SOSA ON SKEPTICISM

Abstract: Ernest Sosa has recently articulated an insightful response to skepticism and, in particular, to the dream argument. The response relies on two independent moves. First, Sosa offers the imagination model of dreaming according to which no assertions are ever made in dreams and no beliefs are involved there. As a result, it is possible to distinguish dreaming from being awake, and the dream argument is blocked. Second, Sosa develops a virtue epistemology according to which in appropriately normal conditions our perceptual beliefs will be apt. Hence, in these conditions, we will have at least animal knowledge, and the conclusion of the dream argument is undermined. In this article, I examine various moves that the skeptic can make to resist Sosa's challenge, and I contrast the proposal to a neo-Pyrrhonian stance. In the end, there is surprisingly little disagreement about the status of ordinary perceptual beliefs in the two stances.     

“PURE” VERSUS “PRACTICAL” EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

Abstract: In this article I distinguish a type of justification that is “epistemic” in pertaining to the grounds of one's belief, and “practical” in its connection to what act(s) one may undertake, based on that belief. Such justification, on the proposed account, depends mainly on the proportioning of “inner epistemic virtue” to the “outer risks” implied by one's act. The resulting conception strikes a balance between the unduly moralistic conception of William Clifford and contemporary naturalist virtue theories.     

EPISTEMIC MALEVOLENCE

Abstract: Against the background of a great deal of structural symmetry between intellectual and moral virtue and vice, it is a surprising fact that what is arguably the central or paradigm moral vice—that is, moral malevolence or malevolence proper—has no obvious or well-known counterpart among the intellectual vices. The notion of "epistemic malevolence" makes no appearance on any standard list of intellectual vices; nor is it central to our ordinary ways of thinking about intellectual vice. In this essay, I argue that there is such a thing as epistemic malevolence and offer an account of its basic character and structure. Doing so requires a good deal of attention to malevolence simpliciter . In the final section of the essay, I offer an explanation of our relative unfamiliarity with this trait.     

VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND EPISTEMIC LUCK,REVISITED

Abstract: In this article I return to an argument that I presented in earlier work to the effect that virtue epistemology is at worse false and at best unmotivated. In the light of recent responses to this argument from such figures as John Greco, Guy Axtell, and Kelly Becker, I here re‐state and re‐evaluate this argument. In the process the original argument is refined and supplemented in key respects and some of the main charges against it are shown to be unfounded. Nevertheless, I also argue that at least one of the objections to the original argument—due to Becker—may well be on the right lines, and I draw some conclusions in this regard.     

INTRODUCTION: VIRTUE AND VICE

Abstract: This introduction to the collection Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic addresses three main questions: (1) What is a virtue theory in ethics or epistemology? (2) What is a virtue? and (3) What is a vice? (1) It suggests that a virtue theory takes the virtues and vices of agents to be more fundamental than evaluations of acts or beliefs, and defines right acts or justified beliefs in terms of the virtues. (2) It argues that there are two important but different concepts of virtue: virtues are qualities that attain good ends, and virtues are qualities that involve good motives. (3) Accordingly, vices are qualities that either fail to attain good ends or involve bad motives. Finally, the introduction summarizes the eleven essays in the collection, which are divided into four sections: the Structure of Virtue Ethics and Virtue Epistemology; Virtue and Context; Virtue and Emotion; and Virtues and Vices.     

VIRTUE ETHICS AND VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY

Abstract: The aim of this essay is to test the claim that epistemologists—virtue epistemologists in particular—have much to learn from virtue ethics. The essay begins with an outline of virtue ethics itself. This section concludes that a pure form of virtue ethics is likely to be unattractive, so the virtue epistemologist should examine the "impure" views of real philosophers. Aristotle is usually held up as the paradigm virtue ethicist. His doctrine of the mean is described, and it is explained how that doctrine can provide a framework for an account of epistemic virtue. The conclusion of the essay is that a virtue epistemology based on analogies with virtue ethics, though well worth developing and considering, will face several challenges in fulfilling the significant promises that have been made on its behalf.     

