毫无保留服从预期和思想的艺术作品阿多诺与美学的矛盾

西奥多·阿多诺的<美学理论>如由碎片组成,几乎是一部程序内既定的告别之作:书的不完整性,篇章出其不意中断的特点,强调了一个事实,美学的思考没有终点没有圆满可言.表面上看来此书犹如石矿,标题所示的理论需被发掘整理出来.谁没有被那些黑暗隧道吓倒而要勘探前行的,很快就认识到,随处翻开作品,随处都可以是章节开始和结束,却仍然能够从散漫叙述中发现理论的系统性.于尔根·哈贝马斯[1]提出,阿多诺的<美学理论>已经呈后结构主义发展趋向了.这个意见对阅读者的阅读自由而言是正确的,阿多诺这样做,比德勒兹和瓜达里写没开头没结尾的书早了好几年.     

Age and Expectations About Counseling: Two Methodological Perspectives

Quantitative and phenomenological research methods are briefly discussed as they were simultaneously applied to expectations about counseling in 100 elderly persons and 100 gender- and ethnic-matched college students. Participants completed the Expectations About Counseling-Brief Form (EAC-B) questionnaire with appended demographic items, and also participated in semistructured group interviews. Analysis of variance indicated general similarity in EAC-B responses for elderly and young respondents. Phenomenological analyses of interview responses, however, revealed different expectations among elderly and young participants, which may account for the reluctance of many elderly persons to seek counseling. Results are discussed as they apply to counseling research and practice.     

The No-No Paradox Is a Paradox

The No-No Paradox consists of a pair of statements, each of which ‘says’ the other is false. Roy Sorensen claims that the No-No Paradox provides an example of a true statement that has no truthmaker: Given the relevant instances of the T-schema, one of the two statements comprising the ‘paradox’ must be true (and the other false), but symmetry constraints prevent us from determining which, and thus prevent there being a truthmaker grounding the relevant assignment of truth values. Sorensen's view is mistaken: situated within an appropriate background theory of truth, the statements comprising the No-No Paradox are genuinely paradoxical in the same sense as is the Liar (and thus, on Sorensen's view, must fail to have truth values). This result has consequences beyond Sorensen's semantic framework. In particular, the No-No Paradox, properly understood, is not only a new paradox, but also provides us with a new type of paradox, one which depends upon a general background theory of the truth predicate in a way that the Liar Paradox and similar constructions do not.     

Two Fallacies in Proofs of the Liar Paradox

Philosophia - At some step in proving the Liar Paradox in natural language, a sentence is derived that seems overdetermined with respect to its semantic value. This is complemented by...     

The Cookie Paradox

We’ve all been at parties where there's one cookie left on what was once a plate full of cookies, a cookie no one will eat simply because everyone is following a rule of etiquette, according to which you’re not supposed to eat the last cookie. Or at least we think everyone is following this rule, but maybe not. In this paper I present a new paradox, the Cookie Paradox, which is an argument that seems to prove that in any situation in which everyone is truly following the rule, no one eats any cookies at all, no matter how many there are to be eaten. The ‘Cookie Argument’ resembles the more familiar argument that surprise exams are impossible, but it's not exactly the same. I argue that the biggest difference is that, unlike the surprise exam argument, the Cookie Argument is actually sound! I conclude the paper by explaining how it could be possible for a group of people to engage in behavior (eating cookies) that guarantees that at least one of the members of the group will violate a rule, even when it's common knowledge in the group that everyone is committed to following that very rule.

Sometimes me think, “What is friend?” and then me say, “Friend is someone to share the last cookie with.” ‐ Cookie Monster, http://youtu.be/LHh0A_bH5ig 1 1 I’m grateful to Eric Carter for this quote.

     

The Goodman Paradox: Three Different Problems and a Naturalistic Solution to Two of Them

It is now more than 50 years that the Goodman paradox has been discussed, and many different solutions have been proposed. But so far no agreement has been reached about which is the correct solution to the paradox. In this paper, I present the naturalistic solutions to the paradox that were proposed in Quine (1969, 1974), Quine and Ullian (1970/1978), and Stemmer (1971). At the same time, I introduce a number of modifications and improvements that are needed for overcoming shortcomings of the solutions. The discussion of this improved version suggests that the Goodman paradox actually embodies three different problems; yet, one of them is not Goodman’s but Hume’s problem. The discussion also suggests that the naturalistic approach is probably the best for basing on it a theory of confirmation. Finally, I analyze one of Hume’s insights that seems to have been largely ignored. This insight shows a surprising similarity to a central feature of the naturalistic solutions.     

The Apology Paradox

Some leaders and citizens think it appropriate to apologize for historical injustices like slavery or the dispossession of indigenous people. But can we sincerely say 'Sorry' for the deeds of our forebears? By making an apology we are expressing regrets for what they did: we are saying that we prefer that these deeds had not been done. However, if these deeds had not been done, history would have been different, and probably we would not exist. Since most of us are glad to be alive, it seems that our apologies must be insincere. I discuss a number of proposed solutions to this paradox.     

The Train Paradox

When two omnipotent beings are randomly and sequentially selecting positive integers, the being who selects second is almost certain to select a larger number. I then use the relativity of simultaneity to create a paradox by having omnipotent beings select positive integers in different orders for different observers.

The Abridgement Paradox

When axiomatizing a body of truths, one first concentrates on obtaining a set of axioms that entail all and only those truths. The theorist expects that this complete system will have some needlessly strong axioms that can later be weakened or even deleted. What happens if the theorist includes in his system recognition of this superfluity? Contradiction! Even admitting the possibility of superfluity dashes all hope of consistency. Any suspicion of superfluous information must be voiced from outside the system.     

Preference,Expectations, and Attributional Bias: Two Field Studies1

Two quasi-experiments were conducted to test the relationship among a perceiver's preference, expectations, and causal attributions for an event, when the outcome of the event ran for and counter to expectation and preference. Following the 1976 Superbowl, fans of Dallas and Pittsburgh and fans with no preference were asked to attribute causality for a series of game events, counterbalanced for (un)favorability for each team. Following the 1976 Presidential election, fans of Carter and Ford were asked to attribute causality for the election outcome and estimate its repeatability and mutability. Both studies revealed that fans exhibit a biased attributional pattern, offering more credit to their own side for their successes than to the opponents for their successes. Furthermore, fans see their side's successes as replicable and their side's failures as nonreplicable. The implications of the data patterns for real world manifestations of attributional bias are discussed.