Juror Preference for Curative Alternative Verdicts for Veterans With PTSD

Two studies examined mock juror verdicts for veterans with PTSD in the criminal justice system. Mock jurors demonstrated a leniency toward treatment bias for veterans with PTSD who committed a violent crime, compared to a nonviolent crime. This leniency toward treatment bias occurred only when alternative verdict options, beyond guilty or not guilty, were available. In fact, a guilt bias was demonstrated by mock jurors when the only verdict options were guilty or not guilty, and a bias toward treatment was demonstrated when curative alternative verdicts were available. Implications for efforts to address the growing national problem of veterans with PTSD in the criminal justice system are discussed.     

The effect of jury deliberations on jurors' propensity to disregard inadmissible evidence

The goal of this research was to examine the effect of jury deliberations on juror's propensity to disregard inadmissible evidence. Extant research is inconclusive; some research indicates that jurors do follow judicial instructions to ignore inadmissible evidence, but other research suggests that jurors do not. Two experiments examined whether jurors were affected by inadmissible evidence. The results revealed that although mock jurors were biased by inadmissible evidence prior to deliberations, the bias was tempered following deliberations. In Experiment 1, post deliberation jurors disregarded incriminating evidence that was ruled inadmissible because of due-process concerns. Experiment 2 replicated these results with less incriminating inadmissible evidence and also revealed that jurors did not accurately gauge the impact that the inadmissible evidence had on their verdicts. Theoretical and judicial policy implications are discussed.     

The effects of consensus requirements and multiple decisions on mock juror verdict preferences

After watching a simulated rape trial, prerecorded on videotape, mock jurors either did or did not expect to sentence a defendant following deliberation with or without a group verdict required. Both sentencing expectation and verdict requirement significantly elevated jurors' preference for conviction (and average ratings of guilt likelihood). Closer analyses of personal changes (before and after deliberation) in the distribution of opinions suggested that majorities favoring not guilty were more influential than guilty-favoring majorities; and, somewhat unexpectedly, minorities in juries which deliberated without a verdict required were more likely to change personal opinions than minorities in juries required to render a verdict. The overall social decision scheme confirmed earlier observations about the importance of the initial majority in determining the verdict; but the majority did not always prevail and there was a marked asymmetry (“defendant protection”) in its action.     

"Recipe for a Jury" Revisited: A Balance Theory Prediction

This study examined the relationship of three variables to verdict confidence in an experimental simulation of the jury deliberation process. The three variables were: sex of juror, verdict (guilty or innocent), and the similarity or dissimilarity between juror and confederate verdicts (congruence or incongruence). The subjects were 35 male and 37 female college students. They deliberated in groups containing a male confederate who role-played an obnoxious anti-White or anti-Black juror. Results indicated that before deliberation, male and guilt verdict jurors were more confident than females and innocent verdict jurors. After deliberation, however, sex differences in verdict confidence were absent while innocent verdicts jurors were more confident than guilt verdict jurors. Most important, as predicted from Heider's Balance Theory, males who deliberated with a confederate whose verdict was congruent with theirs' became less confident in their verdicts. Unexpectedly, females became more confident. The study's major hypothesis, then, that it may be advantageous for the defense to accept a juror who zealously advocates a guilty verdict, was only supported for males.     

The Impact of the Guilty but Mentally III Verdict on Juror Decisions: An Empirical Analysis

The present study attempted to determine the impact of alternative verdict choices on the decisions of mock jurors. Subjects used in this study as mock jurors were all college undergraduates. They were shown one of two versions of a videotaped simulated murder trial. Both films presented a defendant who appeared to be suffering emotional difficulties, but in one film the defendant had clearly committed the act while in the other film the defendant's actions were less certain. Subjects than gave their individual verdicts and, after deliberation with other subjects, a total jury verdict. The verdicts available to the subjects varied across three conditions such that the subjects in one condition were only allowed to find the defendant to be innocent or guilty. In another condition the subjects could find the defendant innocent, guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). In the third condition the subjects were allowed to choose between innocent, guilty, NGRI, and guilty but mentally ill (GBMI). The results indicated that the addition of the "mental health" verdicts had a significant impact on the decisions of the jurors. In particular, it appears that only defendants who would otherwise have been found innocent were likely to be found NGRI. This study also indicated that the GBMI verdict is very attractive to mock jurors. Indeed, even innocent defendants were found to be GBMI, a form of guilt, when this alternative was made available. These findings raise potentially important constitutional and practical issues for the trial of emotionally disturbed criminal defendants.     

