Does control of the environment enhance the perception of control?

It has been proposed that control over the environment increases the perception of control, thereby enhancing motivation. Revesman and Perlmuter (1981) found that when subjects were permitted to choose response terms to be learned on a paired-associate task, decision latencies were faster if the announcement of the desired option caused the screen upon which materials were printed to go blank. On the basis of the results of the present experiment, it was concluded that control of the environment does result in faster decision latencies, but that this effect occurs despite a decrease in the perception of control.     

The relationship between multidimensional health locus of control and perceived behavioural control: How are distal perceptions of control related to proximal perceptions of control?

The present article tests the predictive and convergent validity of distal and proximal indices of perceived control, as measured by multidimensional health locus of control (MHLC) and perceived behavioural control (PBC), across 12 health behaviours. The study (n = 235) employed a cross-sectional design and examined 12 health-related behaviours: binge drinking, fruit and vegetable consumption, exercise, eating junk food, safe sex (condom use), teeth brushing, teeth flossing, cigarette smoking, blood donation, taking vitamin supplements, using marijuana, and attending health screening. Respondents completed questionnaire measures of MHLC, health value, PBC, and behavioural intention. The data were analysed using a combination of between- and within-persons correlations and hierarchical multiple regression. Between-persons analyses showed that although MHLC accounted for 4% of the variance in behavioural intentions whereas PBC accounted for 21%, PBC did not fully mediate the effects of MHLC on intention. Within-persons analyses demonstrated that internal health locus of control was predictive of the within-persons correlation between PBC and intention, suggesting there may be a dispositional basis to perceived control. Further work that examines the relationship between distal and proximal perceptions of control is required.     

Locus of control in three behavioural domains: Factor structure and correlates of the “spheres of control” scale

The “Spheres of Control” (SOC) scale and the extraversion, neuroticism and lie scales from the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ) were administered to a large sample (N = 576) of male subjects in the age range 30–65 yr. The factor structure of the SOC was examined by testing the goodness-of-fit of a series of confirmatory factor models using LISREL. The results supported Paulhus' three-dimensional formulation of perceived control in the personal, interpersonal and socio-political behavioural domains, but the personal and interpersonal domains were found to be closely related. There was also evidence that the internally-worded SOC items discriminated the three domains of control more clearly than the externally-worded items; the latter showed high loadings on a general factor. The SOC scales showed only moderate reliabilities.Relations between the SOC and EPQ measures were examined by means of two canonical correlation analyses. These analyses demonstrated: (i) that SOC personal and interpersonal control scales were positively related to extraversion and negatively related to neuroticism, but control in the socio-political domain was not predicted by the Eysenck measures; and (ii) that the general-factor effects apparent in SOC responses were related to neuroticism and, to a lesser extent, to the lie scale. These results are discussed in relation to the rationale underlying the development of the SOC scale and other relevant literature.     

Who needs control? A cultural perspective on the process of compensatory control

Compensatory control theory (CCT) provides a framework for understanding the mechanisms at play when one's personal control is challenged. The model suggests that believing the world is a structured and predictable place is fundamental, insofar as it provides the foundation upon which people can believe they are able to exert control over their environment and act agentically towards goals. Because of this, CCT suggests, when personal control is threatened people try to reaffirm the more foundational belief in structure/predictability in the world, so that they then have a strong foundation to reestablish feelings of personal control and pursue their goals. This review seeks to understand how the basic assumptions of these compensatory control processes unfold in different cultural contexts. Drawing on research and theorizing from cultural psychology, we propose that cultural models of self and agency, culturally prevalent modes of control, and culture-specific motivations all have implications for compensatory control processes. Culture determines, in part, whether or not personal control deprivation is experienced as a threat to perceiving an orderly world, how/whether individuals respond to low personal control, and the function that responses to restore a sense of order in the world serve. A theoretical model of compensatory control processes across cultures is proposed that has implications for how people cope with a wide range of personal and societal events that potentially threaten their personal control.     

Locus of control: a work-related variable?

Inconsistencies in findings between age and perceived locus of control of reinforcement were examined in light of social learning theory. Absence of work was hypothesized to reduce opportunities for reinforcement and thus expectancies. No differences were found in internal-external (I-E) locus of control among nine age groups (20 to 65 years) for subjects (882 school teachers) during the span of their work lives. It seems that I-E depends on the frequency and intensity of expectancies for behavior reinforcement sequences that work affords. Before and after work life there is not only less to control, but many of the nonwork reinforcers are not contingent on one's own behavior. Relinquishing internal control and a shift of focus toward reflection on experience and meaning of ife may well be a desirable and natural process for older people.     

Three measures of locus of control: what do they measure?

The Rotter, Adult Nowicki-Strickland, and Levenson IE scales were completed by 175 undergraduate students. Factor analyses reconfirmed the factor structure of the Levenson IE scale. Partial correlation analyses showed that the portion of common variance shared by the Rotter IE and the Adult Nowicki-Strickland IE scales associated closely with Levenson's Chance factor. These findings support a multi-dimensional view of locus of control attribution.     

