共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Peter Schulte 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2012,15(2):159-174
Morality and rationality are both normative: the moral claim “you ought to help others” is a genuine normative judgment, as
well as the rational maxim “you ought to brush your teeth twice a day”. But it seems that there is a crucial difference these
two judgments. In the first part of this paper, I argue that this difference is to be understood as a difference between two
kinds of normativity: demanding and recommending normativity. But the crucial task is, of course, to explain the difference.
In the second part of this paper, I suggest that metaethical expressivists can provide a good explanation: by extending the
analysis of ordinary (non-normative) demands and recommendations to normative judgments, they can formulate a convincing account
that captures the key differences between morality and rationality. 相似文献
2.
Emer O’Hagan 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(5):525-537
Kant’s duty of self-knowledge demands that one know one’s heart—the quality of one’s will in relation to duty. Self-knowledge
requires that an agent subvert feelings which fuel self-aggrandizing narratives and increase self-conceit; she must adopt
the standpoint of the rational agent constrained by the requirements of reason in order to gain information about her moral
constitution. This is not I argue, contra Nancy Sherman, in order to assess the moral goodness of her conduct. Insofar as
sound moral practice requires moral self-knowledge and moral self-knowledge requires a theoretical commitment to a conception
of the moral self, sound moral agency is for Kant crucially tied to theory. Kant plausibly holds that self-knowledge is a
protection against moral confusion and self-deception. I conclude that although his account relies too heavily on the awareness
of moral law to explain its connection to moral development, it is insightful and important in Kantian ethics. 相似文献
3.
John Brunero 《Philosophical Studies》2012,157(1):125-140
Instrumental rationality prohibits one from being in the following state: intending to pass a test, not intending to study,
and believing one must intend to study if one is to pass. One could escape from this incoherent state in three ways: by intending
to study, by not intending to pass, or by giving up one’s instrumental belief. However, not all of these ways of proceeding
seem equally rational: giving up one’s instrumental belief seems less rational than giving up an end, which itself seems less
rational than intending the means. I consider whether, as some philosophers allege, these “asymmetries” pose a problem for
the wide-scope formulation of instrumental rationality. I argue that they do not. I also present an argument in favor of the
wide-scope formulation. The arguments employed here in defense of the wide-scope formulation of instrumental rationality can
also be employed in defense of the wide-scope formulations of other rational requirements. 相似文献
4.
H. E. Baber 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2010,13(4):377-392
Critics suggest that without some “objective” account of well-being we cannot explain why satisfying some preferences is,
as we believe, better than satisfying others, why satisfying some preferences may leave us on net worse off or why, in a range
of cases, we should reject life-adjustment in favor of life-improvement. I defend a subjective welfarist understanding of
well-being against such objections by reconstructing the Amartya Sen’s capability approach as a preferentist account of well-being.
According to the proposed account preference satisfaction alone—possible as well as actual—is of value. States of affairs
contribute to well-being because and to the extent that they satisfy actual or nearby possible preferences, and are fruitful,
that is, compatible with a range states that satisfy further actual or nearby possible preferences. The proposed account solves
the problem of adaptive preference. Individuals whose preferences are “deformed” are satisfied with fruitless states of affairs,
which constrain their options so that they are incapable of satisfying a wide range of nearby possible preferences—preferences
they “could easily have had.” Recognizing the value of capabilities as well as actual attainments allows us to explain why
individuals who satisfy “deformed” or perverse preferences may not on net benefit from doing so. More fundamentally, it explains
why some states are, as Sen suggests, bad, awful or gruesome while others are good, excellent or superb without appeal to
any objective account of value. 相似文献
5.