知识创新与心理学的发展

在知识经济时代,创新能力决定国家的前途命运,建设国家创新体系是提高国家创新能力的重要举措。知识创新是国家创新体系的一个重要组成部分,是提高我国整体创新能力的关键所在。心理学是一门横跨自然科学和社会科学的交叉科学,其成果在人类生活的许多方面有重要影响。根据当前国家需求和心理学的发展前沿,我们认为,在知识创新活动中,应当将心理健康与创新能力、认知与复杂信息环境、社会经济与心理行为作为重要研究方向。     

Lucky achievement: virtue epistemology on the value of knowledge

Virtue epistemology argues that knowledge is more valuable than Gettierized belief because knowledge is an achievement, but Gettierized belief is not. The key premise in the achievement argument is that achievement is apt (successful because competent) and Gettierized belief is inapt (successful because lucky). I first argue that the intuition behind the achievement argument is based wrongly on the fact that ‘being successful because lucky’ implicates ‘being not competent enough’. I then offer an argument from moral luck to argue that virtue epistemologists should maintain that knowledge is no more valuable than Gettierized belief.     

知识类别和特点对内隐序列学习的影响

用序列学习中的反应时和错误个数间接测量被试的内隐知识,用再认成绩和预测成绩直接测量被试的外显知识,通过倒转不同的规则探讨了知识类别和特点对内隐序列学习的影响。结果表明：(1)内隐学习和外显学习可能分别依赖于两个独立的学习系统,且互不干扰;(2)当内隐序列学习既包含运动知识又包含概念知识时,知识类别和特点影响被试对序列知识的获得,被试较易获得运动知识;(3)在内隐序列学习中练习的数量也影响被试对序列知识的获得,序列学习是一个动态的过程。     

工作记忆与领域知识在个体认知行为中的作用

新近研究表明,工作记忆和领域知识在个体认知行为上起了积极的作用,对二者关系的研究有三种观点：一是强调工作记忆或领域知识在认知行为中的单独作用;二是综合考察二者在个体认知行为中的不同作用;三是建立模型,阐述工作记忆和领域知识在认知行为中的作用。最后针对当前有关此方面的研究,探讨有关工作记忆和领域知识作用研究的发展趋势。     

样例与运算性程序知识学习迁移关系的初步研究

以程序性知识进一步区分为联结性程序知识与运算性程序知识为前提,对样例与运算性程序知识学习迁移的关系进行探讨。结果表明：（１）样例对运算性程序知识迁移成绩有重要影响;（２）运算性程序知识的学习迁移有着不同联结性程序知识的学习迁移现象。     

ON THE RELIABILITY OF MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES

Abstract: I examine here whether reliability is a defining feature of (moral or intellectual) virtues. I argue (1) that reliability is not a defining feature of a virtue where virtues are conceived (as they often are) as “personal excellences,” but (2) that there is another (also intuitive and familiar) conception of a virtue according to which reliability is a defining feature. I also argue (3) that even on the former conception, a certain rational belief pertaining to reliability is essential and (4) that reliability itself, while not a defining feature of a virtue thus conceived, nevertheless is a concomitant of it.     

RELIABILISM AND SAFETY

Abstract: Duncan Pritchard has recently highlighted the problem of veritic epistemic luck and claimed that a safety‐based account of knowledge succeeds in eliminating veritic luck where virtue‐based accounts and process reliabilism fail. He then claims that if one accepts a safety‐based account, there is no longer a motivation for retaining a commitment to reliabilism. In this article, I delineate several distinct safety principles, and I argue that those that eliminate veritic luck do so only if at least implicitly committed to reliabilism.     

