Spinoza's Concept of Substance and Attribute: A Reading of the Short Treatise

ABSTRACT

In the recent secondary literature on Ockham’s philosophy of mind, it has been debated whether Ockham proposed an externalist or an internalist view of the intentional contents of intuitive cognitions. It has also been debated whether Ockham only attributes intentional content to intuitive cognitions, or rather two different properties, i.e. a likeness and an intentional content. Intuitive cognitions can be roughly understood as perceptions. In this article I propose a different perspective for analysing both debates, that is, the perspective that concerns Ockham’s theory of reflexivity. Ockham defended the idea that one can reflexively cognize two different features of intuitive cognitions; namely, their similarity or likeness, and their intentional content. Ockham proposed different degrees and modes of reflexive cognition regarding these features.     

STRAWSON ON EXISTENCE AS A PREDICATE

Abstract

Substance dualism is widely rejected by philosophers of mind, but many continue to accept some form of property dualism. The assumption here is that one can consistently believe that (1) mental properties are not physical properties, while denying that (2) mental particulars are not physical particulars. But is this assumption true? This paper considers several analyses of what makes something a physical particular (as opposed to a non-physical particular), and it is argued that on any plausible analysis, accepting (1) requires accepting (2) as well.     

Bare Personhood? Velleman on selfhood

In the Introduction to Self to Self, J. David Velleman claims that ‘the word “self” does not denote any one entity but rather expresses a reflexive guise under which parts or aspects of a person are presented to his own mind’ (Velleman 2006, 1). Velleman distinguishes three different reflexive guises of the self: the self of the person's self-image, or narrative self-conception; the self of self-sameness over time; and the self as autonomous agent. Velleman's account of each of these different guises of the self is complex and repays close philosophical attention. The first aim of this paper is therefore to provide a detailed analysis of Velleman's view. The second aim is more critical. While I am in agreement with Velleman about the importance of distinguishing the different aspects of selfhood, I argue that, even on his own account, they are more interrelated than he acknowledges. I also analyse the role of the concept of ‘bare personhood’ in Velleman's approach to selfhood and question whether this concept can function, as he wants it to, to bridge the gap between a naturalistic analysis of reasons for action and Kantian moral reasons.     

Positive and negative mind wandering: an assessment of their relationship with mindfulness and metacognition in university students / Divagación mental positiva y negativa: evaluando su relación con la atención plena y la metacognición en estudiantes universitarios

Abstract

This article reports the results of an initial study whose purpose was to create a mind wandering scale in Spanish through documenting evidence of its validity. Then, it presents the results of a second study that develops correlation and regression analysis on the relationship between positive and negative mind wandering, mindfulness, metacognition and frequency of daydreaming. Positive mind wandering has a positive correlation with all the mindfulness facets and metacognition scales, with the exception of the Academic Difficulties scale. Negative mind wandering has a negative correlation with all the mindfulness facets and metacognition scales, with two exceptions: Observing, which is uncorrelated with Negative Mind Wandering, and Academic Difficulties, which correlates positively. Likewise, the study allowed a preliminary identification of how positive and negative mind wandering — as well as facets of mindfulness — predict different metacognition scales. Upon examination of interaction effects, three significant — negative — effects were detected between positive mind wandering and the frequency of daydreaming when predicting (i) Independent Thinking, (ii) Academic Self-efficacy and (iii) Metacognitive Strategies. This suggests that, for these three response variables, the positive effects associated with positive mind wandering decrease as the frequency of daydreaming increases.     

More than Information: A Christian Critique of a New Dualism

In light of quantum theory and advances in computer science, scientists have posited that it is information, rather than matter, that forms the bedrock of the universe. Thus it follows that the essence of our selves as human beings is simply the information housed in the neural connections of our brain. If this is so, then the self could be reproduced digitally. Such a cybernetic immortality introduces a new Cartesian dualism that separates mind from body, locating the self wholly in the mind.

This view contrasts with the traditionally Christian view, that humans are created and best understood as being in the image of God—an image found in our rational intellect, our embodied agency, and our relationships. Our sense of self is incomplete without all three. We are neither just a mind nor just a body, but a mind that is both part and product of our human body, embedded within the larger environment of the physical world and human culture. Our knowledge, functioning, and self-understanding is shaped and acquired by and through our bodies. Without a body, we also cannot feel emotion, and thus have neither human-like intelligence nor compassion. The dreams of cybernetic immortality fail to capture the full nature of what it means to be human and are illusory hopes for a form of immortality not requiring the action of a supernatural being. Any hope for immortality is best found, as Niebuhr noted, beyond the scope of history. Further, this new dualism leads us to grandiose delusions—Niebuhr's sin of pride—regarding what we can accomplish in the here and now, delusions that are harmful to both our sense of self and to our capacity to love one another.     

