REVIEWS

Book reviewed in this article:
Unbaptized God: The Basic Flaw in Ecumencial Theology by Robert W. Jenson
The Body of God, by Saille Mcfague
Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions by David B.Burrell
Speaking the Christian God:the Holy Trinity and the Challenge of Feminism,by Alvin F. Kimel
Loyalty to God. The Apostles'Creed in life and Liturgy by Theodore W. Jennings, Jr.
Theology and Narrative: Selected Essays by Hans Frei, ed. George Hunsinger and William C. Placher
Pseudo-Dionysius. A Commentary on the Texts and an Intriduction to Their Influence, by Paul Rorern
Ecumencial faith in Evangetical Perspective by Gabriel Rapids
Theology after Vedanta. An Experiment in Comparative Theology, by Francis X. Clooney,S.J.
New Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of Transforming Biblical Reading by Anthony C. Thiselton
Shadow of Spirit: Postmodernism and Religion edited by Philippa Berry and Andrew Wernick
The Amnesty of Grace: Justification by Faith from a Latin American Perspective, by Elsa Tamez, trans. Sharon H. Ringe     

From Sanātana Dharmato Secularism: Hindu Identity in the Thought of Swami Rama Tirtha and the Swami Rama Tirtha Mission

The speeches and writings of the neo-Vedantin Swami Rama Tirtha (1873–1906) and his followers show an ongoing concern with discussion of Hinduism, Vedanta, and religion in general. Although a constant in this discussion is the basic understanding of Vedanta as the core, essential truth of all religions, the presentation of Vedanta has changed in differing social and political situations. This paper examines how one Hindu community has sought to define Hinduism and construct its own sense of identity over time, focusing particularly on the ways in which the definition of Hinduism has been modified since India became an independent, secular state.     

PANENTHEISM,NEUTRAL MONISM,AND ADVAITA VEDANTA

It is argued that when it comes to the hard problem of consciousness neutral monism beats out the competition. It is further argued that neutral monism provides a unique route to a novel type of panentheism via Advaita Vedanta Hinduism.     

A Strange Fire: an exploration of psycho‐spiritual development aided by Jungian analysis and Vedanta

This paper explores the process of psychological and spiritual development through a series of active imaginations arising from the author's ‘psycho‐spiritual quest’, a process of transformation in which the individual progressively frees themselves from the ego's identifications and may be afforded a vision of the ‘self as consciousness’, as described by Vedanta. The author describes how this quest was facilitated by the disciplines of Transcendental Meditation, Jungian analysis and Vedanta, and how these three disciplines can work together to foster psycho‐spiritual development. The paper aims to de‐mystify the actual experiences that can accompany these practices. The records of these active imaginations, tracing some key stages in this process, are then presented, with a commentary by Marcus West, linking them to Jung's concepts of ego and Self and recent understandings of consciousness and ego development. There is a discussion of Jung's conceptualizations of the ego and the Self and his rejection of the Vedantic understanding of the Self as consciousness. These views are then explored and a reconciliation is suggested through the understanding of the process of disidentification where the difference between Jung's view of the Self and that of Vedanta is understood to be due to the extent of disidentification from the contents of consciousness.     

It's Personal—Or Not At All: On God as Love/r

Abstract : Henriksen discusses what it means that God is personal, with special regard to the claim that God is love. If God is love, God must be understood as personal. This approach is related to different elements concerning human life and human freedom, and how to engage in human life. Also the radical alternative is suggested: instead of understanding God as love, the alternative is considered that death is God (as the final and strongest power there is). This alternative shows that it is the most likely interpretation of actual human conduct to opt for the alternative that God is love. Hence, to understand God as love is part of what it means to relate humanely and with hope to what is taking place in human life.     

