惩罚和社会价值取向对公共物品两难中人际信任与合作行为的影响

通过两个计算机情境模拟实验, 采用“取消惩罚”范式, 引入社会价值取向变量, 发现惩罚对人际信任和合作行为具有消极影响, 具体表现为当惩罚取消后, 经历过惩罚的被试的人际信任水平显著低于无惩罚条件被试的水平。惩罚对博弈者合作行为的影响在社会价值取向不同的博弈者之间存在显著差异：经历过惩罚的亲社会型被试在惩罚取消阶段的合作程度显著低于惩罚存在阶段的合作程度, 并且显著低于无惩罚条件被试的相应水平。惩罚通过亲社会型博弈者的人际信任水平对合作程度产生间接负效应, 即惩罚程度越强, 亲社会型博弈者的人际信任水平越低, 进而使其合作程度也下降。     

When sanctions fail to increase cooperation in social dilemmas: considering the presence of an alternative option to defect

Previous social dilemma research has shown that sanctioning defection may enhance cooperation. The authors argue that this finding may have resulted from restricting participants to two behaviors (cooperation and defection). In this article, the authors introduce the concept of a "social trilemma" (a social dilemma in which an alternative option to defect is present) and tested the effect of a sanction. The authors show that a sanction only increased cooperation and collective interests in the traditional social dilemma. In a social trilemma, the sanction failed because it caused some people to choose the alternative option to defect. Moreover, the results indicate that this was especially the case when people did not expect fellow group members to cooperate. In this case, the sanction even worked counterproductive because it decreased collective interests. It is concluded that allowing individuals to consider alternative options to defect can reveal the potential detrimental effects of sanctioning systems for the collective.     

The effect of decision timing on the willingness to costly reward cooperation and punish noncooperation: Sanctioning the past,the present,or the future

Numerous studies have demonstrated that sanctions can promote cooperation. However, it is important to know not only that sanctions can work but also under what conditions people are actually willing to sanction cooperation positively (i.e., reward) or noncooperation negatively (i.e., punish). In this article, we demonstrate that people use sanctions less often and sanction more mildly when they decide about sanctioning before (instead of after) the occurrence of others' (non)cooperation (Experiments 1 and 2), regardless of whether they decide directly afterwards or after a time delay (Experiment 2). Moreover, we reveal that beforehand (as compared with afterwards) people have not yet formed clear sanctioning preferences (Experiment 3). These findings corroborate our reasoning that the decision environment beforehand induces nonconsequential reasoning and thereby hampers people's willingness to sanction. We discuss the theoretical, methodological, and practical implications of our work.     

Sanctions and moral judgments: The moderating effect of sanction severity and trust in authorities

In order to induce people to follow rules, sanctions are often introduced. In this paper we argue for the importance of studying the positive influence of sanctioning systems on people's moral convictions regarding the rule advocated by the sanction and of studying factors that moderate this influence. In three experiments we tested the influence of sanction severity and showed that severe sanctions evoke stronger moral judgments with regard to rule‐breaking behavior and stronger social disapproval towards rule‐breakers than mild sanctions. This was particularly the case when trust in authorities is high rather than low. Implications of these findings are discussed. Also, a framework is proposed to understand the possible circumstances that determine whether sanctions either increase or decrease moral norms. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Framing in Resource Dilemmas: Loss Aversion and the Moderating Effects of Sanctions

Two resource dilemmas, the commons dilemma, in which individuals take from a common resource, and the public goods problem, in which individuals give to a common good, were experimentally compared. Although they provide equivalent outcomes, the two dilemmas involve different frames of reference and are not psychologically equivalent. We also examined sanction systems, which involve contributions by individuals in the dilemma to provide rewards and penalties for cooperation. The results of Experiment 1 supported the hypothesis that public goods problems ("give dilemmas") activate greater loss aversion and less cooperation than commons dilemmas ("take dilemmas"), and that this effect is moderated by sanction systems. No difference between dilemmas was obtained when either the reward or penalty sanction was present, indicating that sanctions cause a shift in frame of reference to the aspiration of obtaining the reward or avoiding the penalty. The penalty sanction and especially the reward sanction produced greater cooperation. Also, as expected, loss aversion heightened exploitation: when the others were cooperative, a give dilemma generated less cooperation than a take dilemma. In Experiment 2, we extended the concept of frame and loss aversion to the structure of sanction systems, finding that subjects were more likely to contribute to a "take sanction" than to a "give sanction." We discuss potential sources of reference points and loss aversion in resource dilemmas and the likely impact on cooperation.     

