The role of perceptually represented structure in analogical problem solving

Current models of analogical reasoning assume that representations of source examples and target problems occur in an amodal format--that is, a representation whose construction and processing are independent of activity in the perceptual and motor cortices of the brain. We examined the possible use of kinesthetic information--perceptual structures associated with the sensation of space and force--in the representation of source examples and target problems. Participants who recreated a source story while acting out the key elements were more likely to access the story when later working on the target problem than were participants who only verbally recreated the story or who verbally recreated it as well as sketched it. We argue that enactment made kinesthetic and spatial features more salient in participants' source story representations and that this aided performance. These results suggest that current models of analogical reasoning might be improved by including perceptual information as part of their representational schemes.     

Aligning Logical and Psychological Contributions to the Understanding of Human Reasoning

Modern logic is an abstract study of consequence rather than a mechanistic study of reasoning. This abstract view has much to offer psychological studies of the representations which implement human reasoning. This paper reviews recent results showing the abstract equivalence of all the main psychological competence models of syllogistic reasoning. Their apparently contrasting representations are computationally equivalent for the kind of data presented. The true empirical contrasts between theories lie in other details of implementation — in whether integrated representations are constructed and in the sequence of cases considered. These contrasts are independent of sentential, graphical or mental model representation.Logic is also a guide to representation requirements. Linear syllogism models are representable by sequences of tokens, whereas categorial syllogism models generally require attribute binding. However, one consequence of the present semantic analysis is that all categorial syllogism competence models converge on an algorithm which avoids representation of more than a single sequence.The paper goes on to consider what evidence could distinguish the representations implementing reasoning in working memory. The example of dual task paradigms is considered and some conceptual questions are raised about the identification of the modalities of working memory subsystems with linguistic and spatial representations. Carefully distinguishing memory medium from memory interpretation leads to the conclusion that it is the interpretation of the contents of memory which determines whether it holds spatial or linguistic information. It is argued that the critical dimension for understanding reasoning processes is the expressiveness of interpretation of representations.     

Dyslexia and reasoning: The importance of visual processes

Recent research has suggested that individuals with dyslexia rely on explicit visuospatial representations for syllogistic reasoning while most non‐dyslexics opt for an abstract verbal strategy. This paper investigates the role of visual processes in relational reasoning amongst dyslexic reasoners. Expt 1 presents written and verbal protocol evidence to suggest that reasoners with dyslexia generate detailed representations of relational properties and use these to make a visual comparison of objects. Non‐dyslexics use a linear array of objects to make a simple transitive inference. Expt 2 examined evidence for the visual‐impedance effect which suggests that visual information detracts from reasoning leading to longer latencies and reduced accuracy. While non‐dyslexics showed the impedance effects predicted, dyslexics showed only reduced accuracy on problems designed specifically to elicit imagery. Expt 3 presented problems with less semantically and visually rich content. The non‐dyslexic group again showed impedance effects, but dyslexics did not. Furthermore, in both studies, visual memory predicted reasoning accuracy for dyslexic participants, but not for non‐dyslexics, particularly on problems with highly visual content. The findings are discussed in terms of the importance of visual and semantic processes in reasoning for individuals with dyslexia, and we argue that these processes play a compensatory role, offsetting phonological and verbal memory deficits.     

Conditional reasoning, representation, and empirical evidence on a concrete task

This study examined interactions between empirical data, internal representations, and reasoning performance on a conditional reasoning task using a concrete apparatus. Subjects were asked an initial series of questions in order to determine the pattern of inferences they made after simple exposure to the apparatus. They were subsequently shown two different experimental manipulations designed to provide data about the internal structure of the apparatus without giving information about specific inferences. Some subjects did change their reasoning in response to the new data, although most remained stable throughout the experiment. These results are consistent with the idea that reasoning may require generation of an internal representation of a problem space. It was also concluded that the relation between reasoning and empirical evidence cannot be understood without supposing that evidence is often interpreted by subjects according to their reasoning patterns.     

