Rarely Pure and Never Simple: Tensions in the Theory of Truth

Section 1 discerns ambiguity in the word “truth”, observing that the term is used most naturally in reference to truth-bearers rather than truth-makers. Focusing on truths-as-truth-bearers, then, it would appear that alethic realism conflicts with metaphysical realism as naturalistically construed. Section 2 discerns ambiguity in the purporting of truth (as in assertion), conjecturing that all expressions, not just those found in traditionally recognized opaque contexts, can be read intensionally (as well, perhaps, as extensionally). For instance, we would not generally want to say that “The Matterhorn is 4,500 m high” expresses the same truth as “The Matterhorn is 14763.7795276 feet high” (or that it is true in the same range of utterance contexts), even though the two are extensionally equivalent. The reason is that they express different intensions.     

Intuitive decision making in complex situations: Somatic markers in an artificial grammar learning task

In this article, we explore the extent to which implicit learning is subtended by somatic markers, as evidenced by skin conductance measures. On each trial, subjects were asked to decide which “word” from a pair of “words” was the “correct” one. Unknown to the subjects, each “word” of a pair was constructed using a different set of rules (Grammar Aand Grammar B). A (monetary) reward was given if the subject chose the “word” from Grammar A. Choosing the Grammar B word resulted in (monetary) punishment. Skin conductance was measured during each of 100 trials. After each set of 10 trials, the subjects were asked how they selected the “correct word.” Task performance increased long before the subjects could even formulate a single relevant rule. In this preconceptual phase of the experiment, skin conductance was larger before incorrect than before correct choices. Thus, it was shown that artificial grammar learning is accompanied by a somatic marker, possibly “warning” the subject of the incorrect decision.     

The role of crosstalk in dual-task performance: evidence from manipulating response-code overlap

The present study examined the role of crosstalk in dual-task interference using a combination of a nonspeeded visual task and an auditory-manual reaction time (RT) task. The potential for dual-task crosstalk was introduced by presenting in the visual task objects (e.g., a cup with a handle), which “afford” associated responses that were either spatially compatible or incompatible with the response in the RT task. Crucially, the degree of crosstalk was varied by instructing participants either to attend to the left–right orientation of the objects, creating explicit cross-task response-code overlap (“strong crosstalk”), or to attend to object identity (no direct overlap; “weak crosstalk”). The data indicated a relative benefit for cross-task compatible trials, which was much greater with strong crosstalk than with weak crosstalk. Crucially, however, even on compatible trials dual-task performance was substantially worse with strong crosstalk than with weak crosstalk. This overall cost of crosstalk suggests interference of response codes even on compatible dual-task trials. This work was presented in August 2007 at the XVth Conference of the European Society for Cognitive Psychology (ESCoP) in Marseille, France. The author would like to thank Peter A. Frensch and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments, Julia Klotz and Marion Marksteiner for testing the participants, and Lynn Huestegge for helpful discussions.     

Mixing incompatibly mapped location-relevant trials with location-irrelevant trials: effects of stimulus mode on the reverse Simon effect

When location-relevant trials with an incompatible spatial stimulus-response mapping are mixed with location-irrelevant trials, responses on the latter trials are faster when stimulus and response locations do not correspond than when they do. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that this reverse “Simon effect” also occurs when the location information is presented verbally or symbolically on both location-relevant and location-irrelevant trials. The reversal was absent, however, in conditions of Experiments 1–3 in which the mode of presentation was different on the location-relevant trials than on the location-irrelevant trials. Experiment 4 demonstrated that differences in physical characteristics between the location-relevant and location-irrelevant stimuli were not sufficient to eliminate the reverse Simon effect. These findings imply that the short-term associations between stimulus location information and responses defined for the location-relevant task are relatively mode specific. Received: 21 December 1999 / Accepted: 26 April 2000     

Psychophysiological components of imagery

McGuigan’s neuromuscular model of information processing (1978a, 1978b, and 1989) was investigated by electrically recording eye movements (electro-oculograms), covert lip and preferred arm responses (electromyograms), and electroencephalograms. This model predicts that codes are generated as the lips are uniquely activated when processing words beginning with bilabial sounds like “p” or “b,” as is the right arm to words like “pencil” that refer to its use. Twelve adult female participants selected for their high imagery ratings were asked to form images to three orally presented linguistic stimuli: the letter “p,” the words “pencil” and “pasture,” and to a control stimulus, the words “go blank.” The following findings were significant beyond the 0.05 level: an increased covert lip response only to the letter “p,” increased vertical eye activity to “p” and to the word “pencil,” right arm response only to the word “pencil,” and a decreased percentage of alpha waves from the right 02 lead only to the word “pasture.” Since these covert responses uniquely occurred during specific imagery processes, it is inferred that they are components of neuromuscular circuits that function in accord with the model of information processing tested.     

