxing and waning of working memory: action orientation moderates the impact of demanding relationship primes on working memory capacity

The present research examined how action- versus state-oriented individuals (Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994) utilize their working memory capacity under varying situational demands. Participants visualized either a demanding or an accepting person, after which their working memory capacity was assessed. Among action-oriented participants, visualizing a demanding person led to greater operation spans (Study 1) and superior memory for intention-related information (Study 2) than visualizing an accepting person. State-oriented participants displayed the opposite pattern, such that visualizing an accepting person led to greater operation spans (Study 1) and superior memory for intentions (Study 2) than visualizing a demanding person. These findings indicate that action versus state orientation moderates the impact of situational demands on working memory capacity.     

The Impact of Positive and Negative Affect and Issue Framing on Issue Interpretation and Risk Taking

Two studies examined the influence of transient affective states and issue framing onissue interpretationandrisk takingwithin the context of strategic decision making. In Study 1, participants in whom transient positive or negative affective states were induced by reading a short story showed systematic differences in issue interpretation and risk taking in a strategic decision making context. Compared to negative mood participants, those in a positive mood were more likely to interpret the strategic issue as an opportunity and displayed lower levels of risk taking. Study 2 replicated and extended these results by crossing affective states with threat and opportunity frames. Results showed that framing an issue (as a threat or an opportunity) had a stronger impact on issue interpretation among negative affect participants than among positive affect participants. Affective states also moderated the impact of issue framing on risk taking: the effect of framing on risk-taking was stronger under negative rather than positive affect. These results are interpreted via information-processing and motivational effects of affect on a decision maker.     

The effects of optimism and pessimism on updating emotional information in working memory

In the present study we elucidate the emotional and executive control interactions that might underlie optimism and pessimism. Participants completed a self-report measure of optimism/pessimism and performed an emotion faces categorisation task and an emotion n-back task in which they indicated whether each of a series of faces had the same or a different emotional expression (happy, sad, neutral) as the face presented two trials before. Trials were structured to measure latency to update emotional content in working memory (WM). More pessimistic individuals formed connections among positive stimuli, and broke connections among positive and sad stimuli, in WM more slowly than did less pessimistic individuals; levels of optimism/pessimism did not affect the rate with which individuals formed and broke connections among neutral representations in WM. It appears, therefore, that levels of pessimism are related to specific affective cognitive mechanisms in WM that may be involved in emotion regulation.     

Neuroticism and Affective Priming: Evidence for a Neuroticism-Linked Negative Schema

Neuroticism has been hypothesized to systematically relate to semantic memory networks favoring negative affect, but no studies using affective priming tasks have established this link. The present two studies, involving 145 undergraduate participants, sought to provide initial evidence along these lines. Study 1 used a task in which participants were asked to judge their emotions in the past, whereas Study 2 used a perceptual identification task in which participants merely had to identify the word in question. In both studies, neuroticism was positively correlated with negative affective priming, but not positive affective priming. The studies suggest that neuroticism systematically relates to the inter-connectivity of negative affect with semantic memory systems, whether involving the self-concept (Study 1) or not (Study 2). These results are novel and important in understanding individual differences in neuroticism and their affective processing correlates.     

Emotion regulation choice: the role of environmental affordances

Which emotion regulation strategy one uses in a given context can have profound affective, cognitive, and social consequences. It is therefore important to understand the determinants of emotion regulation choice. Many prior studies have examined person-specific, internal determinants of emotion regulation choice. Recently, it has become clear that external variables that are properties of the stimulus can also influence emotion regulation choice. In the present research, we consider whether reappraisal affordances, defined as the opportunities for re-interpretation of a stimulus that are inherent in that stimulus, can shape individuals’ emotion regulation choices. We show that reappraisal affordances have stability across people and across time (Study 1), and are confounded with emotional intensity for a standardised set of picture stimuli (Study 2). Since emotional intensity has been shown to drive emotion regulation choice, we construct a context in which emotional intensity is separable from reappraisal affordances (Study 3) and use this context to show that reappraisal affordances powerfully influence emotion regulation choice even when emotional intensity and discrete emotions are taken into account (Study 4).     

Do people aggress to improve their mood? Catharsis beliefs, affect regulation opportunity, and aggressive responding

Do people aggress to make themselves feel better? We adapted a procedure used by G. K. Manucia, D. J. Baumann, and R. B. Cialdini (1984), in which some participants are given a bogus mood-freezing pill that makes affect regulation efforts ineffective. In Study 1, people who had been induced to believe in the value of catharsis and venting anger responded more aggressively than did control participants to insulting criticism, but this aggression was eliminated by the mood-freezing pill. Study 2 showed similar results among people with high anger-out (i.e., expressing and venting anger) tendencies. Studies 3 and 4 provided questionnaire data consistent with these interpretations, and Study 5 replicated the findings of Studies 1 and 2 using measures more directly concerned with affect regulation. Taken together, these results suggest that many people may engage in aggression to regulate (improve) their own affective states.     