Cognitive Control of Attentional Guidance by Visual and Verbal Working Memory Representations

Both visual and verbal information in working memory guide visual attention toward a memory‐matching object. We tested whether: (a) visual and verbal representations have different effects on the deployment of attention; and (b) both types of representations can be used equally in a top‐down manner. We asked participants to maintain a visual cue or a verbal cue at the beginning of each trial, and ended with a memory task to ensure that each cue was represented actively in working memory. Before the memory task, a visual search task appeared where validity was manipulated as valid, neutral, or invalid. We also manipulated the probability of valid trials (20%, 50%, and 80%), which had been told to the participants prior to the task. Consistent with earlier findings, attentional guidance by visual representations was modulated by the probability. We also found that this was true for verbal representations, and that these effects did not differ between representation types. These results suggest that both visual and verbal representations in working memory can be used strategically to control attentional guidance.     

Meaning structures and mental representations

This paper argues for a distinction between meaning structure and mental representation, and presents the outlines of a theoretical model of their interrelationship. Meaning structures are defined as structures in the human mind/brain which develop as the combined result of genetic predispositions and individual experience, and lead to relatively stable patterns of perceiving, thinking, feeling, behaving, etc. Mental representation is defined as the aspect of mental processes which involves imagining and thinking of things that are not perceptually present. It is suggested that the mind includes a central network of meaning structures (CNMS) for the storage of information, and a number of other subsystems (e.g., perceptual systems, behavioral systems, and a verbal system) for the processing of externally and internally generated information. Against the dual-coding theory, it is argued that there is one code for the long-term storage of information, but several codes for the processing of information. Mental representations are seen as products of activation that is spread from the CNMS to more peripheral systems. The spread of activation from the CNMS to perceptual systems results in mental imagery; when activation spreads to the verbal system the result is conceptual thinking; and when activation spreads to behavioral systems it produces intentions. It is argued that this conceptual model can help to solve some basic theoretical problems that have plagued cognitive psychology.     

Effect of skill level on recall of visually presented patterns of musical notes

Expertise effects in music were studied in a new task: the construction of mental representations from separate fragments. Groups of expert musicians and non-musicians were asked to recall note patterns presented visually note by note. Skill-level, musical well-formedness of the note patterns and presentation mode were varied. The musicians recalled note patterns better than the non-musicians, even though the presentation was visual and successive. Furthermore, only musicians' performance was affected by musical well-formedness of the note patterns when visual gestalt properties, verbal rehearsability, and familiarity of the stimuli were controlled. Musicians were also able to use letter names referring to notes as efficiently as visual notes, which indicates that the better recall of musicians cannot be explained by perceptual visual chunking. These results and the effect of skill level on the distribution of recall errors indicate that the ability to chunk incoming information into meaningful units does not require that complete familiar patterns are accessible to encoding processes, yet previous knowledge stored in long-term memory affects representation construction in working memory. The present method offers a new reliable tool, and its implications to the research on construction of representations and musical imagery are discussed.     

To Matrix, Network, or Hierarchy: That Is the Question

The authors present a structural analysis of three spatial diagrams-matrices, networks, and hierarchies-that specifies 10 properties on which these diagrammatic representations are hypothesized to differ: global structure, building block, number of sets, item/link constraints, item distinguishability, link type, absence of a relation, linking relations, path, and traversal. Each property has a "value" for each diagram, and these property values constitute the applicability conditions for the representations. Twenty-three college students (computer science majors and math educators) selected the type of diagram they thought would be most efficient for organizing the information in each of 18 short scenarios and verbally justified the reasons for their selections. The verbal protocols were coded with respect to the structural analysis. Both the representation selection and verbal justification data provided strong support for the structural analysis. Additionally, a factor analysis of students' justifications indicated that the organization of their knowledge is consistent with the structural analysis. Students' use of the structural properties to select appropriate representations and to justify those selections indicates that the structural analysis has psychological force.     

One, two, three, four, nothing more: an investigation of the conceptual sources of the verbal counting principles

