Framing effects on metacognitive monitoring and control

Three experiments explored the contribution of framing effects on metamemory judgments. In Experiment 1, participants studied word pairs. After each presentation, they made an immediate judgment of learning (JOL), framed in terms of either remembering or forgetting. In the remember frame, participants made judgments about how likely it was that they would remember each pair on the upcoming test. In the forget frame, participants made judgments about how likely it was that they would forget each pair. Confidence differed as a result of the frame. Forget frame JOLs, equated to the remember frame JOL scale by a 1-judgment conversion, were lower and demonstrated a smaller overconfidence bias than did remember frame JOLs. When judgments were made at a delay, framing effects did not occur. In Experiment 2, people chose to restudy more items when choices were made within a forget frame. In Experiment 3, people studied Spanish—English vocabulary pairs ranging in difficulty. The framing effect was replicated with judgments and choices. Moreover, forget frame participants included more easy and medium items to restudy. These results demonstrated the important consequences of framing effects on assessment and control of study.     

Evidence that judgments of learning are causally related to study choice

Three experiments investigated whether study choice was directly related to judgments of learning (JOLs) by examining people’s choices in cases in which JOLs were dissociated from recall. In Experiment 1, items were given either three repetitions or one repetition on Trial 1. Items given three repetitions received one on Trial 2, and those given one repetition received three on Trial 2—equating performance at the end of Trial 2, but yielding different immediate Trial 2 JOLs. Study choice followed the “illusory” JOLs. A delayed JOL condition in Experiment 2 did not show this JOL bias and neither did study choice. Finally, using a paradigm (Koriat & Bjork, 2005) in which similar JOLs are given to forward and backward associative pairs, despite much worse performance on the backward pairs, study choice again followed the mistaken JOLs. We concluded that JOLs—what people believe they know—directly influence people’s study choices.     

Multiple bases for young and older adults' judgments of learning in multitrial learning

Prior work has suggested that participants use a memory-for-past-tests (MPT) heuristic for judgments of learning (JOLs) in a multitrial learning scenario. That is, when learning the same material in multiple sessions, previous memory performance can be used as a basis for later memory predictions. We explored this issue by evaluating the impact of healthy aging on the use of MPT across trials. Young adults and healthy older adults learned pairs of words, made JOLs, and received a memory test in three study-test trials on the same material. Results indicated that both young and older adults relied on MPT as a basis for JOLs and changes in MPT across trials were nominal. Further, only the most-recent past test influenced JOLs, whereas earlier tests were unrelated to later judgments. JOLs were also influenced by prior-trial JOLs and were related to subsequent memory performance on the same trial. We suggest that these data support both indirect- and direct-memory mechanisms as the bases for the MPT heuristic. Further, in a multitrial learning scenario, in which the same information was being learned, young and older adults used the same bases for their JOLs.     

People use the memory for past-test heuristic as an explicit cue for judgments of learning

When people estimate their memory for to-be-learned material over multiple study–test trials, they tend to base their judgments of learning (JOLs) on their test performance for those materials on the previous trial. Their use of this information—known as the memory for past-test (MPT) heuristic—is believed to be responsible for improvements in the relative accuracy (resolution) of people’s JOLs across learning trials. Although participants seem to use past-test information as a major basis for their JOLs, little is known about how learners translate this information into a judgment of learning. Toward this end, in two experiments, we examined whether participants factored past-test performance into their JOLs in either an explicit, theory-based way or an implicit way. To do so, we had one group of participants (learners) study paired associates, make JOLs, and take a test on two study–test trials. Other participants (observers) viewed learners’ protocols and made JOLs for the learners. Presumably, observers could only use theory-based information to make JOLs for the learners, which allowed us to estimate the contribution of explicit and implicit information to learners’ JOLs. Our analyses suggest that all participants factored simple past-test performance into their JOLs in an explicit, theory-based way but that this information made limited contributions to improvements in relative accuracy across trials. In contrast, learners also used other privileged, implicit information about their learning to inform their judgments (that observers had no access to) that allowed them to achieve further improvements in relative accuracy across trials.     

