Binocular vision with two stabilized retinal images

Experiments are described in which each eye is presented with a target whose image remains on the same part of the retina when the eye moves. The patterns presented to each eye may be similar and may be placed on corresponding parts of the retina or may be placed in non-corresponding positions: alternatively, different targets may be presented to the two eyes. Each pattern fades intermittently. Sometimes both are seen together and sometimes both fields are dark at once. There is a small negative correlation between the times of clear vision with the two eyes. When corresponding areas of the two retinas are illuminated with red and green light respectively, the composite colour (yellow) is never perceived with steady illumination. When two similar patterns are in nearly corresponding positions there may be subjective fusion. With two different targets there is sometimes a subjective impression that the two patterns move with respect to one another even though their positions on the retina are fixed.     

公民的两种身份及其道德要求

“公民道德”意义上的公民具有两种身份,一是法律身份,一是社会身份。不同的身份决定了对个体不同的道德要求。一般来说,这两种身份统一于一个具有完全责任能力的个体之中,不同的身份只能出现在不同的场合或者承载不同的社会关系,场合不同、社会关系不同,对他的道德要求就不一样,二者不能混淆,即身份是不能僭越也不能放弃。但是,两种身份的道德要求在底线上是一致,这就是说,两种身份的责任和道德要求在特定的场合和社会关系之中可以融通。     

Analysis of group composition in multimember multigroup data

Data from groups often have a multimember multigroup (MMMG) structure. Examples are two‐parent families with a female or male child (three members, two groups), two same‐gender and opposite‐gender peers of different status (two members, four groups), or gay, lesbian, and heterosexual couples (two members, three groups). To analyze such data, a framework called MMMG actor–partner interdependence model (MMMG APIM) is presented considering group composition. Three models are discussed in detail: the three‐member two‐group APIM, the two‐member four‐group APIM, and the two‐member three‐group APIM. Structural equation modeling and cross‐sectional and longitudinal data are used to illustrate the approach. To ease the interpretation of APIM findings, a proposal of a general classification scheme is made.     

Tree inference with factors selectively influencing processes in a processing tree

We show how to systematically construct a processing tree using data from an experiment in which two experimental factors are intended to selectively influence two different processes. Only two arrangements are possible for the two selectively influenced processes: ordered and unordered. We show that there are only two standard trees that need be considered, one for each arrangement. Necessary and sufficient conditions are given for each tree to be applicable. If the conditions do not hold, no tree is possible. If the selectively influenced processes are ordered, their order is sometimes determined by the data. We consider two factors that selectively influence two processes in every tree in a set of trees, such that on a given trial, a tree is selected from the set at random. We show that if the influenced processes are ordered in every tree or unordered in every tree, then the mixture of trees is equivalent to one of the two standard trees. To illustrate the method, a tree is constructed from simulated data from a model of Batchelder and Riefer [Batchelder, W.H., Riefer, D.M. (1980). Separation of storage and retrieval factors in free recall of clusterable pairs. Psychological Review, 87, 375–397].     

认知主义与联结主义之比较

认知主义的研究定向和联结主义的研究定向是广义的现代认知心理学的两种主要研究范式。这两种研究范式都各有自己的研究内容和方法论,也取得了各自不同的成就,同时也存在各自不同的问题。通过对两种研究范式的比较,我们可以清楚地认识到二者的相互沟通和融合才是认知心理学未来发展的必然趋势。     

权力感的无意识启动:方法研究*

情境性启动法是对权力感进行内隐社会认知研究的重要方法。本研究首先对权力情境性启动的两种启动方法(概念启动和定势启动)进行介绍,接着通过两个实验对两种启动方法在中文背景下的适用性和有效性进行了验证,认为中文材料的概念启动和定势启动是适用和有效的,可以作为国内权力社会认知研究中启动权力的方法。最后对权力概念启动和定势启动的研究范式、方法差异和内在机制进行了讨论。     

How does running memory span work?

In running memory span, a list ends unpredictably, and the last few items are to be recalled. This task is of increasing importance in recent research. We argue that there are two very different strategies for performing running span tasks: a low-effort strategy in which items are passively held until the list ends, when retrieval into a capacity-limited store takes place; and a higher-effort strategy in which working memory is continually updated using rehearsal processes during the list presentation. In two experiments, we examine the roles of these two strategies and the consequences of two types of interference.     