Since the publication of [Gelman, R., & Gallistel, C. R. (1978). The child's understanding of number. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.] seminal work on the development of verbal counting as a representation of number, the nature of the ontogenetic sources of the verbal counting principles has been intensely debated. The present experiments explore proposals according to which the verbal counting principles are acquired by mapping numerals in the count list onto systems of numerical representation for which there is evidence in infancy, namely, analog magnitudes, parallel individuation, and set-based quantification. By asking 3- and 4-year-olds to estimate the number of elements in sets without counting, we investigate whether the numerals that are assigned cardinal meaning as part of the acquisition process display the signatures of what we call "enriched parallel individuation" (which combines properties of parallel individuation and of set-based quantification) or analog magnitudes. Two experiments demonstrate that while "one" to "four" are mapped onto core representations of small sets prior to the acquisition of the counting principles, numerals beyond "four" are only mapped onto analog magnitudes about six months after the acquisition of the counting principles. Moreover, we show that children's numerical estimates of sets from 1 to 4 elements fail to show the signature of numeral use based on analog magnitudes - namely, scalar variability. We conclude that, while representations of small sets provided by parallel individuation, enriched by the resources of set-based quantification are recruited in the acquisition process to provide the first numerical meanings for "one" to "four", analog magnitudes play no role in this process.     

The evocative power of words: activation of concepts by verbal and nonverbal means

A major part of learning a language is learning to map spoken words onto objects in the environment. An open question is what are the consequences of this learning for cognition and perception? Here, we present a series of experiments that examine effects of verbal labels on the activation of conceptual information as measured through picture verification tasks. We find that verbal cues, such as the word "cat," lead to faster and more accurate verification of congruent objects and rejection of incongruent objects than do either nonverbal cues, such as the sound of a cat meowing, or words that do not directly refer to the object, such as the word "meowing." This label advantage does not arise from verbal labels being more familiar or easier to process than other cues, and it does extends to newly learned labels and sounds. Despite having equivalent facility in learning associations between novel objects and labels or sounds, conceptual information is activated more effectively through verbal means than through nonverbal means. Thus, rather than simply accessing nonverbal concepts, language activates aspects of a conceptual representation in a particularly effective way. We offer preliminary support that representations activated via verbal means are more categorical and show greater consistency between subjects. These results inform the understanding of how human cognition is shaped by language and hint at effects that different patterns of naming can have on conceptual structure.     

Integration of spatial information across vision and language

Three experiments investigated whether spatial information acquired from vision and language is maintained in distinct spatial representations on the basis of the input modality. Participants studied a visual and a verbal layout of objects at different times from either the same (Experiments 1 and 2) or different learning perspectives (Experiment 3) and then carried out a series of pointing judgments involving objects from the same or different layouts. Results from Experiments 1 and 2 indicated that participants pointed equally fast on within- and between-layout trials; coupled with verbal reports from participants, this result suggests that they integrated all locations in a single spatial representation during encoding. However, when learning took place from different perspectives in Experiment 3, participants were faster to respond to within- than between-layout trials and indicated that they kept separate representations during learning. Results are compared to those from similar studies that involved layouts learned from perception only.     

Does spatial information impact immediate verbatim recall of verbal navigation instructions?

The present study addresses the issue of whether spatial information impacts immediate verbatim recall of verbal navigation instructions. Subjects heard messages instructing them to move within a two-dimensional depiction of a three-dimensional space consisting of four stacked grids displayed on a computer screen. They repeated the instructions orally and then followed them manually by clicking with a mouse on the grids. Two groups with identical instructions were compared; they differed only in whether the starting position was indicated before or after the instructions were given and repeated, with no differences in the manual movements to be made. Accuracy on both the oral repetition and manual movement responses was significantly higher when the starting position was indicated before the instructions. The results are consistent with the proposal that there is only a single amodal mental representation, rather than distinct verbal and nonverbal representations, of navigation instructions. The advantage for the before condition was found even for the oral repetition responses, implying that the creation of the amodal representation occurred immediately, while the instructions were being held in working memory. In practical terms, the findings imply that being able to form a mental representation of the movement path while being given verbal navigation instructions should substantially facilitate memory for the instructions and execution of them.     

Categorical reasoning from multiple diagrams.

Syllogistic reasoning from categorical premise pairs is generally taken to be a multistep process. Quantifiers (all, no, some, some ... not) must be interpreted, representations constructed, and conclusions identified from these. Explanations of performance have been proposed in which errors may occur at any of these stages. The current paper contrasts (a) representation explanations of performance, in which errors occur because not all possible representations are constructed, and/or mistakes are made when doing so (e.g., mental models theory), and (b) conclusion identification explanations, in which errors occur even when information has been correctly and exhaustively represented, due to systematic difficulties that people may have when identifying particular conclusions, or in identifying conclusions in particular circumstances. Three experiments are reported, in which people identified valid conclusions from diagrams analogous to Euler circles, so that the first two stages of reasoning from premise pairs were effectively removed. Despite this, several phenomena associated with reasoning from premise pairs persisted, and it is suggested that whereas representation explanations may account for some of these phenomena, conclusion identification explanations, which have never previously been considered, are required for others.     