The effects of categorical relatedness on judgements of learning (JOLs)

On-line monitoring during study can be influenced by the relatedness shared between the cue and target of a paired associate. We examined the effects on people's judgements of learning (JOLs) of a different kind of relatedness, which occurs in a list organised into sets of categorically related words and unrelated words. In two experiments, participants studied a list of words organised into a series of sets of four categorically related words or four unrelated words. In Experiment 1, JOLs were made immediately after each word had been studied, and JOL magnitude was greater for related than unrelated words. In Experiment 2, JOLs were delayed after study and, as expected, they were substantially greater for related sets of words. Serial position effects (an increase in JOL magnitude across the words of a related set) were evident with immediate JOLs but not with delayed JOLs. The relatedness effect was not present early in the list for immediate JOLs but was present throughout the list for delayed JOLs. We conclude by discussing some preliminary explanations for these new phenomena.     

The effects of categorical relatedness on judgements of learning (JOLs)

On-line monitoring during study can be influenced by the relatedness shared between the cue and target of a paired associate. We examined the effects on people's judgements of learning (JOLs) of a different kind of relatedness, which occurs in a list organised into sets of categorically related words and unrelated words. In two experiments, participants studied a list of words organised into a series of sets of four categorically related words or four unrelated words. In Experiment 1, JOLs were made immediately after each word had been studied, and JOL magnitude was greater for related than unrelated words. In Experiment 2, JOLs were delayed after study and, as expected, they were substantially greater for related sets of words. Serial position effects (an increase in JOL magnitude across the words of a related set) were evident with immediate JOLs but not with delayed JOLs. The relatedness effect was not present early in the list for immediate JOLs but was present throughout the list for delayed JOLs. We conclude by discussing some preliminary explanations for these new phenomena.     

The contributions of anchoring and past-test performance to the underconfidence-with-practice effect

In the underconfidence-with-practice effect, people's judgments of learning (JOLs) typically underestimate memory performance across multiple study-test phases. Whereas the past-test hypothesis suggests that this underconfidence stems from participants' reliance on earlier test performance to make subsequent JOLs (despite new learning), the anchoring hypothesis suggests that the underconfidence stems from participants' reliance on a fixed psychological anchor point low on the JOL scale to make their JOLs. To contrast the predictions of these hypotheses, we had college students study, make JOLs, and test over several dozen paired-associate items across two study-test phases. We parametrically manipulated the presence or absence of testing and judging within participants during Phase 1. Contrary to the past-test hypothesis, items tested during Phase 1 demonstrated less underconfidence during Phase 2 than did nontested items. Furthermore, participants did not increase JOLs from Phase 1 to Phase 2 for items that they had not recalled or for items that had not been tested at all, suggesting that the underconfidence stemmed largely from participants' overreliance on a psychological anchor point to make their JOLs. Past test performance, however, seems to be a major cue that participants use to adjust their JOLs away from the anchor, reducing underconfidence. This was most evident when we used a between-participants manipulation (Exp. 2) to cause our participants to anchor their JOLs either high or low on the JOL scale, producing differential underconfidence independent of any adjustment. Taken together, these results support the anchoring hypothesis over the past-test hypothesis for explaining underconfidence with practice.     

Monitoring of learning for emotional faces: how do fine-grained categories of emotion influence participants’ judgments of learning and beliefs about memory?