Shame and Silence

Abstract

Samantha Vice’s proposal on how to live in ‘this strange place’ of contemporary South Africa, includes an appeal to the concepts of shame and silence. In this paper, I use Emmanuel Levinas and Giorgio Agamben to move the discussion of shame from a moral to an existential question. The issue is not about how one should feel, but about the kind of self that whiteness in South Africa makes possible today. Shame desubjectifies. Vice’s recommendation of silence is then taken as witnessing/listening, which I argue grounds the possibility of a recovery of the self.     

Non-reductivism and the metaphilosophy of mind

ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the metaphilosophical assumptions that have dominated analytic philosophy of mind, and how they gave rise to the central question that the best-known forms of non-reductivism available have sought to answer, namely: how can mind fit within nature? Its goal is to make room for forms of non-reductivism that have challenged the fruitfulness of this question, and which have taken a different approach to the so-called “placement” problem. Rather than trying to solve the placement problem, the forms of non-reductivism discussed in this paper have put pressure on the metaphilosophical assumptions that have given rise to the question of the place of mind in nature in the first instance.     

Courting the Enemy: McMahan on the Unity of Mind

Abstract

Jeff McMahan has recently developed the embodied mind theory of identity in place of the other standing theories, which he examines and consequently rejects. This paper examines the performance of his theory on cases of commissurotomy or the split-brain syndrome. Available experimental data concerning these cases seem to suggest that a single mind can divide into two independent streams in ways that are incompatible with our intuitive notion of mind. This phenomenon poses unique problems for McMahan's theory that we are essentially minds. I attempt to use his considered response to these cases as a weapon against his own embodied mind theory by highlighting some of the tensions in McMahan's response. In particular, I argue that in reaching his conclusion McMahan admits to something quite contrary to the very spirit of his own theory and that it is a powerful point in its support that one of the theories McMahan rejects can deal very well with these cases.     

Alexithymia and the reflexive self: Implications of congruence theory for treatment of the emotionally impaired

Abstract

This paper attempts to articulate a so far neglected dimension of congruence theory, the reflexive self to self transaction. My claim is that self reflexivity is a tacit but fundamental assumption behind Carl Rogers’ formulations of the relationship—what he refers to as “congruence” or “incongruence"—between experience and its symbolization in awareness. Gendlin's elaboration of the congruence theory in terms of “experiencing” and “inward sensing” has made clear and explicit the important role self reflexivity plays in the relationship between symbols and “unformed emotional experience.” A case vignette of Focusing is used to demonstrate the relevance of self reflexivity to our understanding of verbal expression of emotions, and by extension, to our understanding and treatment of alexithymia and related conditions of emotional impairments.     

Neurodualism: People Assume that the Brain Affects the Mind more than the Mind Affects the Brain

People commonly think of the mind and the brain as distinct entities that interact, a view known as dualism. At the same time, the public widely acknowledges that science attributes all mental phenomena to the workings of a material brain, a view at odds with dualism. How do people reconcile these conflicting perspectives? We propose that people distort claims about the brain from the wider culture to fit their dualist belief that minds and brains are distinct, interacting entities: Exposure to cultural discourse about the brain as the physical basis for the mind prompts people to posit that mind–brain interactions are asymmetric, such that the brain is able to affect the mind more than vice versa. We term this hybrid intuitive theory neurodualism. Five studies involving both thought experiments and naturalistic scenarios provided evidence of neurodualism among laypeople and, to some extent, even practicing psychotherapists. For example, lay participants reported that “a change in a person's brain” is accompanied by “a change in the person's mind” more often than vice versa. Similarly, when asked to imagine that “future scientists were able to alter exactly 25% of a person's brain,” participants reported larger corresponding changes in the person's mind than in the opposite direction. Participants also showed a similarly asymmetric pattern favoring the brain over the mind in naturalistic scenarios. By uncovering people's intuitive theories of the mind–brain relation, the results provide insights into societal phenomena such as the allure of neuroscience and common misperceptions of mental health treatments.     

