论传媒伦理的界定

要科学地界定传媒伦理,首先,不能偏离伦理“致至善”的本性;其次,须从元伦理学、规范伦理学及应用伦理学三个层面深入考察传媒伦理的理论进路。本文认为,传媒伦理首先是对人们媒介行为中善恶选择的系统性探究,它系统地研究道德善的媒体当如何履职、媒体是否符合它的应当以及媒介从业人员在其媒介行为中对善与恶,正当与不正当的认识与抉择等问题;其次,与人们实际生活相关的是,传媒伦理也试图界定那些构成价值与生活规范的,被作为个体、群体或文化共同体的人们所共同认可的原则性的内容。     

How Information Availability Interacts with Visual Attention during Judgment and Decision Tasks

Decisions in front of a supermarket shelf probably involve a mix of visually available information and associated memories—and interactions between those two. Several cognitive processes, such as decision making, search, and various judgments, are therefore likely to co‐occur, and each process will influence visual attention. We conducted two eye‐tracking experiments capturing parts of these features by having participants make either judgments or decisions concerning products that had been previously encoded. Half the time, participants made their choices with full information about the available products and half the time with crucial task‐relevant information removed. By comparing participants' use of visual attention during decisions and search‐based and memory‐based judgments, we can better understand how visual attention is differently employed between tasks and how it depends on the visual environment. We found that participants' visual attention during decisions is sensitive to evaluations already made during encoding and strongly characterized by preferential looking to the options later to be chosen. When the task environment is rich enough, participants engage in advanced integrative visual behavior and improve their decision quality. In contrast, visual attention during judgments made on the same products reflects a search‐like behavior when all information is available and a more focused type of visual behavior when information is removed. Our findings contribute not only to the literature on how visual attention is used during decision making but also to methodological questions concerning how to measure and identify task‐specific features of visual attention in ecologically valid ways. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Attentional inhibition has social-emotional consequences for unfamiliar faces

Visual attention studies often rely on response time measures to show the impact of attentional facilitation and inhibition. Here we extend the investigation of the effects of attention on behavior and show that prior attentional states associated with unfamiliar faces can influence subsequent social-emotional judgments about those faces. Participants were shown pairs of face images and were asked to withhold a response if a transparent stop-signal cue appeared over one of the faces. This served to associate the cued face with an inhibitory state. Later, when asked to make social-emotional choices about these face pairs, participants chose uncued faces more often than cued faces as "more trustworthy" and chose cued faces more often than uncued faces as "less trustworthy." For perceptual choices, there was no effect of how the question was framed (which face is "on a lighter background" vs. "on a darker background"). These results suggest that attentional inhibition can be associated with socially relevant stimuli, such as faces, and can have specific, deleterious effects on social-emotional judgments.     

Seeking authenticity in diverse contexts: How identities and environments constrain “free” choice

Diversity and inclusion are a key goal in 21st century society, but people continue to self‐segregate in occupations, communities, and everyday interactions. Are people's choices to separate by groups into these different spaces truly “free?” In this paper, we review and extend a new framework for understanding how social identities contextually and automatically constrain the choices people make. We consider how situations subtly cue a sense of fit to one's identity, automatically eliciting state authenticity and a desire to return to those settings that afford authenticity and avoid those that do not. Actors and observers alike often explain these behaviors after the fact as freely chosen. We discuss how the SAFE model can clarify and expand what it means to feel a sense of belonging and explain why those who are advantaged in a setting are often less aware of the way in which their identity advantages them. We end by highlighting how environments can be shaped to foster fit and authenticity among members of underrepresented groups as a means to facilitate diversity.     

Choice,the Invisible Element in Our Work

Unless they use a highly structured approach, psychotherapists make choices all the time in their work, but the role of choice is neglected in the professional literature. Because choices tend to issue under the radar, sometimes as personal enactments, our profession could benefit from examining them. This is especially true for leaders of therapy groups where there are pressures to align with conventional perspectives of pathology, of popular “goodness” and “badness.” Two important influences on our decisions here are milieu—the historical period in which we work—and our clinical identity (training, personality, identifications and practical experience). It is to reinforce these that we often make our choices.     

