Impaired visual perception of hurtful actions in patients with chronic low back pain

Visually presented biological motion stimuli activate regions in the brain that are also related to musculo-skeletal pain. We therefore hypothesized that chronic pain impairs the perception of visually presented actions that involve body parts that hurt. In the first experiment, chronic back pain (CLBP) patients and healthy controls judged the lifted weight from point-light biological motion displays. An actor either lifted an invisible container (5, 10, or 15 kg) from the floor, or lifted and manipulated it from the right to the left. The latter involved twisting of the lower back and would be very painful for CLBP patients. All participants recognized the displayed actions, but CLBP patients were impaired in judging the difference in handled weights, especially for the trunk rotation. The second experiment involved discrimination between forward and backward walking. Here the patients were just as good as the controls, showing that the main result of the first experiment was indeed specific to the sensory aspects of the task, and not to general impairments or attentional deficits. The results thus indicate that the judgment of sensorimotor aspects of a visually displayed movement is specifically affected by chronic low back pain.     

Creating bizarre false memories through imagination

The present study explored memory for familiar or usual actions (e.g., flip the coin) and bizarre or unusual actions (e.g., sit on the dice). In Session 1, action statements were presented to 210 participants, who had to either perform or imagine those actions. In Session 2, 24 h later, participants imagined performing various actions, some presented in the first session and others totally new. Finally, in Session 3, 2 weeks later, participants were tested on their memory for the original actions. We found that as the number of imaginings increased in Session 2, so did the proportion of did responses to actions that were only imagined or not even presented. This pattern was present for both bizarre and familiar actions. These results demonstrate that bizarre actions may lose the item distinctiveness that is used to make accurate memory decisions after repeated imagination.     

No deficits in nonverbal memory, metamemory and internal as well as external source memory in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD)

A large body of literature suggests that some symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) result from mnemonic dysfunctions. The present study tested various formulations of the memory deficit hypothesis considering important moderators, such as depression and response slowing. Thirty-two OCD patients and 32 healthy controls were presented verbal or nonverbal instructions for actions (e.g. simple gestures). These actions should either be performed or imagined. For recognition, previously presented as well as novel actions were displayed. Decisions had to be made whether an action was previously displayed (verbally vs. nonverbally) or not and whether an action was performed or imagined (internal source memory). Moreover, both judgments required confidence ratings. Groups did not differ in memory accuracy and metamemory for verbally presented material. Patients displayed some impairment for nonverbally presented material and imagined instructions, which, however, could be fully accounted for by response slowing and depressive symptoms. The study challenges the view that primary memory deficits underlie OCD or any of its subtypes. We claim that research should move forward from the mere study of objective impairment to the assessment of cognitive performance in conjunction with personality traits such as inflated responsibility.     

Visual context modulates potentiation of grasp types during semantic object categorization

Substantial evidence suggests that conceptual processing of manipulable objects is associated with potentiation of action. Such data have been viewed as evidence that objects are recognized via access to action features. Many objects, however, are associated with multiple actions. For example, a kitchen timer may be clenched with a power grip to move it but pinched with a precision grip to use it. The present study tested the hypothesis that action evocation during conceptual object processing is responsive to the visual scene in which objects are presented. Twenty-five healthy adults were asked to categorize object pictures presented in different naturalistic visual contexts that evoke either move- or use-related actions. Categorization judgments (natural vs. artifact) were performed by executing a move- or use-related action (clench vs. pinch) on a response device, and response times were assessed as a function of contextual congruence. Although the actions performed were irrelevant to the categorization judgment, responses were significantly faster when actions were compatible with the visual context. This compatibility effect was largely driven by faster pinch responses when objects were presented in use-compatible, as compared with move-compatible, contexts. The present study is the first to highlight the influence of visual scene on stimulus–response compatibility effects during semantic object processing. These data support the hypothesis that action evocation during conceptual object processing is biased toward context-relevant actions.     

Are we losing our mind?

