Naturalistic Explanations of Apodictic Moral Claims: Brentano’s Ethical Intuitionism and Nietzsche’s Naturalism

In this article (1) I extract from Brentano’s works (three) formal arguments against “genealogical explanations” of ethical claims. Such explanation can also be designated as “naturalism” (not his appellation); (2) I counter these arguments, by showing how genealogical explanations of even apodictic moral claims are logically possible (albeit only if certain unlikely, stringent conditions are met); (3) I show how Nietzsche’s ethics meets these stringent conditions, but evolutionary ethics does not. My more general thesis is that naturalism and intuitionism in ethics need not be mutually incompatible.

Persisting problems for a quantificational theory of complex demonstratives

I criticized Jeffrey King’s theory of complex demonstratives in “Problems for a Quantificational Theory of Complex Demonstratives.” King replied in “Complex Demonstratives as Quantifiers: Objections and Replies.” I here comment on some of King’s replies.

Mother, Melancholia, and Play in Erik H. Erikson’s Childhood and Society

In an earlier article on Erik H. Erikson’s earliest writings (Capps, 2007), I focused on the relationship between the child’s melancholia and conflict with maternal authority, and drew attention to the restorative role of humor. In this article, I discuss two of the three chapters in part three, “The Growth of the Ego,” of Erikson’s first major book, Childhood and Society [Erikson, Childhood and society. New York: W. W. Norton, 1950, Childhood and society (rev. edition). New York: W. W. Norton, 1963]. I explore the same theme of the relationship of melancholia and the mother, but focus on the restorative role of play. I interpret the differences between the two cases in light of Sigmund Freud’s essay, “Mourning and Melancholia” [Freud, Mourning and melancholia. In S. Freud, General psychological theory (pp. 164–179). P. Rieff (ed.). New York: Collier Books. 1963].

Kant and Wittgenstein: Common Sense,Therapy, and the Critical Philosophy

Kant’s reputation for making absolutist claims about universal and necessary conditions for the possibility of experience are put here in the broader context of his goals for the Critical philosophy. It is shown that within that context, Kant’s claims can be seen as considerably more innocuous than they are traditionally regarded, underscoring his deep respect for “common sense” and sharing surprisingly similar goals with Wittgenstein in terms of what philosophy can, and at least as importantly cannot, provide.

Imagining human enhancement: whose future,which rationality?

This article critically evaluates bettering human life. Because this involves lives that do not exist yet, the article investigates human eugenics and enhancement through the social prism of ‘the imaginary’ (defined ‘as a set of assumptions and concepts for thinking and speaking about human enhancement and its future direction’) [1]. “Exploring basic assumptions underlying the idea of human enhancement” investigates underlying assumptions and claims for human enhancement. Firstly, human eugenics and enhancement entangles a factual as well as a normative claim about what improvement/betterment maybe constitutive of. Secondly, claims about what a better life is, is often a future orientated claim about whether certain kinds of life that do not exist yet should ever exist. Moral images of thought are introduced and how they work to make normative judgments about lives that do not exist. This implicates the moral problem of difference, where an image of a ‘better’ life—classically expressed in eugenics as a ‘superior’ and/or ‘normal’ life—necessarily entails inferiority and/or deviance from a norm. “Moral imagination in contemporary fiction and the history of old eugenics”, introduces moral images in history of eugenics and demonstrates how examples fall foul of the problem. “The new (liberal) eugenics and the moral image of therapy” examines progress in contemporary debates, the move from authoritarian to non-authoritarian eugenics (human enhancement), and how, to some extent, this has solved the problem of difference, through liberal defence of personal choice. “The heart of the eugenic issue” suggests that personal choice in liberal non-authoritarian eugenics is not immune to basic drive behind all eugenic arguments; desire as lack which is expressed as the continual dissatisfaction of not having our future expectations met.

Relaxed Bodies,Emancipated Minds,and Dominant Calm

William James presented “The Gospel of Relaxation” (James in W. James, Writings 1878–1899, 1992) to the 1896 graduating class of Boston Normal School of Gymnastics and a decade later he delivered his presidential address “The Energies of Men” (James in W. James, Writings 1902–1910, 1987) to the American Philosophical Association. Both lectures focus on the body’s influence on emotions and on the liberating effects of live ideas on the body’s natural energies. They also reflect his use of the popular spiritual hygiene literature of his day to support his arguments. The first address draws on Hannah Whitall Smith’s views on disregarding our negative emotions and on Annie Payson Call’s writings, specifically her views on relaxation; the second on Horace Fletcher’s writings, specifically his views on anger and worry. I use these original sources to expand on key ideas in the two addresses, i.e., the role of imitation in altering unhealthy physiological habits and the energy-releasing role of suggestive ideas.

Remarks on Grandi’s Comments

This note is a reply to some of Giovanni Grandi’s comments on my paper “Berkeley’s Contingent Necessities.”

Assertion,Moore, and Bayes

It is widely believed that the so-called knowledge account of assertion best explains why sentences such as “It’s raining in Paris but I don’t believe it” and “It’s raining in Paris but I don’t know it” appear odd to us. I argue that the rival rational credibility account of assertion explains that fact just as well. I do so by providing a broadly Bayesian analysis of the said type of sentences which shows that such sentences cannot express rationally held beliefs. As an interesting aside, it will be seen that these sentences also harbor a lesson for Bayesian epistemology itself.

Has 60 Years of Research in Psychology Really Gone Astray?

The author presents several arguments against Toomela’s (Culture of science: Strange history of the methodological thinking in psychology. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 2007a, doi:, History of methodology in psychology: Starting point, not the goal. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 2007b, doi:) pessimistic thesis: “The last 60 years of research in psychology seems to have gone astray.” Nevertheless he admits that Toomela’s article despite the excessively categorical assessments contained in it and the undue pessimism crowing its conclusion, represents a substantial contribution to the highlighting of socio-cultural impact on various models of psychological cognition, which lurks behind the international unification of globalizing science.