Itay Snir 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(3):407-437
This article offers a new interpretation of Adorno’s “new categorical imperative”: it suggests that the new imperative is
an important element of Adorno’s moral philosophy and at the same time runs counter to some of its essential features. It
is suggested that Adorno’s moral philosophy leads to two aporiae, which create an impasse that the new categorical imperative
attempts to circumvent. The first aporia results from the tension between Adorno’s acknowledgement that praxis is an essential
part of moral philosophy, and his view according to which existing social conditions make it impossible for moral knowledge
to be translated into “right” action. The second aporia results from the tension between the uncompromising sensitivity to
suffering that underlies Adorno’s moral thought, and his analysis of the culture industry mechanisms which turn people into
happy, satisfied customers—an incompatibility which threatens to pull the rug out from under Adorno’s moral philosophy. My
interpretation of the “new categorical imperative” focuses on two characteristics it inherits from the “old,” Kantian one—self-evidence
and unconditionality—in order to present the new imperative as a response to these two aporiae. 相似文献
6.
Peter Langland-Hassan 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2011,10(2):145-173
Visual imagination (or visualization) is peculiar in being both free, in that what we imagine is up to us, and useful to a wide variety of practical reasoning tasks. How can we rely upon our visualizations in practical reasoning if what we
imagine is subject to our whims? The key to answering this puzzle, I argue, is to provide an account of what constrains the sequence in which the representations featured in visualization unfold—an account that is consistent with its freedom.
Three different proposals are outlined, building on theories that link visualization to sensorimotor predictive mechanisms
(e.g., “efference copies,” “forward models”). Each sees visualization as a kind of reasoning, where its freedom consists in our ability to choose the topic of the reasoning. Of the three options, I argue that the approach many will find most attractive—that visualization is a
kind of “off-line” perception, and is therefore in some sense misrepresentational—should be rejected. The two remaining proposals
both conceive of visualization as a form of sensorimotor reasoning that is constitutive of one’s commitments concerning the way certain kinds of visuomotor scenarios unfold. According to the first, these commitments
impinge on one’s web of belief from without, in the manner of normal perceptual experience; according to the second, these commitments
just are one’s (occurrent) beliefs about such generalizations. I conclude that, despite being initially counterintuitive,
the view of visualization as a kind of occurrent belief is the most promising. 相似文献
7.
William Goodwin 《Argumentation》2010,24(3):363-374
In this paper, I characterize Susan Haack’s so called “passes-for” fallacy, analyze both what makes this inference compelling
and why it is illegitimate, and finally explain why reflecting on the passes-for fallacy—and others like it—should become
part of critical thinking pedagogy for humanities students. The analysis proceeds by examining a case of the passes-for fallacy
identified by Haack in the work of Ruth Bleier. A charitable reconstruction of Bleier’s reasoning shows that it is enlightening
to regard the passes-for fallacy as an abuse of the application conditions of the concept of bias, rather than as an egregious
case of Hasty Generalization. 相似文献
8.
We formalise a notion of dynamic rationality in terms of a logic of conditional beliefs on (doxastic) plausibility models.
Similarly to other epistemic statements (e.g. negations of Moore sentences and of Muddy Children announcements), dynamic rationality
changes its meaning after every act of learning, and it may become true after players learn it is false. Applying this to
extensive games, we “simulate” the play of a game as a succession of dynamic updates of the original plausibility model: the
epistemic situation when a given node is reached can be thought of as the result of a joint act of learning (via public announcements)
that the node is reached. We then use the notion of “stable belief”, i.e. belief that is preserved during the play of the
game, in order to give an epistemic condition for backward induction: rationality and common knowledge of stable belief in
rationality. This condition is weaker than Aumann’s and compatible with the implicit assumptions (the “epistemic openness
of the future”) underlying Stalnaker’s criticism of Aumann’s proof. The “dynamic” nature of our concept of rationality explains
why our condition avoids the apparent circularity of the “backward induction paradox”: it is consistent to (continue to) believe
in a player’s rationality after updating with his irrationality. 相似文献
9.