The individual mind of the patient, and how it works, are the central topics of this plenary address. In psychoanalysis we are always dealing with a mind--a mind with its own particular structure--and this is a fact of singular importance in how we listen to, understand, and communicate with patients. Techniques geared to this view are presented. The author reflects on and challenges some contrasting current views of psychoanalysis as primarily coconstructed or as a relational matrix. Technique according to this view highlights the analyst's subjectivity and actions as central to treatment.     

Children's kinematic false memories

ABSTRACT

Individuals misrecognise as seen the never-presented natural continuation of an action. These false memories derive from the running of kinematic mental models of the actions seen, which rest on motor inferences from implicit knowledge. We verified an implied prediction: kinematic false memories should be detectable even in children. The participants in our experiments first observed photos in which actors were about to perform actions on objects. At recognition they were presented with the original photos, plus (a) distractors representing the unseen natural continuation of the original actions, (b) distractors representing the beginning of other actions on the same objects and (c) distractors representing completed different actions on the same objects. In contrast to the original studies in which participants expressed their confidence in recognition, in our experiments the participants catgorirzed the action as seen or not seen. After replicating the original results with the dichotomous recognition task (Experiment 1), we detected spontaneous false memories also in children (Experiment 2).     

Distance effects in memory for sequences: evidence for estimation and scanning processes

The current study sought to uncover how temporal information is represented in our knowledge about routine events. In Experiment 1 we collected norming data on eight routines taken from Galambos (1983). In Experiment 2 participants were presented with two actions of varying distance from a routine and asked "Are the actions in the correct order?". We found that a number of variables interact with distance, including action position, routine familiarity, and experimental block. These data suggest that sometimes participants are faster when the actions are far apart in the routine, while at other times they are faster when actions are closer together, providing evidence for both distance and reverse-distance effects, respectively. A model is presented to help interpret these data in which temporal information for routine events is both: (1) coarsely coded, and processed by an estimation mechanism; and (2) represented serially, and processed by a scanning mechanism.     

Infants' perception of goal‐directed actions on video

Imitation studies and object search studies show that infants have difficulties using action information presented on video to guide their own behaviour. The present study investigated whether infants also have problems interpreting information shown on video relative to real live information. It was examined whether 6‐month‐olds interpret an action with a salient action effect as goal‐directed when it is performed by an actor on a video‐screen and when it is performed by a live actor. A video presentation of a goal‐directed action display was presented to one group of infants, and another group received the same action display, matched in all details, live on a stage. Results indicate that 6‐month‐olds in the video group as well as in the live group interpreted the human action as goal‐directed. Moreover, comparison across both groups revealed no difference in the overall looking pattern between the video and the live presentation group. Thus, our findings show that infants as young as 6 months of age can take important information from video clips and interpret televised actions in meaningful ways that is equivalent to their interpretation of live actions.     

Free will from the viewpoint of teleological behaviorism

A teleological and behavioral view is presented of the concept of free will. Free will is not something people essentially have or do not have. Instead, the following question is asked: Why does society find it useful to label some actions free and some actions not free? It is argued that the function of such labels is to aid in assigning responsibility to people for their actions. Responsibility in turn is useful in assigning rewards and punishments. The sort of actions that are typically seen as free are the same as those seen as self-controlled. Such actions are responsive to environmental contingencies of relatively wide temporal extent. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Language,life praxis and scenic understanding in psychoanalytic therapy

Freud held that the repressed unconscious arose from the separation of thing‐presentations from word‐presentations. The author divests these terms of the implication that they are objectively existing entities by citing some of Freud's other texts. Thing‐presentations are memory‐traces of (as yet) non‐language‐based interactions – that is, precipitates of actions that have been experienced and models of future actions. Scenic understanding, which, on the basis of participation by the therapist in the patient's play, treats all material presented by the patient by an approach analogous to the interpretation of dreams, is therefore the royal road to the unconscious.     

