The Influence of Eyewitness Nonidentifications on Mock-Jurors' Judgments of a Court Case1

Two experiments examined the effect of an eyewitness nonidentificution on mock-jurors' verdicts in robbery cases, as well as the effects of number of identifying eyewitnesses and status of the identifying witness (victim or bystander). Subjects read court case summaries that included variable eyewitness evidence and constant alibi, circumstantial, and character evidence. In Experiment 1, frequency of guilty verdicts was significantly less when an eyewitness testified in court that the defendant was not the perpetrator, even when this nonidentification opposed two positive identifications. In Experiment 2, a low guilty rate was again associated with the presence of a nonidentifier, but only when the nonidentifier actually testified in court and stipulated that the defendant is “not the man.” On the average, 70% of the jurors delivered guilty verdicts when both the victim and bystander gave identifying testimony, whereas 12.5% delivered guilty verdicts when the bystander gave opposing nonidentifying testimony. Guilty rates were unaffected by the identifying eyewitness' status and (in Experiment 2, but not Experiment 1) were higher when there were two (vs. one) identifying eyewitnesses.     

Witnesses and Their Testimony: Effects of Ordering on Juror Verdicts1

Thibaut and Walker's claim that criminal courtroom proceedings are subject to pervasive recency effects was experimentally investigated. Previous research on order effects in a legal setting is critically reviewed; it is argued that this research fails to provide adequate simulation of courtroom protocol. An experiment was designed to retain the structure of a criminal trial while manipulating witness and testimony order. In contrast to earlier research, primacy effects were found. The greatest number of guilty verdicts by simulated jurors occurred when the strongest “guilty” witnesses and “guilty” testimony by these witnesses came first. These results are discussed with respect to (a) witness and testimony order, (b) length of case, and (c) type of case used.     

Sensitizing Potential Jurors to Variations in Eyewitness Evidence Quality Using Counterfactual Thinking

Jurors often have difficulty evaluating eyewitness testimony. Counterfactual thinking is a type of mental simulation that informs causal inference. Encouraging jurors to think counterfactually about eyewitness factors may sensitize them to these factors' causal influence on eyewitness identification and testimony accuracy, improving their overall judgments (such as verdicts). One hundred twenty‐one undergraduate participants were randomly assigned to read a scenario containing either high‐quality or low‐quality eyewitness evidence and to evaluate eyewitness factors adopting either their default or a counterfactual mindset via a question‐order manipulation. Logistic regressions and analyses of variance revealed that a counterfactual mindset lowered perceptions of eyewitness accuracy and guilty verdicts (compared with the default mindset) when the evidence was poor; a counterfactual mindset, however, did not increase perceptions of accuracy and guilty verdicts when evidence was strong. We discuss possible mechanisms underlying these effects and identify several potential avenues for future research.Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Habla Ingles? The Effects of Language Translation on Simulated Juror Decisions1

Two studies were conducted in which college students, acting as simulated jurors, heard the testimony of a defendant in an assault case. The testimony was presented in English or in another language (Spanish in Study 1 and Thai in Study 2) which was translated into English by an interpreter. In Study 1, non-Hispanics judged the defendant to be more guilty than did Hispanics when the defendant's testimony was presented in Spanish than when it was presented in English. This bias was offset when the judge's instructions admonished the jurors to ignore the fact that the defendant's testimony was translated. Similarly, in Study 2, subjects (all non-Thai) judged the defendent more guilty when his testimony was presented in Thai than when it was presented in English. Again, this bias was eliminated by the judge's instructions to the jurors to ignore the fact that the testimony was translated. The increased guilty verdicts for defendants who did not testify in English appeared to be due to prejudice and language ethnocentrism, the belief that defendants in U.S. courts should speak English.     

