The Fading Boundaries of Analysis and Speculation in the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi: An Argument Recognising Advaita as a Philosophy in Praxis

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - The recent scholarship on Advaita testifies that the epistemology of Advaita Vedānta is of a special sort that warrants a philosophical...     

The Predicament of Moral Epistemology

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - Moral epistemology (henceforth ME) has been spoken of as a subject matter in its own right by philosophers in the last few decades and yet the...     

On the Coherence of Dignāga’s Epistemology: Evaluating the Critiques of Candrakīrti and Jayarāśi

I discuss two critiques of Dignāga’s epistemology, one from Candrakīrti and another from Jayarā?i. I argue that they are two versions of what I call the core problem: if the content of Dignāga’s epistemology were correct, two fundamental beliefs within this epistemological theory could not be established or known to be true, as Dignāga claims they are. In response to objections found within the classical Indian tradition as well as several plausible contemporary objections, I then argue that the core problem remains a serious issue with which those sympathetic to Dignāga ought to contend.     

Epistemology, the History of Epistemology, Historical Epistemology

A brief discussion of the ways in which awareness of and sensitivity to the history of philosophy can contribute to epistemology even if epistemology is understood as a distinctively philosophical and not primarily historical enterprise.     

Knowledge, doubt, and circularity

Ernest Sosa??s virtue perspectivism can be thought of as an attempt to capture as much as possible of the Cartesian project in epistemology while remaining within the framework of externalist fallibilism. I argue (a) that Descartes??s project was motivated by a desire for intellectual stability and (b) that his project does not suffer from epistemic circularity. By contrast, Sosa??s epistemology does entail epistemic circularity and, for this reason, proves unable to secure the sort of intellectual stability Descartes wanted. I then argue that this leaves Sosa??s epistemology vulnerable to an important kind of skepticism.     

Supremacist thinking,epistemological despair,and Christian hope

This article looks at the connection between white supremacist cults and an epistemology of despair—a view that knowledge cannot be shared or communicated between diverse people. The theology of Augustine, the fourth century African bishop, undermines the power of this epistemology by inspiring hope in dialogue as an avenue towards ending white supremacist thinking.     

Feminist Epistemology, Contextualism, and Philosophical Skepticism

Abstract: This essay explores the relation between feminist epistemology and the problem of philosophical skepticism. Even though feminist epistemology has not typically focused on skepticism as a problem, I argue that a feminist contextualist epistemology may solve many of the difficulties facing recent contextualist responses to skepticism. Philosophical skepticism appears to succeed in casting doubt on the very possibility of knowledge by shifting our attention to abnormal contexts. I argue that this shift in context constitutes an attempt to exercise unearned social and epistemic power and that it should be resisted on epistemic and pragmatic grounds. I conclude that skepticism is a problem that feminists can and should take up as they address the social aspects of traditional epistemological problems.     

The Curricula of Tibetan Buddhist Commentarial Schools (bshad grwa): Traditional Models and Some Recent Adaptations

This article examines commentarial schools (bshad grwa) within the non-Gelug traditions of Tibetan Buddhism, especially their normative curriculum of ‘thirteen great texts’ promoted—though not necessarily first conceived—by Khenpo Zhenpen Nangwa (1871–1927). Focused on Indian ?āstra, this ideal curriculum omits Tibetan works, tantras and texts on logic and epistemology (pramā?a), and represents the main body of an exoteric curriculum that could be preceded by basic introductory topics and augmented by advanced esoteric study. Recent adaptations of this curriculum by some of the most important non-Gelug institutions in exile depart from Zhenpen Nangwa's non-sectarian ideal in order to accommodate the texts, topics and interpretations favoured by the tradition to which the institution belongs. The article concludes by asking whether further changes to traditional curricula and pedagogy are likely, following the introduction of new qualifications adopted from the Indian university system and developments such as the creation of commentarial schools for international students.     

Judgements,Expertise, and Counterfactuals

Abstract

In The Philosophy of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), Tim Williamson has offered a sophisticated account of thought experiments and of modal epistemology. More recently, he has also engaged in a variant of the so-called ‘expertise defence’ of traditional philosophical methodology. In this paper I argue that if Williamson’s account of thought experiments and of modal epistemology is right, this seriously undermines his version of the expertise defence.     