Researchers have evaluated how broad categories of emotion (i.e. positive and negative) influence judgments of learning (JOLs) relative to neutral items. Specifically, JOLs are typically higher for emotional relative to neutral items. The novel goal of the present research was to evaluate JOLs for fine-grained categories of emotion. Participants studied faces with afraid, angry, sad, or neutral expressions (Experiment 1) and with afraid, angry, or sad expressions (Experiment 2). Participants identified the expressed emotion, made a JOL for each, and completed a recognition test. JOLs were higher for the emotional relative to neutral expressions. However, JOLs were insensitive to the categories of negative emotion. Using a survey design in Experiment 3, participants demonstrated idiosyncratic beliefs about emotion. Some people believed the fine-grained emotions were equally memorable, whereas others believed a specific emotion (e.g. anger) was most memorable. Thus, beliefs about emotion are nuanced, which has important implications for JOL theory.     

Monitoring memory errors: the influence of the veracity of retrieved information on the accuracy of judgements of learning

The current study examined the degree to which predictions of memory performance made immediately or at a delay are sensitive to confidently held memory illusions. Participants studied unrelated pairs of words and made judgements of learning (JOLs) for each item, either immediately or after a delay. Half of the unrelated pairs (deceptive items; e.g., nurse-dollar) had a semantically related competitor (e.g., doctor) that was easily accessible when given a test cue (e.g., nurse-do_ _ _r) and half had no semantically related competitor (control items; e.g., subject-dollar). Following the study phase, participants were administered a cued recall test. Results from Experiment 1 showed that memory performance was less accurate for deceptive compared with control items. In addition, delaying judgement improved the relative accuracy of JOLs for control items but not for deceptive items. Subsequent experiments explored the degree to which the relative accuracy of delayed JOLs for deceptive items improved as a result of a warning to ensure that retrieved memories were accurate (Experiment 2) and corrective feedback regarding the veracity of information retrieved prior to making a JOL (Experiment 3). In all, these data suggest that delayed JOLs may be largely insensitive to memory errors unless participants are provided with feedback regarding memory accuracy.     

When people’s judgments of learning (JOLs) are extremely accurate at predicting subsequent recall: the “Displaced-JOL effect”

Judgments of learning (JOL) made after a delay more accurately predict subsequent recall than JOLs made immediately after learning. One explanation is that delayed JOLs involve retrieving information about the target item from secondary memory, whereas immediate JOLs involve retrieval from primary memory. One view of working memory claims that information in primary memory is displaced to secondary memory when attention is shifted to a secondary task. Thus, immediate JOLs might be as accurate as delayed JOLs if an intervening task displaces the target item from primary memory, requiring retrieval from secondary memory, prior to making the JOL. In four experiments, participants saw related word-pairs and made JOLs predicting later recall of the item. In Experiment 1, delayed JOLs were more accurate than JOLs made shortly after learning, regardless of whether a secondary task intervened between learning and JOL. In Experiments 2–4, the secondary task demands increased and JOLs made shortly after learning with an intervening task were just as accurate as delayed JOLs, and both were more accurate than immediate JOLs with no intervening task (Experiment 4). These results are consistent with a retrieval-based account of JOLs, and demonstrate that the “delayed-JOL effect” can be obtained without a long delay.     

Congruity influences memory and judgments of learning during survival processing

A recent line of research has suggested that memory systems evolved to encode fitness-relevant information more effectively than other types of information—a phenomenon known as the “survival processing effect” (Nairne, Thompson, & Pandeirada Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 33:263–273, 2007). However, the basis for the effect has been debated. In addition, it is unknown whether or not individuals will adjust their judgments of learning (JOLs) to reflect the survival processing effect. In three experiments, participants rated 16 words for their relevance to a survival scenario and another 16 words for their relevance to a bank robbery scenario. In Experiment 1A (with no JOLs), the survival processing effect emerged; in Experiment 1B (with JOLs), no survival processing effect emerged, but JOLs were higher in the survival condition. In both cases, these findings were confounded by higher relevance ratings in the survival condition. In Experiment 2, relevance was manipulated within each list, and the survival processing effect was eliminated. Instead, both recall and JOL magnitude were related to level of congruity between the words and type of processing. Together, these results provide further evidence for the role of congruity in the survival processing effect and JOLs.     