Advaita Vedanta and the Repositioning of Subjectivity in the Life-writing of Christopher Isherwood, "Homosexualist"

Abstract

For British critics, Christopher Isherwood went off the literary radar when he declared himself a pacifist and de-camped to California on the eve of WWII. Nothing he wrote after the Berlin Stories (1939), when his life was barely half over, until Christopher and his Kind, in 1976, when he emerged as a kind of gay literary icon, was accorded much serious attention from Britain's literary establishment. Furthermore, what he published during his long relationship with a guru in the Ramakrishna Vedanta tradition—which culminated in the classic My Guru and his Disciple (1980)—has scarcely been taken seriously, and only a few of the more astute literary critics have detected the influence of Vedanta philosophy in his later work (e.g. Nagarajan, 1972). Yet there have been calls for Isherwood to be re-evaluated as a serious religious writer (Wade, 2001).

If such calls are to be taken seriously there are several issues that need to be addressed, not the least of which would be the dominant cultural expectations surrounding the (im)possibility of a spirituality not predicated on the denial of sexuality. "My personal approach to Vedanta was, among other things, the approach of a homosexual looking for a religion which will accept him," he wrote in 1970 (Bucknell, 2000: ix).

There is also the problem of an unreconstructed colonialist prejudice towards religious practices associated with a subject people. Here, I review important aspects of the non-dualist philosophy of his Advaita training that allowed Isherwood to integrate his sexuality and his writing with his religious practice.

Isherwood was inclined less to approach ideas as abstract principles and more as they were embodied in particular people. With this particular Swami, an exponent of the Ramakrishna Vedanta tradition, Isherwood found his lifelong guide, and the narrative of his spiritual journey is the history of a relationship that deepened over 40 years. That relationship is the other focus of this article.     

The doubled movement of infinity in Kierkegaard and in Sūfism

S?ren Kierkegaard was a very rigorous critic of traditional philosophical thinking and speculative systems. According to his theory it is possible that there is a logic system, but not a system of life. If such a system exists, it can be known only to God. Man can attain the meaning of life only by his own relationship to God. However, this relationship cannot be explained by philosophy because it has to do with a transcendent ‘double movement of infinity’ which takes place between God and the individual. Like philosophy, mysticism cannot explain one's relationship to God. The difference is that philosophy neglects God as the absolute starting point, while mysticism forgets that an individual—after he has experienced divinity—may return to the real world. The self need not disappear in divinity. The dialectic of the relationship between God and man implies that both poles (God and man) are present, thus ‘the infinite difference between God and man’ does not disappear. Since Sūfism is a type of Islamic mysticism, it may be said that a Sūfi cannot witness God's truth if he remains in his union with God. It is therefore relevant to draw some parallels between Kierkegaard's view and a comparable Sūfi view about the human relationship to God.     

Should We Want God to Exist?

Whether God exists is a metaphysical question. But there is also a neglected evaluative question about God’s existence: Should we want God to exist? Very many, including many atheists and agnostics, appear to think we should. Theists claim that if God didn’t exist things would be far worse, and many atheists agree; they regret God’s inexistence. Some remarks by Thomas Nagel suggest an opposing view: that we should want God not to exist. I call this view anti‐theism. I explain how such view can be coherent, and why it might be correct. Anti‐theism must be distinguished from the argument from evil or the denial of God’s goodness; it is a claim about the goodness of God’s existence. Anti‐theists must claim that it’s a logical consequence of God’s existence that things are worse in certain respects. The problem is that God’s existence would also make things better in many ways. Given that God’s existence is likely to be impersonally better overall, anti‐theists face a challenge similar to that facing nonconsequentialists. I explore two ways of meeting this challenge.     

The problem of religious evil: Does belief in god cause evil?

Daniel Kodaj has recently developed a pro-atheistic argument that he calls “the problem of religious evil.” This first premise of this argument is “belief in God causes evil.” Although this idea that belief in God causes evil is widely accepted, certainly in the secular West, it is sufficiently problematic as to be unsuitable as a basis for an argument for atheism, as Kodaj seeks to use it. In this paper I shall highlight the problems inherent in it in three ways: by considering whether it is reasonable to say that “belief in God” causes evil; whether it is reasonable to say that belief in God “causes” evil; and whether it is reasonable to say that belief in God causes “evil.” In each case I will argue that it is problematic to make such claims, and accordingly I will conclude that the premise “belief in God causes evil” is unacceptable as it stands, and consequently is unable to ground Kodaj’s pro-atheistic argument.     