Attentional control of the creation and retrieval of stimulus–response bindings

Two experiments studied the degree to which the creation and retrieval of episodic feature bindings is modulated by attentional control. Experiment 1 showed that the impact of bindings between stimulus and response features varies as a function of the current attentional set: only bindings involving stimulus features that match the current set affect behavior. Experiment 2 varied the time point at which new attentional sets were implemented—either before or after the processing of the to-be-integrated stimuli and responses. The time point did not matter, suggesting that the attentional set has no impact on feature integration proper but controls which features get access to and can thus trigger the retrieval of bindings.     

Is voluntary control of natural postural sway possible?

The authors explored whether standing human participants could voluntarily decrease the amplitude of their natural postural sway when presented with explicit visual feedback and a target. Participants (N = 9) stood quietly, without any feedback and with feedback on the center of pressure coordinate or the head orientation. They were unable to decrease sway amplitude when presented with visual feedback and a target. Decreasing target size led to contrasting effects on the 2 fractions of sway: rambling and trembling. The smaller target was associated with a decrease in rambling and an increase in trembling. Those observations suggest that sway represents a superposition of at least 2 independent processes. They also suggest that providing visual feedback on a variable tied to body sway may not be an effective way to decrease postural sway in young healthy people.     

The role of action effects in infants’ action control

In adults, the selection and the planning of actions are influenced by the anticipation of desired action effects. However, the role of action effects for action control in infants is still an unresolved issue. One important prerequisite for infants action control is that infants are able to relate certain movements to certain effects. To test this assumption, it was investigated how infants action control is affected by action effects. By applying an imitation paradigm, we studied 12- and 18-month-old infants who first observed an adult experimenter demonstrating a three-step action sequence on a toy bear. In three experimental groups, the second action step, the third action step, or no action step elicited an arbitrary sound as an additional acoustic action effect. It was coded how often each of the target actions was performed by the infant in a subsequent 90-s test phase. As predicted, the frequency of the infants target action varied depending on which action step elicited the action effect. In both age groups, the target action that was combined with an acoustical effect was not only produced more often but also occurred with lower latency and was in most cases the first target action shown by the infants. These results are interpreted as evidence of the important role of action effects in infants action control.     

Reactance in affective-evaluative learning: Outside of conscious control?

Recent studies have shown that the basic evaluative conditioning (EC) effect (originally neutral stimuli acquiring an affective value congruent with the valence of the affective stimulus they were paired with) seems to be limited to participants who are unaware of the stimulus pairings. If participants are aware of the pairings, reactance effects occur (i.e., changes in the opposite direction of the valence of the affective stimulus). To examine whether these reactance effects are due to processes of conscious countercontrol or whether the ratings reflect intrinsic feelings towards the stimuli, a new procedure was developed that included a bogus-pipeline condition. In this procedure, which was adapted from attitude research, participants were connected to bogus lie detector equipment leading them to believe that their "true" affective-evaluative responses were being observed. In Experiment 1, reactance effects occurred also in this procedure, suggesting that the effect is spontaneous and not due to processes of conscious countercontrol. In Experiment 2, these effects were replicated using a between-subjects design in addition to the standard within-subjects control condition.     

Negotiating control: Patients’ experiences of unsuccessful weight-loss surgery

Interviews were carried out with 10 men and women who had undergone weight-loss surgery (WLS) up to 10 years ago and felt that it had failed. Seven had had a further successful procedure. Data were analysed using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. Weight regain following surgery was explained in terms of either the mechanics of the operation or with participants describing ways to ‘cheat’ as food continued to be used for emotional regulation. Everyone spoke of how surgery neglected their mind. Following the second successful surgery, participants described changes in both their eating behaviour and cognitions emphasising how their mind had been brought ‘in gear’ through the investment of two invasive procedures. Transcending all accounts was the mind/body relationship and the issue of control with attributions for both failed and successful surgery shifting from the self to the surgical mechanism as the participants negotiated the pathway between self-blame and responsibility and utilised conflicting frameworks in which the mind and body were either divided or united. Whereas failed surgery is characterised by a battle for control, successful surgery involves handing control over to their restricted stomachs or considering WLS as a tool to be worked with.     

Failures of cognitive control or attention? The case of stop-signal deficits in schizophrenia

We used Bayesian cognitive modelling to identify the underlying causes of apparent inhibitory deficits in the stop-signal paradigm. The analysis was applied to stop-signal data reported by Badcock et al. (Psychological Medicine 32: 87-297, 2002) and Hughes et al. (Biological Psychology 89: 220-231, 2012), where schizophrenia patients and control participants made rapid choice responses, but on some trials were signalled to stop their ongoing response. Previous research has assumed an inhibitory deficit in schizophrenia, because estimates of the mean time taken to react to the stop signal are longer in patients than controls. We showed that these longer estimates are partly due to failing to react to the stop signal (“trigger failures”) and partly due to a slower initiation of inhibition, implicating a failure of attention rather than a deficit in the inhibitory process itself. Correlations between the probability of trigger failures and event-related potentials reported by Hughes et al. are interpreted as supporting the attentional account of inhibitory deficits. Our results, and those of Matzke et al. (2016), who report that controls also display a substantial although lower trigger-failure rate, indicate that attentional factors need to be taken into account when interpreting results from the stop-signal paradigm.     

