The intention to commit driving violations – A qualitative study

This study was designed to carry out an in-depth exploration of an extended version of the Theory of Planned Behaviour. Fifty licensed drivers took part in the study and each one was given three different driving scenarios; speeding in an urban area, dangerous overtaking and speeding on a major road. The results indicated that drivers usually find speeding acceptable although this was also related to a context, since speeding on a major road was more acceptable than on a minor one. The immediate response to the question about consequences of the act varied and depended on the perception of the situation. In a serious situation the response was purely affective and immediate whereas in a low risk situation it was more considered. The response to the question about subjective norm was sometimes difficult to answer or misunderstood which throws some light on its weak association with intention. Driving skills were explored in some detail together with its possible link to perceived behavioural control. In general those participants who believed themselves to be superior to others, expressed high degrees of control. The study also found that a low degree of perceived behavioural control (external or internal) could be used as a form of justification for carrying out an act although this only applied to a situation which they perceived as low risk. In a high-risk situation they always tried to maintain their own control. Habit, or rather past behaviour, influenced future behaviour when the experience had been positive. The police, or feelings of regret, could break this pattern. The implications of these findings in relation to theoretical and practical issues are discussed.     

BIS, BAS, and bias: The role of personality and cognitive bias in social anxiety

The goal of the present research was to test the hypothesis that cognitive biases for negative and threatening social information mediate the effects of behavioral inhibition system (BIS) and behavioral approach system (BAS) sensitivity on social anxiety. Participants completed self-report measures of BIS and BAS and then underwent a social-threat induction procedure in which they were told they would have to perform a speech. A battery of cognitive bias measures was then administered, followed by a battery of state anxiety measures. Audience members also rated participants’ anxiety during the speech. Structural equation modeling was used to test the hypothesized model. As predicted, the fully-mediated model showed the best fit to the data, and higher BIS and lower BAS were found to have significant indirect effects on social anxiety via cognitive bias.     

The Dark Triad and animal cruelty: Dark personalities,dark attitudes,and dark behaviors

Research examining the interpersonal interactions of those high on the Dark Triad has proliferated in recent years. Extant research, however, has not examined other types of relationships such as attitudes and behaviors towards animals. Further, there has been limited research examining the associations between personality and attitudes and behaviors towards animals generally. In this study, participants (N = 227) completed an online survey measuring the Dark Triad, attitudes towards animals, and acts of animal cruelty. The results revealed that individuals with higher levels of the Dark Triad demonstrated less positive attitudes towards animals and reported engaging in more acts of animal cruelty. Age and sex were found to be significant predictors of less positive attitudes and behaviors towards animals, independent of the Dark Triad. These results suggest that those callous and manipulative behaviors and attitudes that have come to be associated with the Dark Triad are not just limited to human-to-human interactions, but are also consistent across other interactions.     

American elementary school children's attitudes about immigrants, immigration, and being an American

The current study examined 5 to 11-year-old European American children's (N = 90) attitudes regarding immigrants, immigration policy, and what it means to be an American. The majority of children in the sample (from a predominantly European American community) held strong American identities and had distinct ideas about what it means to be an American (namely, one must love America, live by its rules, and be White). Children were in favor of legal immigration as a policy, and although they believed in allowing illegal immigrants to stay if employed, many younger children believed they should go to jail. Many children in the sample were aware of Americans' anti-immigration sentiments, largely attributing it to ethnic/cultural discrimination. Finally, children held negative attitudes about immigrants, particularly Mexican immigrants. These negative attitudes were most evident among children who held a strong, prototypical national in-group identity. In contrast, children did not hold differential attitudes about White and Black Americans.     

The impact of smart driving aids on driving performance and driver distraction

In-vehicle information systems (IVIS) have been shown to increase driver workload and cause distraction, both of which are causal factors for accidents. This simulator study evaluates the impact that two prototype ergonomic designs for a smart driving aid have on workload, distraction and driving performance. Scenario complexity was also manipulated as an independent variable. Results showed that real-time delivery of smart driving information did not increase driver workload or adversely affect driver distraction, while also having the positive effect of decreasing mean driving speed in both the simple and complex driving scenarios. Subjective workload was shown to increase with task difficulty, as well as revealing important differences between the two interface designs. The findings are relevant to the development and implementation of smart driving interface designs in the future.     