Sometimes happy people focus on the trees and sad people focus on the forest: context-dependent effects of mood in impression formation

Research indicates that affect influences whether people focus on categorical or behavioral information during impression formation. One explanation is that affect confers its value on whatever cognitive inclinations are most accessible in a given situation. Three studies tested this malleable mood effects hypothesis, predicting that happy moods should maintain and unhappy moods should inhibit situationally dominant thinking styles. Participants completed an impression formation task that included categorical and behavioral information. Consistent with the proposed hypothesis, no fixed relation between mood and processing emerged. Whether happy moods led to judgments reflecting category-level or behavior-level information depended on whether participants were led to focus on the their immediate psychological state (i.e., current affective experience; Studies 1 and 2) or physical environment (i.e., an unexpected odor; Study 3). Consistent with research on socially situated cognition, these results demonstrate that the same affective state can trigger entirely different thinking styles depending on the context.     

Denial of gender discrimination is associated with better subjective well-being among women: A system justification account

Despite the fact that women face socially and politically sanctioned disadvantages every day, a large percentage of women and men report that gender discrimination is no longer a problem. Across three studies, which together include over 20,000 participants from 23 countries, we test the hypothesis that denial (vs. acknowledgement) of gender discrimination is associated with higher subjective well-being among women (Studies 1–3), and this is because denying gender discrimination promotes the view that the system is fair (Study 1). We further show that this happens above and beyond personal experiences with sexism (Study 1) and that the association is stronger in countries where sexism is relatively high (vs. low; Study 3). We argue that denial of discrimination is an individual-level coping mechanism and that, like other self-group distancing strategies, it may perpetuate gender inequality.     

Is seeking bad mood cognitively demanding? Contra-hedonic orientation and working-memory capacity in everyday life

Hedonism, or wanting to feel good, is central to human motivation. At times, however, people also seek to maintain or enhance negative affect or to dampen positive affect, and this can be instrumental for the later attainment of their goals. Here, we investigate the assumption that such contra-hedonic orientation is cognitively more demanding than prohedonic orientation, above and beyond the effects of momentary affective experience. We provided 378 participants with mobile phones that they carried with them for 3 weeks while pursuing their daily routines. The phones prompted participants at least 54 times to report their current affect-regulation orientation and to work on two trials of a cognitively demanding working memory task. As expected, contra-hedonic orientation was substantially less prevalent than prohedonic orientation. It was reported in 15% of the measurement occasions. Participants who reported on average more contra-hedonic orientation showed lower average working memory performance throughout the study interval. Further, controlling for the effects of accompanying affective experiences, momentary occurrences of contra-hedonic orientation were associated with temporary declines in working memory performance within individuals, and this could neither be explained by lacking task compliance nor by other characteristics of the individual or the situation. Prohedonic orientation showed a considerably smaller association with working memory performance. These findings are consistent with the view that contra-hedonic orientation is accompanied by momentarily more diminished cognitive resources than is prohedonic orientation.     

Memories of real-life decisions

Three studies investigated decision makers' memory representations of choice alternatives in most important real-life decisions. In Study 1, each participant recalled the most important decision that she or he had ever made and rated to what degree a number of characteristics could describe the decisions. In Study 2, the participants were asked to think about an important decision that they had made during the last 7-10 days. In Study 3, the memory representations of decisions of a group of action-oriented participants were compared with those of a group of state-oriented participants (Kuhl, 1983). Characteristics related to standard decision theory, like consequences, values, and likelihood, had high ratings of applicability as well as affect/feeling. When testing the applicability of a circumplex model, the fuzzy-trace theory of memory, and differences between state- and action-oriented decision makers, we found (1) that there was no support for the circumplex model of emotions. Instead, an important decision problem was characterised by both positive and negative affect/emotion and thus, a bipolar mapping was found inadequate; (2) that a comparison of abstract and concrete aspects showed that the abstract characteristics scored higher, thereby supporting the fuzzy-trace theory; and (3) that the prediction that action-oriented participants would score higher than state-oriented participants on the characteristic of activity was not supported. However, state-oriented decision makers rated passivity higher than action-oriented decision makers for the important decision of leaving a partner. State-oriented decision makers used perceptual/cognitive scenario representations to a greater extent than action-oriented participants. Finally, it was stressed that in the development of decision theories it is essential to find theoretical representations as close as possible to how decision makers themselves represent the decisions. The method used in this contribution is focused on the role of memory in decision making and gives further insights into how important real-life decisions are represented by different decision makers.     

Intuitive (in)coherence judgments are guided by processing fluency, mood and affect

Recently proposed accounts of intuitive judgments of semantic coherence assume that processing fluency results in a positive affective response leading to successful assessment of semantic coherence. The present paper investigates whether processing fluency may indicate semantic incoherence as well. In two studies, we employ a new paradigm in which participants have to detect an incoherent item among semantically coherent words. In Study 1, we show participants accurately indicating an incoherent item despite not being able to provide an accurate solution to coherent words. Further, this effect is modified by affective valence of solution words that are not retrieved from memory. Study 2 replicates those results and extend them by showing that mood moderates incoherence judgments independently of affective valence of solutions. The results support processing fluency account of intuitive semantic coherence judgments and show that it is not fluency per se but fluency variations that drive judgments.     