ON THE LIMITATIONS AND PROMISE OF QUANTUM THEORY FOR COMPREHENSION OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Abstract. I present a partially historical discussion of the basis of the quantum theory in nonmathematical terms using human knowledge and consciousness as an underlying theme. I show that the philosophical position in both classical and quantum theory is the experimental and mathematical philosophy of Isaac Newton. Because almost all the systems we deal with are multicomponent, we must consider the limitations and openness imposed by thermodynamics on our claims in both classical and quantum treatments. Here the reality of measurement stands in the way of any simple picture but also provides the basis for considerations of free will. Particular care is taken with the concepts of quantum measurement, entanglement, and decoherence because of their importance in the discussion.     

中学生知识学习观研究

采用自编的《中学生知识学习观量表》,探讨了中学生知识学习观的现状和特点。结果表明:(1)中学生的知识学习观在总体上还是建设性的;(2)不同性别、文理科学生在知识学习观各维度上存在显著差异;(3)初中生的知识学习观比高中生的知识学习观更具建构性;(4)不同成绩水平的学生在知识学习观各维度上存在显著的差异,知识学习过程观、知识价值观、知识学习态度观是中学生学习成绩的有效预测变量。     

背景知识对4~8岁儿童和大学生分类活动的影响

以4-8岁儿童和大学生为被试,用虚拟生物图片为材料,采用2(不提供背景知识和提供背景知识)×6(年龄)的实验设计,考察背景知识对被试分类活动的影响及其年龄特点。结果发现:(1)两种实验条件下均有显著的年龄差异。(2)提供背景知识与否对不同年龄被试分类活动的影响不同,对4-5岁儿童分类活动的影响不显著,对6-8岁儿童及大学生分类活动的影响显著。     

知识教学中认知策略与原有知识间关系的实验研究

模拟课堂教学情境,探讨知识教学中学习者的认知策略与原有知识间的相互关系。研究表明,二者存在明显的相互作用,策略学习只有在学习者具备适当原有知识的基础上才能有效地促进学习;当原有知识缺乏时,策略教学对学习成绩没有显著性影响;原有知识水平的高低可直接影响学生的学习成绩。该结论对于实际教学工作具有一定的指导意义。     

Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value

A conspicuous oversight in recent debates about the vexed problem of the value of knowledge has been the value of knowledge-how. This would not be surprising if knowledge-how were, as Gilbert Ryle [1945, 1949 Ryle, Gilbert 1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson's University Library.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]] famously thought, fundamentally different from knowledge-that. However, reductive intellectualists [e.g. Stanley and Williamson 2001 Ryle, Gilbert 1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson's University Library.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]; Brogaard 2008, 2009 Brogaard, Berit 2009. What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-Wh, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78/2: 439–67.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2011 Brogaard, Berit 2011. Knowledge-How: A Unified Account, in Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, ed. John Bengson and Marc A. Moffett, New York: Oxford University Press: 136–60. [Google Scholar]; Stanley 2011a Stanley, Jason 2011a. Knowing (How), Noûs 45/2: 207–38.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2011b Stanley, Jason 2011b. Know How, Oxford: Oxford University Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]] maintain that knowledge-how just is a kind of knowledge-that. Accordingly, reductive intellectualists must predict that the value problems facing propositional knowledge will equally apply to knowledge-how. We show, however, that this is not the case. Accordingly, we highlight a value-driven argument for thinking (contra reductive intellectualism) that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.     

高校教师知识共享态度的相关研究

以151名高校教师为测查对象,采用“高校教师知识共享问卷”等研究工具,考察工作态度、组织特征等因素与高校教师知识共享态度之间的关系.结果发现:(1)文、理科教师之间在避损性共享和人际性共享上存在显著差异;(2)组织认同、工作满意度、知识特性和学科与避损性共享存在显著相关;(3)组织认同、工作满意度、工作意义、工作奉献、组织特性和学科与人际性共享存在显著相关.研究表明,理科教师的共享态度较文科教师更为积极;知识共享除了与工作态度有关之外,也与软硬件环境有关.