The role of expectancy in comparative judgments

Researchers interested in the processing of relational information have sought a satisfactory explanation for the congruity effect in linear orders. It is relatively easy to select either the greater of two objects that are high on a dimension or the lesser of two objects that are low on a dimension, but it is relatively difficult to determine the greater of two objects that are low in magnitude or the lesser of two objects that are high in magnitude. One explanation of the congruity effect is the expectancy hypothesis that claims that the choice of the comparative primes objects of particular magnitudes. We present two experiments that demonstrate that a congruity effect of equivalent magnitude is obtained when the comparative is presented after the stimulus pair. Moreover, this equivalence cannot be attributed to the salience of the dimensions we employed, because this equivalence held for stimuli that were classified as salient and for those classified as nonsalient. These findings are interpreted in the context of some current explanations of the congruity effect.     

Information processing by performers and observers in a paired associate learning task

The effects of two training procedures on learning and performance are compared. Performers select a response alternative for each stimulus on Trial 1 and receive feedback in terms of “Right” or “Wrong”. Observers receive the same information by listening to the experimenter. Experiment I tests the hypothesis that performers and observers are using a different learning strategy when there are only two response alternatives available for each stimulus on Trial 1. A recognition procedure was used on Trial 2; each stimulus was followed by four alternatives, two of them being the same as presented on Trial 1. Subjects have to recognize the two “old” alternatives. Performers are always better at recognizing the chosen alternative, whereas observers are better at recognizing the correct alternative. Experiment II extends the comparison between performers and observers to a task with four response alternatives on Trial 1. There are no longer differences in performance between the two training procedures.     

The Metaphysical Equivalence Of Three And Four Dimensionalism

I argue that two competing accounts of persistence, three and four dimensionalism, are in fact metaphysically equivalent. I begin by clearly defining three and four dimensionalism, and then I show that the two theories are intertranslatable and equally simple. Through consideration of a number of different cases where intuitions about persistence are contradictory, I then go on to show that both theories describe these cases in the same manner. Further consideration of some empirical issues arising from the theory of special relativity lead me to conclude that the two theories are equally explanatory, and thus finally that they are metaphysically equivalent.     

How does running memory span work?

In running memory span, a list ends unpredictably, and the last few items are to be recalled. This task is of increasing importance in recent research. We argue that there are two very different strategies for performing running span tasks: a low-effort strategy in which items are passively held until the list ends, when retrieval into a capacity-limited store takes place; and a higher-effort strategy in which working memory is continually updated using rehearsal processes during the list presentation. In two experiments, we examine the roles of these two strategies and the consequences of two types of interference.     

The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons

Epistemic reasons are mental states. They are not propositions or non-mental facts. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the topic. Section 2 gives two concrete examples of how our topic directly affects the internalism/externalism debate in normative epistemology. Section 3 responds to an argument against the view that reasons are mental states. Section 4 presents two problems for the view that reasons are propositions. Section 5 presents two problems for the view that reasons are non-mental facts. Section 6 argues that reasons are mental states. Section 7 responds to objections.     

What inductive explanations could not be

Marc Lange argues that proofs by mathematical induction are generally not explanatory because inductive explanation is irreparably circular. He supports this circularity claim by presenting two putative inductive explanantia that are one another’s explananda. On pain of circularity, at most one of this pair may be a true explanation. But because there are no relevant differences between the two explanantia on offer, neither has the explanatory high ground. Thus, neither is an explanation. I argue that there is no important asymmetry between the two cases because they are two presentations of the same explanation. The circularity argument requires a problematic notion of identity of proofs. I argue for a criterion of proof individuation that identifies the two proofs Lange offers. This criterion can be expressed in two equivalent ways: one uses the language of homotopy type theory, and the second assigns algebraic representatives to proofs. Though I will concentrate on one example, a criterion of proof identity has much broader consequences: any investigation into mathematical practice must make use of some proof-individuation principle.     