Utopias and Comparative Assessments of Justice

When we make public policy choices, is it helpful to know how utopia (that is, the perfectly just institutional design) would look? Amartya Sen argues that it is neither necessary, nor sufficient, nor even contributory. He claims that before making a policy choice one should compare several feasible institutional designs to see which promotes justice most (a “comparative assessment” of justice), and that it is misleading to use the perfect design as a standard in those comparisons. Principles of justice are the proper standard. The present article contends that the perfect design has nevertheless an important role to play in the prior task of identifying and refining our principles of justice. It also shows that the perfect design—in at least one sense of this term—may be a legitimate long‐term goal for present policy choices.     

Conscious awareness of methodological choices: A reply to Milberg and McGlinchey (2010)

Milberg and McGlinchey (2010) claim that the conclusions we reach in "Perceptual Grouping Operates Independently of Attentional Selection: Evidence From Hemispatial Neglect" are unwarranted. Specifically, it is asserted that insufficient methodological control was exerted over the attentional status of the patients and that partial attention to the contralesional field could have resulted in the congruency effects we observe. Although we agree with their methodological cautions in general, we argue that our investigation is, in fact, methodologically sound. In particular, we reiterate and highlight that our investigation is unprecedented in the characterization of a patient sample with multiple clinical, psychophysical, and experimental measures; in our use of a stringent, rigidly controlled paradigm specifically designed for investigating perceptual grouping without awareness; in our modification of the experimental procedure to make it even more stringent; and in our specific methodological choices for comparison/control conditions within this experimental paradigm. We also demonstrate that partial attention to the contralesional left cannot support the robust congruency effects we observe. In light of this, we remain confident of our interpretation of our findings and suggest that perceptual grouping can indeed operate in the absence of attention.     

Flashing the Yellow Traffic Light: Choices Forced Upon Us by Gene Editing Technologies

The 2018 birth of two designer babies in China has sparked an immediate global controversy over the ethics of gene editing. For the longer range future, however, we must assess how CRISPR/Cas9, like so many other new bio-technologies, is forcing choice—moral choice—on a large scale. Gene editing for purposes of medical therapy, human enhancement, engineering of future children, and even creating a posthuman species, confront our society with the inescapable necessity of making moral choices. The task for churches in partnership with universities is not to decide in advance what is right or wrong. Rather, it is to prepare our people to make responsible choices.     

Transformative Choice,Practical Reasons and Trust

Abstract

In this article I reflect on the question of whether we can have reason to make transformative choices. In attempting to answer it, I do three things. First, I bring forward an internalist account of practical reasons which entails the idea that agents should deliberate to the best of their ability. Second, I discuss L.A. Paul’s views on transformative choice, arguing that, although they present a real problem, the problem is not as profound as she believes it is. Third, I argue that, given the situation in which we face transformative choices (a situation of principled uncertainty though not cluelessness), trust is an appropriate response to transformative choices, and that when one’s trust that one’s current desires will be fulfilled in making a transformative choice is reasonable, one has a reason to make it. Thus, trust turns out to be a crucial response to a profound problem each of us will face during our lives.     

The role of risk,regret, and rejoice in non-instrumental information seeking

Standard theories suggest that humans should seek information only when it can help them make better decisions. However, recent work suggests that people choose to seek information even when it cannot influence the outcome of a choice. Across three experiments, we examined how this preference for non-instrumental information was related to the risk, regret, and rejoice associated with different choices. Experiment 1 examined how risk preference informed the appetite for non-instrumental information and tested how risk and information preference in a gamble-task related to the desire for knowledge across a range of hypothetical real-world scenarios. In Experiment 2, we tested how risk, operationalized as variance, related to non-instrumental information seeking when allowing participants to mentally simulate the potential outcomes of gambles. In Experiment 3, we provided explicit feedback about forgone options, intending to make the potential for regret or rejoice more salient. Taken together, our results show a consistent appetite for information that was robust to changes across all experimental manipulations. We found some evidence of a positive correlation between the desire for knowledge and the level of anticipated regret (Experiment 1), but overall, our data appear more consistent with the idea that non-instrumental information seeking is driven by a general aversion to uncertainty than by an attempt to regulate specific future emotions.     