Discovering Jesus Anew

In light of the political and ritual abuse of religion in India today, this article underlines the importance of Christian women’s engagement with women of all faiths to resist discrimination and violence. The Indian Christian Women’s Movement draws on Jesus’ liberative practice and teaching as women find creative and subversive ways to strengthen Christian women’s solidarity with women of other faiths. While all faith traditions carry embedded patriarchal biases that have been used to legitimize the second-class status of women, they also have streams of liberation motifs. The article employs a feminist epistemology to reconstruct dominant theological motifs and assumptions based on an ethic of care, compassion, and mutuality in relationships.     

Dialoguing Height Psychology into a life of interconnectedness: Response to commentaries by Hwang,Bhawuk, King & Hodgetts,Kashima, and Xie,Su, & Zhong

Liu (Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 000, 000) attempts to articulate an epistemology for the aspirational practice of Height Psychology as a human science informed by Kantian epistemology in dialogue with other philosophies, especially Confucianism and Taoism. Height Psychology is a framework or metatheory for the practice of teaching, research, and service rooted in Kantian epistemology, in dialogue with other philosophies. It provides a holistic philosophy for social scientists responding to wicked problems unfolding over long periods of time. In responding to commentaries, I suggest a corollary to Shweder's (Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 3, p. 207) ‘One mind, many mentalities’: ‘Many indigenous psychologies, interconnected by one epistemology’. Height Psychology is about holding to an invisible moral centre. The practical postulates are foundational to the moral and ethical practices of human societies: they are for doing, their value is ontological. Human agency, proscribed by natural science epistemologies takes centre stage in Height Psychology by facilitating social scientists to act reflexively from multiple positions (from basic to action research) to benefit society. Height Psychology is dedicated to articulating and actioning the moral and ethical basis of a human science that can assist present and future generations of social scientists to meet the grave situational futures facing us in different parts of the world.     

Some historical and conceptual relations among logical positivism, operationism, and behaviorism

Historical and conceptual relations among logical positivism, conventional operationism, and behaviorism are examined from the standpoint of Skinner's radical behaviorism. Although logical positivism and conventional operationism sought the formulation and application of an epistemology based strictly upon physicalistic principles and experiential verification, the application of that epistemology in psychology has resulted in the perpetuation, rather than the resolution, of a number of mentalistic, if not outright dualistic, problems.     

Evidence,experience, and externalism

The Sellarsian dilemma is a famous argument that attempts to show that nondoxastic experiential states cannot confer justification on basic beliefs. The usual conclusion of the Sellarsian dilemma is a coherentist epistemology, and the usual response to the dilemma is to find it quite unconvincing. By distinguishing between two importantly different justification relations (evidential and nonevidential), I hope to show that the Sellarsian dilemma, or something like it, does offer a powerful argument against standard nondoxastic foundationalist theories. But this reconceived version of the argument does not support coherentism. Instead, I use it to argue for a strongly externalist epistemology.     

Moral knowledge and self control in Mengzi: rectitude,courage, and Qi

In this paper, I reveal systematic aspects of the moral epistemology of the Warring States Confucian, Mengzi. Mengzi thinks moral knowledge is ‘internally’ available to humans because it is acquired through normative dictates built into the human heart–mind (xin). Those dictates are capable of motivating and justifying an agent's normative categorizations. Such dictates are linked to Mengzi's conception of human nature (ren xing) as good. I then interpret Mengzi's difficult discussion of courage and qi in Mengzi 2A: 2 as illuminating the idea of ‘internal’ justification. The epistemology of courage is intimately related in 2A: 2 to its practice. Finally, I indicate at the end in outline the ways in which Mengzi and Gaozi are engaged in a dispute about moral epistemology that pits each of them against Xunzi and also against Zhuangzi.     

A Priori Causal Models of Natural Selection

Plato articulates a deep perplexity about inquiry in ‘Meno's Paradox’—the claim that one can inquire neither into what one knows, nor into what one does not know. Although some commentators have wrestled with the paradox itself, many suppose that the paradox of inquiry is special to Plato, arising from peculiarities of the Socratic elenchus or of Platonic epistemology. But there is nothing peculiarly Platonic in this puzzle. For it arises, too, in classical Indian philosophical discussions, where it is formulated with great clarity, and analysed in a way that casts it in a new light. We present three treatments of the puzzle in Indian philosophy, as a way of refining and sharpening our understanding of the paradox, before turning to the most radical of the Indian philosophers to tackle it. The Indian philosophers who are optimistic that the paradox can be resolved appeal to the existence of prior beliefs, and to the resources embedded in language to explain how we can investigate, and so move from ignorance to knowledge. Highlighting this structural feature of inquiry, however, allows the pessimist philosopher to demonstrate that the paradox stands. The incoherence of inquiry is rooted in the very idea of aiming our desires at the unknown. Asking questions and giving answers rests on referential intentions targeting objects in a region of epistemic darkness, and so our ‘inquiry sceptic’ also finds structurally similar forms of incoherence in the pragmatics of interrogative discourse.     

