The importance of belief in argumentation: belief,commitment and the effective resolution of a difference of opinion

This paper examines the adequacy of commitment change, as a measure of the successful resolution of a difference of opinion. I argue that differences of opinion are only effectively resolved if commitments undertaken in argumentation survive beyond its conclusion and go on to govern an arguer’s actions in everyday life, e.g., by serving as premises in her practical reasoning. Yet this occurs, I maintain, only when an arguer’s beliefs are changed, not merely her commitments.     

A belief in trend reversal requires access to cognitive resources

There are two research traditions studying people's reactions to random binary events: one concerns serial choice reaction times, the other concerns predictions of events in a series. The present studies focused on comparing expectations between these two approaches. We formed and tested a general hypothesis that, regardless of the type of task, when an individual faces a sequence of events they initially expect trend continuation. Only when people assume that a sequence is random might they override the default and expect trend reversal instead. In a series of experiments we found that limitation of access to cognitive resources enhances expectations of trend continuation. Our interpretation of this finding is that an expectation of trend continuation is the default for the human cognitive system and that a belief in trend reversal requires access to cognitive resources to overcome the tendency to expect trend continuation.     

Reasons for (prior) belief in Bayesian epistemology

Bayesian epistemology tells us with great precision how we should move from prior to posterior beliefs in light of new evidence or information, but says little about where our prior beliefs come from. It offers few resources to describe some prior beliefs as rational or well-justified, and others as irrational or unreasonable. A different strand of epistemology takes the central epistemological question to be not how to change one’s beliefs in light of new evidence, but what reasons justify a given set of beliefs in the first place. We offer an account of rational belief formation that closes some of the gap between Bayesianism and its reason-based alternative, formalizing the idea that an agent can have reasons for his or her (prior) beliefs, in addition to evidence or information in the ordinary Bayesian sense. Our analysis of reasons for belief is part of a larger programme of research on the role of reasons in rational agency (Dietrich and List, Nous, 2012a, in press; Int J Game Theory, 2012b, in press).     

(Non)Complementary updating of belief in two hypotheses

Past research has led to the conclusion that two competing hypotheses are represented dependently, and confidence in them is updated in a complementary manner. It is argued here that confidence in two hypotheses can be represented either dependently or independently. Changes in confidence in the former case are always complementary, but changes in the latter case are complementary only under certain conditions. In three simulated medical diagnosis experiments, subjects learned about two illnesses in a manner expected to lead to either dependent or independent confidence. They were then presented with two symptoms sequentially (for each of several patients), updating confidence after each. Experiment 1 demonstrated that changes in confidence in the two illnesses were largely complementary for subjects with dependent, but not independent, confidence. Experiment 2 showed that encouraging consideration of the alternative led to more complementary changes for subjects with independent confidence. Experiment 3 succeeded in producing complementary changes from these subjects. Thus, complementarity does not imply dependent confidence, nor does independent confidence imply non-complementarity.     

Three challenges (and three replies) to the ethics of belief

In this paper I look at three challenges to the very possibility of an ethics of belief and then show how they can be met. The first challenge, from Thomas Kelly, says that epistemic rationality is not (merely) a form of instrumental rationality. If this claim is true, then it will be difficult to develop an ethics of belief that does not run afoul of naturalism. The second challenge is the Non-Voluntarism Argument, which holds that because we cannot believe at will and because ought implies can, there can be no ethics of belief. The third challenge comes from Richard Feldman, who claims that there is no such thing as ought all-things-considered. He says, for example, that moral oughts can be weighed against other moral oughts and that epistemic oughts can be compared to each other, but that there is no way to weigh moral oughts against epistemic oughts. If this is true, then norms about what one ought to believe are not nearly as important as one might have hoped or as philosophers have traditionally thought. In answering these three challenges, I try to show how and why the project of developing epistemic norms might be a promising avenue of research, despite claims to the contrary.     