Risk preference and choice stochasticity during decisions for other people

In several contexts, such as finance and politics, people make choices that are relevant for others but irrelevant for oneself. Focusing on decision-making under risk, we compared monetary choices made for one’s own interest with choices made on behalf of an anonymous individual. Consistent with the previous literature, other-interest choices were characterized by an increased gambling propensity. We also investigated choice stochasticity, which captures how much decisions vary in similar conditions. An aspect related to choice stochasticity is how much decisions are tuned to the option values, and we found that this was higher during self-interest than during other-interest choices. This effect was observed only in individuals who reported a motivation to distribute rewards unequally, suggesting that it may (at least partially) depend on a motivation to make accurate decisions for others. Our results indicate that, during decision-making under risk, choices for other people are characterized by a decreased tuning to the values of the options, in addition to enhanced risk seeking.     

Family therapy by default: developing useful fall‐back positions for therapists

This article looks at some of the effects on practitioners of the increasing complexity and variety of ideas within the family therapy field. In adopting the currently popular notion of ‘default position’ from information technology, I argue that therapists can easily feel that their work has a random quality to it. I examine how our own default positions can be based on force of habit, a quest for novelty or the effects of stress. Some suggestions are offered for how we can more accurately go about choosing ideas that will be of help to the families with which we work and to ourselves.     

Assessing Mathematics Misunderstandings via Bayesian Inverse Planning

Online educational technologies offer opportunities for providing individualized feedback and detailed profiles of students' skills. Yet many technologies for mathematics education assess students based only on the correctness of either their final answers or responses to individual steps. In contrast, examining the choices students make for how to solve the equation and the ways in which they might answer incorrectly offers the opportunity to obtain a more nuanced perspective of their algebra skills. To automatically make sense of step-by-step solutions, we propose a Bayesian inverse planning model for equation solving that computes an assessment of a learner's skills based on her pattern of errors in individual steps and her choices about what sequence of problem-solving steps to take. Bayesian inverse planning builds on existing machine learning tools to create a generative model relating (mis)-understandings to equation solving choices. Two behavioral experiments demonstrate that the model can interpret people's equation solving and that its assessments are consistent with those of experienced teachers. A third experiment uses this model to tailor guidance for learners based on individual differences in misunderstandings, closing the loop between assessing understanding, and using that assessment within an educational technology. Finally, because the bottleneck in applying inverse planning to a new domain is in creating the model of possible student misunderstandings, we show how to combine inverse planning with an existing production rule model to make inferences about student misunderstandings of fraction arithmetic.     

Legal and Ethical Issues in the Court-Mandated Treatment of Batterers

Summary

In the following article, we will explore the nature of the therapeutic relationship as it relates to batterers' treatment programs. We will consider the impact of obligations created by forces outside the relationship, such as those imposed by legal proceedings. We will discuss the concepts of confidentiality, privilege, and agency and their impact on the therapeutic relationship and the extent to which the therapists' understanding of the role these concepts play may be altered by court orders that impose treatment on a client/patient. Finally, we examine the issues and choices a therapist must make when engaging in court-ordered treatment of batterers, and the implications of those choices for both therapist and client; we will also suggest guidelines to help therapists sort through the often conflicting goals of therapy and the legal process.     