Kitzinger’s Feminist Conversation Analysis: Critical Observations

This paper contributes to ongoing discussions on feminism and the analysis of discourse. In particular, I examine Celia Kitzinger’s [(2000), Doing feminist conversation analysis. Feminism and Psychology, 10, 163–193 and (2002) Doing feminist conversation analysis. In P. McIlvenny (Ed.), Talking gender and sexuality. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.] claims to be engaged in “feminist conversation analysis.” This paper identifies susceptibilities in her arguments at both the theoretical level and the level of data analysis. My argument is that Kitzinger fails to appreciate the fact that her enterprise is basically a formal analytic one and that as such it is both radically different from, and incommensurate with, ethnomethodology (EM) and conversation analysis (CA). Indeed her attempts to supplement feminism with EM/CA are unnecessary and counterproductive from an EM/CA position insofar as they crucially undermine its integrity.

Muslim women, middle class habitus, and modernity in Indonesia

This article asks how pious religious practices, which are often highly gendered, and implicated in diverse formulations of “the modern” in non-Western contexts. Based on ethnographic research among women members of Indonesia's Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), I argue that PKS women’s pious practices are part of the creation of a particular kind of middle class subjectivity. An examination of two constitutive elements of this habitus, clothing and marriage, reveals how these pious Islamic practices enact class and gender difference, and simultaneously produce “modern” selves. While scholars have shown that gender is an important axis for class difference, I extend this argument to suggest that gendered forms of piety are key ways class in which distinctions are embodied and expressed. Yet the habitus of PKS women is just one of several competing Islamic habitus in Indonesia. The question of which habitus is most culturally legitimate, I maintain, turns on the hegemony of particular understandings of piety and ideas about how modernity should be defined–issues which remain unresolved in contemporary Indonesia.

Between conflict and reconciliation: the hard truth

In the context of the fairly recent Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC), I examine phenomenologically the nature of truth as the essential condition for overcoming social and political conflicts, and as an instrument for enforcing so-called “transitional justice” periods and promoting reconciliation. I also briefly approach the limits of this truth’s possibility of being recognized, if its evaluative and practical dimensions and its appeal to an “intelligence of emotions” do not prevail over its merely theoretical claims. Though not expounding Schutz’s and Husserl’s contributions, and meditating on phenomena they did not deal with, I carry out this reflection inspired by their work and methodological approach. The case study used as an intuitive illustration is the recent Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

God Diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder

This article endorses the contention that God suffers from a mental disorder, but challenges J. Henry Jurgens’ diagnosis of bipolar disorder as reported in The Onion (“God diagnosed with bipolar disorder”, 2001) and proposes narcissistic personality disorder instead. It uses the diagnostic criteria for narcissistic personality disorder from The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders—DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, Washington, DC, 1994) and various biblical citations in support of this diagnosis. It rejects the idea that a major personality change is reflected in the New Testament and claims that God did not experience a major transformation of his narcissistic personality structure as described by Heinz Kohut (Forms and transformations of narcissism, in A. P. Morrison, Ed., Essential papers on narcissism, pp. 61–87, New York University Press, New York, 1966/1986). However, it concludes that God’s creativity accounts for the stability of his narcissistic personality structure and helps to explain his lack of empathy toward human beings.

Deeper Affinities: Fundamental Resonances Between Psychoanalysis and Religion

This essay considers how we “create meaning” in the interplay of “felt sense” and “symbols,” and examines the direct and immediate interplay between some common everyday experiences and a series of concepts from psychoanalytic perspectives to reveal how this interplay has affinities with religion. Psychoanalysis and religion are overlapping projects. Psychoanalytic symbolizing of experience facilitates our knowing features of religion not previously known, as well as knowing features previously known, in new ways.

Anti-Autonomism Defended: A Reply to Hill

In the current issue of this journal, Scott Hill critiques some of my work on the “is”-“ought” controversy, the Hume-inspired debate over whether an ethical conclusion can be soundly, or even validly, derived from only non-ethical premises. I’ve argued that it can be; Hill is unconvinced. I reply to Hill’s critique, focusing on four key questions to which he and I give different answers.

The Ethics of Academic Journal Editing

This paper amounts to a reply to Professor Donald G. Brown’s thoughtful comment on my “Ethical Issues in Journal Peer-Review”, which appeared in this journal.

HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF MINDFULNESS AND SELF-ACCEPTANCE IN PSYCHOTHERAPY

We describe some of the historical conditions that made possible Kabat-Zinn’s [(1990). Full catastrophe living: Using the wisdom of your body and mind to face stress, pain, and illness. New York: Delacorte] very successful use of mindfulness in his stress management program. The ground had been prepared by the nonjudgmental acceptance of people and symptoms by Humanistic psychotherapists, and by the increasing assimilation of Buddhist ideas into Western psychology and psychotherapy. In addition the word “mindfulness,” as the translation of the Pali sati, came to refer to both the manualized practice that provides the evidence for its efficacy in the hands of Kabat-Zinn and others, and the more complex process of clear comprehension and recollection that is described in his more discursive writings, and is similar to Ellen Langer’s use of “mindfulness” in her book of that name.

Ultimacy and alternative possibilities

I explore a key feature of Robert Kane’s libertarianism (about which I have been puzzled for some time). Kane claims that we should separate issues of alternative possibilities from issues of ultimacy, but he further argues that they are connected in a certain way. I call into question this connection, and I continue to argue for a strict separation of considerations pertaining to alternative possibilities and “actual-sequence” considerations.