从归因视角探讨公共物品两难中惩罚系统对合作的影响

社会两难中惩罚系统对合作的影响是当前的一个研究热点。前人研究发现惩罚系统可以促进合作,但也有学者提出惩罚系统对合作动机具有破坏作用,存在不一致结论。且这些研究大多只关注金钱惩罚而忽略了社会惩罚。本文采用2(惩罚类型:金钱,社会)×2(惩罚频率:高,低)×2(阶段:有惩罚,无惩罚)混合设计,利用"惩罚撤除"实验范式,比较了社会高低频惩罚和金钱高低频惩罚对合作、归因以及预期的影响。并探讨了合作、归因、预期之间的相互关系,结果发现:(1)金钱和社会惩罚均可提高被试合作水平;(2)金钱高频惩罚减少了对合作行为的内归因,惩罚撤除后合作行为下降,而低频惩罚没有出现下降效应;(3)社会惩罚增加了对合作的内归因,高低频惩罚在移除之后均保持较高水平,且之前的惩罚频率越高,保持效果越好;(4)合作、预期与内归因正相关,外归因负相关,同时合作与预期正相关。     

Blinded by trust in close others: Examining the effect of social closeness on cooperative behaviors during the COVID-19 pandemic

In the context of public health crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, it is essential that individuals cooperate by complying with preventive measures (e.g., wearing a mask). The current research examines how high trust in close others is linked to less cooperation—that is, less compliance with measures—and thus, undermines collective interests. Specifically, we test whether individuals are less willing to comply with preventive measures when interacting with close others they trust. We conducted two experiments in which participants read a vignette depicting a social interaction with either close others (e.g., family) or strangers. Participants had to report the extent to which they would (1) trust the other people in the situation and (2) comply with the mask wearing and physical distancing measures during this interaction. In both experiments, we find that when individuals are considering an interaction with close others, they report experiencing higher trust which is then linked to lower compliance with preventive measures. In Experiment 2, we further demonstrate that participants report less compliance with preventive measures around close others, even when they perceive non-compliance with the measures as morally “wrong”. Our findings shed light on the challenges that compliance with preventive measures poses during social interactions in a context of high trust.     

Procedural Justice and Sanctions in Social Dilemmas: The Moderating Effects of Group Feedback and Identification

An experimental study investigated the role of sanctioning systems in shaping individual contributions in step‐level public good dilemmas. It was predicted and found that procedural justice of the sanctioning system (i.e., accurate vs. inaccurate evaluations of contributions) influenced contributions. Specifically, when group members identified strongly with the group, procedural justice exerted influence only when the group failed in establishing the public good. In contrast, when group members did not identify strongly with the group, procedural justice of the sanction only exerted influence if the group succeeded. These findings suggest that integrating the social dilemma and procedural justice literature may be beneficial for understanding the conditions that determine the effectiveness of sanctioning systems.     

Palatable Punishment in Real‐World Social Dilemmas? Punishing Others to Increase Cooperation Among the Unpunished1

Social‐dilemma research has shown that imposing sanctions on defection may increase cooperation, a principle behind attempts to solve real‐world social dilemmas. Yet sanctioning systems are often difficult to implement: They are unpopular and often have large surveillance and enforcement costs. A new sanctioning system, intentionally punishing defection intermittently for some but not all group members, is shown to increase cooperation among those not punished, a finding labeled the spillover effect. This study suggests that the effect cannot be attributed simply to cooperative tendencies, as factors affecting cooperation do not affect the effect's size. The benefits of such a sanctioning system, which preserves the characteristics of social dilemmas, could include minimization of surveillance and enforcement costs, and greater public acceptability.     

Accounting for successful control of implicit racial bias: the roles of association activation, response monitoring, and overcoming bias

Individuals who are primarily internally motivated to respond without prejudice show less bias on implicit measures than individuals who are externally motivated or unmotivated to respond without prejudice. However, it is not clear why these individuals exhibit less implicit bias than others. We used the Quad model to examine motivation-based individual differences in three processes that have been proposed to account for this effect: activation of associations, overcoming associations, and response monitoring. Participants completed an implicit measure of stereotyping (Study 1) or racial attitudes (Study 2). Modeling of the data revealed that individuals who were internally (but not externally) motivated to respond without prejudice showed enhanced detection and reduced activation of biased associations, suggesting that these processes may be key to achieving unbiased responding.     