Naturalistic observation of drivers’ hands, speed and headway

Drivers’ hands position have been shown to vary with traffic speed and complexity of the driving environment, such that drivers are more likely to place two hands on the top half of the steering wheel as the supposed driving difficulty increases (Walton, D. & Thomas, J. A. [2005]. Naturalistic observations of driver hand positions. Transportation Research Part F, 8, 229–238). This research evaluates drivers’ hands positions, examining the reliability of the measure and the relationship between the positions of the driver’s hands, vehicle speed, vehicle headway and driver sex. The findings show that the observed positions of drivers’ hands have good inter-rater reliability and demonstrate both temporal and contextual reliability. The positions of drivers’ hands are related to other measures, such that drivers with lower-ranked positions of hands are more likely to travel at higher speeds and accept shorter headways. Female drivers are found to be 2.87 times more likely than males to place two hands rather than one hand on the top half of the steering wheel.     

Gender Role Flexibility in Early Adolescence: Developmental Change in Attitudes, Self-perceptions, and Behaviors

Gender role flexibility has been conceptualized as a multi-dimensional construct that consists of attitudes, self-perceptions, and behaviors. The present study was designed to examine the developmental trajectory of gender role attitude flexibility, self-perception flexibility, and gender-typed behavioral flexibility during early adolescence. One hundred and thirty six male and female sixth grade students completed the Children’s Occupations, Activities, and Traits Scale (Liben & Bigler, 2002) during the fall and spring of their first 2 years of middle school and they kept monthly after-school activity diaries, which were coded for gender stereotypicality. Each component of flexibility exhibited a different pattern of developmental change consistent with the multi-dimensional view of gender role flexibility.     

The own-age face recognition bias in children and adults

Children recognize children's faces more accurately than adult faces, and adults recognize adult faces more accurately than children's faces (e.g., Anastasi & Rhodes, 2005 Anastasi, J. S. and Rhodes, M. G. 2005. An own-age bias in face recognition for children and older adults. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 12: 1043–1047. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). This is the own-age bias. Research has shown that this bias is at least partially based on experience since trainee teachers show less of an own-age bias than do other adults (Harrison & Hole, 2009 Harrison, V. and Hole, G. J. 2009. Evidence for a contact-based explanation of the own-age bias in face recognition. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16: 264–269. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). The present research tested the own-age bias in three groups of children (age 4–6, 7–9, 10–12 years) and a group of adults in the recognition of three age groups of faces (age 7–9, 20–22, and 65–90 years). Results showed an own-age bias for 7- to 9-year-old children and adults. Specifically, children could recognize faces more accurately if they were less than two years different from their own age than if they were more than two years older or younger. These results are discussed in terms of short-term experience with faces creating biases, and this rapidly changes with age.     

The intentionality bias and schizotypy

The “intentionality bias” refers to our automatic tendency to judge other people's actions to be intentional. In this experiment we extended research on this effect in two key ways. First, we developed a novel nonlinguistic task for assessing the intentionality bias. This task used video stimuli of ambiguous movements. Second, we investigated the relationship between the strength of this bias and schizotypy (schizophrenia-like symptoms in healthy individuals). Our results showed that the intentionality bias was replicated for the video stimuli and also that this bias is stronger in those individuals scoring higher on the schizotypy rating scales. Overall these findings lend further support for the existence of the intentionality bias. We also discuss the possible relevance of these findings for our understanding of certain symptoms of schizophrenic illness.     

Accuracy and confidence in detecting truths andlies in elaborations and denials:Truth bias, lie bias and individual differences

Accuracy in the ability to detect truths and lies isimportant in a legal setting. It might be used as atool in police investigations to eliminate potentialsuspects, to check the truthfulness of informants orto examine contradictory statements of witnesses andsuspects in the same case. A consistent finding in thedetection of deception literature is the truthbias: People's accuracy at detecting truths isusually higher than their accuracy at detecting lies.The present article examines whether the existence ofa truth bias depends on the type of lie. It is arguedthat a truth bias may occur when people judgeextensive statements (e.g. elaborations), but that alie bias may occur when people judge statements whichdo not provide much verbal information (e.g. denials).Fifty participants (college students) were exposed to20 video fragments of 20 people telling elaborations(10) or denials (10). Half of the elaborations anddenials were truthful, the other half were deceptive.After each fragment, the participants were asked toindicate whether the person was lying or telling thetruth and how confident they were in their decisionmaking. As predicted, with regard to elaborations atruth bias was found and with regard to denials a liebias was found. In other words, people have difficultyin accurately judging deceptive elaborations andtruthful denials. The study further revealedindividual differences in participants' confidence atdetecting deceit. The more socially anxious/shy theparticipants reported themselves to be, the lessconfident they were in their ability to detect deceit.Also, the more extraverted they themselves reported tobe, the more confident they were in their ability todetect deceit. The importance of confidence onimproving people's ability to detect deceit will bediscussed.     