John S. Wilkins 《Synthese》2011,178(2):207-218
Creationism is usually regarded as an irrational set of beliefs. In this paper I propose that the best way to understand why
individual learners settle on any mature set of beliefs is to see that as the developmental outcome of a series of “fast and
frugal” boundedly rational inferences rather than as a rejection of reason. This applies to those whose views are opposed
to science in general. A bounded rationality model of belief choices both serves to explain the fact that folk traditions
tend to converge on “anti-modernity”, and to act as a default hypothesis, deviations from which we can use to identify other,
arational, influences such as social psychological, economic and individual dispositions. I propose some educational and public
policy strategies that might decrease the proportion of learners who find creationism and anti-science in general a rational
choice. 相似文献
10.
John Nolt 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2008,37(3):203-237
Several philosophers—including C. S. Peirce, William James, Hilary Putnam and Crispin Wright—have proposed various versions
of the notion that truth is an epistemic ideal. More specifically, they have held that a proposition is true if and only if
it can be fixedly warranted by human inquirers, given certain ideal epistemic conditions. This paper offers a general critique
of that idea, modeling conceptions of ideality and fixed warrant within the semantics that Kripke developed for intuitionistic
logic. It is shown that each of the two plausible notions of fixed warrant faces difficulties and that, moreover, “truth”
defined in terms of either of them is distressingly dependent upon one’s conception of idealized inquiry and perhaps also
upon one’s standards of warrant. 相似文献
11.
Daniel Guevara 《Synthese》2008,164(1):45-60
Various formally valid counterexamples have been adduced against the Humean dictum that one cannot derive an “ought” from
an “is.” There are formal rebuttals—some very sophisticated now (e.g., Charles R. Pigden’s and Gerhard Schurz’s)—to such counterexamples.
But what follows is an intuitive and informal argument against them. I maintain that it is better than these sophisticated
formal defenses of the Humean dictum and that it also helps us see why it implausible to think that we can be as decisive
about the truth or falsity of the dictum as both the formal counterexamples or formal barriers to them purport to be. 相似文献
12.
Kyung-Man Kim 《Human Studies》2011,34(4):393-406
Although the success of Habermas’s theory of communicative action depends on his dialogical model of understanding in which
a theorist is supposed to participate in the debate with the actors as a ‘virtual participant’ and seek context-transcendent
truth through the exchange of speech acts, current literature on the theory of communicative action rarely touches on the
difficulties it entails. In the first part of this paper, I will examine Habermas’s argument that understanding other cultural
practices requires the interpreter to virtually participate in the “dialogue” with the actors as to the rationality of their
cultural practice and discuss why, according to Habermas,such dialogue leads to the “context-transcendent truth”. In the second
part, by using a concrete historical example, I will reconstruct a “virtual dialogue” between Habermas and Michael Polanyi
as to the rationality of scientific practice and indicate why Habermas’s dialogical model of understanding based on the methodology
of virtual participation cannot achieve what it professes to do. 相似文献
13.
Jeff A. Snapper 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2011,69(1):45-56
In this paper I show that two arguments for the inconsistency of skeptical theism fail. After setting up the debate in “Introduction”
section, I show in “The initial debate” section why Mylan Engel’s argument (Engel 2004) against skeptical theism does not
succeed. In “COST” section I strengthen the argument so that it both avoids my reply to Engel and parallels Jon Laraudogoitia’s
argument against skeptical theism (Laraudogoitia 2000). In “COST*” section, I provide three replies—one by an evidentialist
theist, one by a closure-denying theist, and one by a necessitarian theist, and argue that the necessitarian’s reply successfully
rebuts the inconsistency charge. I conclude that skeptical theism which accepts God’s necessary existence is immune to both
kinds of arguments for its inconsistency. 相似文献
14.
Jiyuan Yu 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2008,3(3):317-334
In 1958, a group of New-Confucians issued “A Manifesto for a Re-Appraisal of Sinology and Reconstruction of Chinese Culture.”