The relationship between epistemological beliefs,implicit theories of intelligence,and self‐regulated learning among Norwegian postsecondary students

Background. More empirical work is needed to examine the dimensionality of personal epistemology and relations between those dimensions and motivational and strategic components of self‐regulated learning. In particular, there is great need to investigate personal epistemology and its relation to self‐regulated learning across cultures and academic contexts. Because the demarcation between personal epistemology and implicit theories of intelligence has been questioned, dimensions of personal epistemology should also be studied in relation to implicit theories of intelligence. Aims. The primary aim was to examine the dimensionality of personal epistemology and the relation between those dimensions and implicit theories of intelligence in the cultural context of Norwegian postsecondary education. A secondary aim was to examine the relative contribution of epistemological beliefs and theories of intelligence to motivational and strategic components of self‐regulated learning in different academic contexts within that culture. Samples. The first sample included 178 business administration students in a traditional transmission‐oriented instructional context; the second, 108 student teachers in an innovative pedagogical context. Methods. The dimensionality of the Schommer Epistemological Questionnaire was examined through factor analyses, and the resulting dimensions were examined in relation to implicit theories of intelligence. We performed multiple regression analyses, separately for the two academic contexts, to try to predict motivational (i.e. self‐efficacy beliefs, mastery goal orientation, and interest) and strategic (i.e. self‐regulatory strategy use) components of self‐regulated learning with epistemological beliefs and implicit theories of intelligence. Results. Considerable cross‐cultural generalizability was found for the dimensionality of personal epistemology. Moreover, the dimensions of personal epistemology seemed to represent constructs separate from the construct of implicit theories of intelligence. Differences in the predictability of the epistemological dimensions were found for the two samples. For the student teachers, belief about knowledge construction and modification was a better predictor of self‐regulated learning. For the business administration students, belief about the certainty of knowledge played a more important role in self‐regulated learning. Conclusions. Epistemological beliefs predict self‐regulated learning among Norwegian postsecondary students and play more important roles than implicit theories of intelligence. Relations between epistemological beliefs and self‐regulated learning may vary with academic context.     

Indian cognitivism and the phenomenology of conceptualization

We perform conceptual acts throughout our daily lives; we are always judging others, guessing their intentions, agreeing or opposing their views and so on. These conceptual acts have phenomenological as well as formal richness. This paper attempts to correct the imbalance between the phenomenal and formal approaches to conceptualization by claiming that we need to shift from the usual dichotomies of cognitive science and epistemology such as the formal/empirical and the rationalist/empiricist divides—to a view of conceptualization grounded in the Indian philosophical notion of “valid cognition”. Methodologically, our paper is an attempt at cross-cultural philosophy and cognitive science; ontologically, it is an attempt at marrying the phenomenal and the formal.     

Conceiving, Experiencing, and Conceiving Experiencing: Neo-Kantianism and the History of the Concept of Experience

It is often claimed that epistemological thought divides around the issue of the place of experience in knowledge: While empiricists argue that experience is the only legitimate source of knowledge, rationalists find other such sources. The trouble with such accounts is not that they are wrong, but that they are incomplete. On occasion, epistemological differences run deeper, raising the very notion of experience as an issue for epistemology. This paper looks at two epistemological debates which concerned not simply the place of experience in knowledge but also the appropriate account of experience itself. The first episode is the rise of Marburg Neo-Kantianism in the 1870s – in particular the seminal work of Hermann Cohen in his Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (1871). Cohen's principal point was that Kant's significance as an epistemologist was in providing a new theory of experience, one that tied experience to exact science and led to a new stress on the formal conditions of exact knowledge. The second episode is Carnap's rejection of epistemology in the 1930s in favour of a program of the logic of science. My focus in each case will be the interplay between an epistemology focused on exact science as the locus of knowledge and a concomitant call for logical methods in epistemology. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY

Standard characterizations of virtue epistemology divide the field into two camps: virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. Virtue reliabilists think of intellectual virtues as reliable cognitive faculties or abilities, while virtue responsibilists conceive of them as good intellectual character traits. I argue that responsibilist character virtues sometimes satisfy the conditions of a reliabilist conception of intellectual virtue, and that consequently virtue reliabilists, and reliabilists in general, must pay closer attention to matters of intellectual character. This leads to several new questions and challenges for any reliabilist epistemology.