Information representation in visual images

How information is represented in visual images was explored in five experiments where subjects judged whether or not various properties were appropriate for given animals. It took more time to evaluate an animal when the subjective image of it was small, whether size was manipulated directly or indirectly (e.g., by having a target animal imaged at the correct relative size next to an elephant or a fly). More time also was required if the animal was imaged in a relatively “complex” environment (next to 4 vs. 2 digits painted on an imaginary wall, or next to a 16 cell vs. 4 cell matrix). Finally, subjectively larger images required more time to evoke than smaller images. These results support a constructivist notion of imagery, and the idea that images may act as ‘analogues’ to percepts.     

Measuring the visual angle of the mind's eye

People in these experiments claimed to be able to imagine moving only a given distance toward some imaged object before it seemed to “overflow,” not remaining all visible at once in their mental images. In addition, the larger the imaged object, the further away it seemed at the point of overflow. Although the angle subtended by the imaged objects at the point of overflow did not vary systematically with the size of the object, it did vary with different stimuli and instructions. These disparities in the size of the angle estimated seemed partly due to differences in criterion of “overflow”: Images seem to fade off gradually toward the periphery and not to occur in a spatial medium with sharply defined edges. When subjects were given a relatively strict definition of “overflow,” similar estimates of the “visual angle of the mind's eye” were obtained with three distinct methods: (1) Asking subjects to estimate the apparent distance at which an imaged horizontal ruler began to overflow; (2) Measuring how much time subjects required to scan across each degree of an imaged line, and then inferring the maximal angle from the time required to scan an image of a longest nonoverflowing line; and, (3) Simply asking subjects to hold up their hands to indicate the subjective size of an image of the longest possible nonoverflowing line. Finally, the maximal subjective size of images seemed related to the scope of “focal” vision, and images tended to be constructed spontaneously at about the maximal size.     

Mental imagery and the third dimension

What sort of medium underlies imagery for three-dimensional scenes? In the present investigation, the time subjects took to scan between objects in a mental image was used to infer the sorts of geometric information that images preserve. Subjects studied an open box in which five objects were suspended, and learned to imagine this display with their eyes closed. In the first experiment, subjects scanned by tracking an imaginary point moving in a straight line between the imagined objects. Scanning times increased linearly with increasing distance between objects in three dimensions. Therefore metric 3-D information must be preserved in images, and images cannot simply be 2-D "snapshots." In a second experiment, subjects scanned across the image by "sighting" objects through an imaginary rifle sight. Here scanning times were found to increase linearly with the two-dimensional separations between objects as they appeared from the original viewing angle. Therefore metric 2-D distance information in the original perspective view must be preserved in images, and images cannot simply be 3-D "scale-models" that are assessed from any and all directions at once. In a third experiment, subjects mentally rotated the display 90 degrees and scanned between objects as they appeared in this new perspective view by tracking an imaginary rifle signt, as before. Scanning times increased linearly with the two-dimensional separations between objects as they would appear from the new relative viewing perspective. Therefore images can display metric 2-D distance information in a perspective view never actually experiences, so mental images cannot simply be "snapshot plus scale model" pairs. These results can be explained by a model in which the three-dimensional structure of objects is encoded in long-term memory in 3-D object-centered coordinate systems. When these objects are imagined, this information is then mapped onto a single 2-D "surface display" in which the perspective properties specific to a given viewing angle can be depicted. In a set of perceptual control experiments, subjects scanned a visible display by (a) simply moving their eyes from one object to another, (b) sweeping an imaginary rifle sight over the display, or (c) tracking an imaginary point moving from one object to another. Eye-movement times varied linearly with 2-D interobject distance, as did time to scan with an imaginary rifle sight; time to tract a point varied independently with the 3-D and 2-D interobject distances. These results are compared with the analogous image scanning results to argue that imagery and perception share some representational structures but that mental image scanning is a process distinct from eye movements or eye-movement commands.     

Different cognitive processes in two image-scanning paradigms

Mental image scanning is generally assumed to be a single process that allows people to shift attention across visualized objects. However, this implicit assumption is open to question. We report a set of three experiments based on the tasks originally designed by Kosslyn, Ball, and Reiser (1978) and Finke and Pinker (1982). Participants scanned the identical images of an array of dots in the two tasks. Nevertheless, the participants required more time to shift their focus over the imaged stimulus in the Kosslyn et al. (1978) paradigm. Moreover, correlational analyses revealed no consistent relationship between the slopes of the increases in scanning times with increasing distances in the two paradigms. We conclude that in the Kosslyn et al. (1978) paradigm, the participants draw primarily on transformational processes to scan, whereas in the Finke and Pinker (1982) paradigm, they draw primarily on attentional processes. Both processes, transforming the image and shifting an attention window, produce linear increases in time with increases in distance, but for different reasons.     