Memories of real-life decisions

Three studies investigated decision makers’ memory representations of choice alternatives in most important real-life decisions. In Study 1, each participant recalled the most important decision that she or he had ever made and rated to what degree a number of characteristics could describe the decisions. In Study 2, the participants were asked to think about an important decision that they had made during the last 7–10 days. In Study 3, the memory representations of decisions of a group of action-oriented participants were compared with those of a group of state-oriented participants (Kuhl, 1983). Characteristics related to standard decision theory, like consequences, values, and likelihood, had high ratings of applicability as well as affect/feeling. When testing the applicability of a circumplex model, the fuzzy-trace theory of memory, and differences between state- and action-oriented decision makers, we found (1) that there was no support for the circumplex model of emotions. Instead, an important decision problem was characterised by both positive and negative affect/emotion and thus, a bipolar mapping was found inadequate; (2) that a comparison of abstract and concrete aspects showed that the abstract characteristics scored higher, thereby supporting the fuzzy-trace theory; and (3) that the prediction that action-oriented participants would score higher than state-oriented participants on the characteristic of activity was not supported. However, state-oriented decision makers rated passivity higher than action-oriented decision makers for the important decision of leaving a partner. State-oriented decision makers used perceptual/cognitive scenario representations to a greater extent than action-oriented participants. Finally, it was stressed that in the development of decision theories it is essential to find theoretical representations as close as possible to how decision makers themselves represent the decisions. The method used in this contribution is focused on the role of memory in decision making and gives further insights into how important real-life decisions are represented by different decision makers.     

The Influence of Emotional Prediction on the Other-race Effect in Face Recognition

异族效应(other-race effect) 是一种在面孔加工研究领域中被研究者广为熟之的一种社会性知觉现象。具体而言,就是指个体识别异族面孔的成绩显著低于本族面孔。大量的研究证据表明个体在知觉他人的情绪面孔时,会表现出明显的异族面孔效应。但就目前而言,研究者还不了解自上而下的情绪预期(top-down emotional prediction) 是如何影响面孔识别过程中的异族效应。本研究采用线索-目标范式（cue-target）对该问题进行了考察,实验通过操纵“一致试次”的比率,来区分预期 (75% 的“一致”实验试次) 与非预期实验条件 (50% 的“一致”实验试次)。本实验招募28名健康的大学生被试(12名女性,16名男性)参加正式实验,这些被试无精神疾病、情绪障碍、视力缺陷等疾病。实验后,每一名被试都获得一定的实验报酬。实验结果发现,在正性和负性情绪不预期条件下,个体表现出了对异族面孔的识别劣势,即个体识别异族面孔表情的反应时更长。虽然在负性情绪预期条件下,个体仍然表现出了对异族面孔的识别劣势,但在正性情绪预期条件下,个体对异族面孔的这种识别劣势却消失。这些研究结果表明先前的正性面孔情绪预期有效地消除了异族效应。因此,可以认为自上而下的情绪预期可能是一种促进劣势知觉加工的认知管理策略。     

The Influence of Affect on Goal Choice and Task Performance

The present study investigated the influence of mood on self-set goals and task performance. Results from 2 studies suggest a restricted view of mood effects in which affective state influences the level of self-set goals or task performance, but not both. Study 2 reveals asymmetrical mood effects on task performance, with positive- and negative-mood participants exceeding the baseline performance of neutral mood participants. Evidence indicates that goal-setting instructions may alter how individuals interpret motivational implications of mood. Although theory implies an inclusive view in which mood has both direct and indirect (through goal-setting) performance effects, the conflicting influences of affect infusion at different points of the goal-striving process may diminish the likelihood of observing inclusive effects.     

Mental representations of attachment figures facilitate recovery following upsetting autobiographical memory recall

A growing literature shows that even the symbolic presence of an attachment figure facilitates the regulation of negative affect triggered by external stressors. Yet, in daily life, pernicious stressors are often internally generated--recalling an upsetting experience reliably increases negative affect, rumination, and susceptibility to physical and psychological health problems. The present research provides the first systematic examination of whether activating the mental representation of an attachment figure enhances the regulation of affect triggered by thinking about upsetting memories. Using 2 different techniques for priming attachment figure representations and 2 types of negative affect measures (explicit and implicit), activating the mental representation of an attachment figure (vs. an acquaintance or stranger) after recalling an upsetting memory enhanced recovery--eliminating the negative effects of the memory recall (Studies 1-3). In contrast, activating the mental representation of an attachment figure before recalling an upsetting memory had no such effect (Studies 1 and 2). Furthermore, activating the mental representation of an attachment figure after thinking about upsetting memories reduced negative thinking in a stream of consciousness task, and the magnitude of the attachment-induced affective recovery effects as assessed with explicit affect measures predicted mental and physical health in daily life (Study 3). Finally, a meta-analysis of the 3 studies (Study 4) showed that the regulatory benefits conferred by the mental representation of an attachment figure were weaker for individuals high on attachment avoidance. The implications of these findings for attachment, emotion regulation, and mental and physical health are discussed.