Implicit bias,confabulation, and epistemic innocence

In this paper I explore the nature of confabulatory explanations of action guided by implicit bias. I claim that such explanations can have significant epistemic benefits in spite of their obvious epistemic costs, and that such benefits are not otherwise obtainable by the subject at the time at which the explanation is offered. I start by outlining the kinds of cases I have in mind, before characterising the phenomenon of confabulation by focusing on a few common features. Then I introduce the notion of epistemic innocence to capture the epistemic status of those cognitions which have both obvious epistemic faults and some significant epistemic benefit. A cognition is epistemically innocent if it delivers some epistemic benefit to the subject which would not be attainable otherwise because alternative (less epistemically faulty) cognitions that could deliver the same benefit are unavailable to the subject at that time. I ask whether confabulatory explanations of actions guided by implicit bias have epistemic benefits and whether there are genuine alternatives to forming a confabulatory explanation in the circumstances in which subjects confabulate. On the basis of my analysis of confabulatory explanations of actions guided by implicit bias, I argue that such explanations have the potential for epistemic innocence. I conclude that epistemic evaluation of confabulatory explanations of action guided by implicit bias ought to tell a richer story, one which takes into account the context in which the explanation occurs.     

Personality, risky driving and accident involvement among Norwegian drivers

Despite the large body of studies, the role of personality in risk research still remains debatable and unclear. The objective of this study was to identify determinants of road user behaviour and accident involvement with the aim of developing effective accident countermeasures. Examining relationships between personality, risky driving and involvement in accidents can open up the possibility of early identification of those more likely to be involved in accidents. The aim is not to influence personality as such, but to develop measures constructed for specific groups. The results are based on a self-completion questionnaire survey carried out among a sample of Norwegian drivers in year 2000 and 2001 (n=2605). The Norwegian Directorate of Public Roads financed the study. The questionnaire included measures of risky driving, accident involvement, normlessness, sensation-seeking, locus of control and driver anger. Results showed that those who scored high on sensation seeking, normlessness and driver anger reported more frequent risky driving compared to those who scored low on these variables. They were more often involved in both speeding and ignorance of traffic rules. Respondents involved in risk taking-behaviour experienced near-accidents and crashes leading to both injuries and material damage more often than other drivers.     

The valence-specific laterality effect in free viewing conditions: The influence of sex, handedness, and response bias

The right hemisphere has often been viewed as having a dominant role in the processing of emotional information. Other evidence indicates that both hemispheres process emotional information but their involvement is valence specific, with the right hemisphere dealing with negative emotions and the left hemisphere preferentially processing positive emotions. This has been found under both restricted (Reuter-Lorenz & Davidson, 1981) and free viewing conditions (Jansari, Tranel, & Adophs, 2000). It remains unclear whether the valence-specific laterality effect is also sex specific or is influenced by the handedness of participants. To explore this issue we repeated Jansari et al.'s free-viewing laterality task with 78 participants. We found a valence-specific laterality effect in women but not men, with women discriminating negative emotional expressions more accurately when the face was presented on the left-hand side and discriminating positive emotions more accurately when those faces were presented on the right-hand side. These results indicate that under free viewing conditions women are more lateralised for the processing of facial emotion than are men. Handedness did not affect the lateralised processing of facial emotion. Finally, participants demonstrated a response bias on control trials, where facial emotion did not differ between the faces. Participants selected the left-hand side more frequently when they believed the expression was negative and the right-hand side more frequently when they believed the expression was positive. This response bias can cause a spurious valence-specific laterality effect which might have contributed to the conflicting findings within the literature.     

Comparing implicit and explicit attitudes of gay,straight, and non-monosexual groups toward transmen and transwomen

Background: Transphobia studies have typically relied on self-report measures from heterosexual samples. However, there is evidence suggesting the need to use indirect measures and to explore transphobia among other populations. Aims: This study examined how explicit and implicit attitudes toward transwomen and transmen differ between people of different sexual orientations. Methods: Cisgender participants (N = 265) completed measures of explicit feelings toward transmen and transwomen, as well as Implicit Association Tests (IAT) for each group. Comparisons were made between 54 gay, 79 straight, and 132 non-monosexual (asexual, bisexual, pansexual) individuals. Results: An interaction was found between measurement type (explicit, implicit) and sexual orientation (straight, gay, non-monosexual). With regard to transmen, gay respondents’ explicit and implicit scores diverged such that they explicitly reported lower bias than their straight counterparts, but their Transmen-IAT showed an implicit preference for biological men over transmen. For attitudes toward transwomen, implicit measurement scores were consistently negative and did not differ by group. Gay participants also reported positive explicit attitudes toward transwomen, similar to non-monosexual people. Discussion: Overall, findings show that gay people tend to report positive attitudes toward transgender people explicitly, but tend to have implicit bias against both transmen and transwomen. Future studies need to explore the origins of these biases and how they relate to the complex interplay of sex, gender, and sexual orientation.     