The spiral of distrust: (Non‐)cooperation in a repeated trust game is predicted by anger and individual differences in negative reciprocity orientation

This study investigated state anger and individual differences in negative reciprocity orientation as predictors of individuals' willingness to cooperate with strangers. In order to observe real behaviour, we used a trust game that was played over six periods. In the trust game, a first player (sender) determines how much of a certain endowment she/he wants to share with a second player (trustee), who then can give something back. We varied whether participants received feedback [feedback (yes, no)] about the trustee's behavioural decision (amount sent back). Supporting our hypotheses, the results suggest that feedback compared with no feedback about the trustee's behaviour increased anger. Specifically, information about low back transfers triggered anger and non‐cooperation in return. Importantly, participants with a strong negative reciprocity orientation reported higher levels of anger and were less willing to cooperate with the trustee compared with those with low negative reciprocity orientation. Moreover, even when anger was low, individuals with a strong negative reciprocity orientation were less willing to cooperate compared with those with a low negative reciprocity orientation. Thus, negative reciprocity orientation seems to arouse a spiral of distrust. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Interpersonal Trust and Emotion as Antecedents of Cooperation: Evidence From Korea1

In this field study (n = 514), we examined the relationships among interpersonal trust, interpersonal emotion, cooperation, and the characteristics of both the trustor and trustee at work. We found that interpersonal trust and interpersonal emotion were positively related to willingness to cooperate among members working in teams. We also found that interpersonal emotion was positively related to interpersonal trust. Interpersonal trust and interpersonal emotion, in turn, were predicted by 3 trustee characteristics: ability, benevolence, and integrity. Together, interpersonal trust, interpersonal emotion, and trustee characteristics accounted for 70% of the variance in willingness to cooperate among the team members.     

Social exclusion decreases prosocial behavior

In 7 experiments, the authors manipulated social exclusion by telling people that they would end up alone later in life or that other participants had rejected them. Social exclusion caused a substantial reduction in prosocial behavior. Socially excluded people donated less money to a student fund, were unwilling to volunteer for further lab experiments, were less helpful after a mishap, and cooperated less in a mixed-motive game with another student. The results did not vary by cost to the self or by recipient of the help, and results remained significant when the experimenter was unaware of condition. The effect was mediated by feelings of empathy for another person but was not mediated by mood, state self-esteem, belongingness, trust, control, or self-awareness. The implication is that rejection temporarily interferes with emotional responses, thereby impairing the capacity for empathic understanding of others, and as a result, any inclination to help or cooperate with them is undermined.     

Patriotism's Impact on Cooperation with the State: An Experimental Study on Tax Compliance

Although it seems reasonable to assume that activating patriotism might motivate citizens to cooperate with the state in reaching societal goals, the empirical evidence supporting this contention is based mostly on correlational rather than experimental studies. In addition, little is known on whether patriotism can be manipulated without simultaneously triggering nationalism and on the psychological processes which determine the patriotism‐cooperation relation. This current article reports results of one survey and three experiments that manipulate patriotism by displaying either a national flag or national landscapes or by priming national achievements. The outcomes indicate that reported and manipulated patriotism indirectly increase tax compliance, although the national flag also increases nationalism. National achievements, on the other hand, seemingly increases trust in national public institutions and the voluntary motivation to cooperate, whereas national landscapes only increase the voluntary motivation to cooperate. Hence, it is possible to increase social capital in the form of trust and cooperation through patriotism without fostering nationalism as well.     

Acting for the Greater Good: Identification with Group Determines Choices in Sequential Contribution Dilemmas

In mixed‐motive interactions, defection is the rational and common response to the defection of others. In some cases, however, group members not only cooperate in the face of defection but also compensate for the shortfalls caused by others' defection. In one field and two lab studies, we examined when group members were willing to compensate for versus match defection using sequential dilemmas. We found that the level of identification with the broader group increased willingness to compensate for intragroup defection, even when it was personally costly. Compensating for a defecting partner's actions, however, is not an act of unconditional cooperation: It is accompanied by a lack of trust in the errant group member and a desire to be perceived as more ethical. Cooperation by others, on the other hand, is matched independent of whether the cooperator was an in‐group or out‐group member. We find similar patterns of compensation and matching when the personal cost involved contributing money or effort. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Animal Play and the Evolution of Morality: An Ethological Approach

In this paper we argue that there is much to learn about “wild justice” and the evolutionary origins of morality – behaving fairly – by studying social play behavior in group-living mammals. Because of its relatively wide distribution among the mammals, ethological investigation of play, informed by interdisciplinary cooperation, can provide a comparative perspective on the evolution of ethical behavior that is broader than is provided by the usual focus on primate sociality. Careful analysis of social play reveals rules of engagement that guide animals in their social encounters. Because of its significance in development, play may provide a foundation of fairness for other forms of cooperation that are advantageous to group living. Questions about the evolutionary roots of cooperation, fairness, trust, forgiveness, and morality are best answered by attention to the details of what animals do when they engage in social play – how they negotiate agreements to cooperate, to forgive, to behave fairly, and to develop trust. We consider questions such as why play fairly? Why did play evolve as it has? Does “being fair” mean being more fit? Do individual variations in play influence an individual’s reproductive fitness? Can we use information about the foundations of moral behavior in animals to help us understand ourselves? We conclude that there is likely to be strong selection for cooperative fair play because there are mutual benefits when individuals adopt this strategy and group stability may also be fostered. Numerous mechanisms have evolved to facilitate the initiation and maintenance of social play, to keep others engaged, so that agreeing to play fairly and the resulting benefits of doing so can be readily achieved.     