Jurors' Use of Instructions on Negligence1

At the end of a trial, the judge gives jurors a set of instructions that explain the laws that are applicable to the case and that direct jurors to reach a verdict in accordance with those laws. Little is known about how well jurors understand instructions in civil cases. We assess the extent to which jurors understand judicial instructions in negligence cases. We address 3 issues: (a) To what extent do they understand these instructions? (b) To what extent is their comprehension enhanced by access to a written copy of the instructions? and (c) What effect does deliberation have on jurors' comprehension levels? Overall comprehension was approximately 64% and access to written instructions did not enhance comprehension, but the opportunity to deliberate did.     

Attractive but guilty: deliberation and the physical attractiveness bias

The current study examined the effect of jury deliberation on the tendency for mock jurors to find attractive defendants guilty less often. It was expected that there would be an interaction between group deliberation (yes or no) and defendant's appearance (plain-looking or attractive). It was hypothesized that mock jurors who did not deliberate would be more likely to find a plain-looking defendant guilty and that deliberation would mitigate this effect. The study was a 2 x 2 between-subjects factorial design. Participants were assigned randomly to one of four conditions: attractive defendant/deliberation, attractive defendant/no deliberation, plain-looking defendant/deliberation, and plain-looking defendant/no deliberation. A total of 172 undergraduates from a small, rural college in Vermont contributed to this study: mock jurors were 70 men and 52 women, ages ranged from 18 to 52 years (M=20.5, SD=4.9). The hypothesis was supported. Mock jurors who did not deliberate were more likely to find the plain-looking defendant guilty, whereas mock jurors who deliberated were more likely to find the attractive defendant guilty.     

The variable influence of confession inconsistencies: How factual errors (but not contradictions) reduce belief in suspect guilt

Wrongful conviction statistics suggest that jurors pay little heed to the quality of confession evidence when making verdict decisions. However, recent research indicates that confession inconsistencies may sometimes reduce perception of suspect guilt. Drawing on theoretical frameworks of attribution theory, correspondence bias, and the story model of juror decision‐making, we investigated how judgments about likely guilt are affected by different types of inconsistencies: self‐contradictions (Experiment 1) and factual errors (Experiment 2). Crucially, judgments of likely guilt of the suspect were reduced by factual errors in confession evidence, but not by contradictions. Mediation analyses suggest that this effect of factual errors on judgments of guilt is underpinned by the extent to which mock‐jurors generated a plausible, alternative explanation for why the suspect confessed. These results indicate that not all confession inconsistencies are treated equally; factual errors might cause suspicion about the veracity of the confession, but contradictions do not.     

Biased interpretation of evidence by mock jurors

Predecisional distortion is jurors' biased interpretation of new evidence to support whichever verdict is tentatively favored as a trial progresses. In 2 experiments, students and prospective jurors distorted evidence from a mock trial. Further, the magnitude of prospective jurors' distortion was twice that of students. Consistent with previous research, distortion increased with juror confidence in whichever verdict was currently leading. In spite of clear instructions to ignore prior beliefs, general proplaintiff or prodefendant attitudes influenced the verdicts of prospective jurors, but not of students. These findings suggest that jury instructions should warn against not only premature decisions but also any tentative judgments, lest such opinions influence jurors' evaluations of subsequent evidence. Predecisional distortion in jury trials may lead to biased outcomes resulting from evidence order effects.     

Understanding pretrial publicity: predecisional distortion of evidence by mock jurors

Prejudicial pretrial publicity (PTP) constitutes a serious source of juror bias. The current study examined differences in predecisional distortion for mock jurors exposed to negative PTP (N-PTP) versus nonexposed control participants. According to work by K. A. Carlson and J. E. Russo (2001), predecisional distortion occurs when jurors bias new evidence in favor of their current leading party (prosecution or defense) rather than evaluating this information for its actual probative properties. Jury-eligible university students (N=116) acted as jurors in a mock trial. Elevated rates of guilty verdicts were observed in the N-PTP condition. Predecisional distortion scores were significantly higher in the N-PTP condition and reflected a proprosecution bias. The effect of prejudicial PTP on verdict outcomes was mediated by predecisional distortion in the evaluation of testimony. Results are discussed in relation to motivated decision making and confirmation biases.     