Driving without awareness: The effects of practice and automaticity on attention and driving

This research examined the development of proceduralised “driving without awareness” in a driving simulator by paying participants to drive a simulated road regularly over 12 weeks of testing. This longitudinal research paradigm is a significant departure from previous studies which have examined drivers in a conscious attentional mode using short experimental sessions or cross-sectional designs comparing expert and novice performance. During each session, participants took two “trips” on the simulated road; sometimes travelling on a “to and from” journey on one half of the road, sometimes traversing the entire road in one direction. A range of measures, including driving performance, vehicle detection, perceptual speed regulation, and hazard reactions were collected. The results showed the development of driving patterns and changes in object detection performance indicative of proceduralised driving. Speed and lane position variability quickly decreased with practice, as did participants’ subjective experiences of driving difficulty. Performance on an embedded detection task appeared to become a proceduralised part of the driving task, becoming highly efficient in later stages of the experiment. The changes in attentional focus and driving performance over time provide new light on previous research findings and allow us to critically re-examine several established models of driver behaviour.     

Interpretation bias and depressive symptoms: The role of self-relevance

Cognitive theories of depression emphasize negatively biased interpretations as an important target of therapy. Much of the research on interpretation bias in depression has focused on selection, or deciding which of several interpretations is likely. However, depressive biases may also exist in the generation of possible interpretations, or the ability to think of positive alternatives. If biases exist for generation as well as selection, therapeutic techniques to encourage the generation of more positive interpretations would be warranted. Asking therapy clients to consider someone else in a similar situation is a commonly used therapy strategy but has not been sufficiently examined empirically. In the current studies, we examine interpretation generation and selection in dysphoric and nondysphoric individuals, and contrast interpretations made for the self to interpretations made for two types of “other.” Our studies reveal depressive biases in both interpretation generation and selection, and indicate that interpretation valence is highly sensitive to the type of other considered. All participants generated and selected significantly more positive interpretations for friends than for themselves, but generated significantly more negative interpretations for hypothetical others than for themselves. Our results suggest that encouraging dysphoric individuals to imagine others can be beneficial, but the type of “other” used is critically important, with instructions to consider a close friend most likely to be effective in decreasing negativity in interpretation.     

Case method and casuistry: The problem of bias

Case methods of reasoning are persuasive, but we need to address problems of bias in order to use them to reach morally justifiable conclusions. A bias is an unwarranted inclination or a special perspective that disposes us to mistaken or one-sided judgments. The potential for bias arises at each stage of a case method of reasoning including in describing, framing, selecting and comparing of cases and paradigms. A problem of bias occurs because to identify the relevant features for such purposes, we must use general views about what is relevant; but some of our general views are biased, both in the sense of being unwarranted inclinations and in the sense that they are one of many viable perspectives. This reliance upon general views to determine relevancy creates additional difficulties for defenders who maintain that case methods of moral reasoning are not only useful, but more basic, reliable or prior to other forms of moral reasoning. If we cannot identify the case's relevant features and issues independently of our general views or biases, we need further explanation about why a case method or casuistry should be viewed as prior to or more basic or reliable than other forms of moral reasoning. Problems of bias also arise for other methods of reasoning. In medical science, case reviews are regarded as an unreliable way to form generalizations, and methods such as clinical trials are used to address bias.     

The role of egocentrism and focalism in the emotion intensity bias

People sometimes judge their emotions, preferences, and attitudes to be more intense than those of other people. Two experiments tested whether this emotion intensity bias in direct comparisons results from two non-motivated cognitive processes—egocentrism and focalism. In Study 1, the intensity bias was found even when comparing a friend’s preferences to peers. In Study 2, attention given to own versus other’s preferences, and the referent of the comparison (self or others) were manipulated. Results indicated that attention to others reduced the bias, presumably by reducing egocentrism. Consistent with focalism, the bias also emerged when a friend was the target of comparison, and the bias was eliminated when the self was the referent rather than the target of comparison. In the discussion, we evaluate these accounts in light of some alternative explanations for the intensity bias.