What it means to be general cultural

Published and unpublished research with the Vocational Interest Inventory based on Anne Roe's interest scheme supported separating the General Cultural area out of the RIASEC framework. It emerged as a distinct fusion of certain verbal-artistic and social tendencies, and, as an occupational group, takes social scientists away from Roe's Science group. General Cultural provides a bridge in career counseling between interests and cognitive variables because of the repeated association of CUL scores with academic achievement and persistence.     

What God might be

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - As Plato suggested, the cosmos may exist because this is ethically necessary. It then might well consist of infinitely many minds, each itself...     

What Does it Mean to be Trauma-Informed? A Multi-System Perspective from Practitioners Serving the Community

The increased awareness of the detrimental consequences of trauma exposure has led researchers to focus their attention in identifying best practices on integrating trauma-informed approaches (TIAs) to child and family services. Yet, terms related to TIAs are often utilized without an adequate definition, and most importantly, without concrete and specific strategies to ensure that services are in fact trauma-informed. Using a multi-methods approach, this project examined important practice considerations that support successful implementation of TIA in school and community-based behavioral health settings. Key informant interviews and electronic surveys were conducted with child and family systems practitioners; interviews inquired about training, current practices, and barriers to service engagement. Data was analyzed, organized, and synthesized in accordance with core domains and specific components proposed by Hanson and Lang’s (2014) trauma-informed care framework. Findings suggest that practice of TIA differed by system and was largely driven by experiential and informal learning experiences. Practitioners also report challenges unique to each system hinder the utilization of screening and intervention best practices. Salient differences included those related to knowledge and accessibility to training, utilization of evidence-based practices, application of screening tools, and availability of resources within their systems. This brings to light the importance of considering both general and system-specific practice mechanism for the successful implementation and sustainability of TIA frameworks. We suggest system-specific strategies to help integrate trauma into services, including prioritizing capacity building efforts within each system by leveraging their natural supports and identifying systems-specific assets for both screening and intervention practices.

     

What could be caused must actually be caused

I give two arguments for the claim that all events which occur at the actual world and are such that they could be caused, are also such that they must actually be caused. The first argument is an improvement of a similar argument advanced by Alexander Pruss, which I show to be invalid. It uses Pruss’s Brouwer Analog for counterfactual logic, and, as a consequence, implies inconsistency with Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals. While (I suggest) this consequence may not be objectionable, the argument founders on the fact that Pruss’s Brouwer Analog has a clear counterexample. I thus turn to a second, “Lewisian” argument, which requires only an affirmation of one element of Lewis’s analysis of causation and one other, fairly weak possibility claim about the nature of wholly contingent events. The final section of the paper explains how both arguments escape objections from supposed indeterminacy in quantum physics.     

Cosmopolitanism and What it Means to be Human: Rethinking Ancient and Modern Views on Discerning Humanity

This paper takes a conceptual look at cosmopolitanism and the related issue of what it means to be human in order to arrive at an alternative conceptual framework which is free from empiricist assumptions. With reference to a discussion on Homer’s Iliad, the author develops a ‘humanist’ model of discerning humanity. This model is then compared and contrasted with Martha Nussbaum’s version of cosmopolitanism. The notion of ‘aspect-seeing’ discussed by Wittgenstein in the second part of the Philosophical Investigations is also examined in order to shed light on what it involves to discern humanity. Finally, racism is discussed from the philosophical perspective elaborated in order to highlight its distinctive conceptual features. It is hoped that this paper can refocus our attention on important issues concerning the basis of what it means to see human beings as human beings.     

What chance-credence norms should be

Synthese - Multiple realizability says that the same kind of mental states may be manifested by systems with very different physical constitutions. Putnam (1967) supposed it to be...     

What makes it a heap?

On the epistemic view of vagueness, a vague expression has sharp boundaries whose location speakers of the language cannot recognize. The paper argues that one of the deepest sources of resistance to the epistemic view is the idea that all truths are cognitively accessible from truths in a language for natural science, conceived as precise, in a sense explained. The implications of the epistemic view for issues about the relations between vague predicates and scientific predicates are investigated.     

What logical pluralism cannot be

Logical Pluralists maintain that there is more than one genuine/true logical consequence relation. This paper seeks to understand what the position could amount to and some of the challenges faced by its formulation and defence. I consider in detail Beall and Restall’s Logical Pluralism—which seeks to accommodate radically different logics by stressing the way that they each fit a general form, the Generalised Tarski Thesis (GTT)—arguing against the claim that different instances of GTT are admissible precisifications of logical consequence. I then consider what it is to endorse a logic within a pluralist framework and criticise the options Beall and Restall entertain. A case study involving many-valued logics is examined. I next turn to issues of the applications of different logics and questions of which logic a pluralist should use in particular contexts. A dilemma regarding the applicability of admissible logics is tackled and it is argued that application is a red herring in relation to both understanding and defending a plausible form of logical pluralism. In the final section, I consider other ways to be and not to be a logical pluralist by examining analogous positions in debates over religious pluralism: this, I maintain, illustrates further limitations and challenges for a very general logical pluralism. Certain less wide-ranging pluralist positions are more plausible in both cases, I suggest, but assessment of those positions needs to be undertaken on a case-by-case basis.     

What structures could not be

James Ladyman has recently proposed a view according to which all that exists on the level of microphysics are structures “all the way down”. By means of a comparative reading of structuralism in philosophy of mathematics as proposed by Stewart Shapiro, I shall present what I believe structures could not be. I shall argue that, if Ladyman is indeed proposing something as strong as suggested here, then he is committed to solving problems that proponents of structuralism in philosophy of mathematics such as Shapiro are trying to solve. Attempting to do so, however, brings out a tacit tension in Ladyman's position. I shall argue that the upshot of this is that the ontological import that Ladyman attributes to structures is rather epistemological import properly understood.     

Programmed instruction: What it is and how to do it

Five behaviorological features of programmed instruction are outlined: behavioral objectives, reinforcement, activity rate: high and relevant, successive approximation, and mastery progression. Each of these topics is explained, and examples are given to illustrate the differences between programmed instruction and the more common transmission model of teaching. A final section provides suggestions on specific techniques of successive approximation.