Causal knowledge and imitation/emulation switching in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and children (Homo sapiens)

This study explored whether the tendency of chimpanzees and children to use emulation or imitation to solve a tool-using task was a response to the availability of causal information. Young wild-born chimpanzees from an African sanctuary and 3- to 4-year-old children observed a human demonstrator use a tool to retrieve a reward from a puzzle-box. The demonstration involved both causally relevant and irrelevant actions, and the box was presented in each of two conditions: opaque and clear. In the opaque condition, causal information about the effect of the tool inside the box was not available, and hence it was impossible to differentiate between the relevant and irrelevant parts of the demonstration. However, in the clear condition causal information was available, and subjects could potentially determine which actions were necessary. When chimpanzees were presented with the opaque box, they reproduced both the relevant and irrelevant actions, thus imitating the overall structure of the task. When the box was presented in the clear condition they instead ignored the irrelevant actions in favour of a more efficient, emulative technique. These results suggest that emulation is the favoured strategy of chimpanzees when sufficient causal information is available. However, if such information is not available, chimpanzees are prone to employ a more comprehensive copy of an observed action. In contrast to the chimpanzees, children employed imitation to solve the task in both conditions, at the expense of efficiency. We suggest that the difference in performance of chimpanzees and children may be due to a greater susceptibility of children to cultural conventions, perhaps combined with a differential focus on the results, actions and goals of the demonstrator.     

A tutorial on creating logfiles for event-driven applications

This paper describes the practical steps necessary to write logfiles for recording user actions in event-driven applications. Data logging has long been used as a reliable method to record all user actions, whether assessing new software or running a behavioral experiment. With the widespread introduction of event-driven software, the logfile must enable accurate recording of all the user’s actions, whether with the keyboard or another input device. Logging is only an effective tool when it can accurately and consistently record all actions in a format that aids the extraction of useful information from the mass of data collected. Logfiles are often presented as one of many methods that could be used, and here a technique is proposed for the construction of logfiles for the quantitative assessment of software from the user’s point of view.     

Frontal and parietal lobe involvement in the processing of pretence and intention

We assessed whether different processes might be at play during pretence understanding by examining breakdowns of performance in participants with acquired brain damage. In Experiment 1 patients with frontal or parietal lesions and neurologically intact adults were asked to categorize videos of pretend and real actions. In Experiment 2 participants saw three types of videos: real intentional actions, real accidental actions, and pretend actions. In one session they judged whether the actions they saw were intentional or accidental, and in a second session they judged whether the actions were real or pretend. Parietal patients had particular difficulties in the identification of pretend actions, and both parietal and frontal patients were more impaired than controls in understanding the intentional nature of pretence. Analyses of individual patients’ performance revealed that parietal lesions, and in particular lesions to the temporo-parietal junction, impaired the ability to discriminate pretend from real actions. However, this did not necessarily affect the discrimination of intentional from unintentional actions, which instead may be independently disrupted by damage to frontal areas. Moreover, spared ability to discriminate pretend actions from real actions, and intentional actions from accidental actions, did not grant a full conceptual understanding of the intentional nature of pretence. The implications for pretence understanding are discussed.     

Event memory: the effects of processing objectives and time delay on memory for action sequences

The memorial representations of events that result from different types of goal-directed cognition are conceptualized on the basis of the general model of information processing proposed by Wyer and Srull (1980, 1984). In a test of this conceptualization, subjects read a passage describing the events that took place at a cocktail party. They were told either (a) to form an impression of the party and the events that occurred, (b) to empathize with the person from whose perspective the passage was written, or (c) to remember the information presented in a way that would allow them to reproduce it. The stimulus passage contained two target events, each consisting of actions that were either described chronologically or in reverse order, and were either presented together or were separated by other unrelated material. After either a short or a long delay, subjects recalled the information they read in the order it came to mind. Finally, subjects were given the individual event actions and told to place them in the order they were presented. The actions comprising target events were generally more likely to be recalled together and in chronological order when subjects had learned about them with either an impression formation or an empathy objective than when they had read about them with the goal of remembering them. However, orderings of these actions were affected by task objectives only after a long delay. The effect of task objectives on the order of recalling the events themselves showed a quite different pattern; for example, subjects with an empathy objective were most likely to recall the last target event presented before the first one after a long delay, whereas subjects with an impression objective were least likely to do so. The proposed model provided a reasonable account of these and other effects of task objectives on memory for events and the actions comprising them.     

