Marxist ideology and the Soviet economy

It is very tempting to reduce Soviet economic decisions and structures to pragmatic factors and to discount the influence of ideology. Without overemphasizing the influence of the latter, it seems clear that what happens in the Soviet economy is influenced by Marxism-Leninism, even though there is no question of making concrete predictions.     

Lenin,Gorbachev, and ‘national-statehood’: Can Leninism countenance the new Soviet federal order?

One of the most intractable contemporary problems in the USSR is the Soviet federal dilemma. The late 1980s witnessed competing claims among the national minority groups of the USSR to rights of voice, representation, and cultural, economic, and even political sovereignty. Since the onset ofperestrojka, the principle of ‘nationalstatehood’ has acquired a new legitimacy. Nationality is one of the pillars of the federal reform. The drive to create a ‘new Soviet federalism’ has become an important component ofperestrojka. But, according to Leninist doctrine, the ‘nation’ is a transitional formation. Unless there is a significant departure from Leninist theory, the new acknowledgement of the ‘rights of nations’ in the USSR can only be a political — and thus temporary — concession. Can the ideology evolve in such a way as to provide ideologically-based political legitimacy to the notion of national-statehood? Is Gorbachev's ‘dynamic’ interpretation of Leninism capable of rejecting one of Lenin's most fundamental concepts? The thesis of this article is that Soviet federal reform requires a substantial departure from the Leninist tradition. The extent to which Soviet leaders are prepared to do this casts light on one of the perennial concerns of socialist thought, namely whether ideology matters at all.     

ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR TOWARD HUMAN RIGHTS ACROSS DIFFERENT CONTEXTS: THE ROLE OF RIGHT-WING AUTHORITARIANISM,POLITICAL IDEOLOGY,AND RELIGIOSITY*

Three studies were carried out to examine attitudes and behavior toward human rights. ‘Universal’ human rights implies that there should be cross-situational consistency in attitudes and behavior toward human rights. An alternative interpretation is that attitudes and behavior toward human rights may shift across contexts, as a function of ideology. We reasoned that Canadian subjects would be more critical of the human rights records of Soviet and the Third World societies, and thus show stronger support for human rights in these than in Canadian society. Hypothesis two predicted that right-wing political ideology and support for human rights would be negatively correlated in contexts Canada and Third World, but not in the Soviet context; hypothesis three predicted the same pattern of associations between religiosity and support for human rights. Hypothesis four predicted that authoritarians, because of their fundamental opposition to individual liberties, would oppose human rights in all contexts. Study 1 involved 155 students expressing attitudes toward a range of human rights issues. Study 2 involved 74 Pro-Life supporters expressing attitudes on human rights, as well as on abortion. Study 3 involved a behavioral measure of support for human rights among 450 students. The findings generally supported hypotheses one and four, and provided some support for hypotheses two and three. The results seem to provide further evidence of an association between ideology and moral reasoning.     

The Shattered Horizon How Ideology Mattered to Soviet Politics

This article argues that ideology was of key-importance to the Soviet system. The rules which governed Soviet ideological discourse did not only hold for the producers of ideology but also aimed at filtering public communication. The respect people showed for an ideologically filtered discourse counted as a sign of loyalty. In this way ideology constituted a central pillar of power. The article presents the results of an analysis of political texts dating from the Gorbachev era. It concludes that the Gorbachev reforms eroded the communication filter because they changed the rules on which ideological discourse and thus power rested.     

Der Ideologiebegriff bei Marx und die heutige Kontroverse über Ideologie und Wissenschaft in den sozialistischen Ländern

Marx and Engels inherited and developed the 18th Century notion of ideology as distorted consciousness. Although they did not speak explicitly of a ‘proletarian ideology’, they did develop the elements which Lenin then elaborated. His failure to develop a theory of ideology has left this task to contemporary Marxists (e.g., Althusser) and Marxist-Leninists (e.g., Choruc), who often do this in the process of criticizing non-Marxist theories. A lively discussion took place in the 1960's in Poland (Schaff and Bauman) and in the Soviet Union (Jadov and Julina). One of the results has been to cast doubt on the systemic validity of the principle of party-mindedness (partijnost').     

Training Soviet immigrant therapists in the field of group psychotherapy

Between 1970 and 1990 about one-half million Jews immigrated to Israel, most of them from the former Soviet Union, including many mental health therapists who had trained and worked in the Soviet Union. This article addresses the special characteristics of this population, in general, and of the mental health therapists, in particular. It relates these characteristics to training for group psychotherapy. Key issues include their unique experience of the inner world as a source of danger, the specific defensive modes connected with this experience, their perception of authority as an agent of ideology, and their representation of the group as a persecutory entity and as a vehicle of indoctrination.     

