A weak symmetry condition for probabilistic measures of confirmation

This paper presents a symmetry condition for probabilistic measures of confirmation which is weaker than commutativity symmetry, disconfirmation commutativity symmetry but also antisymmetry. It is based on the idea that for any value a probabilistic measure of confirmation can assign there is a corresponding case where degrees of confirmation are symmetric. It is shown that a number of prominent confirmation measures such as Carnap’s difference function, Rescher’s measure of confirmation, Gaifman’s confirmation rate and Mortimer’s inverted difference function do not satisfy this condition and instead exhibit a previously unnoticed and rather puzzling behavior in certain cases of disconfirmation. This behavior also carries over to probabilistic measures of information change, causal strength, explanatory power and coherence.     

Confirmation and the ordinal equivalence thesis

Synthese - According to a widespread but implicit thesis in Bayesian confirmation theory, two confirmation measures are considered equivalent if they are ordinally equivalent—call this the...     

On the Impossibility of Amalgamating Evidence

It is argued in this paper that amalgamating confirmation from various sources is relevantly different from social-choice contexts, and that proving an impossibility theorem for aggregating confirmation measures directs attention to irrelevant issues.     

Corpus-based estimates of word association predict biases in judgment of word co-occurrence likelihood

This paper draws a connection between statistical word association measures used in linguistics and confirmation measures from epistemology. Having theoretically established the connection, we replicate, in the new context of the judgments of word co-occurrence, an intriguing finding from the psychology of reasoning, namely that confirmation values affect intuitions about likelihood. We show that the effect, despite being based in this case on very subtle statistical insights about thousands of words, is stable across three different experimental settings. Our theoretical and empirical results suggest that factors affecting traditional reasoning tasks are also at play when linguistic knowledge is probed, and they provide further evidence for the importance of confirmation in a new domain.     

“<Emphasis Type="Italic">For unto every one that hath shall be given</Emphasis>”. Matthew properties for incremental confirmation

Confirmation of a hypothesis by evidence can be measured by one of the so far known incremental measures of confirmation. As we show, incremental measures can be formally defined as the measures of confirmation satisfying a certain small set of basic conditions. Moreover, several kinds of incremental measure may be characterized on the basis of appropriate structural properties. In particular, we focus on the so-called Matthew properties: we introduce a family of six Matthew properties including the reverse Matthew effect; we further prove that incremental measures endowed with reverse Matthew effect are possible; finally, we shortly consider the problem of the plausibility of Matthew properties.     

A problem for the alternative difference measure of confirmation

Among Bayesian confirmation theorists, several quantitative measures of the degree to which an evidential proposition E confirms a hypothesis H have been proposed. According to one popular recent measure, s, the degree to which E confirms H is a function of the equation P(H|E) ? P(H|~E). A consequence of s is that when we have two evidential propositions, E1 and E2, such that P(H|E1) = P(H|E2), and P(H|~E1) ≠ P(H|~E2), the confirmation afforded to H by E1 does not equal the confirmation afforded to H by E2. I present several examples that demonstrate the unacceptability of this result, and conclude that we should reject s (and other measures that share this feature) as a measure of confirmation.     

Second-order probability affects hypothesis confirmation

Bayesian confirmation measures give numerical expression to the impact of evidence E on a hypothesis H. All measures proposed to date are formal—that is, functions of the probabilities Pr(E∧H), Pr(E∧¬H), Pr(¬E∧H), Pr(¬E∧¬H), and nothing more. Experiments reported in Tentori, Crupi, and Osherson (2007) suggest that human confirmation judgment is not formal, but this earlier work leaves open the possibility that formality holds relative to a given semantic domain. The present study discredits even this weaker version of formality by demonstrating the role in confirmation judgments of a probability distribution defined over the possible values of Pr(E∧H), Pr(E∧¬H), Pr(¬E∧H), and Pr(¬E∧¬H)—that is, a second-order probability. Specifically, when for each of the latter quantities a pointwise value is fixed with a maximal second-order probability, evidence impact is rated in accordance with formal and normatively credible confirmation measures; otherwise evidence impact is systematically judged as more moderate.     

Plausibilistic coherence

Why should coherence be an epistemic desideratum? One response is that coherence is truth-conducive: mutually coherent propositions are more likely to be true, ceteris paribus, than mutually incoherent ones. But some sets of propositions are more coherent, while others are less so. How could coherence be measured? Probabilistic measures of coherence exist; some are identical to probabilistic measures of confirmation, while others are extensions of such measures. Probabilistic measures of coherence are fine when applicable, but many situations are so information-poor that the requisite probabilities cannot be determined. To measure coherence in these cognitively impoverished situations, this article proposes that the discussion be broadened to include plausibilistic measures of coherence. It shows how plausibilistic measures of coherence can be defined using plausibilistic measures of confirmation. It then illustrates how plausibilisic coherence can be measured in situations where probabilistic coherence cannot be determined. The coherence values obtained through the use of plausibilistic measures are often, though not always, comparable. The article also shows that coherence can be instantiated on different levels, one of which permits connections to inductive strength and deductive validity.     

