Effects of number of alternatives on the psychological refractory period

The effects of changing the number of choices in the first response on “psychological refractoriness” were found to be partially consistent with intermittency theory but modifications may be needed to explain the results when the number of choices in the second response is increased.     

Effect of the length of the runs of repetitions on the simple RT-ISI relationship

In a simple RT task the temporal organization of the preparatory processes during a given trial depends upon the time characteristics of the total experimental situation as well as upon the information gathered during one or more previous trials. The present experiment was run in order to determine whether or not these long and short term effects operate independently or interact. The effects of the preceding ISI durations on the simple RT for an ISI 1 (1.5 s) or an ISI 2 (3.0 s) are analysed in 3 experimental conditions differing in the maximum number of successive repetitions (2, 3 or 7) of trials with the same ISI. The results show that the distribution of the preparatory activity during a given trial depends firstly on the number of successive ISIs of the same duration preceding this trial, and secondly on the maximum number of repetitions. An explanation of the subjects' strategy based upon “cost of preparation” is proposed.     

Discriminability and central intermittency in same-different judgements

Four sets of paired visual stimuli (OO, XX, XO, or OX) were judged by 48 subjects to be either “same” or “different.” Decision latencies of the same and different judgement were studied as a function of the inter-stimulus interval (ISI). In Experiments I and II, in which stimulus durations were 70 millisec., decision latencies showed marked increases when the ISI was reduced to 100 millisec., but in Experiments III and IV, in which the stimulus durations were only 40 millisec., comparable increases did not occur until the ISI was reduced to 50 millisec. These increases were more marked for “same” than for “different” judgements, although overall decision latencies were generally shorter for “same” judgements. The effects of varying ISIs and stimulus durations are interpreted in terms of masking; they fail to support an hypothesis of central intermittency.     

Response-stimulus interval in choice serial reaction time: Interaction with sleep deprivation, choice, and practice

In choice serial reaction time (RT), Response-to-next-Stimulus Interval (RSI) was varied from 0 to 600 msec in 40-msec steps. In three experiments, RT fell and errors rose as RSI was increased to 480 msec; they remained unchanged thereafter. The effect of RSI on RT was not linear, was reduced by 6- as compared with 4- or 3-choice responding, and was unaffected by sleep deprivation, despite loss of sleep reducing RT overall. The effect of penultimate RSI on RT was similar to that current RSI, but smaller. Two explanations of RSI—response-generated kinaesthetic feedback blocking a “central processor” and a preparatory interval as in warned simple RT—are rejected. Instead, the idea of “relative refractory state” is revived but now, because of the RSI/error finding, biased more towards responding than stimulus reception and encoding. In all three experiments the influence of RSI on RT was reduced with practice. If practice encourages automatic rather than controlled processing (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977), the prediction is that the former will show less refractoriness.     

Hemispheric refractoriness and control of reaction time

Experiments are described which attempt to assess the relative efficiency of the hemispheres and their relationship in performance on complex RT tasks. A divided visual field method was used to direct signals to the temporal or nasal retinae of each eye thus passing information to separate hemispheres. A comparison of the separate response times was used to assess the relative efficiency of each hemisphere but significant differences were not observed. This suggests that each may be the equal of the other in organizing simple responses. A method was used to examine more complex RT by presenting the subject with two simultaneous signals for response. When pairs of signals are directed to separate hemispheres, response times are at their lowest value. When signals are directed to separate hemispheres through the same eye, a significant increase in RT occurs. A source of mutual interference appears to exist at the level of the eye. Response times are extended to their greatest value, however, when both signals are directed to the same hemisphere. This block to function has been described as “hemispheric refractoriness”, and is different for the two hemispheres. While each show a distinct block to function the extent of this is greater in the right or minor hemisphere than it is in the left or major hemisphere.     