Town vs. gown: a direct comparison of community residents and student mock jurors

The use of students as mock jurors in the majority of legal psychology studies on jury behavior has been criticized (e.g., Bray & Kerr, 1979; Diamond, 1997). This study examined the degree to which student mock jurors' decisions were generalizable to those of real jurors. The participants of the study included 297 jury-eligible university students and 297 volunteers from the venire in the same community as that in which the students resided. All participants viewed one of six versions of a videotaped criminal trial. The defendant testified in English or in Spanish. In addition, the race of defendant was varied. Three bilingual individuals served as defendants with one appearing to be of northern European origin, one of Latino background, and one of African origin. Dependent variables included verdict and, for those who found the defendant guilty, the number of years to which he should be sentenced, and whether he should be fined. Student mock jurors differed reliably from their community counterparts on several demographic characteristics. However, the two groups had mixed results in relation to decision-making tasks. There was no difference in individual verdict preferences, but the students' sentence recommendations were more punitive. These results are interpreted in the context of the generalizability of mock juror studies.     

The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984: Much ado about nothing

The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984(IDRA), passed in the wake of Hinckley (1981) and after two years of Senate and House testimony and debate, removed the “volitional” prong of the ALI test, leaving only the “cognitive” prong. Prior empirical research and speculation suggested that this corrective would not serve its intended purpose. In this experiment, 54 mock jurors received one of four insanity test instructions: IDRA, ALI, a wild beast/mens rea test, or no instructions. Results showed that the test instructions did not produce significantly different verdict patterns, or effect in any other way the relevant and determinative constructs that jurors used in four different insanity cases.     

Racial Bias in Juridic Judgment at Private and Public Levels

Mock jurors (college students and prospective jurors) made individual decisions regarding liability and damages (before and after deliberation) in response to a case of sexual harassment. There were no significant differences in damage awards from college students and prospective jurors. There was evidence of racial bias among White mock jurors against plaintiffs who accused a Black supervisor of sexual harassment: Lower damages were recommended for plaintiffs who accepted an offer to meet for drinks in a Black supervisor's room than for plaintiffs who accepted the same offer from a White supervisor. There was also evidence of racial bias among White mock jurors against Black plaintiffs: Lower damages were recommended for Black plaintiffs than for White plaintiffs. These effects were present in the individual judgments of college students and prospective jurors. However, these forms of racial bias did not carry over into the decisions made by juries comprised of college students or prospective jurors. Subtle racial biases operating primarily at a subconscious level may get washed out in the complex task of coming to agreement on an appropriate award. The effects of manipulated variables on damage awards probably are overestimated in general in mock juror studies that do not examine group verdicts.     

Interactions Between Jurors as a Function of Majority vs. Unanimity Decision Rules

Ruling on the constitutionality of less than unanimous juries, the majority and dissenting Justices of the Supreme Court offered differing theories of social influence processes in jury deliberations. Some areas of disagreement involved verdict distribution, majority-minority interactions, and community confidence as a function of unanimity vs. non-unanimity requirements. The present series of three studies concentrated on these issues. In the first two studies, groups that were split 4:2 in initial vote deliberated a case involving first degree murder. In the third study, individuals served as jurors in each of seven mock trials (both civil and criminal). Half of these groups were required to deliberate to unanimity, the other half being required to deliberate to 2/3 majority. Results indicated that verdicts were not appreciably altered as a result of unanimity vs. non-unanimity requirements. However, unanimity groups were more likely to reach full consensus; their deliberations were characterized by more "conflict"; more opinions were changed as a result of the deliberation process; they reported more confidence in the verdict and tended to feel that justice had been administered. The findings tend to corroborate the influence theories of the dissenting Justices.     

Replications and Limitations of a Two-Factor Model of Child Witness Credibility

Two experiments are reported that test the idea that jurors perceive child witnesses in terms of a 2-factor model of credibility with the factors defined as cognitive ability and honesty (Leippe & Romanczyk, 1987; Ross, Millers, & Moran, 1989). In the first experiment, 300 mock jurors watched a realistic videotaped recreation of a sexual abuse trial and rated the credibility of the child witness. Mock jurors perceived the child witness in terms of 2 factors: cognitive ability and honesty. Only honesty predicted verdict. These findings were replicated in Experiment 2 ( N = 300) when only the child's testimony was presented and the perceptions of the child witness were not contaminated by the testimony of the other witnesses in the trial.     