A Bayesian Way to Make Stopping Rules Matter

Disputes between advocates of Bayesians and more orthodox approaches to statistical inference presuppose that Bayesians must regard must regard stopping rules, which play an important role in orthodox statistical methods, as evidentially irrelevant.In this essay, I show that this is not the case and that the stopping rule is evidentially relevant given some Bayesian confirmation measures that have been seriously proposed. However, I show that accepting a confirmation measure of this sort comes at the cost of rejecting two useful ancillaryBayesian principles.     

The degree of epistemic justification and the conjunction fallacy

This paper describes a formal measure of epistemic justification motivated by the dual goal of cognition, which is to increase true beliefs and reduce false beliefs. From this perspective the degree of epistemic justification should not be the conditional probability of the proposition given the evidence, as it is commonly thought. It should be determined instead by the combination of the conditional probability and the prior probability. This is also true of the degree of incremental confirmation, and I argue that any measure of epistemic justification is also a measure of incremental confirmation. However, the degree of epistemic justification must meet an additional condition, and all known measures of incremental confirmation fail to meet it. I describe this additional condition as well as a measure that meets it. The paper then applies the measure to the conjunction fallacy and proposes an explanation of the fallacy.     

Ways in which coherence is confirmation conducive

Recent works in epistemology show that the claim that coherence is truth conducive – in the sense that, given suitable ceteris paribus conditions, more coherent sets of statements are always more probable – is dubious and possibly false. From this, it does not follows that coherence is a useless notion in epistemology and philosophy of science. Dietrich and Moretti (Philosophy of science 72(3): 403–424, 2005) have proposed a formal of account of how coherence is confirmation conducive—that is, of how the coherence of a set of statements facilitates the confirmation of such statements. This account is grounded in two confirmation transmission properties that are satisfied by some of the measures of coherence recently proposed in the literature. These properties explicate everyday and scientific uses of coherence. In his paper, I review the main findings of Dietrich and Moretti (2005) and define two evidence-gathering properties that are satisfied by the same measures of coherence and constitute further ways in which coherence is confirmation conducive. At least one of these properties vindicates important applications of the notion of coherence in everyday life and in science.     

患者隐私杈的法学思考

结合法学理论、医疗实践和目前患者隐私权的法律保护现状,就侵权行为、民事责任的认定以及隐私权的限制等问题予以理论阐释,并提出了切实可行的保护措施,如建立健全相关法律法规、医务人员要增强法律保护意识等,以期为患者隐私权的保护提供有益的参考。     

Attitudinal versus ecological approaches to the characterization of institutional treatment environments

The relational and discriminative properties of attitudinal and ecological measures of environments were examined within the context of a state hospital for mentally retarted clients. Three hypotheses were advanced, and the results gave substantial support for one of these and partial support for a second: (a) that the correlations between attitudinal and ecological measures should not differ significantly from zero, and (b) that differences among hospital treatment programs and living units should be reflected in ecological but not in attitudinal measures. However, the results did not provide clear confirmation for a third hypothesis: that differences among staff demographic characteristics and employment history should be reflected in attitudinal but not in ecological measures. It was suggested that these background variables may not be appropriate measures of personality-linked attributes.     

Measures of Ethnicity‐Related Stress: Psychometric Properties,Ethnic Group Differences,and Associations With Well‐Being1

This study introduces new measures of ethnicity‐related stress and a newly adapted measure of ethnic identity. Ethnicity‐related stressors assessed in this study were perceived discrimination, stereotype confirmation concern, and own‐group conformity pressure. Ethnic identity refers to the subjective sense of ethnic group membership and, following Luhtanen and Crocker (1992), was assessed as public regard, identity centrality, and private feelings. Data for 333 undergraduates from diverse ethnic groups indicated that the measures are psychometrically sound. Ethnic group differences for mean scores demonstrated the measures’ known‐groups validity. Cross‐sectional analyses indicated that ethnicity‐related stress and identity constructs captured by the instruments are related to measures of psychological and physical well‐being. The new measures may be useful in the investigation of psychological aspects of ethnicity and their adaptive consequences.     

Personality,confirmation bias,and forensic interviewing performance

Confirmation bias is a universal characteristic of human cognition, with consequences for information processing and reasoning in everyday situations as well as in professional work such as forensic interviewing. Cognitive measures such as general intelligence are also related to personality traits, but there is a lack of research on personality and confirmation bias specifically. This study focuses, firstly, on the relationship between Big Five personality traits and confirmation bias as measured by the Wason selection task, and secondly, how these dispositions are related to observed performance in real forensic interviews of child victims. In a sample of police interviewers, Openness (i.e., the facets Ideas and Fantasy) and Neuroticism (i.e., the facets Anxiety and Vulnerability) were independently associated with confirmation bias (N = 72). Scores on the selection task, the Openness facet values, and the Extraversion facets Assertiveness and Activity were consistently related to interview performance (N = 46). Implications of these findings are discussed for the empirical and conceptual relations of cognitive ability to personality and for the selection and training of police interviewers and their professional development.     

