Random controls: A rejoinder

Furedy, Poulos, and Schiffman (1975) have made a conclusion in direct contradiction to available data in skin conductance conditioning which show clearly that a stimulus designated to be random was, in fact, random with respect to an unconditioned stimulus. It was also pointed out that the overlap criterion does illustrate the weakness of the Toronto studies; that the random stimulus in the Prokasy, Williams, Kumpfer, and Lee (1973) paper was not excitatory; and that controlled studies for at least a decade have shown the first-interval response to be associative.     

Good-behavior game: a replication and systematic analysis

A good-behavior game was implemented in a fifth-grade reading class consisting of two groups of 14 students each. After the presentation of the game, reversal and component analysis phases were instituted. Game components included rules, lights (response feedback), and group consequences of extra recess and extra free time. Student observers recorded the dependent variables which included talking-out, disruptive, and out-of-seat behaviors. The results show that the game reduced the dependent measures from their baseline rate by almost 99% for one group and 97% for the other. The component analysis revealed that after association in the game, the stimulus components of rules and lights were effective in reducing the dependent behaviors.     

Stimulus presentation order in receptive identification tasks: A systematic replication

Conflicting recommendations exist in the literature regarding the optimal order of stimulus presentation when teaching auditory–visual conditional discriminations. The present study examined the generality of a previously demonstrated advantage of presenting the auditory sample before visual comparisons (sample‐first condition) over the reverse sequence (comparison‐first condition). Participants were four typically developing 5‐ and 6‐year‐old boys. The procedures of Petursdottir and Aguilar (2016) were systematically replicated with the addition of a prompted error correction trial following each incorrect response. Overall, there were more instances of quicker mastery in the sample‐first condition (four of seven evaluations) than in the comparison‐first condition (two of seven evaluations). A comparison‐first advantage was associated with slower acquisition in both conditions than in the remaining evaluations, and an analysis of stimulus and position bias yielded tentative evidence for unwanted sources of stimulus control.     

Learned helplessness and defensive strategies: A rejoinder

The results of experiments reported by Oakes and Curtis (1982), Tennen, Drum, Gillen and Stanton (1982), and Tennen, Gillen, and Drum (1982) are seen as inconsistent with the cognitive learned helplessness theory of Seligman and his associates (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Alloy & Seligman, 1979). Comments on the Oakes and Curtis studies by Alloy (1982) and by Silver, Wortman, and Klos (1982) are seen as employing three defensive strategies: (1) Declaring the research findings to be irrelevant to the theory; (2) declaring the experiments to be flawed; and (3) modifying the theory to accommodate the research findings. This rejoinder argues that the research findings are relevant and that the criticisms are of questionable validity. It is suggested that the questions of the validity of the theory raised by these findings not be declared to be resolved, but that additional data bearing on the questions be sought.     

Negation: A rejoinder to Wales and Grieve

Wales and Grieve (1969) report an experiment in which they show that a factor of “confusability” affects the comprehension of affirmative and negative sentences, and then claim that this is a relevant factor in explaining the difficulty of negatives. The present paper submits arguments and experimental evidence to dispute this claim.     

Comments on cyberbullying article: A rejoinder

In this article, I discuss many of the points raised in the thoughtful comments by Hinduja and Patchin (2012, this issue), Menesini (2012, this issue), and Smith (2012, this issue) on my original article “Cyberbullying: An overrated phenomenon” (Olweus, 2012, this issue). After having seriously considered the arguments of my commentators, I still think there is strong empirical evidence for my original position—supported by one or more but not all of my commentators—that cyberbullying is a basically low-frequent phenomenon and that there has not occurred a marked increase in the prevalence rates of cyberbullying over the past five or six years. With regard to the possible negative effects of cyberbullying, over and above the effects of traditional bullying, I note with appreciation that this issue has received some attention in the recent research literature but I also make a call for more systematic consideration of potential confounders in such studies. A good deal of the discussion in the comments and the current article concerned the issue of whether cyberbullying should be regarded as a form of bullying on a par with traditional forms of bullying or if it is distinct enough to be considered a partly separate phenomenon or dimension. I conclude by arguing that in order for research on cyberbullying to proceed in a systematic and fruitful way, it is necessary to place it in proper context (along with traditional bullying) and to communicate a somewhat more realistic picture of its prevalence and nature.     

A rejoinder to Pribram

Summary Contrary to Pribram's assertion, Köhler proposed a functional isomorphism between brain processes and phenomenal events; the sense organs are not implied in the isomorphism principle. With respect to the facts of the Köhler-Pribram collaboration reliance on the written record is recommended.     

Morgan on deductive explanation: A rejoinder

This paper is mainly a response to Charles Morgan's criticisms (this journal, pp. 511–25) of the author's model of the (formal aspects of) explanation. It is claimed in the paper that with two modifications and some additional specifications the model withstands Morgan's criticisms.     

Transpersonal views of existentialism: A rejoinder

Abstract

Over the past several years, a growing number of transpersonal theorists have addressed existentialism. These articles have been supportive of existential positions but only to a point. This point concerns one major theme: whether or not the universe is friendly (assimilable, consoling) or unfriendly (unassimilable, “other"). Transpersonalists tend to adopt the former, and in their view, superior, position and existentialists lean toward the latter “delimited” view. This article explores the accuracy of this perception on the part of transpersonalists and strongly argues for its reassessment.