Cognitive reference points in judgments of symbolic magnitude

Research on speeded symbolic magnitude comparisons indicates that decisions are made more quickly when the magnitudes of the stimuli being compared are relatively close to an explicit or implicit reference point. Alternative explanations of this phenomenon are tested by seeking similar effects in nonspeeded rating tasks. In accord with the predictions of discriminability models, rated magnitude differences between stimuli in the vicinity of a reference point are expanded relative to differences between stimuli far from it. The inferred locations of cities along a west-east axis varies systematically depending on which coast, Pacific or Atlantic, is specified as the reference point. Scales derived from the rating data are correlated with the pattern of reaction times obtained in a comparable speeded comparison task. In addition, the distance between the cities nearest the locale of our subjects is subjectively stretched. Reference point effects are also observed when the form of the comparative specifies an implicit reference point at either end of a continuum of subjective size; however, these effects are very small and do not clearly support a discriminability interpretation. Stronger evidence for discriminability effects is obtained when an explicit reference point is established at an arbitrary size value. An implicit scaling model, related to range-frequency theory, is proposed to account for the influence of reference points on relative discriminability of stimulus magnitudes. The implicit scaling model is used to develop an account of how symbolic magnitudes may be learned and of how habitual reference points can produce asymmetries in distance judgments.     

The effect of perceived locomotor constraints on distance estimation

Two experiments were conducted to examine the ways in which the visual estimation of distance to a target is affected by constraints perceived to be placed on the subsequent locomotion to the target without vision. We hypothesized that an appraisal of impending effort would play a role in ascertaining the distance to be walked. In Experiment 1, the amount of resistance to walking was variable and unpredictable. One group of subjects performed against relatively low resistance, whereas another group performed against substantially greater resistance. In the low-resistance condition, no significant differences in CE, VE, time to target, or number of steps to target were found between any of the eight combinations of predictable or unpredictable resistances during walking. In the high-resistance condition, however, significant differences were found for CE and number of strides to target when resistance varied unpredictably during walking. Experiment 2 was similar in design but required subjects to walk with combinations of normal or short steps after they had viewed the target knowing only the gait type that would be used to begin locomotion. No differences in CE, VE, or time to target were found between four different combinations of gait type and predictability, under subjectively controlled conditions. When the step constraints were externally imposed, however, differences were found for CE. None of the results from either experiment, in which the number of strides needed to reach the target or the predictability of gait did not change from normal, supported the hypothesis that motor output requirements are necessary in forming a mental representation of the target position that can be used to walk to the target with eyes closed. Whichever locomotor technique was used to walk the estimated distance in these cases, the representation was able to be used independently. When walking mechanics were altered by externally imposed constraints, however, the success at reaching the estimated target position was reduced. These latter results are consistent with those obtained using up, down, and level walking and support the premise that mental representations used in blind walking are linked to the locomotor mechanics afforded by environmental conditions.     

自由拦截启动策略与信息利用

手的启动方向自由, 伸手拦截不同速度的运动小球。本研究通过考察手启动时的运动参数, 研究自由启动的情况下的信息利用和拦截策略, 并且考察了人的启动模式。结果发现, 自由拦截时手的拦截区域相对固定, 在物体快速运动情景下启动晚, 而在慢速下启动早, 可能综合利用了接触时间和距离信息, 存在速度伴随效应, 手的拦截启动策略为启动有相对稳定的角度和加速度, 并不随物体运动速度和物体大小的改变而改变。     

Misleading contextual cues: How do they affect visual search?

Contextual cueing occurs when repetitions of the distractor configuration are implicitly learned. This implicit learning leads to faster search times in repeated displays. Here, we investigated how search adapts to a change of the target location in old displays from a consistent location in the learning phase to a consistent new location in the transfer phase. In agreement with the literature, contextual cueing was accompanied by fewer fixations, a more efficient scan path and, specifically, an earlier onset of a monotonic gaze approach phase towards the target location in repeated displays. When the repeated context was no longer predictive of the old target location, search times and number of fixations for old displays increased to the level of novel displays. Along with this, scan paths for old and new displays became equally efficient. After the target location change, there was a bias of exploration towards the old target location, which soon disappeared. Thus, change of implicitly learned spatial relations between target and distractor configuration eliminated the advantageous effects of contextual cueing, but did not lead to a lasting impairment of search in repeated displays relative to novel displays.     