Semantic access in second-language visual word processing: Evidence from the semantic Simon paradigm

The present study investigated whether visually presented second-language words activate their meaning during low-level word processing, just as native-language words do. Using the semantic Simon paradigm (De Houwer, 1998) with a letter-case judgment task, Dutch-English bilingual participants were instructed to classify targets’ letter case using verbal labels (e.g., by saying “animal” to uppercase targets or “occupation” to lowercase targets). Results showed that both native-language and second-language targets yielded faster responses if the verbal response corresponded to the targets’ semantic category (e.g., the response “animal” to the target LEEUW or LION) than when it did not (e.g., LAWYER), even though the meaning of target words was irrelevant for the task. These results show that second-language word forms may quickly and automatically activate their meaning through strong form-to-meaning mappings, which is consistent with theories of bilingual lexicosemantic organization, such as that of Duyck and Brysbaert (2004).     

The gender-congruency effect in picture-word tasks

In Dutch noun phrases like “het boek” (the book) or “de kat” (the cat), the definite article (het or de) depends on the noun's grammatical gender (neuter or non-neuter). Schriefers reported that the production of a noun phrase like “het rode bed” (“the red bed”) in response to a colored picture takes less time when the picture is accompanied by a distractor word of congruent gender (e.g., “huis,” a het-word) than when it is accompanied by a word of incongruent gender (e.g., “hand,” a de-word). In three experiments we explored the characteristics of this gender-congruency effect. The following conclusions were reached. First, the gender-congruency effect is a rather robust phenomenon. Second, with the exception of a small effect in Exp. 2, no evidence was obtained for a gender-congruency effect when subjects were required to produce a single noun in response to a picture (e.g., “bed”). Third, the gender-congruency effect decreases with a decreasing familiarity of the distractor word. Implications for models of word production are discussed. Received: 20 May 1997 / Accepted: 25 September 1997     

A habituation account of change detection in same/different judgments

We investigated the basis of change detection in a short-term priming task. In two experiments, participants were asked to indicate whether or not a target word was the same as a previously presented cue. Data from an experiment measuring magnetoencephalography failed to find different patterns for “same” and “different” responses, consistent with the claim that both arise from a common neural source, with response magnitude defining the difference between immediate novelty versus familiarity. In a behavioral experiment, we tested and confirmed the predictions of a habituation account of these judgments by comparing conditions in which the target, the cue, or neither was primed by its presentation in the previous trial. As predicted, cue-primed trials had faster response times, and target-primed trials had slower response times relative to the neither-primed baseline. These results were obtained irrespective of response repetition and stimulus–response contingencies. The behavioral and brain activity data support the view that detection of change drives performance in these tasks and that the underlying mechanism is neuronal habituation.     

Sequential modulations of stimulus-response correspondence effects depend on awareness of response conflict

In two experiments, sequential modulations of prime—target correspondence effects were investigated in a metacontrast paradigm. Primes were either unmasked and thus consciously discriminable, or entirely masked and thus indiscriminable. Mirroring similar findings from Eriksen- and Simon-type tasks, the influence of prime—target correspondence was reduced in trials that followed a noncorresponding prime—target pair, which suggests that prime-induced response activation can be temporarily suppressed after an incompatible trial. This sequential modulation was independent of prime discriminability in the current trial, but it occurred only when the prime, and thus a conflict between the primeinduced and the deliberately to-be-selected response, was consciously experienced in the preceding trial. This suggests that the suppression of automatic response priming is not an immediate consequence of response conflict, but an intention-mediated strategy.     

The revelation effect for autobiographical memory: A mixture-model analysis

Participants provided information about their childhood by rating their confidence about whether they had experienced various events (e.g., “broke a window playing ball”). On some trials, participants unscrambled a key word from the event phrase (e.g., wdinwo—window) or an unrelated word (e.g., gnutge—nugget) before seeing the event and giving their confidence ratings. The act of unscrambling led participants to increase their confidence that the event occurred in their childhood, but only when the confidence rating immediately followed the act of unscrambling. This increase in confidence mirrors the “revelation effect” observed in word recognition experiments. In the present article, we analyzed our data using a new signal detection mixture distribution model that does not require the researcher to know the veracity of memory judgments a priori. Our analysis reveals that unscrambling a key word or an unrelated word affects response bias and discriminability in autobiographical memory tests in ways that are very similar to those that have been previously found for word recognition tasks.     