Equally in 1958, the British philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe published her classical paper “Modern Moral Philosophy.” These
two papers have the same target — modern Western morality — and the solutions they proposed respectively. Yet Anscombe’s paper
did not mention Confucianism, and the “Manifesto” ignored Aristotelian tradition of virtue. Furthermore, from 1960s to 1990s,
the revival movement of Confucianism and the revival movement of Aristotelian ethics have not had much dialogue. This paper
seeks to explain this phenomenon by comparing these two historically important documents. In particular it tries to understand
why the “Manifesto” fails to see the similarities between Aristotle and Confucius.
Translated by Lei Yongqiang and polished by Yu Jiyuan from Shandong Daxue Xuebao 山东大学学报 (Journal of Shandong University), 2007, (1): 1–9 相似文献
15.
Joseph M. Kramp 《Pastoral Psychology》2009,58(4):387-401
I argue that what are typically identified as “calls from God” to an office of sacred power are filled with various degrees
and types of ambivalence. This ambivalence becomes manifest (or not) to the person experiencing a call at various points in
their lifespan and it exists for a number of reasons. I seek to unveil the psychodynamics responsible for these feelings of
ambivalence. I argue that the awareness of feelings of ambivalence can be correlated with the degree of one’s happiness—specifically
in one’s sexual and mental health; this point is marshaled throughout the essay by autobiographical examples of men who experienced
some type of divine calling. In addition to psychoanalytic resources, I apply postmodern autobiographical criticism to this
autobiographical study; my autobiographical notes are written in italics. 相似文献
16.
Hongxing Chen 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2010,5(4):506-522
This article draws out the subtle connections among the various sorts of categories—“sheng 生 (reproduction),” “qin 亲 (familiarity),” “ai 爱 (love),” and “ren 仁 (humaneness)”—focusing on the following: Confucius found the original significance of “reproduction” to be sympathy between
males and females, and upon further study he found it extended to the.affinity of blood relations, namely “familiarity.” From
“familiarity” he came to understand “love” that one generates and has for people and things beyond one’s blood relations,
in other words, the empathic heart or the feeling of empathy itself. From here he anticipated rende 仁德 (the humane and virtuous) level of “fan’ai zhong 泛爱众 (universal love for all people)” or “fan’ai wanwu 泛爱万物 (universal love for all creatures).” The article further makes the point that in order to meet the conditions for the
perfection of “humaneness” which has neither any excesses nor any deficiencies, Confucius ultimately developed a means, that
is, “the golden mean,” which indicates that his ancient understanding of life and growth produced in Confucius a profound
shift in the focus of human concern from “ming 命 (fate)” to “Dao 道 (the Way).” 相似文献
17.
David Botting 《Argumentation》2012,26(2):213-232
From Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations the following classifications are put forward and defended through extensive excerpts from the text. (AR-PFC) All sophistical
refutations are exclusively either ‘apparent refutations’ or ‘proofs of false conclusions’. (AR-F) ‘Apparent refutations’
and ‘fallacies’ name the same thing. (ID-ED) All fallacies are exclusively either fallacies in dictione or fallacies extra dictionem. (ID-nAMB) Not all fallacies in dictione are due to ambiguity. (AMB-nID) Not all fallacies due to ambiguity are fallacies in dictione. (AMB&ID-ME) The set of fallacies due to ambiguity and fallacies in dictione together comprise the set of arguments said to be “dependent on mere expression”. Being “dependent on mere expression” and
“dependent on language” are not the same (instances of the latter form a proper subset of instances of the former). (nME-FACT)
All arguments that are not against the expression are “against the fact.” (FACT-ED) All fallacious arguments against the fact
are fallacies extra dictionem (it is unclear whether the converse is true). (MAN-ARG) The solutions of fallacious arguments are exclusively either “against the man” or “against the argument.” (10) (F-ARG) Each (type of) fallacy
has a unique solution (namely, the opposite of whatever causes the fallacy), but each fallacious argument does not. However,
each fallacious argument does have a unique solution against the argument, called the ‘true solution’ (in other words, what
fallacy a fallacious argument commits is determined by how it is solved. However, if the solution is ‘against the man’ then
this is not, properly speaking, the fallacy committed in the argument. It is only the ‘true solution’—the solution against
the argument, of which there is always only one—that determines the fallacy actually committed). 相似文献
18.