The Effect of Perceived Locomotor Constraints on Distance Estimation

Two experiments were conducted to examine the ways in which the visual estimation of distance to a target is affected by constraints perceived to be placed on the subsequent locomotion to the target without vision. We hypothesized that an appraisal of impending effort would play a role in ascertaining the distance to be walked. In Experiment 1, the amount of resistance to walking was variable and unpredictable. One group of subjects performed against relatively low resistance, whereas another group performed against substantially greater resistance. In the low-resistance condition, no significant differences in CE, VE, time to target, or number of steps to target were found between any of the eight combinations of predictable or unpredictable resistances during walking. In the high-resistance condition, however, significant differences were found for CE and number of strides to target when resistance varied unpredictably during walking. Experiment 2 was similar in design but required subjects to walk with combinations of normal or short steps after they had viewed the target knowing only the gait type that would be used to begin locomotion. No differences in CE, VE, or time to target were found between four different combinations of gait type and predictability, under subjectively controlled conditions. When the step constraints were externally imposed, however, differences were found for CE. None of the results from either experiment, in which the number of strides needed to reach the target or the predictability of gait did not change from normal, supported the hypothesis that motor output requirements are necessary in forming a mental representation of the target position that can be used to walk to the target with eyes closed. Whichever locomotor technique was used to walk the estimated distance in these cases, the representation was able to be used independently. When walking mechanics were altered by externally imposed constraints, however, the success at reaching the estimated target position was reduced. These latter results are consistent with those obtained using up, down, and level walking and support the premise that mental representations used in blind walking are linked to the locomotor mechanics afforded by environmental conditions.     

Countermanding saccades: evidence against independent processing of go and stop signals

In a stop signal paradigm, subjects were instructed to make a saccade to a visual target appearing left or right of the fixation point. In 25% of the trials, an auditory stop signal was presented after a variable delay that required the subject to inhibit the saccade. Observed saccadic response times in stop failure trials were longer than predicted by Logan and Cowan's (1984) race model. Saccadic response time and amplitude decreased with the time between stop signal presentation and saccade execution, suggesting an inhibitory effect between the stop signal and the go signal processes that is not compatible with an independent race assumption. Moreover, countermanding a saccade was more difficult when stop and go signals appeared at the same location.     

A study named desire: Local focus increases approach motivation for desserts

When we desire something, our approach motivation is high. Recent research shows affective states high in approach motivation cause attentional narrowing (localization) (e.g.; Gable and Harmon-Jones in Psychological Science 19:476–482, 2008; Juergensen and Demaree in Motivation and Emotion 39:580–588, 2015). Does the reciprocal relationship exist? That is, when our attention is narrowed, does our motivation to approach something desirable increase? To test this, we primed participants with either global or local attentional focus before viewing images of desirable items (e.g., desserts) or neutral items (e.g., furniture). Relative to participants primed with global attentional focus, participants primed with local attentional focus demonstrated greater approach motivation to desirable desserts compared to neutral items on an Approach Avoidance Task. Despite greater approach motivation for desserts, participants with localized attention did not subjectively rate desserts as more desirable than participants with global attention. These results suggest that increased approach motivation following local priming is evidenced at an implicit level only: participants appear to be unaware of appetitive images’ increased desirability.     

On what people know about images on mirrors

As observed by Gombrich [Gombrich, E. H. (1960). Art and illusion. Oxford: Phaidon Press], we confirm that most people are unaware of the size of their own image on mirrors. Specifically we have documented the knowledge that people have of the size of their own head and of the size of the mirror image of their own head. In addition we have explored naive beliefs about how the size of mirror images changes with distance. The main pattern of findings is consistent with a focus on target distance and a difficulty in factoring the observer's vantage point correctly when people reason about the problem. The issue of information about vantage point is discussed in relation to other literatures.     

Linguistic focus and memory: An eye movement study

We report an eyetracking study investigating the effects of linguistic focus on eye movements and memory during two readings of a text. Across two presentations of the text, a critical word either changed to a semantically related word or remained unchanged. Focus on the critical word was manipulated using context. Eye movements were monitored during reading, and there was a secondary task of detecting the word change. Results indicated that when a word changed, participants were more successful at detecting it when it was in focus. In the second display, there were more fixations and longer viewing times on a changed than on an unchanged word, but only when the critical word was in focus; eye movement data for changed and unchanged words did not differ when the word was not in focus. We suggest that linguistic focus leads to more detailed lexical semantic representations but not more effortful initial encoding of information.     