Improving the Credibility of Child Sexual Assault Victims in Court: The Impact of a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner

The present study investigated the influence of a sexual assault nurse examiner's (SANE's) testimony on mock juror perceptions of a child or adolescent victim of child sexual assault. Community members (N = 252, 156 females) read a fictional criminal trial summary of a child sexual assault case in which the victim was 6 or 15 years old and the prosecution presented medical testimony from a SANE or a traditional registered nurse (RN), or did not present medical testimony. Mock jurors were more likely to render guilty verdicts when a SANE testified compared with the other two testimony conditions. In addition, pro-victim judgments (e.g., sympathy toward the victim) and negative defendant judgments (e.g., anger toward the defendant) mediated this relation. Finally, cognitive network representations of the case demonstrated that the RN and no-medical-testimony groups were similar and the SANE group was distinct from the other two conditions. We discuss these results in terms of the implications of SANE testimony in child sexual assault court cases. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Jurors' Decisions in Trials of Battered Women Who Kill: The Role of Prior Beliefs and Expert Testimony1

The present research explored the influence of four factors on mock jurors' decisions in a homicide trial involving a battered woman who killed her abusive husband: (a) jurors' preexisting beliefs about wife abuse, (b) the presence of expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome, (c) jurors' beliefs in a just world, and (d) gender. Mock jurors listened to a trial involving a woman who had killed her abuser, which either contained expert testimony or did not, and then rendered various judgments about the case. Results indicated that those individuals who were more informed about the dynamics of abuse and those exposed to the expert testimony, compared to their respective counterparts, were more believing of the battered woman's account of what occurred. In general, weak believers in a just world were more lenient in their judgments, with verdicts of not guilty being associated with weaker beliefs in a just world than guilty verdicts. Weak believers in a just world also felt that the expert testimony applied more to the defendant than did strong believers. Finally, women who were weak believers in a just world were less likely to hold the defendant responsible for the events and to be more informed about the dynamics of abuse following the experiment.     

Gender effects on individual verdicts and on mock jury verdicts in a Simulated Acquaintance Rape Trial

Since more women than men college students vote guilty in a simulated acquaintance rape trial [e.g., G. J. Fischer (1991) “Cognitive predictors of not-guilty verdicts in a Simulated Acquaintance Rape Trial,”Psychological Reports, Vol. 68, pp. 1199–1206], guilty mock jury verdicts were expected to increase as a function of the number of women on the jury (i.e., 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12). However, guilty verdicts did not increase significantly until either females were an overwhelming majority (i.e., 10 women to 2 men) or the jury was all female. Even in the latter conditions, guilty verdicts were fewer than would be expected based on the 86% of women and 66% of men voting guilty on a survey completed after reading about the trial, but before serving on a jury. Although a very large majority of females were needed to increase guilty verdicts, a majority appeared to lessen the likelihood of not guilty verdicts. For example, when a majority of jurors were female, 0/18 hung juries leaned toward a not guilty verdict vs. 11/34 juries leaning toward a not guilty verdict when less than or equal to one half of the jurors were female. Most of the students were White (85%), with 4% Asian, 3.2% Black, 3.2% Hispanic, and 4% “Other.”     

The Impact of the Guilty but Mentally III Verdict on Juror Decisions: An Empirical Analysis

The present study attempted to determine the impact of alternative verdict choices on the decisions of mock jurors. Subjects used in this study as mock jurors were all college undergraduates. They were shown one of two versions of a videotaped simulated murder trial. Both films presented a defendant who appeared to be suffering emotional difficulties, but in one film the defendant had clearly committed the act while in the other film the defendant's actions were less certain. Subjects than gave their individual verdicts and, after deliberation with other subjects, a total jury verdict. The verdicts available to the subjects varied across three conditions such that the subjects in one condition were only allowed to find the defendant to be innocent or guilty. In another condition the subjects could find the defendant innocent, guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). In the third condition the subjects were allowed to choose between innocent, guilty, NGRI, and guilty but mentally ill (GBMI). The results indicated that the addition of the "mental health" verdicts had a significant impact on the decisions of the jurors. In particular, it appears that only defendants who would otherwise have been found innocent were likely to be found NGRI. This study also indicated that the GBMI verdict is very attractive to mock jurors. Indeed, even innocent defendants were found to be GBMI, a form of guilt, when this alternative was made available. These findings raise potentially important constitutional and practical issues for the trial of emotionally disturbed criminal defendants.     