What matters is the underlying experience: Similar motor responses during processing observed hand actions and hand-related verbs

It is well-accepted that processing observed actions involves at some extent the same neural mechanisms responsible for action execution. More recently, it has been forwarded that also the processing of verbs expressing a specific motor content is subserved by the neural mechanisms allowing individuals to perform the content expressed by that linguistic material. This view is also known as embodiment and contrasts with a more classical approach to language processing that considers it as amodal. In the present study, we used a go/no-go paradigm, in which participants were requested to respond to real words and pictures and refrain from responding when presented stimuli were pseudowords and scrambled images. Real stimuli included pictures depicting hand- and foot-related actions and verbs expressing hand- and foot-related actions. We, therefore, directly compared the modulation of hand motor responses during the observation of actions and the presentation of verbs, expressing actions in the same category. The results have shown that participants gave slower hand motor responses during the observation of hand actions and the processing of hand-related verbs as than observed foot actions and related verbs. These findings support embodiment showing that whatever the modality of presentation (observed action or verb), the modulation of hand motor responses was similar, thus suggesting that processing seen actions and related verbs shares common mechanisms most likely involving the motor system and the underlying motor experience.     

Developmental changes in preschoolers' ability to distinguish memories of performed,pretended, and imagined actions

The goals of the research presented in this article were to: a) examine changes in pre-schoolers' ability to distinguish among memories of performed, pretended, and imagined episodes, and b) use source monitoring as a tool for inferring the nature of preschoolers' conceptualizations of pretense. The participants, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds, performed, pretended, and imagined performing actions. After a short delay, they identified the origin of their memories in a 3-alternative, forced-choice procedure. Results showed significant improvements between ages 3 and 4 in the ability to distinguish: a) performed actions from imagined actions, and b) performed actions from pretended actions. However, 4- and 5- year-olds confused memories of pretended and imagined actions. These results were replicated in a second experiment with 3- and 4-year-olds, using a simpler 2-alternative, forced-choice format. The findings suggest that, by age 4, children represent both pretense and imagination in memory according to cognitive operation features associated with generating a fictional mental state. Thus, 4-year-olds may recognize that constructing a mental, alternative reality is an important part of pretense.     

Infants' imitation of goal-directed actions: the role of movements and action effects

This paper reviews studies on infants' imitation of goal-directed actions in the first two years of life. Special emphasis is given to the role of the two observable components of an action, that is, the movement and the action effects, on infants' replication of target actions. The reviewed studies provide evidence that infants benefit most from a full demonstration of both movements and effects. If movements are demonstrated in isolation, infants may encode this information, but they preferentially reproduce actions that lead to salient effects. If action effects are presented in isolation, infants younger than 19 months usually fail to emulate the unseen movements that would be necessary to produce these effects. Infants' ability to predict action effects or to infer unseen movements from incomplete demonstrations improves substantially at the end of the second year of life. It is concluded that the capability to learn relations between movements and action effects by observation, and the knowledge about movement-effect relations acquired so far, may be important factors underlying the developmental changes in infants' imitation of goal-directed actions.     

Evidence for separate representations for action and location in implicit motor sequencing

We examined sequential learning of actions in an experiment in which four different actions (push, twist, pinch, switch) were placed at four horizontal locations. At transfer, participants responded to a sequence that required performing the same sequence of actions at different locations and to a different sequence of actions at the same sequence of locations. Participants with explicit knowledge demonstrated only learning the sequence of response locations. However, participants with implicit knowledge learned the sequence of actions just as well as the sequence of locations, and performance on individual sequences was just as good as performance when both sequences were presented. These results demonstrated that two types of sequences, one of actions and another of response locations, can be learned simultaneously, suggesting that parallel representations are involved in implicit motor skill acquisition.