A solution to the many attitudes problem

Philosophical Studies - According to noncognitivism, normative beliefs are just desire-like attitudes. While noncognitivists have devoted great effort to explaining the nature of normative belief,...     

A new solution to the problem of luck

The issue of whether and how we have the control necessary for freedom and moral responsibility is central to all control accounts of freedom and moral responsibility. The problem of luck for libertarians aims to show that indeterministic agents are ill-equipped with the control required for freedom and moral responsibility. In view of this, we must either endorse scepticism about the possibility of free and morally responsible agents, or make some form of, possibly revisionary, compatibilism work. In this paper, I shall offer a new solution to the problem of luck for libertarians. After outlining the problem of luck, I shall argue that, given a particular approach to mental causation, indeterminism can be viewed as an essential requirement of free and morally responsible action. After this, I shall distinguish between different types of inability and show how this provides us with a solution to the problem of luck. Finally, I shall consider some advantages and objections to the proposed solution.     

A neuroengineering solution to the optimal tracking problem

A mathematical solution is developed for an optimal sensory-to-motor transformation. This specifies a unique vector of motor command signals for goal-directed upper limb movement, conditional on cost of muscular effort vs. performance accuracy. Derivation is based on a realistic model of visual tracking, incorporating characteristics of external tracking system, target and disturbance as well as multivariable, nonlinear, time-varying characteristics of neuromuscular and biomechanical systems internal to the human operator. The optimal transformation removes redundancy in a 58-dimensional muscle system to give a two-dimensional response, thus solving the degrees-of-freedom problem. While adaptive filter neural networks are required to implement the general solution, an instructive linear matrix approximation reveals computational modules with observable behavioural correlates such as prediction, synergy generation and speed–accuracy compromise.PsycINFO classification: 2330     

A general solution to Mosier's oblique procrustes problem

Browne provided a method for finding a solution to the normal equations derived by Mosier for rotating a factor matrix to a best least squares fit with a specified structure. Cramer showed that Browne's solution is not always valid, and proposed a modified algorithm. Both Browne and Cramer assumed the factor matrix to be of full rank. In this paper a general solution is derived, which takes care of rank deficient factor matrices as well. A new algorithm is offered.     

A modest solution to the problem of religious disagreement

Many assume that the best, and perhaps only, way to address the so-called Problem of Evil (PoE) is to claim that God does not do evil, but that God merely allows evil. This assumption depends on two claims: (i) the doing-allowing distinction exists and (ii) the doing-allowing distinction is morally significant. In this paper I try to undermine both of these claims. Against (i) I argue that some of the most influential analyses of the doing-allowing distinction face grave difficulties and that these difficulties are only exacerbated when applied to God. Against (ii) I argue that broadly Kantian considerations give a better explanation of the moral differences in paradigm cases than the doing-allowing distinction and, when applied to God, effectively dissolve the moral significance of the doing-allowing distinction. The upshot of this is that those who claim God does evil are no worse off than those who claim God allows evil regarding the PoE.     

A Kantian solution to the problem of imperceptible differences

There are cases such as climate change where the cumulative effects of the actions of several agents lead to grave harm but where no individual agent can make a perceptible difference for the better or worse. According to Derek Parfit, dealing with such imperceptible difference cases requires substantial changes to the way we think about morality. In On What Matters, Parfit builds on Kantian Ethics to address the problem of imperceptible differences, but the transformation that Kant's theory undergoes in his hands is radical. I argue that Parfit's changes to Kant's theory are not only unnecessary but also detrimental to making sense of the ethical dimensions of action in collective contexts. Building on the notion of imperfect duties, I offer an alternative solution to the problem of imperceptible difference cases that remains closer to Kant's original theory and avoids the difficulties of Parfit's approach.     

A theoretical solution to the problem of personality-situation interaction

There has been much debate and research on the relative roles and the interaction of personality and situational factors in the determination of behaviour, and more broadly on the relative status of psychology and social science as explanations for human action. Much of this is based on a misconception, to which a branch of applied mathematics called automata theory suggests the answer. If our objective is redefined as the explanation of situation-behaviour relations by reference to psychological processes, rather than the explanation of behaviour by reference to situational and psychological factors, then many of the confusions and inconsistencies disappear. On this view, behaviour varies from situation to situation in a way which varies from person to person. However, the two processes are of different kinds and different orders, and they are only misrepresented as commensurable causes working interactively to produce a common effect. Alternative formulations are presented, and their implications discussed for research in individual and social psychology.     

Illusory contours as the solution to a problem

The perception of certain figures with illusory contours entails a reversal of figure and ground. It is hypothesized that this process occurs in two stages. First, some factor must suggest or cue the reversal. Experiments are described that isolate three such factors, namely, alignment of physically present contours, recognized incompletion of parts of the stimulus array, and set. Once cued, however, other experiments indicate that in a further stage of processing the solution is examined with respect to its compatibility with the stimulus display or with other preceptual properties to which the display gives rise. Only if such compatibility is present will the perception of a figure with illusory contours be maintained.     