Influence of cue word perceptual information on metamemory accuracy in judgement of learning

Previous studies have suggested that perceptual information regarding to-be-remembered words in the study phase affects the accuracy of judgement of learning (JOL). However, few have investigated whether the perceptual information in the JOL phase influences JOL accuracy. This study examined the influence of cue word perceptual information in the JOL phase on immediate and delayed JOL accuracy through changes in cue word font size. In Experiment 1, large-cue word pairs had significantly higher mean JOL magnitude than small-cue word pairs in immediate JOLs and higher relative accuracy than small-cue pairs in delayed JOLs, but font size had no influence on recall performance. Experiment 2 increased the JOL time, and mean JOL magnitude did not reliably differ for large-cue compared with small-cue pairs in immediate JOLs. However, the influence on relative accuracy still existed in delayed JOLs. Experiment 3 increased the familiarity of small-cue words in the delayed JOL phase by adding a lexical decision task. The results indicated that cue word font size no longer affected relative accuracy in delayed JOLs. The three experiments in our study indicated that the perceptual information regarding cue words in the JOL phase affects immediate and delayed JOLs in different ways.     

Monitoring memory errors: The influence of the veracity of retrieved information on the accuracy of judgements of learning

The current study examined the degree to which predictions of memory performance made immediately or at a delay are sensitive to confidently held memory illusions. Participants studied unrelated pairs of words and made judgements of learning (JOLs) for each item, either immediately or after a delay. Half of the unrelated pairs (deceptive items; e.g., nurse–dollar) had a semantically related competitor (e.g., doctor) that was easily accessible when given a test cue (e.g., nurse–do_ _ _r) and half had no semantically related competitor (control items; e.g., subject–dollar). Following the study phase, participants were administered a cued recall test. Results from Experiment 1 showed that memory performance was less accurate for deceptive compared with control items. In addition, delaying judgement improved the relative accuracy of JOLs for control items but not for deceptive items. Subsequent experiments explored the degree to which the relative accuracy of delayed JOLs for deceptive items improved as a result of a warning to ensure that retrieved memories were accurate (Experiment 2) and corrective feedback regarding the veracity of information retrieved prior to making a JOL (Experiment 3). In all, these data suggest that delayed JOLs may be largely insensitive to memory errors unless participants are provided with feedback regarding memory accuracy.     

Using the past to predict the future

This research addressed three issues. First, we examined whether retrospective confidence judgments (RCJs) and judgments of learning (JOLs) assess memory differently. Second, we examined the relative accuracy of JOLs and RCJs at predicting future recall performance. Third, we examined whether making JOLs improves subsequent recall better than making RCJs or making no metacognitive judgment. Results suggest that RCJs and JOLs are both based on retrievability, but that participants use their memory differently when making JOLs. RCJs were more accurate than JOLs at predicting future recall for some subsets of items, but the reverse was true for other subsets of items. Finally, eventual recall performance was facilitated when participants made JOLs but not when they made RCJs, suggesting that the JOL task helps to improve people's learning of the items.     

学习和测验经验对学习判断中UWP效应的影响

针对重复学习判断中出现的练习伴随低估效应（UWP效应）,目前存在多种理论解释。本研究基于过去测验记忆假说,在学习阶段和测验阶段引入两种判断：学习判断准确性的判断和回溯性信心判断,通过两个实验考察学习经验和测验经验对UWP效应的影响。结果发现：在学习判断中学习判断准确性的判断和回溯性信心判断均消除了UWP效应,间接证明了学习和测验经验均影响到UWP效应的出现。     

Do memorability ratings affect study-time allocation?