The 1950 Joint Scientific Session: Pavlovians as the accusers and the accused

In 1950, Stalin and the Soviet Government prevailed upon the USSR Academy of Sciences and the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences to organize the 1950 Joint Scientific Session for the purpose of formalizing the teachings of I. P. Pavlov. During the Session, some of Pavlov's erstwhile students—the Pavlovians—split into accusers and accused. The more prominent of the latter were denounced for deviating from the orthodox Pavlovian path, and urged to admit their mistakes, to work within the framework of Pavlov's theory of higher nervous activity, and to avoid Western influence. Within this context, the travail of the prominent Pavlovian physiologist L. A. Orbeli is discussed. Contemporary Russian historians and scientists, evaluating the consequences of the 1950 Joint Scientific Session, point out its negative effects; namely, the general moral decline of Soviet physiologists pressured to accept a dogmatic ideology, the lowering of the quality of research in physiology, and the self-imposed exclusion of Soviet physiology from the worldwide scientific community. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

The politics of physiological psychology Ivan Pavlov’s suppressed defense of scientific freedom and its consequences

This statement, first presented at a plenary session of the Pavlovian Society on 9 October 1992, in Los Angeles, California, attempts to assess the recently released speech delivered by Ivan Pavlov in 1923, but publicly brought to light only in 1991, on the subject of “Communist Dogmatism and the Autonomy of Science.” This speech, noteworthy for the courage of the delivery under adverse circumstances no less than the contents of its remarks, compels a new estimate of the place of science in a totalitarian system boasting an ideology of physiological psychology. It also sheds new light on the Russian Nobel laureate and pioneer in the areas of behavior modification induced by the functions of the higher nervous system. These remarks take an in-depth view of American radical and Marxian appraisals — how they followed the Soviet lead in harnessing Pavlov to the Communist cause, and in attempting to discredit the work of Sigmund Freud. This lethal combination of Communist political needs and ideological proclivities served to rationalize the implementation of slave labor as work therapy during the Stalinist era. The linkage of Pavlov to Makarenko in education and Michurin in biology serves as a case study in the manufacture of tradition. The collapse of the Soviet system permits a recasting of the history of science and Pavlov’s place in Russian life. Such new conditions also provide a lesson in the distortive role of ideology in the evolution of modern science.     

CONCERNING THE MORAL DIMENSION OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM IN A COMMUNIST-FREE WORLD*

The socio-economic “pro-democracy” revolutions which are currently sweeping the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the name of glasnost and perestroika have virtually stunned all but the best informed in the Western World. The demand for reform throughout the so-called “Soviet block,” and the concomitant impatience with the progress of these changes in the economic and basic social fabric of these societies, have come to exhibit an urgency which few observers, if any, had been able to forecast a few short years ago. The declarations by some members of the U.S. Congress that these changes are indicative of the fact that the cold war has been won by the West, and that we are now witnessing the precipitous collapse of Marxist ideology, together with the widespread sentiment that there is “no going back” to the repressive Leninist-inspired regimes of Stalin, Khruschev, and Brezhniev are all synergistic to the creation of a sentiment of optimism that indeed we have turned the corner in East-West relations. To a world which has lived under the long night of thermonuclear extinction for over four decades, the feeling accompanying the prospect of a possible end to the nightmare of Armageddon further enhances the euphoric sentiment.     

Five-year plan of philosophy: Stalinism after Kojève,Hegel after Stalinism

The aporia inherent in Kojève’s discussion of the end of history stems from the temporality implicit in the moment of inscribing the end of history in philosophy. Hegel’s Phenomenology as the unfolding of absolute knowledge stands at the last moment in history, without necessarily constituting its end. Reading the post-NEP (New Economic Policy) Soviet ideology through Kojève demonstrates that the doctrine of “socialism in one country” similarly situates itself outside historical time as history’s last moment, marked by the coincidence of being and concept, the disappearance of negation, and classless society without an historical agent. In the reconceptualization of labor in Stalinist ideology as a temporalization of being without negation, the representation of time in five-year plans radically reinvents temporality as a suspension of history in the perpetual deferral of its end. Going beyond Kojève, the immanent logic of temporality of five-year plans enables a non-teleological reading of Hegelian philosophy with regard to the status of its method and the function of the end of history.     

Suicide and suicidology in the Soviet Union

This study was conducted in order to obtain information on suicide in the Soviet Union, an important subject for which we have no scientific literature. Studies of attempted suicide in Soviet psychiatric journals were analyzed. This information was supplemented by interviews with Soviet psychiatrists now living abroad. The results of this inquiry show that suicide is a subject that clearly has become of increasing concern in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, in spite of the absence of essential statistical data on mortality, there is evidence indicating that the rate of Soviet suicide may be rising in certain parts of the country. Finally, growing concern about suicide has led to expanded prevention programs and to a new emphasis on social and psychological etiological explanations. In particular, the role of the Soviet family in crisis has been emphasized as a major influence in understanding the causes of suicidal attempts.     

Ivan Pavlov on communist dogmatism and the autonomy of science in the Soviet Union in the early 1920s. 1923.

On 25 September, 1923, two days before his 74th birthday, Ivan Petrovich Pavlov stood before a class of medical students assembled in the auditorium of his Alma Mater, the Military Medical Academy in Leningrad. Pavlov, the recipient of the Nobel prize in medicine in 1904 for his work in physiology, was about to address his first class of the new academic year, and, as was his custom, he had prepared his first lecture on a general theme. This was an especially significant address, however, for in it Pavlov reviewed the impressions he had gathered during his travels in Western Europe and the United States in the summer of 1923, and he criticised the prevailing ideology of Soviet communism by attacking the ideas of Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin, then the leading expositor of Bolshevik Marxism. An English translation of the lecture is printed below.     