Choosing remedies after accidents: Counterfactual thoughts and the focus on fixing “human error”

The present research is motivated by an interest in why organizational decision makers so often respond to accidents with remedy plans that focus narrowly on correcting human error rather than more environment-focused plans or more encompassing plans. We investigated the role of counterfactual thinking in the decision-making tendency toward human-focused plans. Our experiments indicated that even in a domain where human-focused remedies were not otherwise appealing, many participants decided on human-focused remedies after they had generated an “if only” conjecture about the accident. This reflects that human actions are often selected as the focus of “if only” conjectures and, importantly, that this focus “locks in” and carries through to subsequent remedy decisions. Our hypothesis that remedy plans are produced from “if only” thoughts was supported over several alternative interpretations. We discuss implications for research on the relation between counterfactual thinking and adaptive learning.     

Persons,animals, and identity

The paper is concerned with how neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity should respond to the challenge of animalist accounts. Neo-Lockean accounts that hold that persons can change bodies via brain transplants or cerebrum transplants are committed to the prima facie counterintuitive denial that a person is an (biologically individuated) animal. This counterintuitiveness can be defused by holding that a person is biological animal (on neo-Lockean views) if the “is” is the “is” of constitution rather than the “is” of identity, and that a person is identical with an animal in a sense of “animal” different from that which requires the persistence conditions of animals to be biological. Another challenge is the “too many minds problem”: if persons and their coincident biological animals share the same physical properties, and mental properties supervene on physical properties, the biological animal will share the mental properties of the person, and so should itself be a person. The response to this invokes a distinction between “thin” properties, which are shared by coincident entities, and “thick” properties which are not so shared. Mental properties, and their physical realizers, are thick, not thin, so are not properties persons share with their bodies or biological animals. The paper rebuts the objection that neo-Lockean accounts cannot explain how persons can have physical properties. To meet a further problem it is argued that the biological properties of persons and those of biological animals are different because of differences in their causal profiles.     

W<Emphasis Type="SmallCaps">ang</Emphasis> Yangming’s 王陽明 Philosophy and Modern Theories of Democracy: A Reconstructive Interpretation

Liu Shipei 劉師培 (1884–1919) was the first scholar to locate intellectual resources of modern democracy in Wang Yangming’s theory of the “original knowing” (liangzhi 良知). In the 1950s there was a debate between Taiwanese liberals and the “New Confucians” over the relationship between the traditional Confucianism and modern democracy. Like Liu Shipei, the “New Confucians” justified modern democracy by means of Confucian philosophy (including that of Wang Yangming). For liberals, however, the Confucian tradition encompassed only the concept of “positive liberty,” which was irrelevant to or even incompatible with modern democracy. In this article, I try to argue for the position of the “New Confucians” by reconstructing Wang Yangming’s theory of the “original knowing” from a communitarian perspective.     

Dimensions and Latent Classes of Episodic Mania-Like Symptoms in Youth: An Empirical Enquiry

The dramatic increase in diagnostic rates of bipolar disorder in children and adolescents in the USA has led to an intense interest in the phenomenology of the disorder. Here we present data from a newly-developed instrument to assess episodic mania-like symptoms in youth in a large population-based sample (N = 5326) using parent- and self-report. We found that a substantial proportion of children screened positive for having episodes of “going high” and were at an increased risk for morbidity and impairment. Using factor analysis, we identified that episodic mania-like symptoms comprised two dimensions: An under-controlled dimension that was associated with significant impairment, and a low-risk exuberant dimension. Using latent class analysis, we identified a small group of children scoring high on a range of manic symptoms and suffering from severe psychosocial impairment and morbidity. Our results carry implications for the nosology and psychosocial impairment associated with episodic mood changes in young people.     

Unconsciously controlled processing: the Stroop effect reconsidered

The Stroop effect is widely considered to be compelling evidence that an acquired skill such as reading is “automatic” in the sense that lexical/semantic analyses of single words cannot be prevented, even when they are irrelevant and harmful to the task at hand. This view is challenged by a series of three experiments in which the presence/absence of a Stroop effect depends on (1) whether all of the target elements are colored or not, in conjunction with (2) whether the target and the spatially distinct color word distractor belong to the same domain or not. A framework is offered in which domain-specific encoding algorithms play a major role. Skilled word recognition is typically unconscious, but is characterized better as contextually controlled, rather than “automatic.”     