A solution to a problem raised in Luce and Marley (2005)

Luce and Marley [2005. Ranked additive utility representations of gambles: Old and new axiomatizations. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 30, 21-62] examined various relations between mathematical forms for the utility of joint receipt ⊕ of gambles and for the utility of uncertain gambles. Their assumptions lead to a bisymmetry functional equation which, when the gambles are ranked, is defined on a restricted domain. Maksa [1999. Solution of generalized bisymmetry type equations without surjectivity. Aequationes Mathematicae, 57, 50-74] solved the general case and Kocsis [2007. A bisymmetry equation on restricted domain. Aequationes Mathematicae, 73, 280-284] presents the solution for the ranked case. The latter solution allows us to solve open problem 5 in Luce and Marley (2005) by showing that the assumptions of their Theorem 19 for an order-preserving ranked additive utility (RAU) representation U imply that U is a ranked weighted utility (RWU) representation that is additive over ⊕.     

Moorean pluralism as a solution to the incommensurability problem

Several prominent ethical philosophers have attempted to demonstrate that there exist instances or types of value that are of crucial moral significance but which cannot legitimately be compared with one another. Bernard Williams and Michael Stocker, for example, argue that it can sometimes be rational to regret having chosen the all-things-considered better of two alternatives, and that this sense of regret entails that the goodness of the worse option is not made up for by and is therefore incommensurable with that of the better. Joseph Raz and others have made similar points. In this paper, I propose a theory of value that is monistic in that it countenances just one sort of morally crucial value, but pluralistic in that several distinct properties bearer this value. I then explain how this view avoids incommensurable values without doing violence to the core intuitions that seemed to necessitate them, and how it fits into a larger conception of morality, right conduct, and moral psychology.     

Skinner and a solution to the problem of inner events

Skinner's treatment of inner states has been criticized not only by cognitivists but also by people who are close to behaviorist views. In particular, critics have argued that because of the limited conceptual resources of his scientific framework, Skinner cannot account for "mental" phenomena such as the qualitative character of feelings, conscious contents, or states of awareness. The present paper claims that these criticisms are mistaken. By paying careful attention to Skinner's strict physicalist position and by employing a consistent physicalist terminology, it can be shown that Skinner is able to account for the phenomena in question.     

Agent causation as a solution to the problem of action

My primary aim is to defend a nonreductive solution to the problem of action. I argue that when you are performing an overt bodily action, you are playing an irreducible causal role in bringing about, sustaining, and controlling the movements of your body, a causal role best understood as an instance of agent causation. Thus, the solution that I defend employs a notion of agent causation, though emphatically not in defence of an account of free will, as most theories of agent causation are. Rather, I argue that the notion of agent causation introduced here best explains how it is that you are making your body move during an action, thereby providing a satisfactory solution to the problem of action.     

A general first-order solution to the ramification problem with cycles

We provide a solution to the ramification problem that integrates findings of different axiomatic approaches to ramification from the last ten to fifteen years. For the first time, we present a solution that: (1) is independent of a particular time structure, (2) is formulated in classical first-order logic, (3) treats cycles – a notoriously difficult aspect – properly, and (4) is assessed against a state-transition semantics via a formal correctness proof.This is achieved as follows: We introduce indirect effect laws that enable us to specify ramifications that are triggered by activation of a formula rather than just an atomic effect. We characterise the intended models of these indirect effect laws by a state-transition semantics. Afterwards, we show how to compile a class of indirect effect laws into first-order effect axioms that then solve the ramification and frame problems. We finally prove the resulting effect axioms sound and complete with respect to the semantics defined earlier.     

Tooley's solution to the inference problem

Conclusion Tooley's speculative theory, I have tried to show, is beset with difficulties. I warned that this theory threatens to fail in its goal of illuminating the possible nature of a necessitation relation if it employs radical principles about parts and wholes and universals. Secondly, I argued that regardless of how we interpret the crucial phrase existing only as a part of, the speculative theory cannot solve the inference problem without appealing to such radical principles. Finally, I considered and rejected a version of Tooley's speculative theory that attempts to solve the inference problem using the Indiscernibility of Identicals.I conclude that the speculative theory fails. Tooley must fall back to the stipulative theory and live with the lack of an illuminating solution to the inference problem. But this is not to admit defeat. While it would be nice to have a more complete account of its workings, we may view the introduction of the necessitation relation as a theoretical posit, analogous to the positing of subatomic particles in physics to account for various data.I would like to thank Phillip Bricker for his persistent help with this paper. I would also like to thank David Lewis and an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies for their comments.