The strategic logic of costly punishment necessitates natural field experiments, and at least one such experiment exists

Costly punishment's scarcity "in the wild" does not belie strong reciprocity theory as Guala claims. In the presence of strong reciprocators, strategic defectors will cooperate and sanctioning will not occur. Accordingly, natural field experiments are necessary to assess a "wide" reading of costly punishment experiments. One such field experiment exists, and it supports the hypothesis that costly punishment promotes cooperation.     

Prejudice Control and Interracial Relations: The Role of Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice

ABSTRACT A decade of research indicates that individual differences in motivation to respond without prejudice have important implications for the control of prejudice and interracial relations. In reviewing this work, we draw on W. Mischel and Y. Shoda's (1995, 1999) Cognitive–Affective Processing System (CAPS) to demonstrate that people with varying sources of motivation to respond without prejudice respond in distinct ways to situational cues, resulting in differing situation–behavior profiles in interracial contexts. People whose motivation is self-determined (i.e., the internally motivated) effectively control prejudice across situations and strive for positive interracial interactions. In contrast, people who respond without prejudice to avoid social sanction (i.e., the primarily externally motivated) consistently fail at regulating difficult to control prejudice and respond with anxiety and avoidance in interracial interactions. We further consider the nature of the cognitive–affective units of personality associated with motivation to respond without prejudice and their implications for the quality of interracial relations.     

Enhanced memory for the wolf in sheep’s clothing:: Facial trustworthiness modulates face-trait associative memory

Our decision about whether to trust and cooperate with someone is influenced by the individual’s facial appearance despite its limited predictive power. Thus, remembering trustworthy-looking cheaters is more important than remembering untrustworthy-looking cheaters because we are more likely to trust and cooperate with the former, resulting in a higher risk of unreciprocated cooperation. The present study investigated whether our mind adaptively copes with this problem by enhancing memory for trustworthy-looking cheaters. Participants played a debt game, wherein they learned to discriminate among good, neutral, and bad lenders, who respectively charged no, moderate, and high interest on the debt. Each lender had either a trustworthy- or untrustworthy-looking face. A subsequent memory test revealed that participants remembered the bad traits of trustworthy-looking lenders more accurately than those of untrustworthy-looking lenders. The results demonstrate enhanced memory for trustworthy-looking cheaters, or wolves in sheep’s clothing, implying that humans are equipped with protective mechanisms against disguised, unfaithful signs of trustworthiness.     

Adaptive Flexibility,Cooperation, and Prosocial Motivations: The Emotional Foundations of Becoming Human

ABSTRACT

Humans are highly motivated to cooperate, share, and help others. The evidence for this claim comes from examining prosocial behaviors as they show up very early in development, and by systematic comparisons between young children and mankind’s closest great ape relatives. Highly cooperative and social species that care for kin and nonkin members of their group are rare in nature and call for an evolutionary explanation. Based on the work of Michael Tomasello and others, I offer a possible explanation based on a two-phase model. The first phase of the evolution of cooperation and sociability is induced by climate change taking place during a critical period of human evolution. Climate variability produced shifts from wet, monsoon landscapes to dry and arid landscapes in East Africa, the home of many of humanity’s ancestors. Shifting environmental conditions produced selective pressures favoring adaptive flexibility and forced cooperation and interdependence among our hominin ancestors, who had to search for food (cooperative foraging) and protect each other from predators. Forced interdependence came together with two biosocial adaptations: a cooperative form of raising young children (cooperative breeding) and long-term mating patterns (pair bonding). These biosocial adaptations help explain how the species might have begun to develop emotionally modern intersubjective mind-reading capacities. During a second phase of the evolution of cooperation, the emergence of shared social norms, social reputations, the cumulative effects of cultural knowledge passed on over many generations, and cultural differences produced a new form of evolution: cultural evolution. In turn, cultural evolution produced a new cycle of innovations consisting of symbolic capacities and language. When it comes to psychotherapy, the same conditions that made one human—adaptive flexibility, cooperation, helping others and mutual enjoyment in sharing—are the same conditions that make for a strong therapeutic alliance.