The contingency of composition

There is widespread disagreement as to what the facts are concerning just when a collection of objects composes some further object; but there is widespread agreement that, whatever those facts are, they are necessary. I am unhappy to simply assume this, and in this paper I ask whether there is reason to think that the facts concerning when composition occurs hold necessarily. I consider various reasons to think so, but find fault with each of them. I examine the theory of composition as identity, but argue that the version of this doctrine that entails universalism is unwarranted. I consider the claim that the a priority of such facts leads to their necessity, but give a defence of substantial contingent a priori truths. I ask whether the contingency of such facts would lead to unwelcome possibilities, but argue that it does not. Next, I argue against the thought that the Lewis–Sider argument against restricted composition might give us reason to accept the necessity of universalism. Lastly, I respond to two objections from the 2006 BSPC. I conclude in favour of the contingency of the facts concerning when some things compose some thing.

The psychophysics of contingency assessment

The authors previously described a procedure that permits rapid, multiple within-participant evaluations of contingency assessment (the "streamed-trial" procedure, M. J. C. Crump, S. D. Hannah, L. G. Allan, & L. K. Hord, 2007). In the present experiments, they used the streamed-trial procedure, combined with the method of constant stimuli and a binary classification response, to assess the psychophysics of contingency assessment. This strategy provides a methodology for evaluating whether variations in contingency assessment reflect changes in the participant's sensitivity to the contingency or changes in the participant's response bias (or decision criterion). The sign of the contingency (positive or negative), outcome density, and imposition of an explicit payoff structure had little influence on sensitivity to contingencies but did influence the decision criterion. The authors discuss how a psychophysical analysis can provide a better understanding of findings in the literature such as mood and age effects on contingency assessment. They also discuss the relation between a psychophysical approach and an associative account of contingency assessment.     

The counselor as contingency manager

Aspects of contingency management are discussed as they relate to counseling. Three case studies illustrate the role of a counselor as a contingency manager and adviser to teachers in the application of behavior modification techniques to common classroom problems.     

The analysis of group contingency data

The data analyses utilized in group contingency projects are reviewed. Previous studies are cited to emphasize advantages of nonconsolidated ("individual") over consolidated analyses. Several procedures are described that enable applied researchers to incorporate nonconsolidated data analyses in group contingency studies.     

The role of contingency in classical conditioning

The assumption that classical conditioning depends on a contingent relation between the conditioned stimulus (CS) and the unconditioned stimulus (US), which was proposed some decades ago as an alternative to the traditional contiguity assumption, still is widely accepted as an empirical generalization, if no longer as a theoretical postulate. The first support for the contingency assumption was provided by experiments in which occasional CS-US pairings produced no response to the CS in random training--i.e., training in which the probability of the US was the same in the presence and absence of the CS. Those early experiments, the results of which too often are taken at face value, are reconsidered along with various later experiments that show conditioning, both of the CS and its context, in random training. The evidence suggests that CS-US contingency is neither necessary nor sufficient for conditioning and that the concept has long outlived any usefulness it may once have had in the analysis of conditioning.     

The limits of anchoring

Anchoring and adjustment is a pervasive bias in which decision makers are influenced by random or uninformative numbers or starting points. As a means of understanding this effect, we explore two limits on anchoring. In Experiments 1 and 2, implausibly extreme anchors had a proportionally smaller effect than anchors close to the expected value of the lotteries evaluated. In Experiments 2 and 3, anchoring occurred only if the anchor and preference judgment were expressed on the same scale. Incompatible anchors and response modes resulted in no anchoring bias. A confirmatory search mechanism is proposed to account for these results.     

The limits of over-constancy

A number of studies have led to the generalization that there is a tendency to “overconstancy” in the perception of size. The experiments reported here suggest that over-estimation is limited to objects subtending angles of approximately 2° or less, and that objects subtending greater angles are judged fairly accurately. This raises the possibility that foveal diameter (approximately 2°) is involved.     

The rejection-rage contingency in borderline personality disorder

Though long-standing clinical observation reflected in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text rev.) suggests that the rage characteristic of borderline personality disorder (BPD) often appears in response to perceived rejection, the role of perceived rejection in triggering rage in BPD has never been empirically tested. Extending basic personality research on rejection sensitivity to a clinical sample, a priming-pronunciation experiment and a 21-day experience-sampling diary examined the contingent relationship between perceived rejection and rage in participants diagnosed with BPD compared with healthy controls. Despite the differences in these 2 assessment methods, the indices of rejection-contingent rage that they both produced were elevated in the BPD group and were strongly interrelated. They provide corroborating evidence that reactions to perceived rejection significantly explain the rage seen in BPD.     

Standard and non-standard Newcomb Problems

Examples involving common causes — most prominently, examples involving genetically influenced choices — are analytically equivalent not to standard Newcomb Problems — in which the Predictor genuinely predicts the agent's decision — but to non-standard Newcomb Problems — in which the Predictor guarantees the truth of her predictions by interfering with the agent's decision to make the agent choose as it was predicted she would. When properly qualified, causal and epistemic decision theories diverge only on standard — not on non-standard — Newcomb Problems, and thus not on examples involving common causes.     

The response-stimulus contingency and reinforcement learning as a context for considering two non-behavior-analytic views of contingency learning

This paper introduces a special section on the contingency. Bower and Watson were invited to present their views of contingency learning in human infants from outside the context of behavior analysis, and Cigales, Marr, and Lattal and Shahan provided commentaries that point out some of the more interesting and controversial aspects of those views from a behavior-analytic perspective. The debate turns on how to conceptualize the response-stimulus contingency of operant learning. The present paper introduces the contingency concept and contingency detection by subjects, as well as research practices in behavior analysis, in a context in which the dependency between infant responding and the presentation of environmental consequences may be disrupted through procedures in which ordinarily consequent events occur before the response or in its absence. These points can relate to and serve as an introduction to the Bower and Watson papers on infant contingency learning as well as to the three commentaries that follow.     

The problem of extras and the contingency of physicalism

Perhaps all concrete phenomena obtain solely in virtue of physical phenomena. Even so, it seems that the world could have been otherwise. It seems that physicalism, if true, is contingently true. In fact, many believe that the actual truth of physicalism allows metaphysically possible worlds duplicating the actual world in all physical respects while containing immaterial extras, e.g. ghosts, spirits, or Cartesian souls, that no physicalist would believe actually exist. Here I focus on physicalism regarding mentality and argue that the doctrine does not allow possible worlds that physically duplicate the actual world while differing mentally. By revealing what physicalism (regarding the mind) does not allow, this essay helps us get clear on what the view really amounts to and why it is contingent.     

The role of the response-reinforcer contingency in negative automaintenance

When a response key is briefly illuminated before a grain reinforcer is presented, key pecking is reliably developed and maintained in pigeons, even if pecking prevents reinforcement (negative automaintenance). This experiment demonstrated that pigeons are sensitive to a negative response-reinforcer contingency, even though it does not eliminate responding. Within individual pigeons, two kinds of trials were compared: red key trials, in which reinforcement was negatively contingent on responding, and white key trials, in which reinforcement was unrelated to responding. Reinforcement frequency in non-contingent trials was yoked to the obtained reinforcement frequency in negatively contingent trials. All eight pigeons pecked substantially more on the non-contingent key than on the negative key, and preferred the non-contingent key to the negative key on occasional “choice” trials where both were presented together. When the stimuli correlated with the two conditions were reversed, the pigeons' behavior also shifted. These response differences are taken as evidence that pigeons are sensitive to the negative response-reinforcer contingency.