Intentional switching of auditory attention between long and short sequential tone patterns

The current study focuses on auditory task switching, more precisely on switching attention between different temporal patterns of the same auditory stimulus. Tone sequences consisting of nine different pitch tones were presented aurally. Three repetitive short 3-tone patterns (local focus) were combined to a long pattern (global focus), and each could be either rising or falling, resulting in congruent or incongruent combinations. Participants were informed by a cue if they had to attend to the short or to the long pattern, and they indicated if the target pattern was rising or falling by pressing one of two keys. In two experiments, we investigated cued switches between the two attentional foci. Switch costs in reaction times and errors were observed when switching from the long to the short pattern but not when switching from the short to the long pattern. These asymmetric switch costs were reduced when participants had more time to prepare for the switch in a condition with a prolonged cue-stimulus interval. In addition, participants made more errors when global and local patterns did not correspond to each other (i.e., in incongruent trials) when attending to either of the patterns, but this congruency effect was not modulated by preparation time. The data suggest that the mechanisms of task goal prioritizing, as indicated by the asymmetric attention switch costs, are dissociable from those underlying stimulus selection, as indicated by the congruency effects.     

Evidence for an addition to the reading scan hypothesis

Letters were tachistoscopically presented in pairs to the left or right of fixation for 40 msec. The pair consisted of a target letter (B, D, P, or T) and a noise letter (all other letters of the alphabet except I), with the noise letter appearing either to the inside or the outside of the stimulus letter. S’s task was to report verbally the target letter as fast as possible. Reaction times and number of errors indicated that there was more interference when the noise letter occurred further from the fixation point than the target letter for both the left and right visual field. Since a reading scan cannot account for the results in the right visual field, an outside-toward-fixation scan is proposed. An analysis of the different kinds of errors indicated that the outside to fixation scan is more primitive than the reading scan in that it produces less detailed information about the letters than does the reading scan.     

Predictive Pointing Movements and Saccades Toward a Moving Target

The authors investigated whether and, if so, how velocity information is used to control predictive manual pointing movements and saccades. Participants (N = 6) intercepted an occluded moving target as if it were still visible. They kept their eyes fixated while the target moved. The target traveled over a fixed distance and changed its velocity on the way. The presentation time of the final velocity was varied. Both the eye and the hand overshot the slow target and undershot the fast target, particularly when the duration of the final velocity was short. Thus, responses were biased in the direction of the target's initial velocity. The error seemed to arise because participants did not take their latency into account when aiming at the target. Instead, they strategically aimed farther ahead when the target was fast. Amplitude was also more related to the position of velocity change than to final velocity duration. Both findings suggest that target velocity is not extrapolated but that individuals add an increment to the position of velocity change.     

Memory scanning of shapes,colors, and compounds: A comparison of retarded and nonretarded adults

Three experiments were performed to assess memory scanning of shapes, colors, and shape-color compounds by retarded and nonretarded people. Attributes comprising compounds provided either redundant or nonredundant information. Large retarded-nonretarded differences in reaction time were obtained. In contrast to previous reports of slow scanning of digits and nonsense shapes by retarded people, scan rates for shapes and colors did not differ between groups. Retarded subjects were not characterized by a deficient scan rate. Although compound stimuli required twice as many attributes in their repersentation as did simple stimuli, they were not scanned more slowly, indicating that per item scan rate is not determined by the number of attributes required to define each item. Both groups were able to exploit redundant relevant information to achieve faster processing than in simple conditions. Decision rules for rejecting compound stimuli comprised one, two, or more binary tests. Groups did not differ in speed of performing elementary binary test(s).     

Is time to scan visual images due to demand characteristics?

The time to scan across an object in a mental image increases with the distance scanned. Does this finding reflect the operation of underlying mechanisms or the effects of demand characteristics? Two types of demand characteristics were considered here. First, the scanning effects were shown to persist even when they conflicted with the experimenters' expectations. Experimenters were led to expect different rates of scanning and different effects of distance on scan times, but the results in all cases showed no hint of experimenter effects, instead displaying the usual increase in time with distance scanned. Second, the scanning effects were shown to persist in the absence of implicit task demands. Effects of distance were observed in an experiment in which subjects were never asked to scan the image; furthermore, such effects were observed only for items that should require spontaneous scanning even though they were randomly intermixed with items that should not, and this distinction was never mentioned nor alluded to in the instructions. Thus, experimenter effects and task demands are not sufficient explanations for the increase in the time to scan across an image as distance is increased.     

伸手拦截启动中的信息利用

通过两项实验考察时空信息对拦截运动启动的影响: 实验一为知觉估计实验, 通过释放匀速小球模拟拦截过程; 实验二为特定拦截路线情景下的拦截行为实验, 即固定手的拦截方向, 但容许拦截速度自由控制。结果发现, 拦截行为的启动基于综合信息, 在所拦截物体作慢速运动的情景下拦截行为启动偏早, 而在快速运动的情景下启动偏晚, 结果不支持单纯用tau理论解释启动行为。本研究对手的速度伴随效应提出了新的解释。