Mock Jurors’ Perception of Stalking: The Impact of Gender and Expressed Fear

Two experiments investigated mock-juror perceptions of intimate stalking using Kentucky’s (United States) anti-stalking legislation. Experiment 1 used a mock-juror methodology in which 177 undergraduates (87 men and 90 women) from a large southeastern US university read a stalking trial summary and rendered individual judgments as mock jurors. The main research question of Experiment 1 was how participant gender impacted trial judgments (e.g., verdict) when the gender of both the defendant and victim were manipulated. Overall, the results showed that men rendered significantly fewer guilty verdicts than women, particularly in conditions that included the prototypical type of intimate stalking (female victim/male defendant). In Experiment 2, also using a mock-juror methodology, 129 undergraduates (51 men and 78 women) from a large southeastern U.S. university read a stalking trial summary (involving a female victim and male defendant) and rendered individual judgments as mock jurors. The main research question of Experiment 2 focused on whether victim fear (high or low) impacted trial judgments (e.g., verdict). The results yielded an interaction of participant gender and victim fear. Specifically, whereas different levels of fear did not impact women, men yielded fewer guilty verdicts in the low victim fear condition compared to the high victim fear condition. The results of the present experiments are discussed in terms of the implications of stalking allegations brought to trial.     

Explaining Jury Verdicts: Is Leniency Bias for Real?

Laboratory research suggests juries that begin deliberation with a strong majority (i.e., 2/3 or more) usually end up choosing the verdict favored by this majority, whereas those without a strong majority generally acquit or hang. We tested the robustness of these findings in the field by examining trial and deliberation correlates of jury verdicts using data from 79 criminal jury trials held in Indiana. As expected, several trial characteristics and the first-vote preference distribution were related to jury verdicts. However, there was no evidence of leniency bias—75% of those juries without a 2/3 majority on the first deliberation vote ended up convicting. Contributions of the study, limitations, and alternative explanations for the observed severity bias are discussed.     

Effects of Testimonial Inconsistencies and Witness Group Identity on Mock‐Juror Judgments1

We examined the interaction of testimonial consistency and witness group identity on mock jurors' judgments of witness effectiveness, probability that the defendant committed the crime, and verdict. In a 3 × 2 (Witness Group Identity × Testimonial Consistency) between‐groups design, 180 mock jurors heard a trial of a person charged with assault. Although both variables affected judgments, group‐identity effects were weak when testimony was characterized by inconsistencies, and they were stronger when testimony was internally consistent but ambiguous. The judgment patterns were consistent with predictions from Chaiken, Liberman, and Eagly's (1989) heuristic‐systematic processing theory, suggesting that heuristic processing would bias systematic processing when the evidence was not decisive.     

Disjunction Between Probability and Verdict in Juror Decision Making

Although the law assumes a close relation between the probability that a defendant committed the act in question and the ensuing verdict of the jurors, prior research has shown this assumption to be often violated. We present five experiments designed to show that factors that influence probability also influence verdict, but other factors are capable of directly producing changes in verdict without affecting probability. In Experiment 1, we replicated the Wells Effect; scenarios generating the same probability that the Blue Bus Company was to blame for the same accident, nevertheless, generated significantly different likelihoods of finding the defendant liable. In Experiment 2, we showed that equally diagnostic affirmative and negative evidence had differential effects on mock jurors' probability estimates and verdicts. In Experiment 3, we showed that a completely nondiagnostic witness, who either implicates the same bus company or a different bus company as did a diagnostic witness, significantly influenced mock jurors' verdicts. However, the nondiagnostic witness did not change the probability that the Blue Bus Company was responsible for the accident. In Experiment 4, we demonstrated that base rate and witness reliability information resulted in very similar probability estimates but radically different verdicts. In Experiment 5, we showed that a change in the diagnosticity of the evidence influenced both probability and verdict with the former mediating differences in the later. Because probability is only one of the several determinants of the verdict, the two dependent variables are not as closely related as the law presumes. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.