Some evidence for parallel comparisons in a letter recognition task

Subjects were asked to judge successively presented letter trigrams “same” or “different.” The different stimuli were divided into four groups; not confusable (NC), acoustically confusable (AC), visually confusable (VC), and both visually and acoustically confusable (VC & AC). Reaction times (RT) were lengthened only by the double confusability. It is argued that comparisons are normally made in both channels, so that confusability in a single channel has no effect since the alternative channel is unimpaired. RTs are only increased when both channels are slowed down. A further experiment confirms this interpretation. When the situation is manipulated so that only the visual channel is employed, the VC group shows the same increase as the VC & AC group.     

After-effects of responding and of withholding responses in C.RT tasks

The effects of response repetition on choice RT were compared in b-reaction and in c-reaction tasks [Experiments I(a) and I(b)]. The difference in RTs for repeated and for non-repeated responses was found to be less for c-reaction than for b-reaction tasks. This seemed to be because in c-reaction tasks subjects can prepare themselves to make the same response on every trial, so that there is little further RT reduction consequent on immediate response repetition. In b-reaction tasks subjects cannot always prepare to make the same response, so that the difference between response repetition RT and responce alteration RT is greater. Experiment II examined transitions between events in a serial, self-paced C.RT task in which subjects made a different response to each of two signals but withheld any response to the onset of a third. In this task responses were faster when they followed other, different responses than when they followed “no go” trials. The results of these experiments allow us to reject, even for very elementary tasks, a simple “S--R connection network” model for the processes involved in the identification of signals and the production of responses to them.     

A comparison of body perceptions in relation to measured body composition in young Japanese males and females

The body composition of 139 Japanese females and 84 Japanese males (aged 18–30 years) was measured using anthropometry to assess gender differences in body perceptions in relation to their measured values. Participants were asked to rate perceptions of their own “heaviness” and “fatness” and these were compared to their BMI and percent body fat (%BF). Japanese females showed a significantly greater desire to lose body weight (−4.20 ± 0.6 kg) compared to males (0.27 ± 1.4 kg). Females also showed poor understanding of their “heaviness” and “fatness” in relation to actual body composition compared to males. The results confirmed distinct gender differences in body perception in relation to actual body composition and attitudes to weight management. Further promotion of “healthy” body image is recommended for the Japanese population.     

The effect of an irrelevant dimension on “same-different” judgements of multi-dimensional stimuli

Subjects made “same”-“different” judgements of simultaneously presented pairs of visual stimuli which could vary either in shape and colour independently, or in shape alone. In both conditions only shape was relevant to the “same”-“different” judgement. In the former condition “same” and “different” reaction times (RTs) were shorter when the states (“same” or “different”) of the relevant and the irrelevant dimension, colour, were the same. This result is interpreted as support for either a perceptual or a response interference hypothesis. The presence of an irrelevant dimension did not appear to affect differentially “same” and “different” judgements. The need for a re-evaluation of the results from other studies of multi-dimensional stimulus discrimination is discussed.     

Information relevance, working memory, and the consideration of alternatives

People routinely focus on one hypothesis and avoid consideration of alternative hypotheses on problems requiring decisions between possible states of the world--for example, on the “pseudodiagnosticity” task (Doherty, Mynatt, Tweney, & Schiavo, 1979). In order to account for behaviour on such “inference” problems, it is proposed that people can hold in working memory, and operate upon, but one alternative at a time, and that they have a bias to test the hypothesis they think true. In addition to being an ex post facto explanation of data selection in inference tasks, this conceptualization predicts that there are situations in which people will consider alternatives. These are:

1. “action” problems, where the alternatives are possible courses of action;

2. “inference” problems, in which evidence favours an alternative hypothesis.

Experiment 1 tested the first prediction. Subjects were given action or inference problems, each with two alternatives and two items of data relevant to each alternative. They received probabilistic information about the relation between one datum and one alternative and picked one value from among the other three possible pairs of such relations. Two findings emerged; (1) a strong tendency to select information about only one alternative with inferences; and (2) a strong tendency, compared to inferences, to select information about both alternatives with actions.