On the Morality of Having Faith that God Exists

Many theists who identify themselves with the Abrahamic religions (Christianity, Judaism, and Islam) maintain that it is perfectly acceptable to have faith that God exists. In this paper, I argue that, when believing that God exists will affect others, it is prima facie wrong to forgo attempting to believe that God exists on the basis of sufficient evidence. Lest there be any confusion: I do not argue that it is always wrong to have faith that God exists, only that, under certain conditions, it can be.     

Meeting the Evil God Challenge

The evil God challenge is an argumentative strategy that has been pursued by a number of philosophers in recent years. It is apt to be understood as a parody argument: a wholly evil, omnipotent and omniscient God is absurd, as both theists and atheists will agree. But according to the challenge, belief in evil God is about as reasonable as belief in a wholly good, omnipotent and omniscient God; the two hypotheses are roughly epistemically symmetrical. Given this symmetry, thesis belief in an evil God and belief in a good God are taken to be similarly preposterous. In this paper, we argue that the challenge can be met, suggesting why the three symmetries that need to hold between evil God and good God – intrinsic, natural theology and theodicy symmetries – can all be broken. As such, we take it that the evil God challenge can be met.     

Divine timelessness: A coherent but unfruitful doctrine?

The author argues in this article that it is possible to have a consistent and coherent version of the doctrine of divine timelessness. Towards the objection that a timeless God cannot act it is defended that a timeless God can certainly act in the world and can love human people. In spite of the consistency and coherence of the doctrine of divine timelessness, however, the author has serious problems with the fruitfulness of this doctrine when it comes to essential practices of the Christian faith, such like seeking help from God, loving God, and prayer.     

Prevalence and Social-Cognitive Predictors of Anger Toward God in a Polish Sample

Based on empirical studies, we may assume religion is an important source of support, consolation, and a sense of life for many individuals. However, notwithstanding the psychological benefits religion provides, it is also a reason for discomfort and struggle. The research presented in this article is an attempt at analyzing one of religious struggle types: anger toward God. Our study addresses the following issues: (a) prevalence of anger toward God in a national Polish sample; (b) predictors of anger toward God (religious attributions and God concepts); and (c) moderation of relationships between religious attributions, God concepts and anger toward God by centrality of religiosity. We applied the social-cognitive perspective for explaining the phenomenon of anger toward God. The results showed that anger toward God is frequently a reaction to negative experiences, and its intensity is low, lower than the intensity of positive emotions toward God. Anger toward God correlated positively with assigning negative intentions and the responsibility for suffering to God. A moderating effect of centrality on the relation between attributions and perception of God and anger toward God was observed.     

Postmodernism—A cross‐cultural perspective

In this paper, I attempt to throw light on the phenomenon of postmodernism by comparing it with the understanding of other cultures such as the Indian and Chinese. One can say that postmodernism, like, say Mahayana Buddhism, Taoism and Advaita Vedanta recognise the impossibility of finding an absolute in the world. However, unlike the latter three, rather than moving on beyond finite things, postmodernism seems content to simply sit and play around with the non‐absolutes that it has found (even if ‘ironically'). Comparison with the philosophies of other cultures, and also the message of Christianity, show clearly the mistake that postmodernism makes in doing this. Finally, I note some of the responsibilities that Western postmodern philosophers have.     