Russification as a factor in religious conversion. Making Lenin roll over in his grave

The Soviet project was as thoroughly atheist as any geopolitical system seen on the world stage. Yet in a way that V.I. Lenin could have never imagined, one of the main objectives of Soviet authorities has now become a significant factor in Central Asian Muslims converting to Christianity. Russification is the term normally used to describe the social process, whereby non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union became acculturated into Russian patterns of life, thought and worldview during the Soviet era. The result was that many Muslims inhabited both Soviet/Russian and Muslim cultural space, thus creating a new cultural identity that facilitated religious conversion away from Islam. This field research report uses the lens of personal conversion stories to examine some aspects of this phenomenon. Also, the range of personal experiences points towards the need to understand Russification as a spectrum of acculturation.     

Inside the World of the Soviet Professional

In this article Carl recounts his experiences with psychologists, educators, and researchers in the Soviet Union. While in the Soviet Union, Carl did live counseling sessions with Soviet citizens to demonstrate his person-centered approach. In the end, Carl reflects that the Soviet professional has needs and concerns similar to psychologists and educators in America. This is a joint report of work carried on by Carl Rogers and Ruth Sanford. The account was largely written by Carl, but Sanford contributed to it.     

History, Present Situation, and Problems of Chinese Psychology of Religion

There have been few research studies on the psychology of religion in Mainland China because of the “leftist” ideology that shaped the People’s Republic of China from its foundation until the introduction of reform and open policy. Since the 1980s, research in the field of psychology of religion in Mainland China has made remarkable progress. The main efforts include translating and introducing representative works from the former Soviet Union and the West, while theoretical studies have concentrated mainly on the origins, features, functions, and schools of psychology of religion. Researchers have developed new measurement tools based on local culture in psychology of religion. Empirical studies pay special attention to the relationship between religious belief and mental health, the features of religious thinking of the Chinese, the psychological state of professionals, and characteristic emotions of religious experiences as well as their correlation with biological processes. The problems that currently exist in the field in Mainland China include the following: lack of critical in-depth studies on the history of Western psychology of religion, absence of diversity in research methods, and disconnection of theoretical study from practical application. Obviously, these issues should influence the direction of future efforts.     

Socialist realism in the Soviet Union: Portrayal of Western European and North American businessmen

Success in Soviet trade negotiations depends to a great extent on the images that the Soviet negotiators form of their Western counterparts. These images, in turn, depend to a great extent on the images presented to such Soviet negotiators during their education, through various tales and stories.     

The formation of Soviet cultural theory of music (1917–1948)

This article explores the continuities and discontinuities of pre-Revolutionary intellectual traditions in 1920s Soviet culture and the Stalin-era cultural revolution. Through examination of the pre-revolutionary philosophical legacy underpinning Soviet musicological theory, I demonstrate that there are decisive features, such as Soviet Prometheanism, that characterize the musicology of the 1920s that both underline and differ from the pre-revolutionary philosophy of music and the musicology of the 1930s. I offer the basic outlines of a Soviet cultural theory of music formulated by Russian music critic, historian, composer and musicologist Boris Asafiev (1884–1949) in the 1920s. Explaining and describing what I mean by a particular cultural theory of music in the Soviet context forms the core issue of my article.

     

Georgii Shakhnazarov and the Soviet Critique of Historical Materialism

The emergence of ideological and political pluralism in the Soviet Union during 1990 led to a growing number of critiques of Marxism-Leninism. The development of the internal Soviet critique of orthodox Soviet Marxism-Leninism culminated in the publication of a two-part article by Georgii Shakhnazarov in Kommunist in 1991. In this article Shakhnazarov outlined a comprehensive critique of orthodox historical materialism, and many of the ideas he developed became a central part of the Draft Party Programme of July/August 1991. This programme amounted to the virtual social-democratisation of Soviet Marxism-Leninism. The collapse of Soviet Marxism-Leninism can in part be explained by the internal critique of its basic tenets which developed in the period after 1988.     

Pictures at an exhibition: Russian land in a global world

This article examines Russian realist landscape paintings of the Peredvi?niki. It demonstrates how in the course of the formation of a national identity during the late nineteenth century, an originally ideology-free space was politically charged and in the course of decades has been incorporated through various measures and media into the collective memory. In this way, the topos of the ‘Russian Landscape’ became lieu de mémoire for Russianness (russkost’) that transcends social order (Russian Empire, Soviet Union, Russian Federation). Through identification with supposedly Russian scenery, which knows no regional or national borders, love of the motherland (‘ljubov’ k rodine) can be created and strengthened. In their various reproductions, these landscape images developed into a kind of world parallel to the world of everyday experience in the Stalin era. The ideology of Russian landscape painting is now experiencing a new level of appreciation in the West, the effect of which is a shift in focus in their evaluation, from national to universal criteria.