Experiment 2 tested the second prediction. It was predicted that data suggesting that one alternative was incorrect would lead many subjects to consider, and select information about, the other alternative. For actions, it was predicted that this manipulation would have no effect. Again the data were as predicted.     

Group play therapy and tangible reinforcers used to modify the behavior of 8-yr-old boys

Eleven third-grade boys were randomly assigned to three play therapy groups. The boys had been referred by their teachers because of shy, withdrawn behavior. The Token Group met in a play group (4 Ss), had a therapist, and received tangible reinforcements for social approach behavior. The Verbal Group (4 Ss) was treated similarly to the Token Group except that no tangible reinforcements were used. The Control Group (3 Ss) met in a play group without a therapist present. Fourteen play sessions were held for each group. The Token Group changed more than the Verbal Group; the Verbal Group changed more than the Control Group; the Control Group showed no change on the objective measures used. The Token Group exhibited an increase in social approach behavior and a decrease in discrete, problem behavior. The Verbal Group increased slightly in social approach behavior. All groups failed to demonstrate changes in “productivity”, “anxiety” and “general psychological adjustment”.     

Effects of visual familiarity on “same” and “different” decision processes

An experiment was conducted in which subjects matched upper and lower case versions of well-known abbreviations, such as BBC and etc, and meaningless controls. “Same” RT showed a familiarity effect for upper case versions of abbreviations such as BBC and GPO, but not for the lower case versions bbc and gpo. The converse did not occur for abbreviations such as etc, which were thought to occur most frequently in lower case. The “different” RT was inhibited by familiarity, with pairs such as IBM GPO being classified less rapidly than their lower case versions or controls. These effects occurred for subjects instructed to report “No” for “same” displays and “Yes” for “different” displays as well as for subjects given a conventional decision-report assignment. Some implications of these results for an account of the manner in which familiarity affects graphemic comparison processes are considered.     

A preliminary study of distinctive features in problem solving

The abstract logical structure of family relationship problems, such as, “What relationship to a man is his mother's father?” was described in terms of a “distinctive-feature-transition count (dft)”, where the answer to the problem was characterized in terms of the distinctive features of descendancy, co-linearity, and sex. On average, it proved possible to predict the difficulty of such problems from such a count; thus tending to support the idea of a relational rather than an associative memory structure.     

Reaction time to a second stimulus as a function of intensity of the first stimulus

Reaction time (RT) to the second of two stimuli presented in rapid succession was examined as a function of the intensity of the first stimulus (S₁). It was found that the delay in RT₂ was greater following a dim first stimulus than following a bright first stimulus. The magnitude of this increase corresponded to the difference in RTs to the two intensity levels of S₁. These results support the prediction of a single channel model of response selection. Examination of mean first RTs revealed a general elevation in latency of RT. However, since this increase was not influenced by the inter-stimulus interval (ISI) or by the intensity of the second stimulus (S₂), and since the same increase was found on “catch trials“ where no S₂ was presented, this increase is considered to be a function of change in set in the double response situation.     

Assumptions underlying psychological testing

Tests purporting to reflect the learning aptitudes of school children differ much more than generally is recognized. However, error in assesing such learning aptitude inheres much more in the users of the tests than in the tests themselves. Assumptions fundamental to such assessment, or even testing, are considered. It is particularly important that the assessor, or tester, constantly be sensitive to the nature of the relationship between the psychological demands of test items or tests and the learning demands confronting the child. Even tests that generally are grossly or crudely used often can yield psychoeducationally meaninful information if their results are differentially perceived in terms of the light they throw on the psychological operations fundamental to learning, “process,” as contrasted with that thrown on the results of the functioning of such operations, “product.”     