Probabilistic measures of coherence: from adequacy constraints towards pluralism

The debate on probabilistic measures of coherence flourishes for about 15 years now. Initiated by papers that have been published around the turn of the millennium, many different proposals have since then been put forward. This contribution is partly devoted to a reassessment of extant coherence measures. Focusing on a small number of reasonable adequacy constraints I show that (i) there can be no coherence measure that satisfies all constraints, and that (ii) subsets of these adequacy constraints motivate two different classes of coherence measures. These classes do not coincide with the common distinction between coherence as mutual support and coherence as relative set-theoretic overlap. Finally, I put forward arguments to the effect that for each such class of coherence measures there is an outstanding measure that outperforms all other extant proposals. One of these measures has recently been put forward in the literature, while the other one is based on a novel probabilistic measure of confirmation.     

Two functions of verbal intergroup discrimination: identity and instrumental motives as a result of group identification and threat

In two studies, the authors examined the circumstances under which discrimination has an identity confirmation function or an instrumental function (instigating collective action). In Study 1, participants (N = 601) described a situation in which they had discriminated and then completed measures of functionality, group identification, and group threat. Both functions were predicted by group identification, whereas the instrumental function (but not identity confirmation) operated under group threat. In Study 2, "die-hard" soccer fans (N = 1,546) suggested soccer chants in reaction to either a group-reinforcing (own team scores) or group-threatening (other team scores) situation and rated the perceived functionality of the song. Although both of these conditions evoked discriminating songs, as predicted, these served a more identity-confirming function in the reinforcing situation but a more instrumental function (pepping up the team) in the threat situation. Results are discussed in terms of a contextual-functional model of intergroup discrimination.     

Irrelevant conjunction and the ratio measure or historical skepticism

It is widely believed that one should not become more confident that all swans are white and all lions are brave simply by observing white swans. Irrelevant conjunction or “tacking” of a theory onto another is often thought problematic for Bayesianism, especially given the ratio measure of confirmation considered here. It is recalled that the irrelevant conjunct is not confirmed at all. Using the ratio measure, the irrelevant conjunction is confirmed to the same degree as the relevant conjunct, which, it is argued, is ideal: the irrelevant conjunct is irrelevant. Because the past’s really having been as it now appears to have been is an irrelevant conjunct, present evidence confirms theories about past events only insofar as irrelevant conjunctions are confirmed. Hence the ideal of not confirming irrelevant conjunctions would imply that historical claims are not confirmed. Confirmation measures partially realizing that ideal make the confirmation of historical claims by present evidence depend strongly on the (presumably subjective) degree of belief in the irrelevant conjunct. The unusually good behavior of the ratio measure has a bearing on the problem of measure sensitivity. For non-statistical hypotheses, Bayes’ theorem yields a fractional linear transformation in the prior probability, not a linear rescaling, so even the ratio measure arguably does not aptly measure confirmation in such cases.     

Stimulation seeking and hyperactive behavior in children with ADHD: a re-analysis

To examine the stimulation-seeking function of hyperactivity in children with ADHD, Antrop and colleagues analyzed the behavior of 30 hyperactive and 30 nonhyperactive children during a waiting situation, either with or without extra stimulation. The behavior was assessed by frequency measures. In their study it was hypothesized that children with ADHD would show a greater decrease in activity in the presence of stimulation than control children. Since confirmation for this hypothesis was only found for 2 of 25 target behaviors, the present re-analysis included other behavioral measures to assess two relationships: first, how hyperactivity varies under fixed time conditions, using measures of duration and intensity of behavior instead of frequency measures, and second, how the perceived duration of waiting time affects behavior. Analysis indicated that children with ADHD showed a greater decrease in behavior in the presence of stimulation for touching objects and movements of trunk, as reported. Further, children who underestimated the waiting period were more apt to seek additional stimulation in its absence than those who overestimated the waiting period.     

On Ratio Measures of Confirmation

There are different Bayesian measures to calculate the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis H in respect of a particular piece of evidence E. Zalabardo (Analysis 69:630–635, 2009) is a recent attempt to defend the likelihood-ratio measure (LR) against the probability-ratio measure (PR). The main disagreement between LR and PR concerns their sensitivity to prior probabilities. Zalabardo invokes intuitive plausibility as the appropriate criterion for choosing between them. Furthermore, he claims that it favours the ordering of pairs evidence/hypothesis generated by LR. We will argue, however, that the intuitive non-numerical example provided by Zalabardo does not show that prior probabilities do not affect the degree of confirmation. On account of this, we conclude that there is no compelling reason to endorse LR qua measure of degree of confirmation. On the other side, we should not forget some technicalities which still benefit PR.