Juror Preference for Curative Alternative Verdicts for Veterans With PTSD

Two studies examined mock juror verdicts for veterans with PTSD in the criminal justice system. Mock jurors demonstrated a leniency toward treatment bias for veterans with PTSD who committed a violent crime, compared to a nonviolent crime. This leniency toward treatment bias occurred only when alternative verdict options, beyond guilty or not guilty, were available. In fact, a guilt bias was demonstrated by mock jurors when the only verdict options were guilty or not guilty, and a bias toward treatment was demonstrated when curative alternative verdicts were available. Implications for efforts to address the growing national problem of veterans with PTSD in the criminal justice system are discussed.     

Polygraph Testimony and Juror Judgments: A Comparison of the Guilty Knowledge Test and the Control Question Test1

The present experiment investigated the impact of the Control Question Test (CQT) and the Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT) on the verdicts of mock jurors. Although studies have indicated that polygraph evidence has little influence on jurors' verdicts (Cavoukian & Heselgrave, 1980; Spanos, Myers, Dubreuil, & Pawlak, 1992–1993), no research has previously distinguished between the different types of polygraph tests and their impact on juror verdicts. In the present study, jurors were shown a videotape of a simulated rape-murder trial that contained either CQT polygraph evidence, GKT polygraph evidence, or no polygraph evidence. No differences were found among the 3 conditions for either jury verdicts or individual juror verdicts, and jurors tended to rate both forms of polygraph testimony below other forms of equally suspect evidence, such as eyewitness testimony, in its influence on their decision-making process.     

Information Processing in Joined and Severed Trials

The present study was conducted to determine the process by which jurors reach verdicts in trials in which multiple charges are joined in one indictment. The experiment was designed to test the impact of joinder of affenses, similarity of offenses, and evidentiary strength of jurors' ability to process trial evidence. The results gathered from 220 male and female subjects indicated, as previous research has shown, that joined trials lead to more guilty verdicts than severed trials; that the first charge in a joined trial accounts for this "joinder effect," receiving significantly more guilty verdicts than its severed counterpart. When joined trials are composed of similar categories of crimes, guilt verdicts increase and jurors tend to confuse evidence-as shown by a high rate of antidefendant intrusions from case two to case one. More antidefendant cognitions were also found when the cases were similar. Furthermore, case similarity interacted with the evidentiary strength of the charges in joined trials.     

Videotaped Versus In-Court Witness Testimony: Does Protecting the Child Witness Jeopardize Due Process?1

Videotaping depositions may protect a child witness from the stress of testifying in court but also may influence jurors’ perceptions of the child and the defendant, and jurors’ verdicts in systematic ways. The present study examines several psychological hypotheses that emerge from the controversy over the use of videotaped depositions of child witnesses in child sexual abuse trials. We predicted that student jurors viewing a videotaped deposition would be more proprosecution and less prodefense than those who did not receive testimony in such a form. Thus, it was predicted that jurors viewing a videotaped deposition would perceive the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies more favorably, the defense witnesses and their testimonies less favorably, and give more guilty verdicts than jurors who viewed identical testimony during the course of a trial. We also predicted that females would be more proprosecution and less prodefense than males and that this gender difference would be accentuated by the medium of presentation. The medium of presentation had only a few effects on jurors’ responses. However, when differences emerged, they generally provided support for the predicted main effects. The implications of these findings for the use of videotaped depositions of child sexual abuse victims are discussed.     

The Effects of Bifurcation and Death Qualification on Assignment of Penalty in Capital Crimes1

An experiment was conducted to test the effects of the bifurcated trial procedure and the death qualification process on sentencing and verdicts in death penalty cases. Forty-four 12-person juries, assigned to one of five trial conditions, returned verdicts indicating that death qualified, bifurcated juries gave the most severe verdicts and the highest proportion of guilty verdicts, while non-death qualified, trial only, juries returned the least severe verdicts and the highest proportion of not guilty or hung outcomes. Thirty-seven penalty phase juries, of which 20 had previously assigned guilt, were distributed among five penalty conditions. The sentencing data revealed that the most severe sentences were given by the death qualified, bifurcated juries. The least severe sentences were returned by the non-death qualified, bifurcated juries. Juries impaneled for the penalty phase only and death qualified meted out moderate sentences.     