This research addresses the relation between predicting future memory performance (judgment of learning, or JOL) and subsequent self-paced study-time allocation. The results of three experiments support the main hypotheses: (1) recall increases with increasing JOL, (2) restudy increases JOL accuracy, and (3) study time is related to JOL. This last relation depends on the length of initial presentation time of the items. When the initial exposure trials were short, the most restudy time was allocated to the items judged hard to recall, but when the initial exposure times were long, the most restudy time was allocated to the uncertain items. Items studied longer were recalled equally well (Experiments 1 and 3) or to a lesser extent (Experiment 2) than items studied for a shorter time. It is hypothesized that during study time, subjects refine their JOLs for the items initially less well discriminated.     

Metacognitive monitoring during criterion learning: When and why are judgments accurate?

Research on metacognitive judgment accuracy during retrieval practice has increased in recent years. However, prior work had not systematically evaluated item-level judgment accuracy and the underlying bases of judgment accuracy in a criterion-learning paradigm (in which items are practiced until correctly recalled during encoding). Understanding these relationships during criterion learning has important theoretical implications for self-regulated learning frameworks, and also has applied implications for student learning: If the factors that influence metacognitive judgments are not predictive of subsequent test performance, students may make poor decisions during self-regulated learning. In the present experiments, participants engaged in test–restudy practice until items were recalled correctly. Once a given item reached criterion, participants made an immediate or delayed judgment of learning (JOL) for the item. A final cued-recall test occurred 30 min later. We examined judgment accuracy (the relationship between JOLs and test performance) and the underlying bases of judgment accuracy by evaluating cue utilization (the relationship between cues and JOLs) and cue diagnosticity (the relationship between cues and test performance). Immediate JOLs were only modestly related to subsequent test performance, and further analyses revealed that the cues related to JOLs were only weakly predictive of test accuracy. However, delaying JOLs improved both the accuracy of the JOLs and the diagnosticity of the cues that influenced judgments.     

The role of memory for past test in the underconfidence with practice effect

According to the Memory for Past Test (MPT) heuristic, judgments of learning (JOLs) may be based, in part, on memory for the correctness of answers on a previous test. The authors explored MPT as the source of the underconfidence with practice effect (UWP; A. Koriat, L. Sheffer, & H. Ma'ayan, 2002), whereby Trial 1 overconfidence switches to underconfidence by Trial 2. Immediate and delayed JOLs were contrasted because only immediate JOLs demonstrate UWP. Consistent with MPT for immediate JOLs, Trial 1 test performance better predicted Trial 2 JOLs than did Trial 2 test performance. Delayed JOLs showed the reverse. Furthermore, items forgotten on Trial 1 but remembered on Trial 2 contributed disproportionately to UWP, but only with immediate JOLs.     

The effects of proactive interference (PI) and release from PI on judgments of learning

In three experiments, we investigated metacognitive monitoring in a variant of an A–B A–C learning paradigm in which the repetition of cues, but not targets, led to increasing proactive interference (PI) across trials. Judgments of learning (JOLs) correctly predicted decreases across trials in this paradigm but incorrectly continued to predict decreases on a final release trial in which new cues were introduced and performance consequently increased. Experience with the paradigm did not ameliorate this metacognitive failure (Experiment 3). In addition, JOLs decreased equally for pairs with repeated and with novel cue terms, even though recall of the latter group of items did not decrease across trials (Experiment 2). These results suggest that metacognizers’ naïve theories of remembering and forgetting include a role for global, but not cue-specific, interference.     

情绪确定性对学习判断的影响

为了揭示情绪的确定性维度对学习判断的影响,本研究通过使用即时学习判断范式的两个实验,分别探讨了高确定性情绪(愤怒、快乐)和低确定性情绪(恐惧、惊喜)的被试在学习判断中的表现。结果显示:(1)愤怒组和快乐组花费在项目学习上的时间显著少于恐惧组和惊喜组;(2)愤怒组的学习判断值显著高于恐惧组;(3)愤怒组的学习判断准确性显著低于恐惧组。从而证明了情绪的确定性维度与学习判断之间的因果关系。