Matthew S. Bedke 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(1):85-111
There are a number of proposals as to exactly how reasons, ends and rationality are related. It is often thought that practical
reasons can be analyzed in terms of practical rationality, which, in turn, has something to do with the pursuit of ends. I
want to argue against the conceptual priority of rationality and the pursuit of ends, and in favor of the conceptual priority
of reasons. This case comes in two parts. I first argue for a new conception of ends by which all ends are had under the guise
of reasons. I then articulate a sense of rationality, procedural rationality, that is connected with the pursuit of ends so
conceived, where one is rational to the extent that one is motivated to act in accordance with reasons as they appear to be.
Unfortunately, these conceptions of ends and procedural rationality are inadequate for building an account of practical reasons,
though I try to explain why it is that the rational pursuit of ends generates intuitive but misleading accounts of genuine
normative reasons. The crux of the problem is an insensitivity to an is-seems distinction, where procedural rationality concerns
reasons as they appear, and what we are after is a substantive sense of rationality that concerns reasons as they are. Based
on these distinct senses of rationality, and some disambiguation of what it is to have a reason, I offer a critique of internalist
analyses of one’s reasons in terms of the motivational states of one’s ideal, procedurally rational self, and I offer an alternative
analysis of one’s practical reasons in terms of practical wisdom that overcomes objections to related reasons externalist
views. The resulting theory is roughly Humean about procedural rationality and roughly Aristotelian about reasons, capturing
the core truths of both camps.
相似文献
Matthew S. BedkeEmail: |
19.
Peter B. M. Vranas 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2010,39(1):59-71
“Surrender; therefore, surrender or fight” is apparently an argument corresponding to an inference from an imperative to an
imperative. Several philosophers, however (Williams 1963; Wedeking 1970; Harrison 1991; Hansen 2008), have denied that imperative
inferences exist, arguing that (1) no such inferences occur in everyday life, (2) imperatives cannot be premises or conclusions
of inferences because it makes no sense to say, for example, “since surrender” or “it follows that surrender or fight”, and
(3) distinct imperatives have conflicting permissive presuppositions (“surrender or fight” permits you to fight without surrendering,
but “surrender” does not), so issuing distinct imperatives amounts to changing one’s mind and thus cannot be construed as
making an inference. In response I argue inter alia that, on a reasonable understanding of ‘inference’, some everyday-life
inferences do have imperatives as premises and conclusions, and that issuing imperatives with conflicting permissive presuppositions
does not amount to changing one’s mind. 相似文献
20.
Thomas Brockelman 《Continental Philosophy Review》2008,41(4):481-499
“Laughing at Finitude” interprets Slavoj Žižek’s intellectual project as responding to a challenge left by Being and Time. Setting out from discussions of Heidegger’s book in The Parallax View and The Ticklish Subject, the essay exfoliates Žižek’s response to the Heideggerian version of a “philosophy of finitude”—both finding the central
insight of Žižek’s work in Heidegger’s radical proposal for “anticipatory resoluteness” and developing Žižek’s critique of
Being and Time as indicating Heidegger’s retreat from that proposal within the very book where it appears. Žižek reads Being and Time’s existential thematic as proposing a radical subjectivism and, unlike other Heidegger-critics, praises this aspect of the
project. Indeed, Žižek claims that the weakness of Being and Time as a whole is that it is insufficiently radical in its subjectivism. For him, Heidegger is a thinker of ambiguous value, one who develops a program from whose own demands
he hides. “Laughing at Finitude” both articulates this accusation of self-deception in Heidegger and examines the imperatives
necessary to avoid it, for a dialectical shift from the “tragic” voice in existential treatments of finitude and for a revolutionary
collectivist re-conception of social “Mitsein.” It suggests, in the process, Žižek’s own intellectual itinerary.
相似文献
Thomas BrockelmanEmail: |