Abstracts of the Major Articles

Aquinas tried to establish his metaphysics of creation theologically and philosophically. Crea- ting belongs to God alone, as means that it is God＇s divine action. For God, as to its essence, is nothing but pure act. The essence of creation is creatio ex nihilo, as means that God the Creator alone creates the entire world out of nothing. Since God is the giver of being, the first principle a- lone, creating is but to give being. And the creatures, as to their existence, were created by God. Although all the things come from God absolutely, they have their own participated being and good. As a new theological paradigm, Aquinas＂ metaphysics of creation was a philosophical ex- pression of the Bible sentence, namely, ＂In the beginning God creates heaven and earth. ＂     

论阿奎那创世形而上学的三个层面

阿奎那在形而上学基础上建构创世信仰,确立创世形而上学体系。此体系包含三个层面:上帝是世界的第一原则,其本质与存在同一,即纯粹的现实活动;创造作为上帝的本质体现和神圣活动就是存在的给予;世界万物,既绝对受造于上帝,又自有其分有之在,表现为存在论上的依存性和自在性。阿奎那的创世形而上学正是对《圣经》"起初,上帝创造天地"信仰告白的哲学表达,代表了新的神学范式。     

Illness theodicies in the New Testament

The New Testament writers advocate or at least mention six different religious explanations for the origin of sickness. First, Satan may thus victimize the innocent. Second, God may send sickness as a punishment for the sufferer's sins. Third, God may send sickness to punish one's parents' sins. Fourth, God may so punish one's own sins committed in a previous life. Fifth, God may inflict illness in order to show his power by subsequent healing. Sixth, God may inflict illness in order to show his power by sustaining the sufferer through the illness instead of healing it.     

God and Evil: A Dialogue

There is a lot of badness around. And many have concluded that there is, therefore, no God. Why? Because God is commonly said to be omnipotent (all‐powerful), omniscient (all‐knowing), and good, and because it seems hard to see how such a God could ever permit the existence of the horrors we find in the world. But does evil show that God does not exist? Many people believe that it does. But what might they say to someone who takes the opposite view? Perhaps they might start by arguing as John does with Ron in the following discussion.     

EUTHYPHRO AND THE GOODNESS OF GOD INCARNATE

A familiar problem is here viewed from an unfamiliar angle. The familiar problem is the Euthyphro dilemma: if God wills something because it is good, then goodness is independent of God, so God becomes, morally speaking, de trop. On the other hand, if something is good because God wills it, then, given the absence of constraint on what God may will, moral truths are – counterintuitively – contingent. An examination of the kinds of necessity and possibility at work in this conundrum leads us to the most promising solution: there is a metaphysical connection between God and goodness. What he wills is an expression of his nature. But (and this is the unfamiliar angle), that solution now poses an acute problem for an understanding of the Incarnation. For if God is constitutive of goodness, and Christ is God incarnate, then Christ is constitutive of goodness. But Christ, as a human, is subject to external moral evaluation and obligation, which entails that he is not constitutive of goodness. This metaethical difficulty is not easily met by the usual strategies by which Christ is understood to have two natures. Reflection on our moral relations to our past selves, however, suggests a way forward.     

Is penal substitution unjust?

Penal substitution in a theological context is the doctrine that God inflicted upon Christ the suffering which we deserved as the punishment for our sins, as a result of which we no longer deserve punishment. Ever since the time of Faustus Socinus, the doctrine has faced formidable, and some would say insuperable, philosophical challenges. Critics of penal substitution frequently assert that God’s punishing Christ in our place would be an injustice on God’s part. For it is an axiom of retributive justice that it is unjust to punish an innocent person. But Christ was an innocent person. Since God is perfectly just, He cannot therefore have punished Christ. Virtually every premiss in this argument is challengeable. Not all penal substitution theories affirm that Christ was punished for our sins. The argument makes unwarranted assumptions about the ontological foundations of moral duty independent of God’s commands. It presupposes without warrant that God is by nature an unqualified negative retributivist. It overlooks the possibility that the prima facie demands of negative retributive justice might be overridden in Christ’s case by weightier moral considerations. And it takes it for granted that Christ was legally innocent, which is denied by the classic doctrine of imputation. It thus fails to show any injustice in God’s punishing Christ in our place.