Phenomenal consciousness in dreams and in mind wandering

Dreaming can be explained as the product of an interaction among memory processes, elaborative processes, and phenomenal awareness. A feedback circuit is activated by this interaction according to the associative links and the requirements of the dream scene. Recently, it has been hypothesized that a partial similarity exists between dreaming and mind wandering and that these two processes may involve the same neural default network. This commentary discusses the differences and similarities between phenomenal consciousness during dreaming and phenomenal consciousness during mind wandering from the perspective of the “continuity” of engagement of cognitive systems. The greatest difference consists in the lack of reality testing during dreaming. Dream imagery is hallucinatory by nature. Consequently, the simulated world in dreams makes dream imagery more akin to perception. In contrast, the imagery of mind wandering is more similar to imagination. The level of meta-awareness is preserved more frequently and to a greater degree in mind wandering.     

We are one: Grief,weeping, and other deep emotions in response to nature as a path toward wholeness

Abstract

Using his own experience of grief in nature as a starting point, the researcher conducted an intuitive inquiry (Anderson, 2004) into experiences of grief, weeping, and other deep emotions in response to the natural world. Written stories of 40 people, told in the style of embodied writing (Anderson, 2001), were gathered and studied. The primary interpretation framed by the researcher was that experiences of grief, weeping, and other deep emotions in response to nature represent moments in a process of psycho‐spiritual transformation capable of healing the splits between mind and body, and between humanity and nature, that are prevalent in contemporary industrial and post‐industrial societies. Additional interpretations, focusing on the role of the body and embodiment, grief and weeping, and nature and spirituality, are offered. Interpretations are fleshed out with excerpts from participants’ stories.     

Fuzzy Fault Lines: Selves in Multiple Personality Disorder

Abstract

This paper outlines a multidimensional conception of Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) that differs from the ‘orthodox’ conception in terms of the content of its commitment to the reality of the self. Unlike the orthodox conception it recognizes that selves are fuzzy entities. By appreciating the possibility that selves are fuzzy entities, it is possible to rebut a form of fictionalism about the self which appeals to clinical data from MPD. Realism about self can be preserved in the face of multiple personalities.     

Demystifying Without Quining: Wittgenstein and Dennett on Qualitative States

Abstract

In his 1991 book Consciousness Explained, Daniel Deimett presents his “Multiple Drafts” model of consciousness. Central to his theory is the rejection of the notion of ‘qualia’ of the existence of the purported ‘qualitative character’ of conscious experience that many argue rules out the possibility of a purely materialist theory of mind. In eliminating qualia from his theory of consciousness, Dennett claims to be following in the footsteps of Wittgenstein, who also had much to say regarding the nature of ‘private’ experience. In this paper I reject this claim and argue that the elimination of qualia plays no part in Wittgenstein’s radical understanding of conscious experience.’¹     

Ego transcendence in postmodern perspective

Based on the author's previous specification of the conventional ego mind as the primary barrier to “realization of the ground of consciousness,” postmodern perspectives on the ego mind barrier are compared with premodern and modern approaches. Postmodernists view the ego as a socio‐linguistic construct. Modern assumptions of consistent subjectivity and a unitary self or identity are rejected, and reduction of the ego mind barrier to transcendence is seen to follow from exploration of alternative self‐concepts. This perspective is manifest in theories of “possible selves” and in the contrast between formulations such as the “saturated self vs. the “empty self.” Though forms of ego transcendence likely in postmodern cultures will differ from those in premodern cultures, many of the same functions will be served, as may be observed in such phenomena as “ecomysticism.”     

From Indian philosophy to cognitive neuroscience: two empirical case studies for Ganeri's <Emphasis Type="Italic">Self</Emphasis>

In this commentary, I confront Ganeri’s theory of self with two case studies from cognitive neuroscience and interdisciplinary consciousness research: mind wandering and full-body illusions. Together, these case studies suggest new questions and constraints for Ganeri's theory of self. Recent research on spontaneous thought and mind wandering raises questions about the transition from unconscious monitoring to the phenomenology of ownership and the first-person stance. Full-body illusions are relevant for the attenuation problem of how we distinguish between self and others. Discussing these examples can help refine key transitions in Ganeri’s theory of self and ensure its empirical plausibility. This discussion also identifies points of contact between Ganeri's self and cognitive neuroscience, raising new questions for future research, both philosophical and empirical.     

Wishful Thinking and the Unconscious: A Reply to Gouws

Abstract

This paper argues against the view that the Freudian unconscious can be understood as an extension of ordinary belief-desire psychology. The paper argues that Freud’s picture of the mind challenges the paradigm of folk psychology, as it is understood by much contemporary philosophy of psychology and cognitive science. The dynamic unconscious postulated by psychoanalysis operates according to rules and principles that are distinct in kind from those rules that organise rational and conscious thought. Psychoanalysis offers us a radical reconception of our ordinary way of thinking about our own minds.