Nonstutterers'' perceptions of stuttering and speech difficulty

Two versions of Woolf's (1967) Perception of Stuttering Inventory (PSI) were administered to nonstuttering college students in three experiments. In one (Woolf's published version) the word “stuttering” appeared and in another [a version developed by Daly, Oakes, Breen, and Mishler (1981)] “stuttering” was replaced by “speech difficulty.” Nonstutterers' scores on the PSI were found to be affected by knowledge of—or attention to—“stuttering” or “stutterers” as well as orientation toward speech or speech pathology. It was concluded that a total PSI score of 5 is presently a more defensible criterion of normality for stutterers than the more commonly used score of 10.     

Bias in Conditional Inference: Implications for Mental Models and Mental Logic

Three experiments are reported in which subjects are given the opportunity to make any of the four inferences associated with conditional statements: modus ponens (MP), denial of the antecedent (DA), affirmation of the consequent (AC), and modus tollens (MT). The primary purpose of the research was to establish the generality and robustness of polarity biases that may be occasioned by systematic rotation of negative components in the conditional rules. In Experiments 1 & 2, three forms of conditionals were used: “if (not) p then (not) q”, “(not) p only if (not) q” and “(not) q if (not) p”. Experiment 1 used a conclusion evaluation task, whereas Experiment 2 used a conclusion production task. In Experiment 3, thematic conditionals were presented with and without a preceding scenario.

The biases investigated were (a) affirmative premise bias—the tendency to draw more inferences from affirmative premises and (b) negative conclusion bias—the tendency to draw more inferences with negative conclusions. The suggestive evidence for affirmative premise bias in the literature was not supported: very little evidence was found for it in the current experiments. Robust findings of negative conclusion bias were, however, found across the three experiments, although the bias was mostly restricted to DA and MT inferences. This suggests that the bias is best regarded as a difficulty with double negation.

The results are discussed with respect to both the mental logic and mental model accounts of propositional reasoning. Neither theory as currently formulated can explain all of our findings, although a plausible revision of each is considered.     

A further study of the pendulum phenomenon

A first series of experiments had demonstrated certain conditions eliciting or inhibiting a “pendulum” phenomenon in the visual perception of apparent movement. The present study consists of five further variations designed to show more clearly conditions of occurrence and non-occurrence of this type of movement. The main findings are:

(i) Altering the axis of display to vertical significantly reduces the frequency of pendular-movement perception;

(2) Altering the position of metronome from behind to the side of the visual display, gives results almost identical with those where the metronome was inaudible, but, when the metronome is illuminated in this position, all forms of movement perception are reduced, and no pendular movement is reported.

The results for all the ten conditions, including the five of the first series are summarized, and the following possible factors are discussed: past experience, physiological nystagmus, and intervening adaptation. All three may be required to account for the perceptual phenomena under investigation and the dichotomizing of explanations into “experiential,” or “physiological,” appears to be arbitrary and inconsistent with the complexity of the observed facts.     

Remembering, Familiarity, and Source Monitoring

Two experiments investigated recollective experience in a source monitoring task. Subjects saw an array of objects and performed, watched, or imagined actions involving pairs of objects. In a subsequent recognition test, subjects indicated whether their recognition judgements were made on the basis of conscious recollective experience (“remember” responses), or on some other basis such as familiarity (“know” responses). The proportions of correct “remember” responses for both objects and actions decreased from performed, through watched, to imagined actions, whereas the proportions of correct “know” responses were uninfluenced by the source of the memories. In addition, the relationship between recollective experience and accuracy of source judgement varied across sources. Source accuracy for performed actions was obtained only in “remember” responses, whereas source accuracy for imagined actions was obtained only in “know” responses. Source accuracy for watched actions was obtained in both “remember” and “know” responses. The findings suggest that the types of memory attributes available at retrieval determine the quality of subsequent memory experience, and it is proposed that memories with strongly self-referential attributes (arising from performed actions) powerfully cue recollective experience during retrieval.