The Timing of the Defense Opening Statement: Don't Wait Until the Evidence Is in1

Defense attorneys often reserve their opening statements until after presentation of evidence by the prosecution, a practice advocated by some experts. The current study, involving 291 subjects, varied the timing of the defense attorney's opening statement so that it preceded the prosecutor's opening statement, immediately followed the prosecutor's opening statement, or was reserved until after the prosecutor's case presentation. The type of opening statement (content vs. noncontent) and the testimony (altered vs. unaltered) were varied for purposes of increasing generalization. Materials were based on an actual case of auto theft and were presented in written form complete with judge's instructions. The results showed that subjects perceived eyewitness testimony, the prosecutor's opening statement, the prosecutor's closing statement, the defense attorney's closing statement, and the effectiveness of the attorneys differently depending on the timing of the opening statement. Each of these items favored the defense more than the prosecution if the defense opening statement was earlier rather than later. These effects did not interact with type of opening statement or the testimony alteration variable. Individual verdicts, when weighted by the subjects' confidence in their verdicts, were also affected by the timing variable with verdicts more favorable to the defense when the defense opening statement was given earlier rather than later. The consistency with which the timing variable affected subjects' impressions suggests that defense attorneys who take their first opportunity to make an opening statement, rather than delay, end up with a stronger case for their client. Possible exceptions to this conclusion are discussed.     

Understanding pretrial publicity: predecisional distortion of evidence by mock jurors

Prejudicial pretrial publicity (PTP) constitutes a serious source of juror bias. The current study examined differences in predecisional distortion for mock jurors exposed to negative PTP (N-PTP) versus nonexposed control participants. According to work by K. A. Carlson and J. E. Russo (2001), predecisional distortion occurs when jurors bias new evidence in favor of their current leading party (prosecution or defense) rather than evaluating this information for its actual probative properties. Jury-eligible university students (N=116) acted as jurors in a mock trial. Elevated rates of guilty verdicts were observed in the N-PTP condition. Predecisional distortion scores were significantly higher in the N-PTP condition and reflected a proprosecution bias. The effect of prejudicial PTP on verdict outcomes was mediated by predecisional distortion in the evaluation of testimony. Results are discussed in relation to motivated decision making and confirmation biases.     

The influence of decision task and deliberation style on the verdict of the juries

The influence of decision task and deliberation style on the verdict of the juries. In the Kameda's Deliberation Style Model the emission of verdicts of responsibility when the deliberation style of the juries (elemental/compound) and the type of decision task (disjunctive/conjunctive) are jointly manipulated, is favoured in certain conditions. Given the consequences that these approaches could have in real judicial processes, this model is analyzed using a manslaughter crime under the Spanish judicial context conditions (nine members juries and seven or five members majorities emitting a verdict of guilty or not guilty, respectively). The obtained results indicated a better operation of the model when a conjunctive decision task was demanded.     

Jury Deliberations: Discussion Content and Influence Processes in Jury Decision Making1

The present research investigated the jury deliberation process. Representative juror subjects viewed a realistic videotaped trial consisting of three offenses, deliberated in groups of six and reached verdicts on each charge, and completed a post-deliberation questionnaire that assessed individual cognitions. Deliberations were videotaped and content-analyzed. The results indicated that the initial vote distribution was a good predictor of the final verdict; majorities tended to prevail. Deliberation content was concentrated primarily in two areas: (a) the facts of the case and (b) statements of preference for guilty or not guilty verdicts. Path analyses suggested that decisions on the first charge were based jointly on the content of deliberations and on the group vote distribution, whereas decisions on later charges were based largely on normative pressures. Jurors' post-deliberation impressions of the trial were affected by whether or not they had changed votes during deliberations.