Adding versus averaging: Evaluability theory applied to job choice decisions

While the unique roles of individual job attributes (e.g., salary and benefits) in job and organizational attraction have received extensive research attention, research examining the mechanisms through which an overall evaluation of a job option is made by combining evaluations of individual attributes is scarce. The current study examined the process through which job choice decisions are made under three conditions: when evaluating a single job offer, when comparing two job offers, and when evaluating more than two job offers. In Study 1, it was found that when a single job offer is evaluated, the average of perceived values of attributes in an offer (e.g., the perceived attractiveness of a salary) drives the choice, whereas the difference between jobs is what matters when two jobs are evaluated simultaneously, potentially leading to a preference reversal between conditions when the same two jobs are evaluated. In Study 2, it was found that average values of attributes across options (e.g., average salary in all job offers received) influence job choice when more than two job offers are evaluated simultaneously. These findings indicate that in all three conditions, job choice decisions are influenced by the evaluability of the choice set, which becomes low when a single job offer is evaluated without any context, or when more than two job offers are evaluated simultaneously, and becomes high when two jobs are compared with each other. When evaluability is low, candidates resort to averaging as the decision rule, whereas adding is used when evaluability is high.     

Self-Report Measures of Individual Differences in Regulatory Focus: A Cautionary Note

Regulatory focus theory distinguishes between two independent structures of strategic inclination, promotion versus prevention. However, the theory implies two potentially independent definitions of these inclinations, the self-guide versus the reference-point definitions. Two scales (the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire, Higgins al., 2001, and the General Regulatory Focus Measure, Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 2002) have been widely used to measure dispositional regulatory focus. We suggest that these two scales align respectively with the two definitions, and find that the two scales are largely uncorrelated. Both conceptual and methodological implications are discussed.     

影像诊断中的系统辩证思路

本文根据影像诊断逻辑学原理,探讨影像诊断思路。影像诊断思路可分为两个层面的思维和四个相应阶段。两个层面的思维是对象思维和元思维。四个阶段是影像观察理解、异常影像解析、疾病假说构建、影像诊断验证。这一过程我们称为影像诊断的二层四阶段系统辩证思路。     

Contrasts and correlations in effect-size estimation

This article describes procedures for presenting standardized measures of effect size when contrasts are used to ask focused questions of data. The simplest contrasts consist of comparisons of two samples (e.g., based on the independent t statistic). Useful effect-size indices in this situation are members of the g family (e.g., Hedges's g and Cohen's d ) and the Pearson r . We review expressions for calculating these measures and for transforming them back and forth, and describe how to adjust formulas for obtaining g or d from t , or r from g , when the sample sizes are unequal. The real-life implications of d or g calculated from t become problematic when there are more than two groups, but the correlational approach is adaptable and interpretable, although more complex than in the case of two groups. We describe a family of four conceptually related correlation indices: the alerting correlation, the contrast correlation, the effect-size correlation, and the BESD (binomial effect-size display) correlation. These last three correlations are identical in the simple setting of only two groups, but differ when there are more than two groups.     

The factorial structure of sleep dissatisfaction

Research into sleep problems has been dominated by a number of theoretical perspectives from each of which useful treatment applications have been derived. However, the rich diversity of problems that are subsumed under insomnia or sleep disturbance often remain unappreciated. This paper reports the results of a factor analysis performed on the combined items of two questionnaires designed to assess sleep disturbance. Six factors are described, two of which relate to cognitive aspects of sleep disturbance; two which map onto sleep onset and sleep maintenance problems; and two which are drawn from dissatisfaction with poor sleep. Correlations of factor scores with measures of neuroticism, worry and various sleep history variables provide a strong level of construct validity. The results are discussed in terms of their treatment implications.     

What difference reveals about similarity

Detecting that two images are different is faster for highly dissimilar images than for highly similar images. Paradoxically, we showed that the reverse occurs when people are asked to describe how two images differ--that is, to state a difference between two images. Following structure-mapping theory, we propose that this disassociation arises from the multistage nature of the comparison process. Detecting that two images are different can be done in the initial (local-matching) stage, but only for pairs with low overlap; thus, "different" responses are faster for low-similarity than for high-similarity pairs. In contrast, identifying a specific difference generally requires a full structural alignment of the two images, and this alignment process is faster for high-similarity pairs. We described four experiments that demonstrate this dissociation and show that the results can be simulated using the Structure-Mapping Engine. These results pose a significant challenge for nonstructural accounts of similarity comparison and suggest that structural alignment processes play a significant role in visual comparison.