Relational Complexity and Ethical Responsibility

Richard Miller uses the concepts of alterity and intimacy as touchstones for analyzing neglected aspects of our interpersonal and social relationships. He argues that, as persons in relation, we oscillate between experiences of alterity and intimacy, and it is with a greater awareness of this oscillation that we do best to consider our ethical responsibilities. This paper affirms the value of thinking about—and potentially reimagining—how we conceive and relate to various others. It also makes explicit that, as persons, each of us is separate, not only from some, but from all other persons, even as we are also one with them. Moreover, each of us is different from all other persons, even as we are also like them. The aspects of persons and relationships on which we focus, in a given situation, matter because they partly determine the choices that we make in another’s regard.     

Emotion regulation choice in an evaluative context: the moderating role of self-esteem

Evaluative contexts can be stressful, but relatively little is known about how different individuals who vary in responses to self-evaluation make emotion regulatory choices to cope in these situations. To address this gap, participants who vary in self-esteem gave an impromptu speech, rated how they perceived they had performed on multiple evaluative dimensions, and subsequently chose between disengaging attention from emotional processing (distraction) and engaging with emotional processing via changing its meaning (reappraisal), while waiting to receive feedback regarding these evaluative dimensions. According to our framework, distraction can offer stronger short-term relief than reappraisal, but, distraction is costly in the long run relative to reappraisal because it does not allow learning from evaluative feedback. We predicted and found that participants with lower (but not higher) self-esteem react defensively to threat of failure by seeking short-term relief via distraction over the long-term benefit of reappraisal, as perceived failure increases. Implications for the understanding of emotion regulation and self-esteem are discussed.     

Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction

Most of us spend a significant portion of our lives learning, practising, and performing a wide range of skills. Many of us also have a great amount of control over which skills we learn and develop. From choices as significant as career pursuits to those as minor as how we spend our weeknight leisure time, we exercise a great amount of agency over what we know and what we can do. In this paper we argue, using a framework first developed by Carbonell [2013], that in many real-world circumstances we have moral obligations to develop some skills rather than others.     

A Reason‐Based Theory of Rational Choice *

There is a surprising disconnect between formal rational choice theory and philosophical work on reasons. The one is silent on the role of reasons in rational choices, the other rarely engages with the formal models of decision problems used by social scientists. To bridge this gap, we propose a new, reason‐based theory of rational choice. At its core is an account of preference formation, according to which an agent’s preferences are determined by his or her motivating reasons, together with a ‘weighing relation’ between different combinations of reasons. By explaining how someone’s preferences may vary with changes in his or her motivating reasons, our theory illuminates the relationship between deliberation about reasons and rational choices. Although primarily positive, the theory can also help us think about how those preferences and choices ought to respond to normative reasons.     

'Good morning, Sir!'Axe handle.' Talking at cross-purposes in family therapy

This paper will examine how therapists can make sense of and use some of the incongruous and apparently absurd replies which clients sometimes make to their therapists' questions. It will be argued that the convention of relying on therapist questions can create its own problems, not least because clients often feel at a disadvantage. Careful attention to the question_answer process in therapy can play an essential part in the therapeutic alliance and can give us clues as to what may be some of the often unstated preoccupations of our clients.     

Exploring tradeoffs in accommodating moral diversity

This paper explores the space of possibilities for public justification in morally diverse communities. Moral diversity is far more consequential than is typically appreciated, and as a result, we need to think more carefully about how our standard tools function in such environments. I argue that because of this diversity, public justification can (and should) be divorced from any claim of determinateness. Instead, we should focus our attention on procedures—in particular, what Rawls called cases of pure procedural justice. I use a modified form of the procedure “I cut, you choose” to demonstrate how perspectival diversity can make what looks like a simple procedure quite complex in practice. I use this to reframe disputes between classical liberal and contemporary liberal approaches to questions of public morality, arguing that classically liberal procedures, such as a reliance on the harm principle, can generate rather illiberal-looking outcomes when used in a morally diverse community. A seemingly less-principled approach, which simply balances burdens, appears to generate outcomes that look closer to what we would expect from classical liberalism. However, since both approaches are based on pure procedures that we can justify without reference to outcomes, it remains indeterminate which we ought to choose.