The initial representation in reasoning towards an interpretation of conditional sentences

All accounts of human reasoning (whether presented at the symbolic or subsymbolic level) have to reckon with the temporal organization of the human processing systems and the ephemeral nature of the representations it uses. We present three new empirical tests for the hypothesis that people commence the interpretational process by constructing a minimal initial representation. In the case of if A then C the initial representation captures the occurrence of the consequent, C, within the context of the antecedent, A. Conditional inference problems are created by a categorical premise that affirms or denies A or C. The initial representation allows an inference when the explicitly represented information matches (e.g., the categorical premise A affirms the antecedent "A") but not when it mismatches (e.g., "not-A" denies A). Experiments 1 and 2 confirmed that people tend to accept the conclusion that "nothing follows" for the denial problems, as indeed they do not have a determinate initial-model conclusion. Experiment 3 demonstrated the other way round that the effect of problem type (affirmation versus denial) is reduced when we impede the possibility of inferring a determinate conclusion on the basis of the initial representation of both the affirmation and the denial problems.     

Learning about Probability from Text and Tables: Do Color Coding and Labeling through an Interactive‐user Interface Help?

Learning from visual representations is enhanced when learners appropriately integrate corresponding visual and verbal information. This study examined the effects of two methods of promoting integration, color coding and labeling, on learning about probabilistic reasoning from a table and text. Undergraduate students (N = 98) were randomly assigned to learn about probabilistic reasoning from one of 4 computer‐based lessons generated from a 2 (color coding/no color coding) by 2 (labeling/no labeling) between‐subjects design. Learners added the labels or color coding at their own pace by clicking buttons in a computer‐based lesson. Participants' eye movements were recorded while viewing the lesson. Labeling was beneficial for learning, but color coding was not. In addition, labeling, but not color coding, increased attention to important information in the table and time with the lesson. Both labeling and color coding increased looks between the text and corresponding information in the table. The findings provide support for the multimedia principle, and they suggest that providing labeling enhances learning about probabilistic reasoning from text and tables. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Identifying Representational Competence With Multi-Representational Displays

Increasingly, multi-representational educational technologies are being deployed in science classrooms to support science learning and the development of representational competence. Several studies have indicated that students experience significant challenges working with these multi-representational displays and prefer to use only one representation while problem solving. Here, we examine the use of one such display, a multi-representational molecular mechanics animation, by organic chemistry undergraduates in a problem-solving interview. Using both protocol analysis and eye fixation data, our analysis indicates that students rely mainly on two visual–spatial representations in the display and do not make use of two accompanying mathematical representations. Moreover, we explore how eye fixation data complement verbal protocols by providing information about how students allocate their attention to different locations of a multi-representational display with and without concurrent verbal utterances. Our analysis indicates that verbal protocols and eye movement data are highly correlated, suggesting that eye fixations and verbalizations reflect similar cognitive processes in such studies.     

Quality of maternal thinking and mother-child interaction in at-risk contexts

This study investigates how the maternal level of perspectivistic reasoning and the level of socialization goals in the representation of their actions are related to the quality of mother-child behaviors as well as to the expert ratings on maternal practices in at-risk contexts. It also investigated whether there is any direct link between mother and child behaviors and expert ratings. A sample of 75 mothers of children between 8 and 12 years old reported on their level of perspectivistic reasoning and were characterized by the social workers of municipal services as being coercive, neglectful or meeting their child's needs. Interactions during a collaborative task were observed to obtain information on level of socialization goals and mother-child behaviors. Structural equation models showed that mothers' higher levels of perspectivism and higher levels of socialization goals positively predicted the mother's and child's sensitivity and active involvement in the task and negatively predicted avoidance and passivity. Higher levels of perspectivism consistently predicted experts' views on maternal practices. However, only mother's avoidance predicted negatively expert ratings on coercion practice, indicating that expert views were mostly derived from the mothers' perspective on their child. The implications of these results for parental assessment and intervention programs are discussed.