Stroop effects on redemption and semantic effects on confession: simultaneous automatic activation of embedded and carrier words

The present study was aimed at assessing whether focusing attention on a task-relevant part of a word prevents processing of its meaning. Participants performed a color-naming task on a prime word followed by lexical decision on a probe. Primes were words, which could contain an embedded color word (e.g., “redemption”) written in an incongruent color. Probes were either semantically related (e.g., “confession”) or unrelated (e.g., “production”) to the prime word. A Stroop effect emerged for color words appearing either in the initial or in the final position of the carrier word. A priming effect also emerged, with faster responses to probes semantically related to the prime. These results are evidence that focusing attention on part of a prime (i.e., the embedded color word) does not prevent the semantic processing of the entire word.     

Uniting the perspectival subject: Two approaches

Visual forms of episodic memory and anticipatory imagination involve images that, by virtue of their perspectival organization, imply a “notional subject” of experience. But they contain no inbuilt reference to the “actual subject,” the person actually doing the remembering or imagining. This poses the problem of what (if anything) connects these two perspectival subjects and what differentiates cases of genuine memory and anticipation from mere “imagined seeing.” I consider two approaches to this problem. The first, exemplified by Wollheim and Velleman, claims that genuinely reflexive memories and anticipations are phenomenally “unselfconscious,” with the co-identity of the notional and actual subjects secured by a determinate causal history. The second approach posits some distinctive phenomenal property that attaches to genuinely reflexive memories and anticipations and serves to experientially conflate the notional and actual subject. I consider a version of the second approach, derived from Kierkegaard’s discussions of phenomenal “contemporaneity,” and argue that this approach can better account for the possibility of affective alienation from the selves we were and will be: the way in which our sense of self and awareness of our causal history can sometimes come apart.     

Evolution and atheism: Has Griffin reconciled science and religion?

The distinguished theologian, David Ray Griffin, has advanced a set of thirteen theses intended to characterize (what he calls) “Neo-Darwinism” and which he contrasts with “Intelligent Design”. Griffin maintains that Neo-Darwinism is “atheistic” in forgoing a creator but suggests that, by adopting a more modest scientific naturalism and embracing a more naturalistic theology, it is possible to find “a third way” that reconciles religion and science. The considerations adduced here suggest that Griffin has promised more than he can deliver. On his account, God is in laws of nature; therefore, any influence He exerts is natural rather than supernatural. But if the differences God makes are not empirically detectable, then Griffin’s account is just as objectionable as a theory of supernatural intervention. And Griffin has not shown that evolution as distinct from his idiosyncratic sense of Neo-Darwinism is incompatible with theism.     

Influence of bias on visuospatial and verbal compatibility effects in mixed-mapping environments

The advantage for the compatible mapping of physical locations or arrows to keypresses is reduced when trials with compatible and incompatible mappings are mixed, whereas the advantage is increased for location words. We evaluated explanations of these mixing effects by varying the proportions of compatible and incompatible trials for groups performing with each stimulus mode. The mappings were compatible on 75%, 50%, and 25% of the trials, respectively, for compatibly biased, unbiased, and incompatibly biased conditions. For locations and arrows, compatible bias increased the SRC effect, and incompatible bias reduced the effect; for location words, the incompatible bias was stronger than the compatible one. Reaction time distributions showed that, with locations and arrows, initial activation toward either the compatible (unbiased condition) or the predominant (biased conditions) response was transient. With words, activation of the corresponding response increased across the distribution, regardless of bias condition. The influence of bias on the SRC effects was relatively independent of the mixing and sequential effects, and was different for words than for nonwords. These results are consistent with the view that visuospatial stimuli produce transient activation of the corresponding or predominant response, whereas location words produce phonological activation, required for word identification, that persists.     

What is it like to be nonconscious? A defense of Julian Jaynes

I respond to Ned Block’s claim that it is “ridiculous” to suppose that consciousness is a cultural construction based on language and learned in childhood. Block is wrong to dismiss social constructivist theories of consciousness on account of it being “ludicrous” that conscious experience is anything but a biological feature of our animal heritage, characterized by sensory experience, evolved over millions of years. By defending social constructivism in terms of both Julian Jaynes’ behaviorism and J.J. Gibson’s ecological psychology, I draw a distinction between the experience or “what-it-is-like” of nonhuman animals engaging with the environment and the “secret theater of speechless monologue” that is familiar to a linguistically competent human adult. This distinction grounds the argument that consciousness proper should be seen as learned rather than innate and shared with nonhuman animals. Upon establishing this claim, I defend the Jaynesian definition of consciousness as a social–linguistic construct learned in childhood, structured in terms of lexical metaphors and narrative practice. Finally, I employ the Jaynesian distinction between cognition and consciousness to bridge the explanatory gap and deflate the supposed “hard” problem of consciousness.