What is a deep interpretation?

Important differences are emerging regarding the place where analysts believe the most meaningful analytic work takes place. One area that highlights these distinct ways of working is the analyst's view of deep interpretations. Models underlying the differing perspectives on this issue are presented, along with an extended clinical example that illustrates the importance of considering, in formulating analytic interventions, the concept of a structured mind. A view of the analytic process that accords the patient's perspective greater privilege is introduced.     

Logische oder metaphysische interpretation der logistik?

Ohne ZusammenfassungPaper sent in for the fifth International Congress for the Unity of Science (Cambridge, Mass. 1939).     

Graphomotor interpretation of the MMPI-2?

Although clinicians may attribute various personality features to patients who complete paper-and-pencil instruments (e.g., the MMPI-2) with notable neatness (compulsivity?) or sloppiness (oppositionalism?), such inferences have not been empirically examined. In our investigation, MMPI-2 protocols of 154 psychiatric inpatients (74 female and 80 male, M age = 36.7) were examined. A scoring system was developed to categorize the degree of neatness with which each patient had filled in the MMPI-2 response sheet (interrater Cohen Kappa = 0.86). Degree of neatness was not found to be correlated with clinical or content scales on the MMPI-2, with any Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-II (MCMI-II) scales, or with various Rorschach (Comprehensive System) variables. These results imply that, clinical lore notwithstanding, clinicians should refrain from drawing unwarranted inferences about patients' personality features on the basis of the apparent neatness or sloppiness of patients' protocols.     

Can transference interpretation as expert evaluation be analyzed?]

Usually the patient is excluded from the evaluation procedure which is necessary to carry out psychotherapy or psychoanalysis. Neither does he know the report of his treating analyst to the expert, nor the latter's report to the medical insurance company that covers the cost of his treatment. In his article, the author suggests to include the patient actively in this process, by giving him access to the evaluation procedure. He maintains that, as long as the procedure is unknown to the patient, its subconscious meaning cannot be analysed, and the analyst's contribution to the process of transference in this area remains obscure.     

The hypnotic use of language — a Heideggerian interpretation

Abstract

This paper shows that Heidegger's theory of language has implications for our understanding of hypnosis. A Heideggerian interpretation of samples of trance inductions brings to light the fact that the hypnotic use of language differs from the everyday language in two major dimensions: in hypnosis, language “call” things into being, thus becoming “something more than a simple, practical means of communicating with others and a means of controlling nature” and in hypnosis, humans enter into a reversed relationship with language, a relationship in which it is language, rather than the hypnotist, that “speaks.”     

A contemporary interpretation of Marx’s thoughts on modernity

Unlike some western scholars who limit their interpretation of modernity and its source to conceptual, cultural, value, and psychological dimensions, Marx pointed out that modernity came mainly from modern production system. Starting from the historical context of his time, Marx explored various aspects of modernity and pointed out that modernity was inherent in the logic of capital, resided in the process of historical evolution, arose in social conflicts and segmentation, and presented itself in a global horizon. The logic of capital, the historical viewpoint, the theory of contradiction and a global perspective are fundamental in Marx’s analysis of the problems of modernity. Marx’s ideas of modernity are methodologically significant to the construction of modernity in contemporary Chinese society. __________ Translated from Zhongguo Shehui Kexue 中国社会科学 (China Social Sciences), 2005 (4) by Xing Lijun     

Empathy is interpretation (and who ever said it wasn't?)

Whenever the subject is explicitly addressed, all analysts agree that empathic perception is an attitude one takes toward making observations, not a privileged means of perception. Furthermore, analysts seem to agree that observations made with an empathic intention are interpretations like any other observations. Empathy is not a conduit to the patient's inner life. But despite these points of consensus, it often seems to be implied in the psychoanalytic literature, usually unintentionally, that empathy is a privileged means of knowing another person. This undercurrent is sometimes present even in the work of theorists who simultaneously state their opposition to this very point of view. In this paper, after presenting an example from the literature of this kind of contradiction, I, basing my argument in hermeneutics, offer the view that all observation, inside and outside psychoanalysis, is interpretation. Then, turning to the three papers of the symposium individually, I take the perspective that in one way or another they all portray empathic perception as a privileged means of observation. These portrayals are examples of the unconscious politics of theory.     

What kind of knowledge is necessary for the interpretation of language?

An investigation into what kind of knowledge is necessary for interpretation is an important research project for the two fields of the theory of meaning and epistemology, through which they are combined. By examining the two basic requirements for a theory on the interpretation of language drafted by Donald Davidson, this paper analyzes several kinds of knowledge which are necessary for interpretation. The goal is to explore the knowledge of radical interpretation and the distinctions and connections between this knowledge and radical translation and Convention-T, thus revealing its characteristics and possibility to interpretation.     

The “idealized individual” interpretation of individual differences in multidimensional scaling

It is shown that several variants of the Tucker-Messick points of view procedure are interpretable in terms of their idealized individual concepts. It is contended that the main function of the method is that it allows the computation ofseveral vectors of mean judgments instead of only one and that each of these may be used to stand for the actual judgments of a subgroup of subjects. Vectors that do not correspond to the judgments of any subjects are to be avoided. It is alleged that Ross's interpretation of points of view is quite different from that intended by Tucker and Messick.The preparation of this paper was supported in part by Contract Nonr-228(32) between the Office of Navel Research and the University of Southern California.     

Psychoanalytic interpretation of the Rorschach: do we have better hieroglyphics?