凉山彝族的疾病信仰与仪式医疗(下)

凉山彝族的疾病认知与其传统信仰密切相关,仪式医疗是彝族传统医疗实践的重要组成部分。至今,仪式医疗活动在大小凉山彝族乡村仍很活跃。笔者根据田野调查资料和彝文仪式文献的相关记载,对凉山彝族的传统信仰与疾病认知进行考察,初步认为在彝族信仰中疾病具有七类超自然的病源;进而分析彝族仪式疗者的类型及其特点;最后对仪式疗者的医疗活动如疾病诊卜、防病仪式和治病仪式进行归类描述。这是第一篇从医疗与宗教关系的新视角考察彝族传统信仰的论文。     

社会知识论(下)

三　戈德曼的社会知识论戈德曼为社会知识论提出的问题域 ,包含在他所谓的“求真知识论” (ｖｅｒｉｔｉｓｔｉｃｅｐｉｓｔｅｍｏｌｏ ｇｙ)名下。求真的知识论 (不论是个体的还是社会的 )关注的是知识的生产 ,这里“知识”被理解为弱的意义上的“真信念”。更准确地说 ,它关注的是知识及其反面———错误 (虚假信念 )与无知 (真信念的缺乏 )。它所研究的主要问题是 :什么样的实践对于知识 (与错误、无知相比 )具有相对有利的影响 ?个体的求真知识论在非社会的实践中寻找有关的答案 ,社会的求真知识论则在社会的实践中寻求解答。在戈德曼那…     

Reflections on religious belief and prosociality: Comment on Galen (2012)

Luke Galen (2012) offers a timely analysis of associations between religiosity and prosocial and antisocial attitudes and behaviors. After identifying 10 points of agreement, I raise 8 questions for further reflection and research: (1) Is ingroup giving and volunteerism not prosocial? (2) Are religion-related prosocial norms part of the religious factor? (3) Is social support also appropriately considered part of the religious factor? (4) Are self-report data from more and less religious people invalid? (5) How should we disentangle gender and religiosity? (6) How might we resolve "the religious engagement paradox"? (7) Does religion serve an adaptive, evolutionary function? And (8) Might research further explore religiosity, in its varieties, and prosociality? (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

The Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse (SKAD)

The article presents the sociology of knowledge approach to discourse (SKAD). SKAD, which has been in the process of development since the middle of the 1990s, is now a widely used framework among social scientists in discourse research in the German-speaking area. It links arguments from the social constructionist tradition, following Berger and Luckmann, with assumptions based in symbolic interactionism, hermeneutic sociology of knowledge, and the concepts of Michel Foucault. It argues thereby for a consistent theoretical and methodological grounding of a genuine social sciences perspective on discourse interested in the social production, circulation and transformation of knowledge, that is in social relations and politics of knowledge in the so-called ‘knowledge societies’. Distancing itself from Critical Discourse Analysis, Linguistics, Ethnomethodology inspired discourse analysis and the Analysis of Hegemonies, following Laclau and Mouffe, SKAD’s framework has been built up around research questions and concerns located in the social sciences, referring to public discourse and arenas as well as to more specific fields of (scientific, religious, etc.) discursive struggles and controversies around “problematizations” (Foucault).     

A theory of belief

A theory of belief is presented in which uncertainty has two dimensions. The two dimensions have a variety of interpretations. The article focusses on two of these interpretations.The first is that one dimension corresponds to probability and the other to “definiteness,” which itself has a variety of interpretations. One interpretation of definiteness is as the ordinal inverse of an aspect of uncertainty called “ambiguity” that is often considered important in the decision theory literature. (Greater ambiguity produces less definiteness and vice versa.) Another interpretation of definiteness is as a factor that measures the distortion of an individual's probability judgments that is due to specific factors involved in the cognitive processing leading to judgments. This interpretation is used to provide a new foundation for support theories of probability judgments and a new formulation of the “Unpacking Principle” of Tversky and Koehler.The second interpretation of the two dimensions of uncertainty is that one dimension of an event A corresponds to a function that measures the probabilistic strength of A as the focal event in conditional events of the form A|B, and the other dimension corresponds to a function that measures the probabilistic strength of A as the context or conditioning event in conditional events of the form C|A. The second interpretation is used to provide an account of experimental results in which for disjoint events A and B, the judge probabilities of A|(A∪B) and B|(A∪B) do not sum to 1.The theory of belief is axiomatized qualitatively in terms of a primitive binary relation ? on conditional events. (A|B?C|D is interpreted as “the degree of belief of A|B is greater than the degree of belief of C|D.”) It is shown that the axiomatization is a generalization of conditional probability in which a principle of conditional probability that has been repeatedly criticized on normative grounds may fail.Representation and uniqueness theorems for the axiomatization demonstrate that the resulting generalization is comparable in mathematical richness to finitely additive probability theory.