Power and the suppression of unwanted thoughts: Does control over others decrease control over the self?

Suppressing unwanted thoughts increases the accessibility of these thoughts after suppression is released. Two studies test the hypothesis that the magnitude of post-suppressional rebound is moderated by power. Study 1 measured participants’ thoughts about a white bear under suppression and expression instructions, following Wegner, Schneider, Carter, and White (1987). Study 2 measured stereotype accessibility after a task that required participants to describe one day in the life of an African-American under suppression or no-suppression instructions. Consistently across the two studies, powerful participants showed stronger post-suppressional rebound relative to powerless participants. The consequences of these findings for decision making and stereotyping are discussed.     

The measurement of locus of control: assessing more than meets the eye?

Ambiguities in the conceptions and measurement of locus of control were investigated in this study. Specifically, some psychometric properties of several widely used measures of perceived behavior-outcome contingency, interpersonal power, and social self-efficacy were assessed. To different degrees, the results indicated that all three measures of perceived behavior-outcome contingency lacked convergent and discriminant validity. Implications for interpreting past research, directions for future investigations, and limitations of the present study are discussed.     

Mapping drivers’ mental models of adaptive cruise control to performance

Driver support features (DSF) have the potential to improve safety, but they also change the driver-vehicle relationship —as well as their respective roles and responsibilities. To maximize safety, it is important to understand how drivers’ knowledge and understanding of these technologies—referred to as drivers’ mental models—impact performance and safety. This simulator study examined how drivers with different mental models of adaptive cruise control performed in edge cases. The study compared the responses of groups of drivers, with strong and weak mental models of ACC, established through a combination of screening, training, and exposure, in edge case situations in a high-fidelity driving simulator. In general, participants with strong mental models were faster than those with weak mental models to respond in edge-case situations—defined as cases where the ACC did not detect an approaching object, such as a slow-moving motorcycle. The performance deficits observed for drivers with weak mental models appear to reflect uncertainty surrounding how ACC will behave in edge cases.     

The relative importance of patients’ decisional control preferences and experiences

Objective: Patients’ role in treatment decision-making can influence psychosocial and health-related outcomes (i.e. satisfaction, felt respect, adherence). We examined decisional control in a surgical context, identifying correlates of patients’ preferences and experiences.

Design: 380 patients and 7 surgeons were surveyed during initial surgical consultation visits in a low-income outpatient clinic.

Measures: Patients reported preferences for (pre-consultation) and experiences of (post-consultation) decisional control, demographics, satisfaction with care, and adherence to treatment recommendations. Surgeons rated patients’ health status.

Results: Preferences for and experiences of decisional control were unrelated, suggesting significant preference–experience misalignment. However, this misalignment did not appear to be consequential for patient outcomes. Rather, more decisional control, regardless of patients’ preferences, predicted greater satisfaction with care and greater self-reported adherence as assessed at a post-surgical appointment.

Conclusions: Decisional control predicts better outcomes for patients, regardless of their preferences for control over treatment decisions. These findings suggest that interventions should aim to increase patients’ degree of decisional control when feasible and appropriate.     

Does lack of control lead to conspiracy beliefs? A meta-analysis

Perceived lack of control is widely believed to motivate, at least partly, belief in conspiracy theories. We question the theoretical foundations of this belief and meta-analyze existing published and unpublished studies to assess the overall effect of lack of control on conspiracy beliefs. The overall effect was small and not statistically significant (d = −0.05), and was not moderated by comparison group (baseline vs. control affirmation), type of manipulation used to threaten control, inclusion of a manipulation check, or sample type. However, the predicted effect of control was more likely to be observed when beliefs were measured in terms of specific conspiracy theories, rather than as general or abstract claims. Overall, the present studies to date offer limited support for the hypothesis that conspiracy beliefs arise as a compensatory control.     

Who's calling the shots? Intentional content and feelings of control

Based on Pacherie’s dynamic theory of intentions, this study investigated how the way an intention is formed and sustained affects action performance and the experience of control during acting. In Experiment 1, task-irrelevant verbal commands were given while participants responded to stimuli in a two-choice reaction time (RT) task. The commands referred to an action goal congruent or incongruent with the actor’s current intention, or ordered the initiation or abortion of the action. In Experiment 2, the same commands were given as participants freely chose between two actions. The distractors affected performance in the reactive task only. In both experiments, feelings of control were based on movement parameters as well as perceived (mis)matches between distractors and intended actions. These findings suggest that the way an intention is implemented affects how well it can be shielded against external perturbations and how much one feels in control.