Actions speak louder than words: An elaborated theoretical model of the social functions of self-injury and other harmful behaviors

The question of why some people do things that are intentionally harmful to themselves continues to puzzle scientists, clinicians, and the public. Prior studies have demonstrated that one fairly extreme, direct form of self-harm, non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI), is maintained by both automatic (i.e., intrapersonal) as well as social (i.e., interpersonal) reinforcement. However, the majority of theoretical and empirical papers on this topic focus almost exclusively on the automatic functions. The purpose of this paper is to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the social functions of NSSI. Evidence is presented supporting the notion that NSSI is maintained by social reinforcement in at least a substantial minority of instances. Moreover, an elaborated theoretical model of the social functions of NSSI is outlined that proposes that this behavior represents a high intensity social signal used when less intense communication strategies fail (e.g., speaking, yelling, crying). The model further proposes that NSSI can serve not only as a signal of distress that is reinforced primarily by the caregiving behavior it elicits from others, but that it can also serve as a signal of strength and fitness that is reinforced by warding off potential threats (e.g., peer victimization), and in some cases can strengthen affiliation with others. Support for this theoretical model is drawn from diverse literatures including psychology, evolutionary biology, and cultural anthropology. The paper concludes with specific recommendations for empirical tests of the proposed model of the social functions of NSSI, as well as other harmful behaviors such as alcohol and drug use.     

When actions speak louder than words: improving children's flexibility in a card-sorting task

People often perseverate, or repeat habitual behaviors when they are no longer appropriate. For example, after sorting cards by one rule, children will reliably perseverate with this rule even when they are clearly and repeatedly instructed to switch to a new rule. Such perseveration may result from limitations in working memory abilities for holding instructions actively in mind. If so, children may switch more readily to a new rule following experiences that are less demanding on working memory, such as guided practice with the new rule. In a study testing this prediction, 3-year-old children received direct instructions to switch to a new rule, guided practice with the new rule, or both. Providing children with guided practice was much more effective than telling them what to do. These findings support theories of perseveration based on competing memory systems, challenge alternative theories, and suggest effective methods for countering prepotent behaviors.     

When actions speak louder than words: Verbal and nonverbal wrangling in the therapeutic arena commentary on paper by F. Diane Barth

Patients’ use of language in the analytic setting can undergo extreme and sometimes surprising fluctuations. Seemingly articulate and engaging patients retreat to the concrete in their use of words, disconnecting verbal expression from one's internal experience. Are these fluctuations indications of limitations in the patient's capacity to put experience into language, or are they indications of the emergence of otherwise unacknowledged aspects of self into the treatment arena? Shifts in the use of language (both patient's and therapist's) can be opportunities to question the work of the analysis. Whether one uses these moments to expand the boundaries of the analytic technique or to expand the boundaries of the analytic relationship—or both—is the question posed in this commentary.     

Negative Actions

Some philosophers have argued that refraining from performing an action consists in actively keeping oneself from performing that action or preventing one’s performing it. Since activities must be held to be positive actions, this implies that negative actions are a species of positive actions which is to say that all actions are positive actions. I defend the following claims:

Worthy Actions

Concrete worthy actions have not been aterminus of discernment for moral theory in theway that they often are for the deliberatingmoral agent. Some ordinary hallmarks of worthyactions challenge the unworldly and impersonalways of envisioning life that dominatephilosophical ethics. I discuss six: a worthyaction (1) improves the world in moralperspective, (2) discloses the agent's power,(3) is personally rewarding, (4) unites virtue,justice, and happiness, (5) is a prime objectof moral choice, and (6) belongs to a practicalgenre (such as work or love). Appreciatingworthy actions leads to a less abstract andconformist view of ethical standards and moreattention to individual portfolio-buildingaccording to diverse practical opportunities.     

Coordinating Actions

The motor system composes complex actions by combining simpler submovements. This presumably involves sharing information about the progress of one submovement with the centres controlling another submovement, to ensure that the second happens in an appropriate relation to the first. This process is called coordination. In this paper Idiscuss evidence that coordinating actions indeed involves an active process of sharing information about the current state of movements. Coordination appears to be qualitatively different from the process of reacting to external stimuli. This may reflect the importance of predictive representations in coordination. Finally, the processes underlying coordination appear to be organized in a response-specific fashion, as a number of relatively independent circuits. The development and tuning of these circuits may, in part, be what makes an action skilled.     

Intentions and Causes, Actions and Right Actions

I argue in this essay that belief/desire explanations are not logically true and not causal, and further that the antecedent of a true belief/desire conditional cannot be strengthened in such a way as to transform it into a true causal statement. I also argue that belief/desire explanations are not dispensable: they are presupposed in our justifications of scientific claims. The proposal is not that psychological determinism is false, but that some at least of our activities are not describable in causal terms. These arguments prepare the ground for a puzzle. If all human intentional behaviour is caused, then all actual linkages between psychological states and behaviour should be expressed in causal statements. But neither the action of asserting a causal statement nor the action of justifying the assertion can be described as the result of a cause. Therefore if one accepts that scientific claims can be justified, not all linkages between psychological states and subsequent action are expressible in causal statements. I do not offer a solution to this puzzle.     

A little bit louder now: negative affect increases perceived loudness

Traditionally, perception was considered to be an encapsulated process that was unaffected by top-down processes like affect. Recent work in vision draws this framework into question by showing that changes in the affective state of the perceiver can impact many different aspects of visual perception. Here, we extend the relationship between affect and perception into another perceptual modality: audition. Participants were induced into a negative or neutral mood by writing about a frightening or neutral experience in their past. They then listened to a series of short, neutral tones (320 and 640 ms) and rated the loudness and duration of the tones. Participants in a negative mood rated the tones as significantly louder, but not longer, than participants in a neutral mood, suggesting that the difference between the groups was perceptual rather than just a response bias. This research shows for the first time that the role of affect in perceptual processes may be more pervasive than previously considered.     

Actions as Events

We present a theory of actions based on a theory of events in branching time, in which “particular” or “token” actions are taken to be sets of transitions from their initial states to the outcomes. We also present a simple theory of composition of events by which composite events can be formed out of other events. Various kinds of actions, including instantaneous group actions and sequential group actions, are introduced by way of composition, and an extended stit theory of agency is proposed, in which the stit operators are combined or equipped with reified group actions.     

Endogenizing Epistemic Actions

Studia Logica - Through a series of examples, we illustrate some important drawbacks that the action model logic framework suffers from in its ability to represent the dynamics of information...     

Actions Speak Louder*

If the current trend of participatory programs catches on, we may get more design and less rhetoric at design conferences in the future.