Schafer (1954) advanced the "Psychoanalytic Interpretation in Rorschach Testing" and asserted that thoughtful interpretation involved more than translating hieroglyphics or scores. In this book, he presented his thesis by describing four defensive styles (repression, denial, projective, and obsessive-compulsive) at various levels of severity of psychopathology. To investigate whether the Structural Summary data from Exner's (1986) Comprehensive System, with its improved reliability and validity and additional scores, allow one to make similar distinctions among the types of defense and severity of disturbance, we rescored the Schafer records. The results of this conservative test of Exner's system suggest that (a) the Comprehensive System reliably distinguishes the repressive style from the other styles, and (b) scores alone may provide adequate measures of severity of disturbance even with form quality excluded. We concluded that Rorschach scores must be understood as complex products of multiple psychological operations and may correspond to different subjective experiences in various contexts.     

The logic and language of Nirvāna: A contemporary interpretation

In contrast to historically orientedapproaches, this paper tackles the concept ofNirvna from the perspective ofcontemporary philosophy of language. It focuseson four propositions: Nirvna exists;Nirvna does not exist; Nirvna existsand does not exist; Nirvna neither exists nordoes not exist. The Buddha's rejectionof these propositions is interpreted by meansof explicit and conditionaldefinitions of existence. Stalnaker's notion ofpragmatic presupposition providesan explanation why the propositions are withoutmeaning. After comparing theword ``Nirvna' with indexicals, propernames and theoretical terms, it is finallyasked what linguistic function the word has.     

The categorical interpretation of Guo Xiang’s “independent genesis”

Seemingly, “independent genesis” refers to the independent existence and changes of each thing, but it is clear that there cannot be any truly “independent” things at all. Each thing in the world has to stay in connection or relationship with other things outside itself if it wants to represent its own “independence” and “genesis” in terms of form; and inevitably such connection or relationship itself has to be embodied in the internal nature of each thing. In the metaphysical thought of Guo Xiang, the former was known as the quality of “interdependence”; and the latter the characteristics of “quality” or “quality image.” Such characteristics of “quality” or “quality image” were interdependent, which constituted the essence of each thing itself as “beingness” and “beinglessness,” and thus resulted in the independent manifestation and change of things in terms of their external forms. The grasping of essence of things as “beingness” and “beinglessness” depended upon comprehension or rational intuition, and that was the realm of “profundity” in Guo Xiang’s terms.     

Two meanings of "if"? Individual differences in the interpretation of conditionals

This work investigates the nature of two distinct response patterns in a probabilistic truth table evaluation task, in which people estimate the probability of a conditional on the basis of frequencies of the truth table cases. The conditional-probability pattern reflects an interpretation of conditionals as expressing a conditional probability. The conjunctive pattern suggests that some people treat conditionals as conjunctions, in line with a prediction of the mental-model theory. Experiments 1 and 2 rule out two alternative explanations of the conjunctive pattern. It does not arise from people believing that at least one case matching the conjunction of antecedent and consequent must exist for a conditional to be true, and it does not arise from people adding the converse to the given conditional. Experiment 3 establishes that people's response patterns in the probabilistic truth table task are very consistent across different conditionals, and that the two response patterns generalize to conditionals with negated antecedents and consequents. Individual differences in rating the probability of a conditional were loosely correlated with corresponding response patterns in a classical truth table evaluation task, but there was little association with people's evaluation of deductive inferences from conditionals as premises. A theoretical framework is proposed that integrates elements from the conditional-probability view with the theory of mental models.     

Outcome producing potential influences twelve-month-olds’ interpretation of a novel action as goal-directed

Learning about a novel, goal-directed action is a complex process. It requires identifying the outcome of the action and linking the action to its outcome for later use in new situations to predict the action or to anticipate its outcome. We investigated the hypothesis that linking a novel action to a salient change in the environment is critical for infants to assign a goal to the novel action. We report a study in which we show that 12-month-old infants, who were provided with prior experience with a novel action accompanied with a salient visible outcome in one context, can interpret the same action as goal-directed even in the absence of the outcome in another context. Our control condition shows that prior experience with the action, but without the salient effect, does not lead to goal-directed interpretation of the novel action. We also found that, for the case of 9-month-olds infants, prior experience with the outcome producing potential of the novel action does not facilitate a goal-directed interpretation of the action. However, this failure was possibly due to difficulties with generalizing the learnt association to another context rather than with linking the action to its outcome.     

Two meanings of “if”? Individual differences in the interpretation of conditionals

This work investigates the nature of two distinct response patterns in a probabilistic truth table evaluation task, in which people estimate the probability of a conditional on the basis of frequencies of the truth table cases. The conditional-probability pattern reflects an interpretation of conditionals as expressing a conditional probability. The conjunctive pattern suggests that some people treat conditionals as conjunctions, in line with a prediction of the mental-model theory. Experiments 1 and 2 rule out two alternative explanations of the conjunctive pattern. It does not arise from people believing that at least one case matching the conjunction of antecedent and consequent must exist for a conditional to be true, and it does not arise from people adding the converse to the given conditional. Experiment 3 establishes that people's response patterns in the probabilistic truth table task are very consistent across different conditionals, and that the two response patterns generalize to conditionals with negated antecedents and consequents. Individual differences in rating the probability of a conditional were loosely correlated with corresponding response patterns in a classical truth table evaluation task, but there was little association with people's evaluation of deductive inferences from conditionals as premises. A theoretical framework is proposed that integrates elements from the conditional-probability view with the theory of mental models.